A) Accession status to nuclear security-related conventions

Trends for 2022

This section examines the status of the surveyed countries’ accession to international conventions related to nuclear security and safety, namely the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); the A/CPPNM; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention); the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Some if not all of these nuclear safety-related conventions have provisions on safety-related physical protection measures. As these measures can also be used for nuclear security purposes, those nuclear safety-related conventions are regarded as “nuclear security-related conventions” in this report. Table 3-4 shows the status of each surveyed country’s membership of the six conventions listed above.
The current status of nuclear security international conventions is as follows:

➢ CPPNM114 (entered into force in 1987): 164 signatories. No new signatories; the number of new signatories since 2016 has been two to three each year, with the exception of 2017, which maintained a continuous increase, but with no increase in 2022.

➢ A/CPPNM115 (entered into force in 2016): 131 countries ratified. New ratifications by Brazil, Malawi, Mozambique, and Oman. The number of ratifying countries in recent years has been risen continuously: 15 in 2016, 7 in 2017, 3 in 2018, 5 in 2019, 2 in 2020 and 2 in 2021.

➢ ICSANT116 (entered into force in 2007): 120 States Parties. Recently ratified by Oman and Tajikistan. In recent years, the number of new States Parties was 6 in 2017, 1 in 2018, 2 in 2019, 1 in 2020 and 1 in 2021.

➢ Nuclear Safety Convention117 (entered into force in 1996): 91 States Parties as of March 2021.118 No new countries have ratified the Convention; 2 countries have ratified the Convention in 2021.

➢ Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident119 (entered into force 1986): 132 States Parties as of February 2022. Newly ratified by Malawi; 4 countries ratified in 2021.120

➢ Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency121 (entered into force 1987): 127 States Parties as of October 2022. Newly ratified by Cambodia, Malawi, and Mozambique. 2 countries ratified in 2021.

➢ Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management122 (entered into force in 2001): 88 parties as of February 2022. Newly ratified by Malawi and Syria. Turkey announced at the IAEA General Conference in September 2022 that it ratified the Joint Convention in July and became a State Party, but the IAEA list of States Parties (most recently published in February 2022) does not yet list Turkey.123 The number of ratifying States Parties in 2020 was 1.

In 2021, there was a gradual increase in the number of parties to all conventions, while in 2022 there was an increase across conventions except the CPPNM and Nuclear Safety Convention. In particular, the number of states ratifying the A/CPPNM, for which the first Review Conference was held in March after entry into force of the A/CPPNM, doubled from the previous year. In terms of trends in the surveyed countries signing and ratification of nuclear security-related conventions, Brazil ratified the A/CPPNM on March 18, prior to the aforementioned Review Conference.

Unrelated to accession to the convention on March 4, 2022, Ukraine, a State Party to the ICSANT, wrote a letter to the effect that it “is unable to guarantee full implementation of its obligations under the above Convention due to the Armed aggression of the Russian Federation and with the imposition of martial law until the complete cessation of encroachment on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine.” Under Article 18.15 of the Convention, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the depositary of the Convention, notified it to the States Parties.124 As noted above, radioactive materials have allegedly been stolen from Ukrainian nuclear facilities, meaning Ukraine has difficulties to ensure the full implementation obligations of the Convention.

 

Conference of the Parties to the A/CPPNM

From March 28 to April 1, 2022, the first Review Conference of the A/CPPNM since it entered into force in 2016 was held in Vienna under the co-presidency of Switzerland and Nigeria. The Conference was scheduled to take place in 2021, five years after the entry into force of the A/CPPNM, under Article 16.1, but was postponed due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to the 106 countries that are parties to the A/CPPNM, 17 countries that are parties to the CPPNM, including South Africa, and 7 countries that are not parties to the CPPNM, including Iran, participated at the Conference as observers.125 The Conference took place amidst the threat to nuclear security caused by Russia’s occupation of nuclear facilities in Ukraine.

