II. Damage and System of Administration under Atomic Bombing
1. Damage of Hiroshima City Hall
At the night of August 5, since the warning was issued, air defense officers and Bokushouku Genchitai were working as usual but went home at 3am or early in the morning. Some of them continued to work the next day (Shiyakusho Genbakushi (Chronicle of A-bomb Damage to Hiroshima City Hall) p33). As city employees working at night were allowed to take a break till noon, on August 8, relatively few male officers worked at the office, while most of the female officers were working. When they were about to start to work after a morning meeting in a court, the a-bomb was dropped. (Shiyakusho Genbakushi (Ibid. pp34-36). The city hall was 1.2 km away from the hypocenter.
“Suddenly, a blinding flash came out. Right after that, trembling sounds roared as if the sounds would destroy the city hall” (Ibid. pp36-37). Windows were broken, and people and things were blown away by the blasts, rendering the city hall an absolute hell. There were people killed on the spot; others were severely wounded or recovering consciousness. Some people who were in the basement and near the wall escaped with minor injuries. Survivors tried to escape by helping each other. After a moment, fire occurred and gradually surrounded the city hall and the area around it. Many people evacuated to the pond in the public hall.
Because buildings near the city hall had been removed due to the building evacuation policy, it was predicted that the city hall would not catch fire from other buildings. However, the hot blast of the fire engulfed the city offices, destroying most of them. Along with the Defense Policy Division, the Director of Defense Policy Division Office, and a boiler room in the southeast corner of the basement, the Health Affairs Division and Relief Division located on the first floor escaped complete destruction because of desperate fire extinguishing conducted by city employees. Around 3pm, when the fire had been put out, those who could walk evacuated.
Officers were injured at their office, on their way to work and in their homes. Senkichi Awaya was buried and died under a collapsed building at the Kakomachi City office. His burned body was found on the 7th. According to the 1946 City Guide, there were 1,445 officers as of August 1, 1945 and 271 out of them were killed. Shigeteru Shibata, the deputy mayor at the time of the bombing, recalled 10 years after the incident, “During the war, a total of 1,200 officers worked at the City Hall; nearly 900 officers at the main building and about 170 were in the Water Supply Division in Motomachi. Among those officers, 377 people in the main building died instantly or were missing, 83 of Water Supply Division died or were missing, reaching a total of 460. There were no officers who escaped without injuries. It was a completely terrifying state.” (Shigeteru Shibata, p23). According to the statistics confirmed by the end of February 1966, the total number of officers exposed to radiation at work was 1,068 (including 42 city council members). 455 among them were killed, 424 survived and 199 were missing. The breakdown of the deceased was 184 unknown date of the death, 45 killed instantly, 106 died within one month of the bombing, 12 died within one year and 98 passed away after one year. (Shiyakusho Genbakushi (Hiroshima City Hall Journal) pp246-249)
2. Damage of Prefectural Office
Hiroshima Prefectural Office, located 900m from the hypocenter, was completely destroyed. It was said approximately 700 officers were working at the time of the bombing, and many of them died instantly or were buried under the building and died in the fire. Evacuated offices and branches near the hypocenter were almost completely destroyed. Many were exposed to the radiation on their way to work or at their homes. The casualty numbers confirmed as of August 10 were, out of 1,107, 254 were in good health, 267 were injured, 57 died and 529 were missing. (Sensai Kiroku (Record of War Damage), p116). Mayor Takano wrote in a letter on September 7, “This area is in a truly terrible state as a result of the atomic bombing. Already 606 prefectural employees have died, and there will be a considerable number of deaths. Most of those who survived were away on business trips” (a letter of Genshin Takano). Hiroshima Kenchou Genbaku Hisaishi (Hiroshima Prefecture Journal of A-bomb Damage) published in 1976, recorded casualties among Hiroshima Prefectural employees. The death toll at the building was 607, that of branch officers was 524, with a total of 1,131. (This death toll was the total number of Hiroshima prefectural employees who had died by January 31, 1976). (Kenchou Genbakuhisaishi (Chronicle of A-bomb Damage to the Prefectural Office), pp92-93, pp323-386)
3. Administrative System: Reconstruction from Destruction
All buildings projected to be the sites for transferring the prefectural office (City Hall, Honkawa National School, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Aki Women’s High School, Fukuya department store) were burned out or collapsed. It was nine hours after the bombing when the police department director (instead of the mayor, who was away on a business trip) set up a headquarters of the Municipal Air Defense Department at Tamoin Temple in Hijiyama.
