Hiroshima Report 2018(1) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES
According to the IAEA definition, a nuclear security threat is “a person or group of persons with motivation, intention and capability to commit criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities or other acts determined by the state to have an adverse impact on nuclear security.”55 The IAEA recommends that the state’s physical protection requirements for nuclear material and nuclear facilities should be based on a Design Basis Threat (DBT), specifically for unauthorized removal of Category I nuclear material, sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities that have potentially high radiological consequences.56 Furthermore, the IAEA recommended that security requirements for radioactive material “should be adopted depending on whether the radioactive material concerned is sealed source, unsealed source, disused sealed source or waste, and should cover transport.”57
The latest version of the IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) was revised and published in 2011. In this revised edition, the IAEA recommends that requirements for physical protection should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of threat, the relative attractiveness, the nature of the nuclear material and potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear facilities.58 the IAEA also suggests that the physical protection system should be designed to deny unauthorized access of persons or equipment to the targets, minimize opportunity of insiders, and protect the targets against possible stand-off attacks-an attack, executed at a distance from the target nuclear facility or transport, which does not require adversary hands-on access to the target, or require the adversary to overcome the physical protection system-consistent with the state’s threat assessment or DBT.59 The objectives of the state’s physical protection regime, which is an essential component of the state’s nuclear security regime, should be to protect against unauthorized removal, locate and recover missing nuclear material, protect against sabotage, and mitigate or minimize effects of sabotage.60
The nuclear material itself is the primary factor for determining the physical protection measures against unauthorized removal. Therefore, categorization based on the different types of nuclear material in terms of element, isotope, quantity and irradiation is the basis for a graded approach for protection against unauthorized removal of “attractive” nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear explosive device, which itself depends on the type of nuclear material, isotopic composition, physical and chemical form, degree of dilution, radiation level, and quantity (see Table 3-1).61
Generally, plutonium with an isotopic concentration of Pu-239 of 80% or more is more attractive than other plutonium isotopes from a standpoint of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices by terrorists. Weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) is usually enriched to 90% or higher levels of U-235. Both of these high-grade nuclear materials require high-level protection measures. In assessing the importance of preventing illegal transfers and sabotage, even if countries do not possess weapon-grade HEU or plutonium, they are risk if they possess a uranium enrichment facility or a nuclear reactor and a plutonium reprocessing facility. The number of such sensitive facilities in a country will be the subject of assessment for a state’s effort in enhancing nuclear security. Of course, the level of these protection measures will vary depending on the geopolitical circumstance or the domestic security situation. Table 3-2 shows the lates evaluations made by the International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) and by other relevant research bodies including the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in its “Civilian HEU Dynamic Map,” of fissile material holdings.
Even today, HEU and plutonium equivalent to nearly 200,000 nuclear weapons exist in the whole world.62
Furthermore, more than 90% of the global HEU and weapon-grade plutonium stockpile is possessed by the United States and Russia. For terrorist’s intent on acquiring material for a nuclear weapons, these and other fissile material holdings can be considered to present the most attractive targets. While the global stockpile of HEU and separated plutonium has been occupying the attention of the international community and civil society, there is little officially disclosed information about stockpiles of HEU and weapon-grade plutonium by individual states, due to the sensitivity of these materials.
In spite of these constraints, transparency of nuclear material holdings is important, in principle. According to the NIT’s “Civilian HEU Dynamic Map,”63 the estimated holdings of HEU and plutonium of some countries other than the ones in Table 3-2 are estimated as follow:
- Countries assumed to retain approximately 1 ton of HEU (category I is 5 kg and more): Kazakhstan (10,470-10,770kg), Canada (1038kg*)
- Countries assumes to retain 1 kg and more but less than 1 ton of HEU: Australia (2kg), Iran (8kg), the Netherlands (730-810kg), Nigeria (less than 1 kg*), Norway (1-9kg), South Africa (700-750 kg (unspecified)*), Syria (less than 1 kg*)
*: Updated figures in 2017
As a result of activities of the recent Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the number of countries that completely removed HEU has increased in recent year. Mexico, Jamaica, Columbia, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Latvia, Chana, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, etc. are citied as countries that achieved complete removal of such HEU.64 For reference information, estimated holdings of HEU and plutonium of some countries not in the list of this survey are as follows:
- Countries assumed to retain 1 kg and more but less than 1 ton of HEU: Belarus (80-280 kg), Italy (100-119 kg)65
Any opening reactor or facility for handling spent fuel presents a potential risk of illicit transfer of fissile material or sabotage against facility. Research reactors can pose a greater risk if they utilize HEU fuel and if they are associated with spent-fuel reprocessing facilities or even unsecured storage of spent fuel.