 

The Conference reviewed the implementation and adequacy of the A/CPPNM. In regard to the Convention’s adequacy, China, Russia, and the U.S. expressed the view that it is appropriate in light of the current situation, and stressed the need to universalize the A/CPPNM and to continue to hold Review Conferences in the future.126 Their statements are given below.

➢ China127: “The world today is in the midst of great changes not seen in a century. Security threats and challenges keep emerging.” “[The A/CPPNM] has played an important role in maintaining the international nuclear security system and advancing the global nuclear security governance.”“Based on its own compliance practice, China believes that the A/CPPNM remains adequate under the current circumstances.” “China calls on more countries to consider ratifying the Amendment and establish corresponding national systems and measures.”

➢ Russia (Vienna Delegation’s Twitter post) 128: “Russia proceeds from the understanding that the provisions of the Amended Convention meet the requirements of the current situation. The development of new amendments to the Convention is not required. There is no need for broad interpretations of its provisions.”

➢ U.S.A.129: “[T]he United States believes its current laws and regulations adequately address changes to the prevailing situation. We have determined that the amended Convention is adequate. Even so, just as it is essential for each state to continually review its nuclear security regime, it is also important to continue the dialogue and review of the global nuclear security regime.”

China and the U.S. also referred to the status of their national implementation of A/CPPNM at the Conference. Since each country’s statement at the Review Conference is not publicly available, information about the national implementation status of countries other than China and the U.S. is provided from countries’ statements at the IAEA General Conference.

➢ China130: “China promulgated ‘Regulations on the Nuclear Material Control’ and its detailed rules for the implementation as early as in 1989 upon accession to the [CPPNM]. Following the entry into force of the Amendment, China has also promulgated ‘National Security Law’ and ‘Nuclear Safety Law.’ China has established a comprehensive and effective nuclear security regulatory system and physical protection regime.”

➢ Brazil131: “This year, Brazil ratified the A/CPPNM. The key principles and obligations of the amended Convention had already been included in our domestic regulatory framework.”

➢ Japan132: “As a single nation cannot ensure global nuclear security, Japan stresses the important role of legal frameworks such as the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) and the Convention on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism.” “Japan welcomes the fact that the first Review Conference of the A/CPPNM was held in March this year and the outcome document was adopted. Japan continues to make efforts to promote the universalization of these conventions.”

➢ Pakistan133: “Considering nuclear security as a national responsibility, Pakistan has developed a comprehensive nuclear security regime, which is regularly reviewed and updated in the light of [CPPNM] and its 2005 amendment (Amended CPPNM), IAEA guidance documents and international best practices. [Pakistan] notes with satisfaction that the Convention and its Amendment remain fully adequate to meet the present day nuclear security challenges. Going forward, the efforts of the Parties to the CPPNM and its Amendment should remain focused on its universalization and effective implementation at the national level.”

➢ Turkey134: “[Tukey wishes] to emphasize our dedication to work closely with the Agency to support the highest standards in nuclear safety, security and safeguards to promote peaceful uses of nuclear technology. By ratifying the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive Waste Management in July, Türkiye is now a party to all international conventions in the nuclear field and submits compliance reports on a regular basis to promote transparency and confidence building.”

➢ U.S.A.135: “The United States prioritizes full implementation of its obligations under the amended Convention and applies the Fundamental Principles set forth in Article 2A of the amended Convention.” (Reference is made to efforts related to cyber security and separated plutonium. See (2)B) and (3)A) of this Chapter for details.)

In relation to national implementation of the NPT, a number of surveyed countries submitted national reports to the NPT RevCon held in August 2022, including reports on their accession to and implementation of nuclear security-related Conventions and their efforts to date. These national reports relate to implementation of the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT RevCon, which includes seven actions (Action 40-46) related to nuclear security.136 Among the countries surveyed, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, the U.K., and the the U.S. submitted reports on their nuclear security efforts.137 Such reports are useful in understanding the status of nuclear security implementation in each country. Although information and its content in each state’s report varies, submitting them improves transparency about nuclear security efforts and is important as a channel of communication with the international community and civil society. It also helps to ensure accountability for commitments to nuclear security.