Despite being injured when his left leg was buried under a collapsed building at a governmental office in Yanagimachi, Police Department Director Ishihara escaped and headed to Sokan-fu and the City Hall after engaging in relief activities. Both the Sokan-fu and the City Hall were burned out, so he headed to Tamonin Temple, which was designated as a gathering place in case of emergency. There, at around 5 pm, together with an injured police officer, he set up a sign reading “Headquarters of Hiroshima Prefectural Air Defense.” Mayor Takano, who was in the Bigo area (Fuchumachi, Ashina District) arrived at Tamoin Temple around 6:30pm3. By 8:30 pm, 60 officers, most of them police officers, had gathered at the temple.
The next morning, the Municipal Air Defense Department (tentative prefectural office) was moved to the Hiroshima Higashi Police Station in Shimoyanagimachi. The Higashi Police Station had been transferred to the fire-resistant building of Geiyo Bank prior to the atomic bomb and it escaped from the fire due to fire-fighting efforts.
At the time of the atomic bombing, an executive meeting was being conducted at the city governor’s office. Treasurer Kurose, educational department director Saito and director of the Wartime Life Policy Department Taniyama attended the meeting and all were injured. Most of the executives and city employees, who were on the defense duties in reaction to an air raid warning issued the previous day, were wounded at home. Despite being injured at home, Distribution Division Chief Shinzo Hamai went to the city hall right after the bombing. He met treasurer Kurose, covered in blood, in front of the headquarters of Hiroshima Railway, across from the Miyukibashi bridge, and heard about the situation at city hall. After that, Senior Examiner Nakahara (exposed to radiation in Niho) appeared, followed by Deputy Mayor Morishita. (Shinzo Hamai, pp3-8) Deputy Mayor Morishita passed out for a moment because he had been buried under the building in which he stayed in Sendamachi, then escaped to the Minami branch (in Minami-machi) in pajamas and ran into Distribution Division Chief Hamai and others. After discussing the countermeasures among the four of them, they went to city hall together with Senior Examiner Nakahara around 2pm. Then Morishita took command in lieu of the city mayor4. On the evening of the 6th, they managed to contact the Municipal Air Defense Department at Tamonin Temple5. On the morning of the 7th, Deputy Major Shibata appeared together with a secretary and his son. Shibata had been exposed to radiation at home in Nakahiro and buried under a collapsed building. Though he was unable to walk due to the injury, he reached Honkawa National School, carried by his son on his back. He returned because of a severe fire and then came to the office the day after that. (Shibata, pp17-18) Although there were a few employees, they stayed at the office to restore administrative functions6.
Chugoku District Sokan-fu, the top of the commanding operation in the Chugoku district, was also completely destroyed. Head Director Otsuka died in the fire under a collapsed building at an official residence in Kaminagarekawa. Deputy Director Hattori was exposed to radiation and injured in an office in Hiroshima Bunrika University, but escaped to the headquarters of the Second General Army located in an air-raid shelter in Futabayama and asked the army to bring the situation under control. After that, Hattori headed to Tamonin Temple and ordered that the prefectural governor cope with the situation because Sokan-fu had lost its function. (Chugoku Chiho Sokan-fu Shi (Chronicle of Chugoku), pp29-30)
The Chugoku District Commanding Office of the 59th Army, located in Motomachi, was in a devastated state and Commanding Officer Youji Fujii had been killed. Surviving Chief of Staff Shuitsu Matsumura dispatched Lieutenant Yamamoto to the 230th Division stationed in Haramura, Kamo District. Lieutenant Yamamoto arrived at the 230 Division at 4pm and relayed his orders. The advance unit left Haramura at 8pm, followed by a major unit commanded by the Chief of Infantry leaving at 10pm. They were transferred in cargo transports (Fukuhei Ando). First Lieutenant Yoshiharu Dobashi, who was in the advanced unit, wrote in his note, “We marched to Happonmatsu Station and then got on a train in the dark at 8pm. The train moved slowly and finally arrived at Kouyou Station (?) in suburban Hiroshima City. From there, we marched into Hiroshima City. It was already dawn on the 7th. The devastated state of the city in the break of dawn was beyond imagination.” (Hiroshima Genbaku Sensaishi Dai 1 kan (Chronicle of A-bomb on Hiroshima vol.1) p430)
4. Recovery Operation Conducted by Army
Amid the situation where both army and administrative bodies were partially destroyed, the Army’s Shipping Command located in Ujina, far from the hypocenter, escaped serious damage. Commander Bunro Saeki described the situation after the bombing.
