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Hiroshima for Global Peace


A) Reduction of nuclear weapons


Russia and the United States continue to undertake reductions of their strategic nuclear weapons under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Since the entry into force of the Treaty in February 2011, neither side has alleged non-compliance.

The status of their strategic (nuclear) delivery vehicles and warheads under the New START has been periodically updated in the U.S. State Department homepage (see Table 1-4 below). The United States also declared the number of each type of its strategic delivery vehicles (see Table 1-5). According to the date as of September 2015, the number of U.S. deployed strategy warheads fell below the upper limit stipulated in the New START for the first time. Furthermore, the data as of September 2017 revealed that the number of U.S. deployed strategic delivery vehicles and deployed/non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles/launchers, besides deployed strategic warheads, also fell below the limit. On the other hand, according to the data as of September 2017, the number of Russia’s deployed strategic warheads has decreased to a level slightly exceeding the upper limit under the New START.

Since the treaty’s entry into force, Russia and the United States have implemented the on-site inspections stipulated in it.42 Neither side has asserted any non-compliance.

U.S. President Donald Trump, inaugurated in January 2017, has been critical of the New START. It was reported that in his first telephone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin in February, President Trump denounced the treaty that caps their deployment of nuclear warheads as a bad deal for the United States.43 Reacting negatively to Putin’s suggestion that the two countries begin work to extend the treaty, Trump said that the New START “[is] a one-sided deal […and] another bad deal that the country made… We’re going to start making good deals.”44 On the other hand, at his confirmation hearing on January 11, 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson started that it was important for the United States to “stay engaged with Russia, hold them accountable to commitments made under the New START and also ensure our accountability as well.”45 By the end of 2017, the U.S. government had not appeared to be seriously contemplating a withdrawal from the treaty. According to Russian media, extending the treaty was discussed at a September 2017 meeting of the biannual Bilateral Consultation Committee (BCC) established under the New START to discuss implementation matters.46 American media did not report any such discussion. Russia and the U.S. also exchanged views on wide range of issues regarding strategic stability at the Strategic Stability Talks launched in October 2017.47


After the conclusion of the New START in 2010, there has been little meaningful progress on U.S.-Russian mutual nuclear reductions, particularly regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia has repeatedly called on the United States and other NATO member states, as a first step, to repatriate all U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons stored in Europe.

There is little prospect of resolving the allegations of Russian non-compliance with the Intermediaterange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which the United States officially brought up in July 2014. According to the report, titled “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”, issued by the U.S. Department of State in July 2017, “[t]he United States has determined that in 2016, the Russian Federation… continued to be in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles,” and pointed out the INF Treaty’s provisions related to the allegations of Russia’s non-compliance.48

In this report, the United States revealed that it “requested to convene a session of the INF Treaty’s implementation body, the Special Verification Commission (SVC)” in 2016 (for the first time since October 2003), and raised the issue of Russia’s violation at the SVC session in November 2016.49 The United States reported to have “provided detailed information to the Russian Federation over the course of these bilateral and multilateral engagements, more than enough information for the Russian side to identify the missile in question and engage substantively on the issue of its obligations under the INF Treaty,” as follows:50

  • Information pertaining to the missile and the launcher, including Russia’s internal designator for the mobile launcher chassis and the names of the companies involved in developing and producing the missile and launcher;
  • Information on the violating GLCM’s test history, including coordinates of the tests and Russia’s attempts to obfuscate the nature of the program;
  • The violating GLCM has a range capability between 500 and 5,500 kilometers; and
  • The violating GLCM is distinct from the R-500/SSC-7 GLCM or the RS-26 ICBM.

According to a news article in February 2017, Russia has two battalions of SCC-8 GLCMs (each battalion equipped with four launchers): one is located at Russia’s missile test site at Kapustin Yar in southern Russia near Volgograd; and the other was shifted in December 2016 from that test site to an operational base elsewhere in the country.51

For its part, Russia dismissed the U.S. claims and asserted that it is the United States that has violated the INF Treaty, claiming that:

  • U.S. tests of target-missiles for missile defense have similar characteristics to intermediaterange missiles;
  • U.S. production of armed drones falls within the definition of ground-launched cruise missiles in the Treaty; and
  • The Mk-41 launch system, which the United States intends to deploy in Poland and Romania in accordance with the European Phased Adaptive Approach of the BMD, can also launch intermediate-range cruise missiles.