As a result of the discussions, the Conference adopted the Outcome Document, which contains the conclusion that the Preamble, the operative parts of the Convention as a whole, and the Annexes are appropriate in the light of the prevailing situation.138 The Outcome Document states that the main relevant changes and factors in the prevailing situation include the expanding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in relation to technological evolution in general, innovative advanced reactor technologies and the threat and risk environment.139 It further notes that the required number of States Parties have requested the depositary, the Director General of the IAEA, to convene the next Conference under Article 16.2 of the Convention.140 In this regard, Australia, China, Switzerland, Sweden, the EU, and others spoke in favor of holding the next Review Conference, and the U.S. said it must be held within six years at the most.141
As a reference, the draft final document of the 10th NPT RevCon included the following paragraph on the A/CPPNM Review Conference.

➢“The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the A/CPPNM, recognizing the importance of its acceptance, approval or ratification by further States and noting the importance of its full implementation and universalization. The Conference welcomes the outcome of the 2022 Conference of the Parties to the A/CPPNM.” (para. 47)

➢ “The Conference calls on all States parties to the CPPNM to become party to the Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and become party to the Amendment as soon as possible.” (para. 187-65) 142

As the draft final document stated, the universalization of the A/CPPNM and its full implementation by each country continue to be the areas require international efforts. In this regard, it is important for each country to share information on experiences related to the implementing the A/CPPNM and the development of relevant laws and regulations. In this regard, in April 2022 the EU, in collaboration with the IAEA, held a side event on universalization of the A/CPPNM,143 and Canada, in cooperation with the IAEA, also held a side event called “Towards universal implementation of the A/CPPNM: challenges, success stories and the way forward” during the Review Conference.144

In relation to full implementation of the Convention, Article 14.1 of the A/CPPNM obliges States Parties to notify the IAEA, the depositary of the Convention, of their domestic laws and regulations for implementing the Convention. In recent years, the importance of such notifications has been emphasized from the perspective of transparency and information sharing regarding each country’s nuclear security measures. The IAEA did not provide the number of countries that submitted information under Article 14.1 in 2022, but as of the end of 2021, 64 countries had submitted information.145 The Outcome Document of the 2022 Review Conference also encourages parties that have not yet submitted to avoid further delays in submission.146

Sharing of information transparently with sensitive information protected is also encouraged as part of international assurance for implementing nuclear security-related conventions by each country. Table 3-6 shows efforts by the countries surveyed in this area.

 

B) INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

Application Status of Each Surveyed Country of the Measures Recommended in INFCIRC/ 225/Rev.5

In 2011, the IAEA published the fifth revision of the “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) as IAEA Nuclear Security Series Document No. 13. Introducing and implementing physical protection measures in accordance with the recommended measures in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, as well as identifying issues and formulating individual measures, are entirely state’s responsibility and are left to the efforts of national regulatory authorities and operators. It is therefore important for states to disseminate information on introducing and applying the measures recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. However, the amount of such information disseminated has gradually declined since the conclusion of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit process. Table 3-7 shows the status of application and efforts of the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 recommended measures by the countries surveyed.

 

It is more than 10 years since INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 was published. It has been said that work to determine whether the IAEA Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations, including INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 needs to be revised soon was completed in December 2020.147 However, no further progress has been revealed in publicly available information on this matter.
The following is information about efforts by the surveyed countries as well as by international organizations in 2022 regarding the main elements of the national physical protection system for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, as set out in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.

 

Development of National Laws and Regulations

➢ Brazil148: “The National Commission for Nuclear Energy has undertaken a complete review of its regulations on nuclear and radiological security, taking into Brazil: The National Commission for Nuclear Energy has undertaken a complete review of its regulations on nuclear and radiological security, taking into account international best practices and provisions of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 2005, as well as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and other relevant IAEA recommendations.”

