Chapter 3 Nuclear Security1

 

(1) Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nuclear security means “the prevention of, detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities.”2 The scopes of nuclear security primarily concerns the theft of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials as well as sabotage against related facilities by non-state actors.

 

A) Nuclear materials

Weapon-usable nuclear fissile materials, namely highly enriched uranium (HEU)3 and separated plutonium, are generally thought to be attractive to those who have malicious intent, such as terrorists looking to produce nuclear explosive devices. In this regard, the amounts of these materials in a country as well as the number of facilities that contain such materials are considered to be among the important indicators for assessing that state’s efforts in enhancing nuclear security. According to various publicly available information, the amount of weapons-usable nuclear fissile materials possessed by the countries surveyed in this report is shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 respectively.
Although the estimated amount of HEU and separated plutonium possessed by each country is highly uncertain as it is mostly based on estimates, in 2023, the total quantity of these materials worldwide seems to have increased from the previous year’s 1,803 tons to 1,806 tons. While the stockpile of HEU has decreased, that of separated plutonium has increased, which led to an increase of the total volume of weapon-usable nuclear materials in the world.

For more information on each material, first, with respect to HEU, in particular for military use, Pakistan’s holdings increased by 0.9 tons compared to last year. India’s holdings decreased by 0.7 tons but India is believed to continue to be producing HEU for naval propulsion (fuel for nuclear submarines).4
As for civilian use, inventories in the United Kingdome fell by 0.05 tons and in Japan fell to 0.6 tons.5 On the other hand, in Russia, where production continues, they increased by 2 tons. Iran also continues to produce HEU. According to an IAEA report in November 2023, as of October 28 that year, Iran possessed 128.3 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride with an enrichment level of approximately 60%.6

 

It should be noted that although 34 countries and Taiwan once had HEUs for civilian use, they have completely eliminated their civilian HEU through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and other initiatives promoted by the United States. Such HEU minimization efforts (see (3) A) of this Chapter) continue to be underway contributing to a downward trend in the global stockpile of HEU. On the other hand, approximately 90% of the world stocks of HEU are dedicated to military purposes. Thus, ensuring the nuclear security of not only civilian but also military-use HEU remains critically important.

With respect to separated plutonium, for military use, India’s stockpile increased by 0.4 tons compared to last year. For civilian use, while Japan’s stockpile decreased by 0.7 tons (see (3) A) of this Chapter for more information), France’s increased significantly to approximately 7 tons. Global inventory of this material as a whole has been on an increasing trend in recent years.

 

B) Radioactive materials

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the threat of radioactive dispersal devices (so-called “dirty bombs”) also became a concern. Therefore, not only nuclear materials, but also other radioactive materials are included in the scope of nuclear security efforts. Among them, radioactive sources are widely used around the world in various fields ranging from medicine to agriculture. Since, those materials are generally stored in locations where security is not as stringent as for weapons-usable nuclear materials, the risk of theft is relatively high, and it is necessary to further strengthen international efforts for the security of those material.

An important international document related to nuclear security of radioactive sources is the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (hereafter referred to the “Code”), which was adopted at the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2003.7 While this is not a legally binding document, as of June 2023, 147 countries, including all of the countries under this survey except North Korea, have made a political commitment to implement it.8 Also, 131 out of 147 countries had notified the IAEA Director General of their intention to act in a harmonized manner in accordance with the Code’s supplementary Guidance documents on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and 58 countries did the same on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources. In this regard, the G7 encouraged further political commitment to and implementation of the Code and its supplementary Guidance documents in a statement issued by the Non-Proliferation Directors Group (NPDG) meeting in April.9

On the nuclear security of radioactive materials, Canada published the “Report on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources” in May. The Report provided information on its efforts related to the implementation of the Code and its Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources during the period from January 2019 to December 2022.10

As for the United States, President Joe Biden signed the “National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advancing Nuclear and Radiological Material Security” in March. It states that the United States has prioritized the reduction of the threat of radiological terrorism as one of its policy objectives and will take policy measures, such as “maintaining robust security for all high-activity radioactive sources11 during their lifecycle for all sources that cannot be replaced” and “the replacement of source-based devices with non-radioisotopic alternative technologies, where technically and economically feasible.”12

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a U.S. nonprofit organization, pointed out in its sixth Nuclear Security Index published in July 2023 that there has been minimal progress in efforts to enhance the security of radioactive sources in various countries.13 NTI suggested placing high priority on this issue by establishing regulatory measures to track and manage the movement of radioactive sources, enforcing basic laws to protect against theft, substituting high-activity radioactive sources with alternatives, and implementing guidance from the IAEA.

 

C) Nuclear facilities

Facilities

Nuclear facilities that could potentially have serious radiological consequences in the event of sabotage include power reactors, research reactors, uranium enrichment facilities, reprocessing facilities, and spent fuel as well as radioactive waste storage facilities. Of these, 436 (-1) power reactors worldwide were operational as of December 2023, 62 (+2) were under construction, 111 (+7) were in the planning stage, and 318 (-20) were proposed for construction (changes from the previous year in parentheses).14 However, the data is updated from time to time so the figures are subject to change.
As for nuclear power generation, Russia and China have come to account for a significant share of the international market for nuclear power plant (NPP) exports: as of January 2023, there were 110 “third generation” NPPs under construction or planning, with China and Russia accounting for 69% of the total.15 Of these, 33 projects are being undertaken outside their own countries, 19 of which are by Russia. Meanwhile, there has been a notable push once again for its promotion as a result of energy policy reviews in some countries in 2022 to address climate change and energy security. Against this backdrop, during the 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) held in Dubai in December 2023, 22 countries, including 10 surveyed in the Hiroshima Report, namely Canada, Finland, France, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden, UAE, the United Kingdom, and the United States, issued a joint declaration, which includes a commitment to triple the nuclear energy capacity by 2050.16 It also includes their commitment to “take domestic actions to ensure nuclear power plants are operated responsibly and in line with the highest standards of safety, sustainability, security, and non-proliferation, and that fuel waste is responsibly managed for the long term.”