The United States denies the Russian argument about U.S. violation of the INF Treaty. However, as a countermeasure to Russia’s alleged violation, in November 2017, the U.S. Congress passed legislation requiring the Department of Defense to establish a program to begin development of a conventional, road-mobile GLC Mand authorized $58 million for this research, which is not prohibited by the treaty.52 In addition, the U.S. State Department announced in December 2017 that while “the United States continues to seek a diplomatic resolution through all viable channels, including the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission (SVC)…the U.S. Department of Defense is commencing INF Treaty-compliant research and development (R&D) by reviewing military concepts and options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems.” At the same time, the United States clarified that it “is prepared to immediately cease this R&D if the Russian Federation returns to full and verifiable compliance with the Treaty.”53

Meanwhile, the possibility of Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty has been a concern, since Russia has not concealed a complaint about the situation where only Russia (as well as the United States) is prohibited from possessing a certain class of missiles under the treaty, while its neighbors, including China, possess them without any restrictions. However, Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, denied Russia would withdraw.54


Among nuclear-armed states other than Russia and the United States, France and the United Kingdom have reduced their nuclear weapons unilaterally. The United Kingdom, which previously announced plans to reduce its nuclear forces to no more than 120 operationally available warheads and a total stockpile of no more than 180 warheads by the mid 2020s, declared in January 2015 that it had completed the reduction of the number of deployed warheads on each of its Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) from 48 to 40 as committed to in 2010, and the total number of operationally available warheads has therefore been reduced to 120.55

Among the five NWS, China has neither declared any concrete information on the number of deployed or possessed nuclear weapons, nor any plan for their reduction, while reiterating that it keeps its nuclear arsenal at the minimum level required for its national security.56 Although it is widely estimated that China has not dramatically increased its nuclear arsenal numerically, it is not considered to have commenced action to reduce its nuclear weapons; rather China is likely to continue actively bolstering its nuclear arsenal qualitatively.

As for India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, there is no information, statement or analysis which suggests any reduction of their nuclear weapons or capabilities. To the contrary, as noted below, they are expanding their nuclear programs.

B) A concrete plan for further reduction of nuclear weapons

In 2017, there were no new proposals by nucleararmed states to take new, concrete measures for further reductions of their nuclear arsenals. The new U.S. administration indicated it would not conclude a concrete policy on nuclear weapons reduction until its nuclear posture review is completed. In the meantime, Russia and the United States have made no move toward further reductions of their strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals. Russia has insisted that the rest of the nuclear-armed states should participate in any future nuclear weapons reductions

However, China, France and the United Kingdom have not changed their positions that further significant reduction of Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals is needed, so as to commence a multilateral process of nuclear weapons reductions. For instance, China argued that “[c]ountries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the lead in substantially reducing those arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner, thus creating the conditions necessary for the ultimate goal of general and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. When conditions are ripe, other nuclear-weapon States should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.”57 However, it has not mentioned the extent of reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, by which China would then participate in a process of multilateral nuclear weapons reduction. Regarding this point, France clearly stated in February 2015: “If the level of the other arsenals, particularly those of Russia and the United States, were to fall one day to a few hundred weapons, France would respond accordingly, as it always has.”58

Nuclear-armed states have not presented concrete plans for nuclear weapons reduction. On the contrary, they have undertaken to modernize and/or strengthen their nuclear arsenals in the unstable international and regional security situation, as mentioned later. The United States implicitly criticized such actions of others, noting that: “[T]wo NPT nuclear weapon states are now expanding their nuclear arsenals and developing new kinds of capabilities, some of them potentially quite destabilizing. Both have also contributed to rising regional tensions.”59

C) Trends on strengthening/ modernizing nuclear weapons capabilities

While nuclear-armed states have reiterated their commitments to promoting nuclear disarmament, they continue to modernize and/or strengthen their nuclear weapons capabilities.


It is believed that China is actively modernizing its nuclear forces, details or numbers of which have never been declassified.