Right after the atomic bombing, the state of the explosion was completely unknown. Numerous clouds piled and remained in the sky above the city. It was a horrible situation.
I tried to contact the General Army, Commanding Office of Chugoku District, Prefectural Office and City Hall, but could not reach them. Although the situation was unclear, it was confirmed that a fire had occurred in Hiroshima City.
After a while, burned patients descended on the Shipping Command. We brought them to the Gaisenkan building and all naval doctors provided first-aid treatment.
Considering “there is no time to waste,” the Commander issued the first order at 8:50. (Senpakushiribu Sakumei Tsuzuri (a file of operation orders by the Shipping Command))
The First Operation Orders
Issued at 8:50, August 6, Ujina
1. After a bombing by enemy aircraft at 8:15 a.m. today, August 6, fires have broken out in many areas. Coupled with the blast, there appears to be extensive damage.
2. I intend to contribute to firefighting and rescue operations in Hiroshima.
3. Captain of the maritime guard unit is ordered to send firefighting vessels to areas along the Kyobashi River to perform firefighting duties.
4. The captain of the Hiroshima shipping unit should use some of their boats to transport victims to Ninoshima Island and perform rescue operations by sailing up the Kyobashi River.
5. The director of the field shipping station should dispatch rescue units to operate rescue activities in the Kyobashi River. In addition, he should allocate part of the rescue units for firefighting in the city.
6. The Chief of the Marine Training Division should prepare rescue units near the Chuobashi bridge and also dispatch the special communication reserve squadron.
7. The Chief of the Marine Education Division should dispatch part of the division to provide rescue activities for the special communications reserve squadron in Sendamachi and also prepare for firefighting using major units.
8. The Commander of Army Marine Artillery Corps should immediately dispatch part of the corps to help the special communication reserve squadron.
9. The Inokuchi Unit and Kounoura Unit should stand ready.
10. I am at the Army Marine Headquarters in Ujina.
Thus, the rescue activities such as firefighting, rescue and transportation of patients started to operate based on the decision by the Army’s Shipping Commander.
Close to evening, based on the order by the General Army, the Army’s Shipping Commander was gien command of units in Hiroshima and units arriving in Hiroshima, as well as Sokan-fu, prefectural government and the city and responsible for defense (Bunro Saeki). Due to a request from Deputy Director Hattori, the Second General Army decided to operate rescue activities in a situation where the administrative system was destroyed and entrusted the activities to the Army’s Shipping Commander. Receiving the order from the General Army, the 18th Operating Orders (a photo appears on the previous page) was issued at 4.40pm (Senpakushiribu Sakumei Tsuzuri (a file of operation orders by the Shipping Command). The commander wrote in the order “I was appointed to be in charge of defense of the Hiroshima area” and divided the city into three defense areas, east, middle and west, and then assigned the Chief of Marine Training Division, Commander of Army Marine Artillery Corps and Commander of Marine Education Division to each area7. At 10am, August 7, at the headquarters of the General Army, a meeting was conducted for directors of governmental institutions, the army and the navy stationed in Hiroshima. It was agreed to operate first-aid measures based on instructions by the General Army (Sensai Kiroku (Chronicle of War-Damage) p100). Reflecting the agreement, under the name of Bunro Saeki, the Army’s Shipping Commander responsible for defense of Hiroshima, “Hiroshima Defense Orders” were issued as the first order at 2pm. (Ibid. p102)
I was appointed to conduct defense operations in Hiroshima and take command of units stationed in Hiroshima and near the city for the immediate recovery of the city. Regarding the defense operations toward recovery, Chugoku District Sokan, Hiroshima Prefectural Governor and Mayor of Hiroshima were divided for administrative purposes.