 

As for research reactors, as of November 2023, there were 840(-1) worldwide, broken down as follows:17

➢ Operational: 225 units (+3)
➢ Temporary shutdown: 9 units (-1)
➢ Under construction: 7 units (-4)
➢ Planned: 13 units (±0)
➢ Extended shut-down: 12 units (-1)
➢ Permanent shut-down: 55 units (-1)
➢ Decommissioned: 450 units (+1)
➢ Currently being dismantled: 69 units (+2)

(Figures in parentheses represent changes from the previous year)

Looking at HEU spent fuel assemblies for research reactors, there are 20,640 assemblies worldwide with an enrichment of more than 20%.18 Of these, 9,384 have an enrichment of 90% or more, a decrease of 95 since last year. By region, there are 10,992 in Eastern Europe, 4,211 in Western Europe, 1,600 in the Far East, 1,623 in North America, 433 in Africa, 223 in the Middle East and South Asia, 1,450 in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and 108 in Latin America.19 This worldwide presence of such a large number of HEU spent fuel assemblies indicates the continued importance of strengthening measures to prevent sabotage, in addition to measures to prevent the theft of HEU at research reactor facilities.

Uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities are considered to be the most attractive nuclear facilities for terrorists seeking to produce nuclear explosive devices because of the availability of nuclear materials that can be directly used for such devices. Table 3-3 shows the status of nuclear power reactors, research reactors, uranium enrichment facilities, and reprocessing facilities in the surveyed countries for the Hiroshima Report.

 

Risks posed by emerging technologies

Unmanned aerial vehicle (Drone)

Regarding sabotage against nuclear facilities, as reported in previous issues of Hiroshima Report, there have been quite a few relevant incidents involving unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), also known as drones. While drones are increasingly used at NPP for inspection, monitoring, and survey purposes, there are concerns about the threat to nuclear security. Although nuclear facilities are robustly protected buildings and direct drone strikes are unlikely to cause serious radiological consequences, some of the characteristics of drones such as the rapid pace of technological improvement and evolution as well as low cost and availability require careful monitoring of their risk trends.

In light of this situation, the IAEA held a technical meeting on “Nuclear Security Countermeasures for UAVs” in Richland in the United States at the end of October 2023, in cooperation with the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).20 The meeting was convened with the recognition that “high endurance, high payload capability, autonomous, single or swarms of UAV(s) will become increasingly difficult to protect against and will require advanced counter-uncrewed aerial vehicle (CUAV) technology and policies” and that “security may need to shift their focus from solely ground based threats to both ground and airborne threats, which requires new physical security methods and technologies to ensure the protection of nuclear facilities or material in transit.”21 The meeting addressed the current situation surrounding UAV platforms, payloads, and capabilities, and discussed how a CUAV capability, both in terms of technology and policy, can be developed and deployed to address current and future nuclear security threats. In this regard, the IAEA also has launched a new Coordinated Research Project (CRP) to determine the nuclear security implications of not only UAVs but also all unmanned systems (airborne, ground-based, and maritime) for addressing the threats and risks that they pose to nuclear security.22

As for the efforts by countries under this survey, it was reported that in the United Kingdom, drone detectors would be deployed around sensitive infrastructure facilities, including NPPs.23 This system is designed to enable the police and security services to track any small or medium-sized drone, using scanning technology to detect potential threats even when the drones are not emitting a signal.24

 

Cyberattacks

In addition to these threats of UAVs to nuclear facilities, cyber threats are becoming more diverse and complex, and dealing with them is a major challenge, even for those that are more technologically advanced. While digitization offers convenience and benefits, there is concern that reliance on digital components of safety and physical protection systems in nuclear facilities may increase cyber risks. Cyberattacks on those systems could also be used to facilitate theft of nuclear material or sabotage leading to the release of radioactive materials.25
In such a context, the IAEA held the “International Conference on Computer Security in the Nuclear World – Security for Safety” in Vienna in June 2023, with approximately 500 participants from 94 countries and seven international organizations.26 The main objective of the conference was to discuss effective security measures to protect facilities handling nuclear and radioactive materials from cyberattacks in an increasingly digital world. At the opening the conference, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said, “Nuclear activities are growing everywhere in the world and the challenges posed by the malicious use of digital tools is real and is growing.”27

At the conference, eight topics on computer security including supply chain management, sustainability, human resources, and international cooperation were discussed. Regarding the funding for the conference, the Netherlands, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States and the EU made financial contributions.