In its Annual Report on the Chinese Military in 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that China is estimated to possess approximately 75-100 ICBMs—DF-5A, DF-5B (MIRVed), DF-31/31A and DF-4. In the maritime, China has four operational JIN-class SSBN (Type 094) armed with JL-2 SLBMs pland a next generation Type 096 SSBN armed with a follow on JL-3 SLBM will likely begin construction in the early-2020s.60 The United States also estimates that “China maintains nuclear-capable delivery systems in its missile forces and navy and is developing a strategic bomber that officials expect to have a nuclear mission.”61

In January 2017, it was reported that China had deployed MIRVed ICBM DF-41, capable of carrying 10-12 nuclear warheads.62 China reportedly conducted a flight test of the MIRV’d ICBM DF-5C in the same month,63 although China did not confirm it was MIRVed.64


In 2017 no significant movement was reported regarding nuclear modernization by France. It introduced new M-51 SLBMs in 2010, with an estimated range of 8,000 km. They were loaded in the fourth Le Triomphant-class SSBN. The previous three Le Triomphant-class SSBNs remain equippedwith M-45 SLBMs that have a range of 6,000km. France plans to replace those M-45s with M-51s by 2017-2018.65

In a speech on nuclear policies in February 2015, President François Hollande announced France would replace the last remaining Mirage 2000N fighters with Rafales, carrying the ASMPA (improved air-to-ground medium-range missile system), by 2018. He said he had instructed the Atomic Energy Commission to prepare the necessary adaptations of its nuclear warheads ahead of the end of their operational life, without nuclear testing; and he underlined France’s commitment not to produce new types of nuclear weapon. He also declassified in this speech that the French nuclear deterrent consists of 54 middle-range ALCMs and three sets of 16 SLBMs.66


Russia continued to develop new types of strategic nuclear forces to replace its aging systems. As mentioned in the Hiroshima Report 2017, Russia planned to start deployment of the RS-28 (Sarmat) in 2018, which Russia has developed as a successor of the SS-18 heavy ICBMs. Russia also seeks to reintroduce a train-mobile ICBM by 2020, and reportedly plans to conduct its flight test in 2019.67 In addition, Russia continues to build the Borei-class SSBNs.

Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced in February 2017 that 90 percent of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces will be armed with modern weaponry by 2020, and over 60 percent of the Strategic Missiles Forces will be armed with new weapon systems by late 2020.68 However, due to economic difficulties, it is considered that Russia’s modernizing nuclear forces will not be implemented as planned.


In October 2015, the United Kingdom decided to construct a new class of four SSBNs as replacements of the existing Vanguard-class SSBNs. Their construction has already started.

In July 2016, the U.K. Parliament approved the government decision to maintain the U.K.’s nuclear deterrent beyond the early 2030s, with subsequent October 2016 commencement of the construction phase for a new Dreadnought-class of four SSBNs, as replacements for the existing Vanguard-class SSBNs, at a projected cost of £31 billion (with additional £10 billion contingency). The first new SSBN is expected to enter into service in the early 2030s. In parallel, the United Kingdom is participating in the U.S. current service-life extension program for the Trident II D5 missile. It is reported that a U.K. decision on a replacement warhead has been deferred until 2019/2020.69


Since the timing of renewal of the U.S. strategic delivery vehicles, which began deployment during the Cold War, is coming closer, the United States has contemplated development of succeeding ICBMs, SSBNs and strategic bombers (and LRSOs for use thereon).70 In addition, with heightening U.S. threat perceptions vis-à-vis, among others, North Korea and Russia, interest in non-strategic nuclear forces has also been increasing both inside and outside of the U.S. administration.

Soon after his inauguration in January 2017, President Trump strongly suggested a possibility of strengthening the U.S. nuclear forces, saying: “I am the first one that would like to see … nobody have nukes, but we’re never going to fall behind any country even if it’s a friendly country, we’re never going to fall behind on nuclear power. It would be wonderful, a dream would be that no country would have nukes, but if countries are going to have nukes, we’re going to be at the top of the pack.”71 While concrete policies on nuclear weapons modernization under the Trump administration have been contemplated along with its nuclear posture reviews, the U.S. national Security Strategy (NSS) that was released in December 2017 stated: “The United States must maintain the credible deterrence and assurance capabilities provided by our nuclear Triad and by U.S. theater nuclear capabilities deployed abroad. Significant investment is needed to maintain a U.S. nuclear arsenal and infrastructure that is able to meet national security threats over the coming decades.”72

Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force announced new contracts for initial development of LRSO ($1.8 billion) and GBSD ($700 million) in August.73 In addition, the U.S. Navy awarded a $5.1 billion contract to General Dynamics Electric Boat for Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD), including the design, completion, component and technology development and prototyping efforts, of the Columbia Class SSBNs in September.74

An estimated cost of procuring strategic nuclear forces has been increasing. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that over the 2017-2026 period, the plans for nuclear forces specified in the 2017 budget requests by the Department of Defense and Energy would cost a total of $400 billion, which is 15 percent higher than the CBO’s most recent estimated.75 Furthermore, the CBO estimated in October 2017 that maintenance and development of nuclear forces would cost $1.2 trillion over the 2017-2046 period: more than $800 billion to operate and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and about $400 billion to modernize them.76


India seems to be energetically pursuing developments toward constructing a strategic nuclear triad, that is: ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear bombers. The nation’s second strategic nuclear submarine Aridhand was launched in November 2017. India reportedly plans to build a bigger and more potent version of the indigenous nuclear submarine in the immediate future.77 As for ICBMs, however, contrary to earlier predictions, as of the end of 2017 the middle-ICBM Agni 5 had not been reported to have started operation.


It is unclear whether the Israeli Jericho III IRBM remains under development or is already deployed. Along with the land- and air-based components of its nuclear deterrent, Israel is also believed to have deployed a nuclear-capable SLCM. It has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) relating to the purchase of three additional Dolphin-calss submarines from Germany, which are capable to load the SLCM mentioned aboce.78


Pakistan has prioritized development and deployment of nuclear-capable short- and medium-range missiles for ensuring deterrence vis-à-vis India. In January 2017, Pakistan conducted the first flight test of MIRVed IRBM Ababeel, with a range of 2,200 km.79 A U.S. think tank also assessed that “Pakistan has constructed a hardened, secure, underground complex in Baluchistan Province that could serve as a ballistic missile and nuclear warhead storage site.”80


Nuclear weapons

North Korea conducted nuclear- and missile-related activities in 2017 as aggressively as previous years. The most noteworthy event was an underground nuclear test on September 3, which North Korea claimed was a hydrogen bomb. While it is uncertain whether the hydrogen bomb was used, as announced by North Korea, its explosive power was estimated to be about 160 kt, which was far beyond that of the North’s past nuclear tests. According to state media, the claimed “H-bomb, the explosive power of which is adjustable from tens kiloton to hundreds kiloton, is a multi-functional thermonuclear nuke with great destructive power which can be detonated even at high altitudes for super-powerful [electron magnetic pulse (EMP) ] attack according to strategic goals… All components of the H-bomb were homemade and all the processes ranging from the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials to precision processing of components and their assembling were put on the Juche basis, thus enabling the country to produce powerful nuclear weapons as many as it wants.”81

It is also not certain whether North Korea has succeeded in miniaturizing nuclear warheads able to fit into the nosecone of its missiles. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assesses, however, that “North Korea has produced nuclear weapons for ballistic missile delivery, to include delivery by ICBM-class missiles,”82 which would appear to mean that North Korea already succeeded in miniaturization. The North has not demonstrated missile re-entry technology, but it is considered likely that this can be mastered within a year or two, if not earlier.

Regarding the number of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, a reputable U.S. think tank estimates that, based on the estimated amount of fissile material produced by the North (33 kg of separated plutonium and 175-645 kg of weapon-grade uranium), it possessed 13 to 30 nuclear weapons by the end of 2016 and that it is currently expanding its nuclear weapons at a rate of about 3-5 weapons per year. Accordingly, through 2020, North Korea is projected to have 25-50 nuclear weapons.83

Fissile Material

Because North Korea has not accepted external monitoring of its nuclear activities since 2002, the actual situation of its activities for further manufacturing of nuclear weapons is unclear. Based on its nuclear testing and announcements, however, as well as other evidence, there is no doubt that North Korea is aggressively expanding its nuclear program. In March 2017, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano stated that North Korea had doubled the size of its uranium-enriching facility in Yongbyon in recent years.84 In September, he said that there were indications that the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant could be operating.85 While North Korea maintains that this reactor is intended for civil nuclear energy purposes, it could be used to produce fissile material for weapons. Of direct relevance to weapons production, U.S. experts analyzed from satellite imagery that “[t]he Radiochemical Laboratory operated intermittently and there have apparently been at least two unreported reprocessing campaigns to produce an undetermined amount of plutonium that can further increase North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile.86


In addition to its nuclear weapons, North Korea’s ballistic missile-related activities in 2017 were also extraordinary active.