➢ China149: “China conducts rigorous management of nuclear material licensing, with a multi-sectoral and coordinated regulatory and law enforcement mechanism to supervise the whole process of the design, construction and operation of the physical protection system of nuclear facilities and the production, transportation, storage and use of nuclear material. China presses ahead with the nuclear security capacity building by upgrading the physical protection systems of outdated nuclear facilities, applying the highest international standards for the newly built nuclear facilities and increasing investment in nuclear security technological innovations.”

➢ The Netherlands150: “To strengthen the physical protection of its nuclear facilities, the Netherlands has implemented a physical protection regime, fully in line with its international obligations and agreements.”

 

Sabotage

Although no information about each country’s efforts concerning sabotage in 2022 was available, Turkey said in its country report to the NPT RevCon that it “takes all necessary precautions by strengthening its national nuclear security regime to prohibit armed attacks against or to prevent threats against nuclear facilities during their operation or construction.”151

With regard to sabotage, the Outcome Document of the A/CPPNM Review Conference reaffirmed “the desire to avert the potential dangers posed by illicit trafficking, the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and underscored the importance of physical protection against such actions.”152

 

Identification and Assessment of Threats (including Insider Threats)

With respect to threat identification and assessment, increased emphasis has been placed on strengthening insider threat prevention measures. However, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), their research for Nuclear Security Index 2020 revealed that despite the importance of addressing threats posed by insiders, “only 55 percent of countries require that personnel vetting be conducted regularly, and only 35 percent require robust personnel vetting that includes drug tests, background checks, and psychological tests. An alarming 20 percent do not require any of these tests.”153 Therefore, each country’s efforts of each country in this area are important. However, in 2022, no new information on the surveyed countries’ new efforts in this area was available.

In regard to nuclear security threats, the Outcome Document of the A/CPPNM Review Conference “expressed concern about existing and emerging nuclear security threats and stressed the importance of international cooperation and fostering a broad dialogue in this regard.”154 Also, the draft final document of the 10th NPT RevCon included a paragraph on threat, “acknowledges existing and emerging nuclear security threats and its State parties commit to addressing such threats.”155

In addition, preventing insiders from stealing nuclear materials from facilities that handle them and accounting for and controlling nuclear materials has become important, both for nuclear security and for nuclear nonproliferation. In this area, the IAEA held “a hybrid International Training Course on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Practitioners in February to provide hands-on training in domestic nuclear material accounting and control techniques.”156

 

Cyber Security

Increased cyber security threats, as mentioned above, have made it imperative that countries strengthen their cyber security measures. In this regard, a paragraph in the draft final document of the 10th NPT RevCon “reaffirms that nuclear security, including the protection of nuclear materials, cybersecurity, and nuclear facilities against unauthorized access, theft, and sabotage, supports the objectives of the NPT”157 (para. 43) was incorporated, acknowledging that cyber security is also important. Germany, which is taking steps in this area, noted that “worrisome developments in the area of computer security suggest that it is important to ensure skilled field experts to support the pivotal infrastructure,” and urged the IAEA to develop new nuclear cybersecurity guidelines.158
Initiatives and status of information dissemination in the cyber security field by the countries in this study in 2022 include the following:

➢U.K.159: In May 2022, the U.K. published a policy document called The 2022 Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy. “A joint strategy between government, the civil nuclear industry and the regulator, setting out how the UK’s civil nuclear sector aims to manage and mitigate evolving cyber risks over the next five years. The 2022 Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy builds on its predecessor strategy, the 2017 Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy, and the 2022 National Cyber Strategy to further strengthen the cyber security posture of the UK civil nuclear sector.”

➢ U.S.A.160: “the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff completed inspections under the U.S. NPP Cyber Security Programs to verify that facilities had fully implemented their cyber security requirements. Starting this year, each plant will be inspected every two years to ensure continued compliance.”

A question regarding cybersecurity measures at Indian NPPs was asked in the Upper House of India’s Parliament. The following are the quotes of the responses by the Indian Minister of Science and Technology.161

➢ “Security arrangements are in place to secure India’s NPP systems from cyber-attack. NPP systems are also isolated from Internet and are not accessible from administrative network. Several measures have been taken to strengthen information security in administrative networks in NPPs like, hardening of internet and administrative intranet connectivity, restriction on removable media, blocking of websites & IPs.”