In conjunction with the conference, the IAEA featured computer security in its official journal IAEA Bulletin, addressing the latest developments and various issues. In this, the IAEA Director General referred to artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) technologies and gave a warning stating, “Digital innovations have been making game-changing advances at an alarming rate even in the past few months. While these advances offer potential benefits such as increased operating efficiencies at nuclear facilities, reduced labor costs, and improved nuclear safety and security, digital innovations could also pose threats.”28 Similar concerns have been raised elsewhere about the possibility for malicious actors to exploit AI to conduct more sophisticated and targeted attacks, or to exploit it to compromise the integrity of networks, systems, or even sensitive information at nuclear and radiological facilities.29

 

D) Armed attacks against nuclear facilities by countries

As reported in the Hiroshima Report 2023, the attack and military occupation of Ukrainian nuclear facilities since the Russian invasion in Ukraine in February 2022 raised difficult questions about how to deal with nuclear security threats posed by states. This is beyond the conventional concept of nuclear security, which assumes non-state actors as threats. In 2023, as the conflict did not end and the fighting intensified, ensuring nuclear safety and nuclear security at nuclear facilities in Ukraine faced multiple difficulties. The situation at the Zaporizhzhya NPP (ZNPP) remained most serious since 2022, but other NPPs in Ukraine also remained at risk and experienced loss of off-site power supply.30

The following section provides an overview of events in 2023, mainly related to nuclear security at five NPPs in Ukraine, and the responses by the IAEA and others to these events.

 

Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)

At the ZNPP, which is located on the frontline of an area of intense military conflict, the Russian military continued occupation and fortification of the facility. The management of the facility was also continued by Rostom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear operator, and the Ukrainian employees at the facility were forced to perform their duties under difficult conditions.

At the ZNPP, although four main off-site power lines available before the conflict, only one off-site power line is available and this last remaining one became unavailable resulting in a complete loss of the main off-site power and emergency diesel generators were used to secure the power. This occurred eight times through December.31
In May, the number of Russian soldiers at the ZNPP exceeded 2,500, more than the number of plant staff, as Ukraine moved toward launching a counteroffensive operation to retake the territory.32 The Russian military also began attempting to improve their defenses in and around the site, reportedly laying more trenches and mines around the city.33

Against this backdrop, on June 6, the Kakhovka Dam, located in a Russian controlled area, from which the ZNPP receives water supplies to cool its reactors and spent fuel, was severely damaged, and the water level in the ZNPP reservoir began to drop.34 Both Russia and Ukraine blamed the other for the destruction of the dam, saying that the other party had destroyed it.
In July, Ukraine claimed that an explosive device had been placed on the roofs of the ZNPP’s Unit 2, Unit 3 and Unit 4 buildings.35 The IAEA immediately requested access to the building from the Russian facility operator, but was denied, and access was not finally granted until a month later.36 Subsequently, the IAEA reported that no mines or explosives were found.

On the other hand, Rosenergoatom, a Russian nuclear energy company, claimed that “Ukraine is planning to drop munitions containing nuclear waste transported from another nuclear power plant in the country on the ZNPP” and “under cover of darkness overnight on 5th July, the Ukrainian military will try to attack the Zaporizhzhia station using long-range precision equipment and kamikaze drones.”37 Officials of Rosatom, which managed the ZNPP, began evacuating the plant, and Ukrainian employees under contract to the company were advised to evacuate by July 5.38 Subsequently, Russia asked the IAEA to stop the shelling of Ukrainian forces and ensure the safety of the ZNPP, but fortunately no shelling took place.39

Toward the end of July, several directional anti-personnel mines were found in the buffer zone separating the inside and outside of the ZNPP site.40 Later, mines were also found in a location inside the site as well.41The shelling took place again in early August. Ukraine claimed that parts of ZNPP’s facilities were severely damaged by Russian shelling and accused the Russian military of using “terror tactics” by shelling the surrounding civilian areas from within the plant.42 In November, the Russian military claimed to have shot down nine Ukrainian drones near the ZNPP and accused Ukraine of risking a serious nuclear crisis.43

 

Other NPPs in Ukraine

At the Chornobyl NPP site, in March, missile attacks and disruptions to Ukraine’s domestic power grid resulted in a significant reduction in power supplied by off-site power lines.44 Regarding Rivne NPP, in January, Russia claimed that Ukraine was storing U.S.-supplied weapons (HIMARS).45 The Ukrainian side denied this, and later the IAEA also denied Russia’s claims.46 In July, certain off-site power lines were disconnected at Rivne NPP, but were reconnected two days later. All other power lines were available.47 As for the South Ukraine NPP, a cruise missile flew in the vicinity in March.48 Also, two off-site high-voltage lines were cut by shelling, but fortunately several backups were available. With regard to the Khmelnytskyy NPP, aerial vehicles flew close to the plant in March and in late October, a blast occurred and its shockwaves damaged the windows of several buildings at the site, including the passageway to the reactor buildings.49 Further explosions were also heard at the end of November near the NPP.50

 

NPP in Russia

Attacks also occurred against facilities on Russian NPP sites near the Ukrainian border. “Three drones identified in an area near the Kursk NPP, one of which caused minor damage to the façade of the building where spent nuclear fuel is stored, and the other two fell within the grounds of the administration building.”51 There was no direct impact on the operation of the NPP.

