Hiroshima Report 2018(6) TRANSPARENCY IN THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
A) Efforts for transparency
In addition to accepting IAEA full-scope safeguards, as described earlier, a state should aim to be fully transparent about its nuclear-related activities and future plans, in order to demonstrate that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. A state that concludes an Additional Protocol with the IAEA is obliged to provide information on its general plans for the next ten-year period relevant to any nuclear fuel cycle development (including nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities). Most countries actively promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy have issues mid- or long-term nuclear development plans, including the construction of nuclear power plans.94 The international community may be concerned about the possible development of nuclear weapon programs when states conduct nuclear activities without publishing their nuclear development plans (e.g., Israel, North Korea and Syria), or are engaged in nuclear activities which seem inconsistent with their plans (e.g., allegedly, Iran).
From the standpoint of transparency, communications received by the IAEA from certain member states concerning their policies regarding the management of plutonium, including the amount of plutonium held, are also important. Using the format of the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549) agreed in 1997, the five NWS, Belgium, Germany, Japan and Switzerland annually publish data on the amount of civil unirradiated plutonium under their control. By December 2017, all except the United Kingdom had declared their civilian plutonium holdings as of December 2016. France and Germany had reported their respective holdings of not only civil plutonium but also HEU. Japan’s report submitted to the IAEA, mentioned above, was based on the annual report “The Current Situation of Plutonium Management in Japan” released by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission.95
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, Iran, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey and the UAE have published the amount of fissile material holdings, or at least have placed their declared nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. From this, it may be concluded that these states have given clear evidence of transparency about their civil nuclear activities.
B) Multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle
Several countries have sought to establish multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle, including nuclear fuel banks, as one way to dissuade NNWS from adopting indigenous enrichment technologies. Austria, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU, as well as six countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) jointly, have made their respective proposals.
Among those proposals, nuclear fuel banks have actually and concretely made progress. Subsequent to the establishment of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) in Angarsk (Russia) and the American Assured Fuel Supply, the IAEA LEU fuel bank in Kazakhstan was inaugurated in August 2017. The LEU fuel bank was mainly funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Kuwait, Norway, UAE, the United States and the EU. The IAEA LEU bank will store up to 90 tons of LEU—sufficient to run a 1,000 MW light-water reactor—in the form of uranium hexafluoride.96 This is the first fuel bank under the direct support of the international organization: the IAEA will bear the costs of purchase and delivery of LEU; and Kazakhstan will meet the cost of LEU storage.97
[94] The World Nuclear Association’s website (http://world-nuclear.org/) provides summaries of the current and future plans of civil nuclear programs around the world.
[95] Office of Atomic Energy Policy, Cabinet Office, “The Status Report of Plutonium Management in Japan—2016,” August 1, 2017, http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/kettei/170801_e.pdf.
[96] “LEU Fuel Bank in Kazakhstan is Inaugurated,” IPFM Blog, August 29, 2017, http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2017/08/leu_fuel_bank_in_kazakhst.html.
[97] “Kazakhstan Signs IAEA ‘Fuel Bank’ Agreement,” World Nuclear News, May 14, 2015, http://world-nuclear-news.org/UF-Kazakhstan-signs-IAEA-fuel-bank-agreement-14051502.html.
