Hiroshima Report 2018(2) IAEA SAFEGUARDS APPLIED TO THE NPT NNWS
A) Conclusion of IAEA Safeguards Agreements
Under Article III-1 of the NPT, “[e]ach Non-nuclearweapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The basic structure and content of the safeguards agreement are specified in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), known as INFCIRC/153, which each state negotiates with the IAEA and then signs and ratifies. As of December 2016, 12 NPT NNWS have yet to conclude CSAs with the IAEA.27
In accordance with a strengthened safeguards system in place since 1997, an NPT NNWS or any other state may also conclude with the IAEA an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement, based on a model document known as INFCIRC/540. As of December 2017, 126 NPT NNWS have ratified Additional Protocols. Honduras, Senegal and Thailand newly ratified them in 2017. Iran started provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol in January 2016, while it has yet to ratify the Protocol.
A state’s faithful implementation of the Additional Protocol, along with the CSA, allows the IAEA Secretariat to draw a so-called “broader conclusion” that “all nuclear material in the State has remained in peaceful activities.” This conclusion is that the Agency finds no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities or any undeclared nuclear material or activities in that country. Subsequently, the IAEA implements so-called “integrated safeguards,” which is defined as the “optimized combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under [CSAs] and [Additional Protocols], to maximize effectiveness and efficiency within available resources.” As of the end of 2016, 69 NNWS have applied integrated safeguards.28
The current status of the signature and ratification of the CSAs and the Additional Protocols and the implementation of integrated safeguards by the NPT NNWS studied in this project is presented in the following table. In addition to the IAEA safeguards, EU countries accept safeguards conducted by EURATOM, and Argentina and Brazil conduct mutual inspections under the bilateral Brazilian-Argentine Agency for According and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).
In 2005, the IAEA modified what is called the Small Quantity Protocol (SQP) which until then held in abeyance most of the operative provisions of the IAEA’s verification tools for states which have only very small quantities of nuclear material. In the resolution, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards” adopted in September 2016, the IAEA General Conference called on all States with unmodified small Quantity Protocols (SQPs) to either rescind or amend them.29 As of June 2017, the amended an intention to introduce nuclear energy, Saudi Arabia has yet to accept an amended SQP.
B) Compliance with IAEA Safeguards Agreements
The IAEA Annual Report 2016 stated:
Of the 124 States that had both a CSA and an [Additional Protocol (AP)] in force the Agency concluded that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities for 69 States; for the remaining 55 States, as the necessary evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing, the Agency concluded only that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. For 49 States with a CSA but with no AP in force, the Agency concluded that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.30
NORTH KOREA
Because North Korea since 2002 has refused to accept the IAEA safeguards, the agency has attempted to analyze the North’s nuclear activities through satellite images and other information. The IAEA Director-General summarized the current situation of North Korea’s nuclear issues in relation to the implementation of the IAEA safeguards in August 2017, as follows.31
- 5MW Graphite Reactor: there were indications consistent with the reactor’s operation, including steam discharges and the outflow of cooling water.
- Radiochemical Laboratory: The Agency has not observed indications of it being in operation during the reporting period.32
- Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant: There were indications consistent with the use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility located within the plant.
- Light Water Reactor (LWR) under construction: There were indications in the LWR construction yard of an increase in activities consistent with the fabrication of certain reactor components. The Agency has not observed indications of the delivery or introduction of major reactor components into the reactor containment building.
- The Pyongsan Mine and Concentration Plant: There were indications of ongoing mining, milling and concentration activities at locations previously declared as the Pyongsan uranium mine and the Pyongsan uranium concentration plant.
In this report, the IAEA unveiled that “in August 2017, a DPRK Team was formed within the Department of Safeguards. The purpose of this team is to enhance the monitoring of the DPRK’s nuclear programme; maintain updated verification approaches and procedures for the nuclear facilities known to exist within the DPRK; prepare for the Agency’s return to the DPRK; and ensure the availability of appropriate verification technologies and equipment.”33
IRAN
The IAEA verifies and monitors implementation of Iran’s nuclear obligations under the JCPOA, as well as the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. As mentioned above, IAEA Director-General reports have been regularly submitted to the Board of Governors every quarter. At the 2017 IAEA General Conference, Director-General Amano stated: “The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran continue.”34
U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, in August 2017 encouraged the IAEA to seek access to Iranian military bases to ensure that Iran did not conceal activities prohibited by the JCPOA, particularly nuclear weapons-related activities prohibited under Section T.35 However, the IAEA reportedly responded that it would only seek access when it had legitimate reason to suspect banned activity.36
SYRIA
As for Syria, the IAEA Director-General judged in May 2011 that the facility at Dair Alzour, which was destroyed by an Israeli air raid in September 2007, was very likely a clandestinely constructed, undeclared nuclear reactor. While the IAEA repeatedly called on Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency so as to solve the outstanding issues, Syria has not responded to that request.37
[27] This number includes Palestine, which acceded to the NPT in 2015. Those 12 countries have little nuclear material, or do not conduct nuclear-related activities.
[28] IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2016, September 2017, p. 14.
[29] GC(61)/16, July 26, 2017.
[30] IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2016, September 2017, p. 92.
[31] GOV/2017/36-GOV(61)/21, August 25, 2017.
[32] As reported in the chapter on Disarmament, the radiochemical laboratory was reported to have been operating intermittently earlier in the year.
[33] GOV/2017/36-GOV(61)/21, August 25, 2017.
[34] “Director General’s Statement to Sixty-first Regular Session of IAEA General Conference,” September 18, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-to-sixty-first-regular-session-of-iaea-general-conference-2017.
[35] “Nuclear Inspectors Should Have Access to Iran Military Bases: Haley,” Reuters, August 26, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-haley-idUSKCN1B524I.
[36] “IAEA Doesn’t Check Iran Military Sites for Nukes Because There’s ‘No Reason To,’” Sputnik News, September 1,2017, https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201709011056978649-iran-military-sites-nuclear-weapons/.
[37] IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2016, September 2017, pp. 94-95.