 

Responses by the international community

IAEA Secretariat

The IAEA Secretariat continued to proactively make efforts in 2023 in accordance with the Board of Governors resolutions52 adopted in 2022 as well as the request from Ukraine. The importance of the IAEA’s role in dealing with this issue was further highlighted as the UN Security Council, which is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, has not been functioning, because Russia, a party to the conflict, is a permanent member of the Security Council.
The IAEA launched the “IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya NPP (ISAMZ)” and their experts have been stationed at the site since September 1, 2022. Such missions have also started at four other Ukrainian nuclear site, namely the Rivne, South Ukraine, and Khmelnytskyy NPPs and the Chornobyl nuclear site since mid-January 2023. In addition to these five missions, the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in Ukraine (ISAMRAD) was sent to Kyiv in July.53

Each of these mission teams continued to monitor and access the status of nuclear safety and security at each facility against the “Seven Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security in Ukraine (the ‘Seven Pillars’54)” during an armed conflict presented by the IAEA Director General in early March 2022.
As for Director General Grossi, he continued to emphasize the need to establish a “nuclear safety and security protection zone (“protection zone”),” which he proposed in September 2022, and engaged in negotiations with both Russia and Ukraine. However, negotiations appeared to be difficult due to the conflicting views between Ukraine, which demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the ZNPP, and Russia, who refused to withdraw.55

Later, before Ukraine launched its counteroffensive operations, Mr. Grossi told the UN Security Council on May 30, “The nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhya NPP continues to be extremely fragile and dangerous. Military activities continue in the region and may well increase very considerably in the near future. The plant has been operating on significantly reduced staff, which despite being in temporary shut-down is not sustainable.”56 He then proposed the following “five principles,” which he identified “to help ensure nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP in order to prevent a nuclear accident and ensure the integrity of the plant.” He urged both Ukraine and Russia to adhere to them and asked Security Council members to clearly support these principles.57

1. There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel;
2. The ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant;
3. Off-site power to the plant should not 3. be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure that off-site power remains available and secure at all times;
4. All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of the ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage; and
5. No action should be taken that undermines these principles.

In response to the presentation of the “five principles,” Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya denied the responsibility of Russia by insisting “every effort had been made to prevent threats to the security of the ZNPP, which were caused by Ukraine and its Western-backed countries.”58 He also insisted that “no attacks have been carried out from the plant site” that “no heavy weapons or ammunition have been placed there, and there are no military personnel who could be used to carry out an attack.” Regarding the “five principles,” he stated, it “is in line with the measures we have already taken for a long time, in accordance with decisions taken at the national level,” and “[I]n the current situation, Russia intends to take all possible measures to strengthen the safety and security of the power plant in accordance with our domestic legislation and our obligations under the relevant international legal instruments to which we are a party.”

On the other hand, Sergiy Kyslytsya, Ukraine’s ambassador to the UN refuted the Russian Ambassador’s claim by stating “Russia continues to use the ZNPP for military purposes and has deployed about 500 military personnel and 50 heavy weapons, equipment, munitions, and explosives,” and “[W]e reiterate that Russia, by illegally occupying the ZNPP and being part of its military strategy, is violating all important international principles on nuclear safety and security and most of its obligations under international treaties.”59 With regard to the “five principles,” he insisted that they “should also include the withdrawal of Russian troops and personnel illegally stationed at the plant, guaranteeing uninterrupted power supply to the facility, and humanitarian corridors to ensure the safe and orderly rotation of personnel.”
Thus, neither Russia nor Ukraine explicitly stated that they would adhere to the “five principles.”

As for reaction of countries under this survey, Brazil urged both Russia and Ukraine to individually confirm their intention to adhere to the five principles.60 China underlined that Zaporizhzhya is “only one aspect of the crisis in Ukraine whose ultimate resolution depends on the prospects for a political settlement” and as such, both parties must meet each other halfway and resume dialogue. They further said that “countries in a position of influence should play a responsible role rather than pouring oil on the fire.”61 On the other hand, many countries called Russia to withdraw its military from Ukraine and one of them, the United Kingdom, stated the view that “the plant’s safety and security cannot be ensured as long as the Russian Federation’s illegal control continues.”62 In addition, it refuted Russia’s claim by saying that “new imagery shows the establishment of sandbag fighting positions on the roofs of several reactor buildings indicating their integration into tactical defence planning.”
Regarding the new challenge of ensuring nuclear safety and security of nuclear facilities in conflict as described above, the IAEA has begun an internal review of challenges in the application of IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance documents in armed conflict situations.63 In this relation, in the nuclear security resolution adopted by the IAEA General Conference in 2023, the following paragraph was inserted: “Encourages the Secretariat, in close consultation with Member States, to continue its work in reviewing nuclear security guidance to identify challenges in applying Nuclear Security Series in armed conflict situations” (para. 68).64

 

IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on March 9, 2023, 49 countries and Euratom, including 15 countries covered by this survey (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) issued a “Joint Statement on Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards in Ukraine” which condemned Russia for occupying the ZNPP and putting the plant at risk.65 Also, it expressed “serious concern about the continued danger to the supply of electricity to nuclear power plants in Ukraine,” and reaffirmed the importance of the “Seven Pillars.” Then, the statement called on Russia to withdraw from the ZNPP, saying that “the risk of a nuclear accident remains extremely high as long as Russia remains at the plant.”