Regarding the defense operation for recovery, administrative organizations were under the control of the army. It was de facto military administration based on the unanimous agreement among military officers stationed in Hiroshima, and recovering operations were conducted by the army. In order to solidify the cooperation among military, governmental and private institutions, various meetings were held one after another after the meeting for directors of governmental institutes, army and navy stationed in Hiroshima conducted from 10am on the 7th. The following list of meetings related to Hiroshima Prefecture appeared in Sensai Kiroku (Record of War Damage).
|7th||Meeting for directors of governmental institutes, army and navy stationed in Hiroshima/Directors’ meeting (at headquarters of Hiroshima Prefecture)/Discussion among Manager of Economic Department, Chief of Agriculture Division and Officers in local branches/ Meeting on Rescue Measures (at Headquarters of Army’s Shipping Command)|
|8th||Meeting hosted by Army Shipping Command (at City Hall, cancelled)/Meeting for marine officers concerning sanitary and rescue hosted by Hiroshima Prefecture/Six officers visiting Hiroshima from the Air Defense Department and had a talk with prefectural governor after communicating with Sokan-fu and General Army (at Prefectural Office)/ Talk between Army’s Shipping Command and Prefectural Governor/ Liaison conference of General Army (at Hijiyama Shrine)/Marshal Hata talked with the Police Department Manager (at Prefectural Office)/Chief of Chugoku regional Munitions Command talked with Police Department Manager (at Prefectural Office)/Conference on rescue operation (at Air Defense Department = Prefectural Office)|
|9th||Meeting hosted by General Army (at City Hall)/ Liaison conference of Army’s Shipping Command (at City Hall)|
|10th||Okayama Prefectural Governor, Domestic Affairs Manager of Yamaguchi Prefecture and Director of Ministry of Interior’s Air Defense General Headquarter visited Hiroshima/Hiroshima Prefectural Governor visited Army’s Shipping Commander, Directors of Railway Bureau, Communications Bureau, Western Communication Bureau and Head of Nishi Police Station/ Meetings among defense unit, police department, volunteer guards and neighborhood association in the area under jurisdiction of Ujina Police Station/ Liaison conference of Army’s Shipping Command (at City Hall)|
|11th||Meeting for measures against disaster (at Prefectural Office)/Defense meeting (at Headquarters of Army’s Shipping Command)|
|12th||Prefectural Governor observed the status of relief aid and then provided directions to the chief of Sanitary Division/Chief meeting of measurement against disaster (at headquarters = Prefectural Office)/Liaison conference of General Army|
|13th||Prefectural Governor provided direction to related chiefs after observing the relief aid situation/Committee on War Damage Measurement (at Prefectural Office, cancelling defense meeting at headquarters of combat command)|
|14th||Prefectural Governor provided direction to Chief of Sanitary Division after observation|
|15th||Manager meeting (at Prefectural Office)/Liaison conference hosted by local commands and division meeting (at City Hall)/ Instruction by Prefectural Governor, assembling of prefectural employees (at Prefectural Office)|
|17th||Prefectural Governor visited Kure Naval District, Kure City Hall and Kure Police Station/The Chief Staff of the Second General Army visited Prefectural Governor/Meeting concerning prefectural office transfer (at Toyokougyo)|
|18th||Prefectural Governor visited Headquarters of Military District/Manager and chief meeting/Meeting for Mayor and Head of local branches/City planning meeting|
|19th||Manager and chief meeting/Director of the Red Cross Hospital visited Prefectural Governor|
|20th||Prefectural Governor provided instructions on transfer of Prefectural Office (to the Toyokogyo building)/Liaison meeting of directors of governmental officers (at Sukan-fu)|
|21st||Prefectural Governor visited the Second General Army/Deputy Director Hattori visited Prefectural Governor/Chairperon of Hiroshima City Council visited Prefectural Governor|
Administrative institutes were responsible for recovery operations. When the army supported them the headquarters of the Military District and the Local District took initiatives. However, since the army units and governmental institutes were completely destroyed, there was no choice but for the Shipping Command to take the lead. However, such operation was a “tentative measure” and immediate recovery was the goal.
At the liaison meeting on August 8, the army stated “we will make efforts to understand the current situation and try to feel people secured” and “also make efforts to restore people’s lives by dealing with major problems” and that such rescue operations would last “for 20 days to one month. Then, return to normal operation at Sokan-fu and Prefectural office accordingly.” On the other hand, the Prefectural Governor indicated that the prefecture would work together with institutes such as Kure City, local branches of the prefecture, infrastructure offices and others because only a few dozen city employees could work. (Ibid. p105)
In the relief plan for Hiroshima on August 10, “Patients accommodated by the Defense Commander of Hiroshima will be moved to military district offices and private institutions” (Ibid.p118). At a defense meeting held at the Army’s Shipping Command on August 11th, the army stated that “Persistent technical and labor support from the army would be difficult to continue. Prefecture and City should consider this” (Ibid.p123).