On March 6, North Korea simultaneously launched four Scud-ER MRBMs, which flew approximately 1,000 km into the Sea of Japan, three of them landing in Japan’s EEZ. North Korea announced that “[i]nvolved in the drill were Hwasong artillery units of the KPA Strategic Force tasked to strike the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces in Japan in contingency.”87 On May 14, according to North Korea, with “aim[ing] at verifying the tactical and technological specifications of the newly-developed ballistic rocket capable of carrying a large-size heavy nuclear warhead,” it conducted a test launch of Hwasong-12 IRBM, which “hit the targeted open waters 787 km away after flying to the maximum altitude of 2,111.5 km along its planned flight orbit.”88 Furthermore, on August 29 and September 15, the North repeated Hwasong-12 flight tests which passed over Japan in normal orbit and landed in the Pacific Ocean, flying 2,700 km in August and 3,700 km in September respectively.89 These tests proved that its Hwasong-12 has the ability of reaching Guam. In addition, in the September test, North Korea showed a capability to shorten the time of preparation of launching missiles by directly firing from the mobile launcher.

North Korea demonstrated an ICBM capability in a latter half of 2017. In January 2017, it stated: “The DPRK’s ICBM development is part of its efforts for bolstering its capability for self-defense to cope with the ever more undisguised nuclear war threat from the U.S… The ICBM will be launched anytime and anywhere determined by the supreme headquarters of the DPRK.”90 On July 4, North Korea launched a Hwasong-14 ICBM, which “was boosted to the maximum height of 2,802 km and traveled 933 km distance,” according to the North.91 A U.S. expert estimated that “[i]f the data is correct, preliminary trajectory reconstructions indicate that if the missile were fired on a more efficient trajectory it would reach a range of anywhere from 6,700 to 8,000 km.”92 North Korea stated that:

The test-launch was aimed to confirm the tactical and technological specifications and technological features of the newly developed inter-continental ballistic rocked capable of carrying large-sized heavy nuclear warhead and to finally verify all technical features of the payload of the rocket during its atmospheric reentry including the heat-resisting features and structural safety of the warhead tip of ICBM made of newly developed domestic carbon compound material, in particular.

…[T]he inner temperature of the warhead tip was maintained at 25 to 45 degrees centigrade despite the harsh atmospheric reentry conditions of having to face the heat reaching thousands of degrees centigrade, extreme overload and vibration, the nuclear warhead detonation control device successfully worked, and the warhead accurately hit the targeted waters without any structural breakdown at the end of its flight.93

North Korea conducted a test flight of Hwasong-14 again on July 28, which was announced to have reached an altitude of 3,724.9 km and flew 998 km for 47 minutes and 12 seconds before landing”94 in Japan’s EEZ. These tests demonstrated that the Hwasong-14 has an ability of reaching the U.S. homeland if it is launched in a normal orbit. On the other hand, governmental officials and experts of Japan, the United States and South Korea analyze that the re-entry vehicle from that launch failed to successfully re-enter the atmosphere.95

Most ominously, on November 29 North Korea launched a much larger new, ICBM, called the Hwasong-15, which soared to an altitude of 4,475 km and flew a distance of 950 km for 53 minutes before making an accurate landing in the present waters in Japan’s EEZ in the Sea of Japan, according to North Korea. If it had flown a normal rather than a lofted trajectory, it could reach the entire U.S. homeland. The North praised the successful test and stated: “With this system, the DPRK has become possessed of another new-type inter-continental ballistic rocket weaponry system capable of carrying super-heavy nuclear warhead and attacking the whole mainland of the U.S….[T]he day was a significant day when the historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power was realized, adding that the day, on which the great might of putting the strategic position of the DPRK on a higher state was given birth, should be specially recorded in the history of the country.”96 U.S. experts estimated that “the Hwasong-15 can deliver a 1,000-kg payload to any point on the US mainland. North Korea has almost certainly developed a nuclear warhead that weighs less than 700 kg, if not one considerably lighter.”97 On the other hand, a U.S. governmental official stated that the North had problems with reentry technologies, in addition to guiding ballistic missiles.98