China announced that it will contribute €200,000 in technical assistance to the IAEA to support the agency’s efforts to address safety and security issues at Ukraine’s NPPs and other nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes.66 China said it opposes armed attack against nuclear power plants and other peaceful nuclear facilities,67 and urged all parties to “abide by international law, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), and resolutely avoid human-caused nuclear accidents.” Further, China said that it will “continue to support efforts to eliminate the causes of nuclear safety risks and maintain the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities by promoting talks for peace and continuing to support efforts toward a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine.”68
The United States criticized Russia, stating that it “continues to act in defiance of IAEA Board of Governors and UN resolutions, most importantly, in violation of each of the principles set forth in the IAEA’s Seven Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security.” The United States said Russia’s “illegal presence at the Zaporizhzhya NPP in Ukraine is the most serious nuclear security danger of our time.”69

The EU noted that Chornobyl laboratory, which contains radioactive sources, was damaged and looted by Russian troops in 2022 and reiterated concern about “the potential risk caused by radioactive sources out of regulatory control.”70 Also, they reiterated “the need to consider new legally binding international rules specifically prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes.”71

At the September IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Director General Grossi said that “It is the increase of military activity around the Zaporizhzhya NPP that worries us the most,” and “[T]he possibility of a nuclear accident with serious radiological consequences continues to be a reality, and we hope this will not happen” and urged that the “five principles” continue to be followed.72 In addition, the Director General’s Report on “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards in Ukraine” which covers the period from the end of May to the end of August 2023 was published.73 The report said that all “Seven Pillars” for Nuclear Safety and Security have been, and continue to be, compromised at the ZNPP and regarding the observance of the “five principles,” Russia impeded IAEA access the site by requiring at least one week’s advance notice. It described the situation in detail and said that Russian military forces still occupy the plant.
At the 67th IAEA General Conference in September, the resolution titled “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards in Ukraine” was adopted.74 This resolution, inter alia:

➢ “Calls for the urgent withdrawal of all unauthorized military and other unauthorized personnel from Ukraine’s ZNPP and for the plant to be immediately returned to the full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities consistent with the existing license issued by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) to ensure its safe and secure operation;
➢ Fully supports the Agency’s continued provision, upon request, of technical support and assistance to Ukraine to help ensure the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities and activities involving radioactive sources, including the continued physical presence of IAEA technical experts at the Chornobyl, Rivne, Khmelnytskyy, and South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants;”

Sixty-nine countries voted in favour of the resolution, six opposed, including Russia, China and Iran, and 33 abstained.75 Regarding funding, 23 donor states and the EU made extrabudgetary contributions to support all of the Ukraine-related activities.76
The following statements were made by the countries covered by this survey at the IAEA General Conference.77

➢ Australia, Belgium, France, Japan, the UAE, and the United Kingdom expressed serious concern about the impact of Russia’s reckless actions on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards, while Australia condemned Russia’s continued control of the ZNPP.
➢ Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom also called on Russia to cease hostilities and withdraw immediately from the ZNPP and from all of Ukraine.
➢ Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UAE expressed support for the IAEA efforts and activities to ensure nuclear safety and security in Ukraine.
➢ Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, and Switzerland expressed support for the implementation of the seven pillars and five principles.
➢ Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland noted funding to support IAEA activities to ensure nuclear safety and nuclear security at Ukraine’s nuclear facilities.

Regarding the IAEA’s annual report submitted to the UN General Assembly, Russia insisted that “it is unacceptable that any provisions of the Agency’s annual report or other documents ignore the fact that nuclear facilities in Sevastopol, in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics and in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions — including the Zaporizhzhya Power Plant — are located on the territory of the Russian Federation and under its jurisdiction.”78
At the Board of Governors Meeting in November, the Director General, warned that “the situation at the ZNPP remains challenging, with six out of ‘the Seven Pillars’ compromised either fully or partially. Issues concerning staffing at the site, the conduct of regular maintenance activities, and special measures taken for securing stable cooling water supply, pose continued and significant risks to the overall nuclear safety and security of the ZNPP.”79 He also said that “There were no indication of non-observance of the five concrete principles at the ZNPP. However, limitations on the timely and unrestricted access by the Agency’s experts have affected the ability of the Agency to fully confirm all five concrete principles are being observed at all times.”

 

Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the NPT Review Conference (RevCon)

At the First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon held in Vienna on July 31-August 11, 2023, many countries expressed concern about the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine, condemned Russia’s aggression, and expressed support for the IAEA’s response efforts in this regard.

➢ The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries urged all nations to “refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities operating or under construction for peaceful purposes in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with international law.”80
➢ Australia, Belgium, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU condemned or expressed concern over Russia’s war against Ukraine and its seizure and occupation of Ukraine’s NPPs and military activities, calling on Russia to return all nuclear facilities to the Ukrainian authorities and withdraw from Ukraine.81
➢ Canada expressed concern that “Russian aggression, including attacks on operating nuclear power plants, continues to pose significant nuclear safety and security risks and significantly increases the risk of nuclear incidents and accidents.”82

At this meeting, the Chair prepared a Chair’s Summary83 under his own responsibility. In addition to expressing concern about the nuclear safety and security of the ZNPP, several paragraphs referred to the need to ensure the nuclear safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and materials in accordance with the IAEA’s “Seven Pillars.” Although no direct accusations were made against Russia in these paragraphs, Russia strongly objected to the description of its nuclear activities and insisted that the document should not be accepted and should be removed from the official record. In the end, the Chair’s Summary was not retained as an official document, as several countries, including Russia, expressed their opposition to it.

