A) Approaches toward a world without nuclear weapons

According to the preamble of the NPT, states parties “[declare] their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, [and urge] the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective.” Article VI of the Treaty stipulates that “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

As mentioned in the previous Hiroshima Reports, no country, including any of the nuclear-armed states, openly opposes the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons or the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Their commitment to nuclear disarmament has been reiterated in various fora, including the NPT review process and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). However, such statements do not necessarily mean that nuclear-armed states are actively pursuing realization of a world without nuclear weapons. Owing in part to this, the stalemate in nuclear disarmament continued again in 2020.

On the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on September 26, 2020, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated, “We need a strengthened, inclusive and renewed multilateralism built on trust and based on international law that can guide us to our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Those States that possess nuclear weapons must lead. They must return to real, good-faith dialogue to restore trust and confidence, reduce nuclear risk and take tangible steps in nuclear disarmament. They should reaffirm the shared understanding that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. They should take steps to implement the commitments they have undertaken.”9

UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu also stated, in touching upon the global pandemic of COVID- 19, “We have seen how vulnerable the world is. Something that was so unimaginable actually happened. And with an incredible speed, it spread across the world. Previously unthinkable situations can happen. This is also applicable to nuclear weapons.”10 She also argued, “It’s hard to imagine a nuclear war actually happening, but to prevent it, we need to reduce the risk.”11

Nuclear-armed states

In February 2020, the five NWS held a regular meeting on nuclear arms control in London. As in previous years, no joint statement was adopted. It was reported that China, Russia and the United States disagreed over the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and other issues, and the only thing the five countries agreed on was their opposition to the TPNW. At the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the NWS, reported the result of the NWS meeting, which included that: they reiterated their commitment to the NPT in all its aspects, such as continuing their individual and collective efforts to uphold their obligations, and advancing the goals of the treaty in all its aspects; and they exchanged views on the current situation in the international security environment and other issues relevant to the NPT Review Conference (RevCon).12

On the 50th anniversary of the NPT in March 2020, the NWS stated, “We remain committed under the NPT to the pursuit of good faith negotiations on effective measures related to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. By helping to ease international tensions and create conditions of stability, security and trust among nations, the NPT has made a vital contribution to nuclear disarmament. The NPT continues to help create conditions that would be essential for further progress on nuclear disarmament.”13

At the First Committee of the UNGA in October 2020, France, on behalf of the NWS, reported on the state of play in the process of dialogue among the five countries. In its statement, France reaffirmed the NWS’s commitment to the NPT mentioned above, and listed the following six points as efforts for nuclear disarmament agreed upon at the NWS meeting:14

➢ The dialogue on doctrines;
➢ NWS’s readiness to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the CD;
➢ Finalization and publication of the second edition of the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms;
➢ Further discussions between NWS and the ASEAN countries on the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty;
➢ Sharing with the international community the many benefits of nuclear technology and its applications for peaceful purposes; and
➢ Presenting NWS’s respective national implementation reports to the NPT RevCon.

Each NWS individually also mentioned at the 2020 UNGA First Committee that they are committed to nuclear disarmament.

China, for instance, stated that “[e]ver since the first day of possessing nuclear weapons, China has been advocating the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons,” and said that it has declared its commitment to the no first use of nuclear weapons, as well as the security assurances provided to the NNWS. At the same time, China reiterated its traditional argument that significant reductions by the largest NWS in its arsenal in a verifiable, irreversible, and legally binding manner are a necessary condition for other NWS to participate in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament15.