In addition, the Defense Order of the Hiroshima area (the 23rd Operational Order) stated that the headquarters of combat command would be removed and returned to the Army’s Shipping Command. The order requested to set up a contact office and delegate a director from the Headquarters of Hiroshima District (Ibid. p127). This was a preparation for returning to the original operation system where the Headquarters of Hiroshima District was under the jurisdiction of the Chugoku Military District.
In a such process, relief operations immediately after the atomic bombing were formed. Then, on August 15, the responsibility of defense operations in the Hiroshima area was transferred to the chief of Chugoku Military District. However, the chief of the Chugoku Military District should “regarding the relief operation, divide the governmental and private institutions for administrative purposes” (The Second General Army Operational Orders). Military operations returned to normal but still control by the army continued8.
Such first-aid relief operations by the army brought significant results in the short term. “Daily meetings were conducted to discuss the priority of relief operations and other measures. The relief operation has been conducted consistently under organized control among all institutions” (detailed report on relief operation against bombing on Hiroshima on August 6). Also, Saeki, the Commander of the Army Shipping Command, wrote in a report to a chamberlain dispatched by Emperor Showa on September 3, “Under the control by the director of the Second General Army, army, governmental and private institutions made efforts for the relief operation together and completed rescue duties in the short term. I am very pleased with it” (Juuji Gosaken Roku (Record of Chamberlain dispatched by Emperor).
5. Support System
Despite the unpredicted attack, support from inside and outside of the prefecture was received. Support from outside of the prefecture, in particular, was made based predetermined plans. Through Kaibe and Kaita Police Stations, the Director of the Police Department directed police stations in the prefecture to provide support for food, police officers, civil defense volunteers and rescue members based on predetermined plans.
As a result, by 3pm on the 6th, when the a-bomb was dropped, 120,000 servings of dried biscuits were distributed and rescue units arrived at Tamonin Temple to set up a relief station. On the following day, the 7th, 190 police officers and 2,159 civil defense volunteers operated in Hiroshima and 300 rescuers came to Hiroshima from the areas under the jurisdiction of police stations. A total of 20,000 defense volunteers were dispatched. Dispatch of rescue units consisting of doctors and nurses to Hiroshima continued until October 5, when The Wartime Damage Protection Law expired. The total of rescuers from within Hiroshima Prefecture who were engaged in the rescue operation was 2,557, with a cumulative total of 21,145. Rescuers from outside of the prefecture totaled 715, with a cumulative total of 5,397. In addition, teachers and students of women’s high schools were dispatched.
Since most of the city employees were injured, City Hall’s function was on the verge of crisis and asked for support from Kure City Hall and Prefectural Office. A prefectural governor’s report on the 21st described, “Among 1,200 city employees who are expected to play a major role in rescue operations, a considerable number of them died or were injured, resulting in only 80 employees attending. Hence, city hall did not operate. Officers from the prefectural office, army and other institutes were engaged in operations.” (Ibid.)
Regarding the prefectural office, local branches were located in several areas in the prefecture, and they could dispatch employees to make up for shortages of officers due to injuries and deaths. On the 9th, a list of where prefectural employees, related organization officers and officers from local branches were from was established. At the same time, investigation of the deceased, people in good health and the injured was started. A boarding house for prefecture employees and their families was used as the Itsukaichi Sanpo Dojo institute to support the investigation. On the 10th, Higashi Police Station was allocated for executives of the prefectural government and police department officers, and the Sanshi Shinyou Kumiai building was allocated for prefectural employees and local branch officers to stay overnight (Sensai Kiroku (Chronicle of War-Damage) pp111-114).
The prefecture also asked the government for transfer and recruit officers. On August 13th, the Prefectural Governor wrote to vice-ministers of each ministry requesting that “Any officers such as higher or junior officials, please arrange the transfer to our prefecture. If possible, officers from this prefecture or who have experience working in this prefecture are more desirable.” For reference, he named a total of 25 managers and chiefs who were killed or injured (Ibid. pp129-130).
Regarding the army, it was not predicted that the Army’s Shipping Command would play a major role in the rescue operation, but they built on their past experience of supporting the prefectural police department with preparation for air raids. Not only units stationed in Ujina, but also other marine units stationed outside of Hiroshima were dispatched to the city based on the order from the Commander of Army Shipping Command. It is said that the total of dispatched officers reached 4,000. At 11:20 am, Kure Naval District also ordered the preparation for rescue units to deploy, having received a report from officers returned from Hiroshima. Including 160 of the 321st infantry units, which arrived in Hiroshima in the early morning of the 7th, other units under the jurisdiction of the Second General Army were dispatched. At the Eba and Hesaka Branches of the First Army Hospital, rescue operations were conducted soon after the atomic bombing. As such, rescue operations were conducted by institutions related to the Army Hospital.