On the other hand, as a way forward, the document (distributed by the Chair), which contains recommendations on potential areas of focus for discussion at the Second PrepCom meeting, noted that at this PrepCom session “Many NPT States Parties stressed the importance of nuclear safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials for peaceful purposes in all circumstances, including in armed conflict zones, and expressed concern about the nuclear safety of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, particularly the ZNPP and its nuclear materials” (para. 19).84 It then noted as priority areas for discussion (a) “ways to strengthen compliance with the IAEA’s proposed ‘Seven Pillars’ for ensuring nuclear safety and security during armed conflict and five specific principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security in the ZNPP” and (b) “With regard to the above, ways to further support the work of the IAEA” were recommended. The Chair’s recommendations were made official documents of this Preparatory Committee in a working document entitled “Considerations by the Chair.”

 

Response by the G7

In April 2023, the G7 NPDG Meeting issued a joint statement, reaffirming the importance of the “Seven Pillars,” expressing support for the IAEA efforts, and calling on “Russia to withdraw its military and civilian personnel from the ZNPP and from all of Ukraine, to return full control of the plant to the competent Ukrainian authorities, and to refrain from taking any actions that could result in a nuclear incident at the plant.”85

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1 This chapter is authored by Junko Horibe.
2 IAEA, “Nuclear Security Series Glossary Version 1.3 (November 2015) Updated,” p. 18. Regarding targets of nuclear security threat and risk scenarios, see Hiroshima Report 2023 edition, p. 134.
3 The material that can be used for nuclear weapons typically includes HEU with an enrichment level 20 % or higher. The majority of military-grade HEU is estimated to have an enrichment level exceeding 90 %.
4 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2023: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), p. 330.
5 International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM), “Fissile Materials Stocks,” April 29, 2023, https://fissile materials.org/. Data as of 2019 indicated that Japan held 1.75 tons, which means that HEU inventories fell by 1.15 tons in Japan. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Civilian HEU: Who Has What?” October 2019, https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/heu_who_has_what.pdf.

6 IAEA, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) Report by the Director General,” GOV/2023/57, November 15, 2023, p. 8.

7 The main objectives of this Code of Conduct are to achieve a high level of safety and security of radioactive sources; to deter unauthorized access, theft, and unauthorized transfer of radioactive sources, thereby causing harmful effects on individuals, society, and the environment; and to minimize radiation effects caused by accidents and malicious acts.
8 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2023, GOV/2023/37-GC(67)/14, September 2023, p. 14.
9 “Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group,” April 17, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ files/100492352.pdf.
10 “National paper of Canada on the implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 2023,” Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, May 30, 2023, https://nuclear safety.gc.ca/eng/resources/international-cooperation/code-of-conduct/canada-report-2023.cfm.
11 Among radiation sources, high-activity radioactive sources should be replaced because of the high risk of nuclear terrorism.
12 “FACT SHEET: President Biden Signs National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security,” The White House, March 2, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/02/fact-sheet-presi dent-biden-signs-national-security-memorandum-to-counter-weapons-of-mass-destruction-terrorism-and-advance-nuclear-and-radioactive-material-security/.
13 The 2023 NTI Nuclear Security Index, NTI, July 2023, p. 36.

14 “World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements,” World Nuclear Association, November 2022, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-requireme.aspx.
15 “70% of New NNPs Made in China and Russia, and Technology Exports Are a Diplomatic Tool,” Nikkei, June 9, 2023, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUC2643R0W3A120C 2000000/.
16 “At COP28, Countries Launch Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy Capacity by 2050, Recognizing the Key Role of Nuclear Energy in Reaching Net Zero,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 1, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/articles/cop28-countries-launch-declaration-triple-nuclear-energy-capacity-2050-recognizing-key.

17 IAEA, “Research Reactor Database,” https://nucleus.iaea.org/rrdb/#/home.

18 IAEA, “Worldwide HEU and LEU Assemblies by Enrichment,” https://nucleus.iaea.org/rrdb/#/ reports/summary-report/WorldwideHEUandLEUassembliesbyEnrichment.
19 IAEA, “Regionwise Distribution of HEU and LEU,” https://nucleus.iaea.org/rrdb/#/reports/ summary-report/RegionwisedistributionofHEUandLEU.
20 “Technical Meeting on Nuclear Security Countermeasures for Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles Information Sheet,” https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/23/07/evt2005113_information_sheet.pdf.

21 Ibid.
22 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2023, p. 3.
23 Charles Hymas and Tony Diver, “Home Office to Install Anti-Drone Detectors to Protect UK from Aerial Terror Attacks,” Telegraph, January 25, 2023, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/01/25/ home-office-install-anti-drone-detectors-protect-uk-aerial-terror/; Charles Harrison, “UK Deploys Anti-Drone Tech in Nuclear Plants to Fight Growing Risk of ‘Devastating’ Attack,” Express, January 25, 2023, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1726358/drone-terrorist-attack-nuclear-plants-uk-government.

24 Charles Harrison, “UK Deploys Anti-Drone Tech in Nuclear Plants to Fight Growing Risk of ‘Devastating’ Attack,” Express, January 25, 2023, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1726358/drone-terrorist-attack-nuclear-plants-uk-government.