North Korea’s SLBM developments are also likely advanced. It conducted a test launch of Pukguksong-2 on May 21. After the test, Workers’ Party of Korea chairman Kim Jong Un approved the deployment and mass-production of this weapons system.99 North Korea also reportedly continues active development of SLBMs100 and construction of a new ballistic missile submarine.101

[42] “New START Treaty Inspection Activities,” U.S. Department of State,

[43] Jonathan Landay and David Rohde, “Exclusive: In Call with Putin, Trump Denounced Obama-era Nuclear Arms Treaty – Sources,” Reuters, February 10, 2017,

[44] Steve Holland, “Trump Wants to Make Sure U.S. Nuclear Arsenal at ‘Top of the Pack,’” Reuters, February 23, 2017,

[45] Jonathan Landay and David Rohde, “In Call with Putin.”

[46] “Russia, US Start Consultations on Extending START Treaty — Diplomat,” Tass, September 12, 2017,

[47] “Russia and US Beginning Strategic Stability Dialogue — Diplomat,” Tass, July 20, 2017,; “U.S., Russian Strategic Stability Talks Begin,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 49, No. 8 (October 2017), p. 29.

[48] U.S. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” April 2017, Regarding the issues that the United States has pointed out, see the Hiroshima Report 2015 and the Hiroshima Report 2016.

[49] The SVC was also held in December 2017.

[50] U.S. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.”

[51] Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump,” New York Times, February 14, 2017,

[52] Kingston Reif, “Hill Wants Development of Banned Missile,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 47, No. 10 (December 2017), p.35.

[53] Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, “INF Treaty: At a Glance,” Fact Sheet, December 8, 2017,

[54] “Russia: the US Intends to Withdraw from Open Skies Treaty,” UAWire, September 26, 2017,

[55] “UK Downsizes Its Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 45, No. 2 (March 2015),

[56] NPT/CONF.2015/32, April 27, 2015.

[57] NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.36, May 9, 2017.

[58] “Statement by France,” General Debate, First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference, May 3, 2017.

[59] “Statement by the United States,” Cluster 1, First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference, May 4, 2017.

[60] U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, May 2017, pp. 24, 31.

[61] Ibid., p. 61.

[62] “China Deploys Intercontinental Missiles Near Russian Border — Media,” Tass, January 24, 2017,

[63] Bill Gertz, “China Tests Missile with 10 Warheads,” Washington Free Beacon, January 31, 2017,

[64] “China Says Its Trial Launch of DF-5C Missile Normal,” China Military, February 6, 2017,

[65] See, for example, “France Submarine Capabilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 15, 2013, articles/france-submarine-capabilities/.

[66] François Hollande, “Nuclear Deterrence—Visit to the Strategic Air Forces,” February 19, 2015,

[67] “Russia to Conduct Flight Tests of Missile for ‘Nuclear Train’ in 2019,” Sputnik News, January 19, 2017,

[68] Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia to Arm 90 Percent of Strategic Nuclear Forces with Modern Weaponry by 2020,” Diplomat, February 23, 2017,

[69] Claire Mills and Noel Dempsey, “Replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent: Progress of the Dreadnought class,” UK Parliament, House of Commons Briefing Paper, June 19, 2017.

[70] Regarding the U.S. nuclear modernization program, see, for instance, “U.S. Nuclear Modernization Program,” Fact Sheet and Brief, Arms Control Association, December 2016,

[71] Steve Holland, “Trump Wants to Make Sure U.S. Nuclear Arsenal at ‘Top of the Pack,’” Reuters, February 23, 2017,

[72] United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” December 2017, p. 30.

[73] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Trump Forges Ahead on Costly Nuclear Overhaul,” New York Times, August 27, 2017, Some experts have argued against development of dual-capable LRSO because of lack of necessity for its nuclear posture, as well as a possibility of misperception of nuclear attack by an opponent (even if the missile mounts a conventional warhead). See, for example, William J. Perry and Andy Weber, “Mr. President, Kill the New Cruise Missile,” Washington Post, October 15, 2015,

[74] “Navy Awards Contract for Columbia Class Submarine Development,” America’s Navy, September 21, 2017,

[75] Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2026,” February 2017, https://

[76] Congressional Budget Office, “Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046,” October 2017. See also “New CBO Report Warns of Skyrocketing Costs of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control Association, October 31, 2017,

[77] Franz-Stefan Gady, “India Launches Second Ballistic Missile Sub,” Diplomat, December 13, 2017, https://; Dinakar Peri and Josy Joseph, “A Bigger Nuclear Submarine is Coming,” The Hindu, October 15, 2017, nuclear-submarine-is-coming/article19862549.ece.