➢ Speaking about the cyber-attack on the Kudankulam NPP in September 2019, the minister said that “investigations have been carried out by the Computer & Information Security Advisory Group.”

IAEA efforts in this area in 2022 include, for example, the first Program Committee meeting in January on the International Conference on Computer Security in the Nuclear World 2023, to be held in June 2023, and the hybrid Technical Meeting on Instrumentation and Control and Computer Security for Small Modular Reactors and Microreactors held in Vienna in February to enhance cooperation and information exchange among Member States.162

 

Nuclear Security Culture

While few countries in the survey detailed their efforts to enhance a nuclear security culture,163 Brazil’s country report submitted to the NPT RevCon says it has taken measures through workshops, seminars, and training courses. Russia also stated in its report that “measures have been taken to enhance nuclear security culture,” although details are unclear.164 In addition, China stated at the A/CPPNM Review Conference that it is working to foster a nuclear security culture as part of its domestic implementation of the Convention.165 In February 2022, Japan held an on-line workshop on “Rethinking Nuclear Security Culture: Human Factors and Organizational Culture,” co-hosted by the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS).166

It has been increasingly recognized in recent years that fostering and maintaining a nuclear security culture is extremely important in ensuring the continued effectiveness of nuclear security measures, including cybersecurity and insider threat countermeasures. All organizations related to nuclear energy, including regulatory agencies and operators, are required to recognize the the threat of nuclear terrorism and the importance of nuclear security, and to ensure that every individual is aware of their role and responsibilities in nuclear security.

In addition, the IAEA Nuclear Security Resolution adopted in 2022 included a paragraph encouraging the IAEA Secretariat to:

➢ “[P]romote international exchanges of experience, knowledge and good practices regarding ways to develop, foster and maintain a robust nuclear security culture compatible with States’nuclear security regimes, and encourages the Secretariat to organize an international workshop on sustaining a nuclear security culture;”

➢ “[I]n consultation with Member States, to increase its assistance to States, upon request, to develop, foster, and maintain a robust nuclear security culture, including publishing guidance, providing training activities and offering related self-assessment support and training materials and tools.”167

 

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114 The Convention requires the criminalization of acts such as receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersing nuclear material without lawful authority and which causes or is likely to cause personal or property damage, and theft of nuclear material. Efforts to universalize the Convention, including countries that do not have nuclear programs, continue to be important.
115 This is the only legally-binding international agreement on the protection of nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes. It is desirable for states that are not parties to the CPPNM to ratify the CPPNM together with the A/CPPNM. It is also important to strengthen efforts to promote A/CCPNM ratification by states that have only joined the CPPNM and to make diplomatic efforts to encourage and support such states to ratify the A/CPPNM.
116 It obliges States Parties to criminalize the possession or use of radioactive materials or nuclear explosive devices with malicious intent, the use of nuclear facilities in a manner that leads to the emission of radioactive materials, or damaging of such facilities.
117 This Convention aims at ensuring and enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants. State Parties are required to take legal and administrative measures, to report to the review committee established under this Convention, and to accept peer review in order to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants under their jurisdiction.

118 No updated information as of December 2022.
119 This Convention obliges State Parties to report to the IAEA immediately when a nuclear accident has occurred, including the type, time and location of the accident as well as relevant information.
120 The Hiroshima Report 2022 lists the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe as the three ratifying countries for 2021, but Niger ratified the Convention on December 19, 2021, bringing the total to 131 ratifying countries in 2021.
121 This Convention establishes an international framework that provides equipment and dispatches experts to prevent and/or minimize nuclear accidents and radioactive emergencies.
122 The Joint Convention calls for its State Parties to take legal and administrative measures, report to its review committee, and undergo peer review by other parties to ensure safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

123 “Statement by Turkey,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022.