The IAEA’s Research Reactor Database (RRDB)66 shows that 221 out of a total of 787 research reactors are currently in operation (137 in developed countries, 84 in developing countries). Another 20 reactors (11 in developed countries, nine in developing countries) are temporarily shut down, seven reactors (four in developed countries, three in developing countries) are under construction, 12 reactors (three in developed countries, nine in developing countries) are scheduled for construction, 111 reactors (97 in developed countries, 14 in developing countries) have been shut down, 352 reactors (336 in developed countries, 26 in developing countries) are decommissioned, and construction of 15 reactors (11 in developed countries, four in developing countries) have been canceled. Compared with the previous year, the number of research reactors increased by 13 in the whole world, while the number of research reactors with shutdown (closed) status decreased to 24 in developed countries and six in developing countries. In addition, the number of research reactors that were decommissioned increased by six in total. It is also noteworthy that the number of research reactors whose construction has been canceled has increased to seven in developed countries.
According to the IAEA, 20,663 spent fuel assemblies from research reactors are enriched to levels above 20% and 9,532 of these stored fuel assemblies are enriched to levels at or above 90%.67 In terms of geographical distribution: 10,627 spent HEU fuel assemblies, which are over half of the total, are currently stored in Eastern Europe, 572 are located in Africa and Middle East, 3,492 in Asia, 4,273 in Western Europe, 85 in Latin America and 1,614 in North America. 68 In this way, in view of the regional distribution of substances with a high attractiveness to terrorists, prevention of illegal transfers and sabotage against facilities becomes critically important as a measure against nuclear security risk, regardless of whether or not the reactor is in operation.
Table 3-3 outlines the presence of nuclear power plants, research reactors, uranium enrichment facilities, and reprocessing facilities in surveyed countries, as risk indicators.
The IAEA recommends that a state defines the risk based on the amount, forms, composition, mobility, and accessibility of nuclear and other radioactive material and takes prospective measures against the defined risk. In terms of unauthorized removal, nuclear or other radioactive material and related production facilities are also potential targets.69 To reduce the potential for sabotage within a plant, the IAEA recommends that a state “establishes its threshold(s) of unacceptable radiological consequences” and identifies the vital areas where risk associated materials, devices, and functions are located are designated “in order to determine appropriate levels of physical protection taking into account existing nuclear safety and radiation protection.”70
In recent years, efforts are also being made on nuclear security of radioactive sources (RI security). In this field, the IAEA publishes “Nuclear Security Series No.11, Security of Radioactive Sources (2009)”71 and “Nuclear Security Series No.14, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities (2011)”.72 Also, at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2016, 28 countries and INTERPOL jointly released a “Gift Basket” statement on strengthening the security of high activity sealed radioactive sources, reflecting the IAEA’s code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources.73 Regarding the individual efforts of each country related to RI security, in March 2017, a regional training course on the Security of Radioactive Sources was held in Obninsk, Russia.74 In April, a meeting of the Working Group Meeting on Radioactive Source Security was held in Vienna.75 In addition, in July the international training course on the Security of Radioactive Sources was held in Vienna76 and in the same month the regional training course on Security of Radioactive Material in Transport for French-speaking African Countries was held in Dakar, Senegal.77
[55] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.20, “Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime,” 2013, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1590_web.pdf.
[56] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.13, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5),” 2011, p. 13.
[57] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.14, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities,” 2011, p. 14.
[58] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.13, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5),” 2011, paragraph 3.37.
[59] Ibid., paragraph 5.14.
[60] Ibid., paragraph 2.1.
[61] Ibid., paragraph 4.5.
[62] Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser, “Global Fissile Material Report 2015: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpile and Production,” NPT Review Conference, May 8, 2015, http://fissilematerials.org/library/ipfm15.pdf. While HEU stocks are decreasing, plutonium stocks are increasing, mainly due to increased inventory of civilian plutonium.
[63] NTI, “Civilian HEU Dynamic Map,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, December 2017, http://www.nti.org/gmap/other_maps/heu/index.html.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] IAEA, Research Reactor Data Base, IAEA website, https://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch.aspx?rf=1.
[67] IAEA, Worldwide HEU and LEU assemblies by Enrichment, IAEA website, https://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/Reports/Container.aspx?Id=C2.
[68] IAEA, Regionwise distribution of HEU and LEU, IAEA website, https://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/Reports/Container.aspx?Id=C1.
[69] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities,” 2011, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1487_web.pdf.
[70] Ibid., p. 14.
[71] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 11, “Security of Radioactive Sources,” 2009, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1387_web.pdf.
[72] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities,” 2011, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1487_web.pdf.
[73] “Joint Statement Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS),” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, March 11, 2016, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/568be36505 f8 e 2af8023adf7/t/57050be927d4bd14a1daad3f/1459948521768/Joint+Statement+on+the+Security+of+High+Activity+Radioactive+Sources.pdf.
[74] Regional Training Course on the Security of Radioactive Sources, March 13-17, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/regional-training-course-on-the-security-of-radioactive-sources-0.
[75] Meeting of the Working Group on Radioactive Source Security, April 24-27, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/meeting-of-the-working-group-on-radioactive-source-security.
[76] International Training Course on the Security of Radioactive Sources, July 3-7, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/international-training-course-on-the-security-of-radioactive-sources.
[77] Regional Training Course on Security of Radioactive Material in Transport for French-speaking African Countries, July 3-7, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/regional-training-course-on-security-of-radioactive-material-in-transportfor-french-speaking-african-countries.