[78] “Israel Signs MoU to Purchase Dolphin-class Submarines from Germany,” Naval Technology, October 25, 2017, germany-5956187/.

[79] “Pakistan Conducts First Flight Test of Nuclear-capable ‘Ababeel’ Missile,” Indian Express, January 24, 2017,

[80] David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach and Frank Pabian, “Potential Nuclear Weapons-related Military Area in Baluchistan, Pakistan,” Institute for Science and International Security, August 10, 2017, reports/detail/potential-nuclear-weapons-related-military-area-in-baluchistan-pakistan/.

[81] “Kim Jong Un Gives Guidance to Nuclear Weaponization,” KCNA, September 3, 2017,

[82] Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima and Anna Fifield, “North Korea Now Making Missile-ready Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Analysts Say,” Washington Post, August 8, 2017,

[83] David Albright, “North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities: A Fresh Look,” Institute for Science and International Security,April 28, 2017,

[84] Jay Solomon, “North Korea Has Doubled Size of Uranium-enrichment Facility, IAEA Chief Says,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2017,

[85] “IAEA Says Indications Show DPRK’s Nuclear Reactor Could be Operating,” Xinhua, September 11, 2017, In January 2017, a U.S. think tank also pointed out a possibility of resumption of this nuclear reactor. See Jack Liu and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Facility: Operations Resume at the 5 MWe Plutonium Production Reactor,” 38 North, January 27, 2017,

[86] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Mike Eley, Jack Liu and Frank V. Pabian, “North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Probable Production of Additional Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons,” 38 North, July 14, 2017,

[87] “Kim Jong Un Supervises Ballistic Rockets Launching Drill of Hwasong Artillery Units of KPA Strategic Force,” KCNA, March 7, 2017,

[88] “Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New Rocket,” KCNA, May 15, 2017,

[89] Before this test, four North Korean ballistic missiles—Taepodong-1 in 1998, Unha-2 in 2009, Unha-3 in 2012 and Kwangmyongsong-4 in 2016—passed over Japan.

[90] “DPRK’s ICBM Development Is to Cope with U.S. Nuclear War Threat: FM Spokesman,” KCNA, January 8, 2017,

[91] “Report of DPRK Academy of Defence Science,” KCNA, July 4, 2017,

[92] John Schilling, “North Korea Finally Tests an ICBM,” 38 North, July 5, 2017,

[93] “Kim Jong Un Supervises Test-launch of Inter-continental Ballistic Rocket Hwasong-14,” KCNA, July 5, 2017,

[94] “Kim Jong Un Guides Second Test-fire of ICBM Hwasong-14,” KCNA, July 29, 2017,

[95] Michael Elleman, “Video Casts Doubt on North Korea’s Ability to Field an ICBM Re-entry Vehicle,” 38 North, July

31, 2017,; John Schilling, “What Next for North Korea’s ICBM?” 38 North, August 1, 2017,

[96] “Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of ICBM Hwasong-15,” KCNA, November 29, 2017,

[97] Michael Elleman, “The New Hwasong-15 ICBM: Significant Improvement That May be Ready as Early as 2018,” 38 North, November 30, 2017,

[98] Barbara Starr and Ray Sanchez, “North Korea’s New ICBM Likely Broke Up Upon Re-entry, US Official Says,” CNN, December 3, 2017,

[99] “Kim Jong Un Supervises Test-fire of Ballistic Missile,” KCNA, May 22, 2017,

[100] See, for example, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile Program Advances: Second Missile Test Stand Barge Almost Operational,” 38 North, December 1, 2017,

[101] Ankit Panda, “The Sinpo-C-Class: A New North Korean Ballistic Missile Submarine Is under Construction,” Diplomat, October 18, 2017, See also Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Korea’s Submarine Ballistic Missile Program Moves Ahead: Indications of Shipbuilding and Missile Ejection Testing,” 38 North, November 16, 2017,

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