124 “ICSANT Ukraine Communication,” Reference: C.N.72.2022.TREATIES-XVIII.15 (Depositary Notification), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2022/CN.72.2022-Eng.pdf.
125 Six international organizations (Arab Organization for Nuclear Energy, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), EU, IAEA, ICPO, UN) and 11 NGO organizations also participated as observers.

126 “Statement by China at the A/CPPNM Review Conference,”; Russian Vienna Delegation Twitter, https://twitter.com/mission_rf/status/1508476451535872009; “Statement by the U.S. at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”
127 “Statement by China at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”

128 Russian Vienna Delegation Twitter.
129 “Statement by the U.S. at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”

130 “Statement by China at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”
131 “Statement by Brazil,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022.
132 “Statement by Japan,” the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022, pp. 5-6.

133 “Statement by Pakistan,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022.
134 “Statement by Turkey,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022.
135 “Statement by the U.S. at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”
136 “Final Document, NPT 2010 Review Conference,” NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 2010, pp. 26-27, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/390/21/PDF/N1039021.pdf?Open Element.
137 These national reports are available from https://www.un.org/en/conferences/npt2020/documents.

138 “2022 Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Outcome Document,” ACPPNM/RC/2022/4, April 2022, p. 4.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI, “Review Conference on the Security of Nuclear Material,” April 6, 2022, https://www.ensi.ch/en/2022/04/06/review-conference-on-the-security-of-nuclear-material/; “Statement by the U.S. at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”
142 NPT/CONF.2020/CRP.1/Rev.2, August 25, 2022, pp. 7, 29.

143 Nuclear Security Report 2022, p. 4.
144 Ibid.
145 IAEA, Nuclear Security Review 2022, GC(66)/INF/5, August 2022, p. 11.
146 “2022 Conference of the Parties to the A/CPPNM, Outcome Document,” ACPPNM/RC/2022/4, April 2022.

147 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 30. Discussions on the need to revise INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, see Mathew Bunn, Laura Holgate, Dmitry Kovchegin, Nickolas Roth and William Tobey, “IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC/225): The Next Generation,” Stimson Center, July 2020, https:// www. stimson.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/IAEA-225-Recommendations.pdf.
148 NPT/CONF.2020/11, November 10, 2021.
149 “Statement by China at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”
150 NPT/CONF.2020/10/Rev.1, November 29, 2021.

151 NPT/CONF.2020/37, November 9, 2021.
152 ACPPNM/RC/2022/4, April 2022, p. 6.
153 “Nuclear Security is Only as Strong as the Weakest Link: 2020 NTI Index Highlights Cybersecurity and Insider Threat Prevention,” August 4, 2020, https://www.nti.org/atomic-pulse/nuclear-security-only-strong-weakest-link-2020-nti-index-highlights-cybersecurity-and-insider-threat-prevention/.
154 ACPPNM/RC/2022/4, April 2022, p. 6.

155 NPT/CONF.2020/CRP.1/Rev.2, August 25, 2022, p. 7.
156 Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 15.
157 NPT/CONF.2020/CRP1.Rev.2, August 25, 2022, p. 7.
158 “Statement by Germany,” at the IAEA General Conference, September 2022.
159 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy 2022, May 13, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government /publications/civil-nuclear-cyber-security-strategy-2022.
160 “Statement by the U.S. at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”

161 “Security in Place to Secure India’s Nuclear Power Plants from Cyber-attacks: Singh,” Mint, December 8, 2022, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/security-in-place-to-secure-india-s-nuclear-power-plants-from-cyber-attacks-singh- 11670489850008.html.
162 Nuclear Security Report 2022, p. 15.
163 IAEA defines “nuclear security culture” as “The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviors of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as means to support, enhance and sustain nuclear security.” INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, p. 52.
164 NPT/CONF.2020/11, November 10, 2021; NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1, March 19, 2021.
165 “Statement by China at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”
166 Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), White Paper on Nuclear Energy 2021, p. 144.

167 GC(66)/RES/7, September 2022, p. 7.