25 “Outpacing Cyber Threats Priorities for Cybersecurity at Nuclear Facilities,” NTI, 2016, p. 10.
26 “Addressing Cyber Threats to Ensure Nuclear Security and Safety: IAEA Conference on Computer Security Begins,” June 19, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/addressing-cyber-threats-to-ensure-nuclear-security-and-safety-iaea-conference-on-computer-security-begins.

27 Ibid.
28 Rafael Mariano Grossi, “The Essential Role of Computer Security in Nuclear Security and Safety,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 64-2, June 2023, p. 1.
29 Mitchell Hewes, “How Artificial Intelligence Will Change Information and Computer Security in the Nuclear World,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 64-2, June 2023, pp. 14-15.
30 IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement to United Nations Security Council,” May 30, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-statement-to-united-nations-security-council.

31 IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” March 9, 2023; “Ukraine War: Russian Air Strikes Cut Power at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant,” BBC, March 9, 2023, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-europe-64897888; IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” December 2, 2023.
32 Olena Roshchina, “More Military at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Than Station Personnel,” Ukrainska Pravda, May 17, 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/17/7402612/.
33 Tom Balmforth and Sarah Mcfarlane, “Russian Forces Dig in at Ukrainian Nuclear Plant, Witnesses Say,” Reuters, May 19, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-dig-ukrainian-nuclear-plant-witnesses-say-2023-05-19/; “Zaporizhzhya NPP Fortified, Mines and Trenches by Russian Troops…Over 2,500 Stationed There,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 22, 2023, https://www.yomiuri.co.jp /world/20230522-OYT1T50175/.
34 “Major Dam Breached in Southern Ukraine, Unleashing Floodwaters,” Reuters, June 7, 2023, https:// www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-blows-up-major-nova-kakhovka-dam-southern-ukraine-2023-06-06/.
35“‘Explosives’ on the Roof of the Zaporizhzhia NPP,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 5, 2023, https:// www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/20230705-OYT1T50106/; “Russia, Ukraine Accuse Each Other of Plotting Imminent Attack on Nuclear Plant,” Reuters, July 5, 2023, https://jp.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-zaporizhzhia-idAFKBN2YK1AA.
36 IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” July 5, 2023; IAEA, GOV/2023/44, September 5, 2023, p. 32.

37 “Russia, Ukraine Accuse Each Other of Plotting Imminent Attack on Nuclear Plant,” Reuters, July 5, 2023, https://jp.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-zaporizhzhia-idAFKBN2YK1AA.
38 “‘Explosives’ on the Roof of the Zaporizhzhia NPP,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 5, 2023.
39 “Russia Asks IAEA To Ensure Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant Security,” Reuters, June 23, 2023, https:// www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-asks-iaea-ensure-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-security-2023-06-23/.
40 IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” July 24, 2023. It should be noted that an initial assessment based on IAEA observations and the plant’s explanation is that the detonation of these mines would not affect the nuclear safety and security systems at the site. IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” July 5, 2023.
41 “Land Mines Placed Around Russian Occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant, UN Says,” PBS, July 25, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/land-mines-placed-around-russian-occupied-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-un-says; “New IAEA Complaint about Anti-personnel Mines in Russian-held Nuclear Plant,” Reuters, July 25, 2023, https://jp.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-nuclear-zaporizhzhia-idAFKBN2Z41 MG.
42 “Ukraine War: IAEA Says Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant Out of Control,” BBC, August 3, 2023, https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62412429; “Zaporizhzhia: Real Risk of Nuclear Disaster in Ukraine – Watchdog,” BBC, August 6, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62449982.
43 “Russia Says Ukraine ‘Playing with Fire’ with Drone Attack Near Nuclear Plant,” Reuters, November 3, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-ukrainian-drones-launched-an-attack-near-za porizhzhia-nuclear-power-2023-11-02/.
44 IAEA, “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine Report by the Director General,” GOV/2023/30, May 31, 2023, p. 32.
45 “Russia Says Ukraine Storing Arms at Nuclear Plants, Kyiv Denies Claim,” Reuters, January 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-spy-service-says-himars-other-weapons-deployed-nucle ar-power-stations-2023-01-23/.
46 “IAEA Rejects Russian Claims That Ukraine Stores Arms at Nuclear Power Plants,” Anadolu Agency, January 25, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/iaea-rejects-russian-claims-that-ukraine-stores-arms-at-nuclear-power-plants/2796455.

47 IAEA, GOV/2023/44, September 5, 2023, p. 33.
48 IAEA, GOV/2023/30, May 31, 2023, p. 33.
49 IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” October 25, 2023; “Ukraine War: Russians Likely Targeted Khmelnytsky Nuclear Plant-Zelensky,” BBC News, October 26, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67226741.
50 IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” November 29, 2023.
51 “Ukrainian Drone Struck Russian Nuclear Waste Facility Risking Disaster, Moscow Says,” BBC News, October 28, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-drone-struck-russian-nuclear-was te-facility-ministry-says-2023-10-28/; IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” October 27, 2023.
52 IAEA, GOV/2022/17, March 3, 2022; IAEA, GOV/2022/58, September 15, 2022; IAEA, GOV/2022/71, November 17, 2023. These resolutions “requested the Director General to continue to closely monitor the situation regarding nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine and regularly report formally to the Board on these matters.”
53 IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” July 24, 2023.