In the Ujina district, which escaped serious damage, a meeting for army, governmental and private organizations was held on the 10th. The Office for Restoring the Ujina Defense District was established to autonomously promote reconstruction with support from the defense unit (Akatsuki Butai) by utilizing governmental and private institutions. The director of Ujina Police Station served as the chairperson of the office and members consisted of probationary officers of the Army Shipping Command, non-commissioned officers of a branch of the Ujina Military Police, the Chair of the Neighboring Committee of Ujina, the Head of the Ujina Civil Defense Volunteers and the Chair of the Neighboring Committee of Western Minami-machi. They worked to ensure the security of citizens and promptly handle daily necessities. Regarding regulating traffic, although the army took responsibility for major railroads, governmental and private institutions promptly performed the recovery operations by delegating areas of responsibility (Ibid. p124-125).
3 According to Jitsuo Kitagawa, the prefectural governor investigated the Kitagawa Tekkojo company in Fuchucho, Ajina District on the previous day. Then, he visited the company again at 8 am on the day after that, when he received a call from Hiroshima. Kitagawa drove him to a police station in Fukuyama by company car. (Sengo Gojunen Hiroshima Kensei no Ayumi (50-year History of post-war Hiroshima Prefectural Government) pp 281-282). Then, the governor stopped by Saijo Police Station and Kamo District Office to hear the situation and requested help with relief activities. After that, he returned to Hiroshima (Kenchou Genbakuhisaishi (Chronice of A-bomb Damage to the Prefectural Office) pp286-287).
4 Hamai, Chief of Supply Division: in order to arrange food distribution to a-bomb victims, he picked up a truck from an armor training institute in Ujina after having a discussion with the directors in front of the headquarters of Hiroshima Railway. He drove to a warehouse in Fuchusho, Aki District and drove a truck full of dried biscuits to Red Cross Hospital together with another truck from Kure (Shinzo Hamai pp9-11).
5 Chief of Supply Division Hamai headed to the Tamonin temple to contact Hiroshima Prefecture (Shinzo Hamai, pp14-15).
6 Deputy Mayor Shibata recalled that he arrived at the city office one day after the bombing: “I was embarrassed that I had spent a day off with minor injuries” and described the struggling officers “those who made efforts to complete their duties, not caring much about their families, were strongly tied together with something noble, beautiful and pure, something that I could not describe with regular words” (Shigeteru Shibata, pp18-19). An officer who went to work six days after the bombing despite having difficulty walking was “scolded by Shibata.” Shibata demanded, “How could you be absent from minor injuries?” The officer replied, “I hit my legs and back hard. I managed to come to the office today although I have severe pain.” Shibata replied, “We do not have enough people. Please work hard” (Genbaku Taikenki (Record of A-bomb Experience) p79).
7 The navy was responsible for defense of the northern part of Hiroshima City. On August 11 after the withdrawal of the navy, the Northern District Defense Unit was established. Major General Fujii (commander of the Hiroshima District Command) was appointed as the head. (Sensai Kiroku (Chronicle of War-Damage) p123)
8 It was unclear how long administration by the army continued. On August 15, the liaison meeting hosted by the headquarters of the local district was conducted. After that, communication between the prefectural governor and the directors of the army was held. On August 20, a meeting for the directors of governmental institutes was conducted at a Sokan-fu. As there were no records of meeting hosted by the army, it is predicted that the administration by the army ended either August 16, at the earliest, or 20, when the meeting for directors of the governmental institutes was held to return administration to normal. Incidentally, Deputy Mayor Shibata described the administration by the army: “Soon after the announcement of unconditional surrender was reported on August 15, nobody came to regular meetings. After a discussion at the Prefectural Office, we decided to hold meetings under the name of prefectural governor. Then, finally, regular participants took part.” Shibata recalled the army withdrew as the war ended (Shigeteru Shibata, p22). Kiyoshi Okazaki, the Chief of Staff of the Second General Army remembered, “The General Army proclaimed martial law which continued after the end of the war,” mentioning that the administration by the army (Shibata described it as “martial law”) lasted after the end of the war.