54 The “Seven Pillars” are: 1. The physical integrity of facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained; 2. All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times; 3. The operating staff must be able to fulfill their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure; 4. There must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites; 5. There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites; 6. There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems, and emergency preparedness and response measures; and 7. There must be reliable communication with the regulator and others. IAEA, “IAEA Director General Grossi’s Initiative to Travel to Ukraine,” March 4, 2022, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-general-grossis-initiative-to-travel-to-ukraine.
55 On March 27, Mikhail Ulyanov, Permanent Representative to the Permanent Mission of Russia in Vienna, said, “Russia has no special expectations for Mr. Grossi’s visit, indicating that he was not prepared to withdraw.” “IAEA Director General Visits ZNPP Where ‘Military Activities Continue’… Russia Not Prepared to Withdraw,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 29, 2023; IAEA, “IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine,” January 6, 2023.
56 “IAEA Director General Statement to United Nations Security Council,” IAEA News, May 30, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-statement-to-united-nations-securi ty-council.
57 “Briefing Security Council, International Atomic Energy Agency Director Outlines Five Principles to Prevent Nuclear Accident at Zaporizhzhia Power Plant in Ukraine,” IAEA News, May 30, 2023, https:// press.un.org/en/2023/sc15300.doc.htm.

58 “IAEA Chief Outlines Five Principles to Avert Nuclear ‘Catastrophe’ in Ukraine,” UN News, May 30, 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1137172.
59 Ibid; “Ukraine NPP Counter-offensive ‘Concerns Dangerous Situation,’ IAEA Head,” Asahi Shimbun, June 14, 2023; “U.N. Monitor Aims to Cross Front Line in Ukraine to Inspect Nuclear Plant,” New York Times, June 13, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/13/world/europe/grossi-zaporizhzhia-nucle ar-plant.html.
60 “Briefing Security Council, IAEA Director Outlines Five Principles to Prevent Nuclear Accident at Zaporizhzhia Power Plant in Ukraine,” United Nations, May 30, 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023 /sc15300.doc.htm.

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 IAEA, GC(66)/RES/7, September 30, 2022, p. 11. “Encourages the Secretariat to consider developing, in close consultation with Member States, new nuclear security guidance to address the security risks and implications posed by armed attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, and further encourages the Agency to consider reflecting these aspects in further Nuclear Security Plans.” (para. 66)
64 IAEA, GC(67)/RES/8, September 2023, p. 11.
65 “Joint Statement on Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards in Ukraine,” IAEA BoG Meeting, March 2023, https://www.government.is/library/09-Embassies/Vienna/230131-Joint%20Statment%20on%20 Ukraine-FINAL-With%20Sponsors.pdf.

66 “China Supports IAEA’s Efforts to Ensure Nuclear Security in Ukraine,” CGTN, March 6, 2023, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-03-06/China-supports-IAEA-s-efforts-to-ensure-nuclear-security-in-Ukraine–1hXqLFzvtQs/index.html.
67 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” February 24, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713. html.
68 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on March,” March 8, 2023, http://ag.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202303/t20230308_11037728.htm.
69 “U.S. Statement under Agenda Item 3,” at the IAEA BoG Meeting, March 6, 2023.
70 “EU Statement on Nuclear Security Review 2023,” at the IAEA BoG Meeting, March 2023.
71 “EU Statement on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine,” at the IAEA BoG Meeting, March 9, 2023.
72 “IAEA Director General Briefs Board of Governors,” IAEA News, September 11, 2023, https://www. iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-director-general-briefs-board-of-governors-fukushima-daiichi-alps-water-release-ukraine-iran-and-new-atoms4food-initiative.
73 “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine: Report by the Director General,” GOV/2023/44, September 5, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/23/09/gov2023-44.pdf.

74 IAEA, GC(67)/RES/16, September 2023. The resolution also recalled the three resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2022 and expressed serious concern over Russia’s failure to respond to the IAEA BoG’s request to Russia to immediately cease all actions against and in Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and to withdraw Russian military and other personnel from the ZNPP.
75 IAEA, GC(67)/RES/16, September 2023; “Invasion of Ukraine, IAEA Resolution Urging Russia to Withdraw from NPP,” Mainichi Shimbun, September 30, 2023, p. 7; “IAEA adopts resolution demanding immediate return of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to full control of Ukraine,” Ukrainska Pravda, September 29, 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/09/29/7421917/.
76 “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” IAEA, November 22, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-th e-board-of-governors-22-november-2023.
77 “Statements to the IAEA General Conference,” IAEA, September 2023, https://www.iaea.org/about/ governance/general-conference/gc67/statements.

78 “Frank Discussion Follows Submission of International Atomic Energy Agency Report to General Assembly, with Focus on Compliance, Risk of Nuclear Disaster,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Release, GA/12558, November 8, 2023.
79 “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” IAEA, November 22, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-22-november-2023.
80 “Statement by Indonesia on Behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned States: Cluster 3,” August 8, 2023.

81 Ray Acheson and Laura Varella, “Report on Cluster Three,” NPT News in Review, Reaching Critical Will, Vol. 18, No. 5, August 9, 2023.
82 Ibid, p. 11.
83 It is prepared on the basis of the general discussions in the PrepCom meetings, the discussions on the three pillars of the NPT, and the contents of each country’s working papers, and is usually attached to the “decisions” (official documents) of each PrepCom meeting, as is the practice.
84 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/6, August 10, 2023.

85 “Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group.”