Russia argued that, “nuclear disarmament can be reached only through step-by-step approach and based on the principle of equal and indivisible security for all, taking into account all factors affecting the strategic stability.” It also reported that, after the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019, Moscow “made a unilateral commitment not to deploy intermediate- and shorter-range ground-launched missiles in those regions of the world until similar U.S.-manufactured systems are deployed there.”16

The United States called for resolving the issue on extending the New START, as discussed below, and for a transition to a new generation of arms control in which not only the United States and Russia but also China would participate, while criticizing Russia’s violation of the nuclear arms control treaties and Chinese and Russian aggressive modernization of their nuclear forces, as destabilizing the international security environment.17

In the meantime, at the First Committee of the UNGA in 2020, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher A. Ford made the following statement, in which the importance of nuclear disarmament in the context of the NPT compared to non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy was not necessarily emphasized:

[T]he NPT remains the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty also remains essential to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for human health and development. Moreover the NPT’s Article VI makes clear that each NPT Party has an obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”18

As for other NWS, France stated that its basis for addressing its commitment under the NPT and to nuclear disarmament are “strict compliance with the central norm of the NPT, which we call on all States to implement, with equal attention to its three pillars,” and continuing “to promote the only realistic way forward, which is the gradual approach.”19 The United Kingdom stated, “[It] reiterates its strong support for the NPT and the step-by-step approach towards nuclear disarmament. …We remain deeply committed to our collective long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, under the framework of the NPT.”20

Among the other nuclear-armed states outside the NPT, India, at the First Committee of the UNGA, reiterated its commitment as follows: “India is steadfast in its commitment to the goal of universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Our call is [sic] for complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a step by step process.”21 Pakistan, on the other hand, mentioned its proposal for a strategic restraint regime in South Asia, and added that “any meaningful progress on disarmament requires concrete steps to address regional and global challenges. In this regard, nuclear disarmament must be pursued in a comprehensive and holistic manner, in line with the principles agreed upon by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.”22

Israel, which neither affirms nor denies possession of nuclear weapons, made no mention of its commitment to nuclear disarmament at the UNGA First Committee. Meanwhile, it expressed distrust toward the NPT as follows: “The NPT in itself does not provide a remedy for the unique security challenges of the region, let alone the repeated violations of the Treaty by some of its member states. Four of the five cases of serious violations of the [NPT] took place in the Middle East since its entering into force.”23

Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND)

The United States, which argues that the international security environment needs to be improved in order to promote nuclear disarmament, launched the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) Working Group (CEWG) in 2019. In November 2019, the second Working Group meeting was held in the United Kingdom, and 31 countries attended to discuss the following three topics which had been raised at the first meeting: measures to modify the security environment to reduce incentives for states to retain, acquire, or increase their holdings of nuclear weapons; institutions and processes NWS and NNWS can put in place to bolster non-proliferation efforts and build confidence in nuclear disarmament; and interim measures to reduce the likelihood of war among nuclear-armed states. They also decided to continue the discussion during the 2020-2021 period.

At the CEND Leadership Group Meeting in September 2020, in which 43 countries (including NWS, NNWS, non- NPT states, NAM countries, U.S. allies, and TPNW signatories) participated, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Ford stated, “[I]f diplomatic dialogue were to have a real chance at working through the many obstacles that impeded disarmament progress, it would need always to bear in mind three ‘inescapable facts,’” which include:24

➢ Disarmament movement only becomes available when, and to the degree that, real-world weapons possessors feel that such movement is feasible, safe, verifiable, and sustainable;
➢ Such movement thus depends hugely upon the nature of, and perceived trends in, the prevailing conditions of rivalry, conflict, and threat in the security environment; and that therefore,
➢ The only serious and viable path to making a future nuclear weapons-free world more likely lies through making sustainable improvements in those conditions.

In November 2020, a CEWG plenary meeting was held, but details were not reported. At its Civil Society Outreach Event, Assistant Secretary Ford explained that the CEWG meetings would occur roughly quarterly, with plenary sessions in the late autumn of 2021 and in the spring of 2023; by early 2023, the initial phase of work for each Sub-Group would been completed, and some kind of report would be created; and in early 2023, the participants would have the chance to evaluate what form the second phase of work would take.25

NNWS

Regarding approaches to nuclear disarmament, while the five NWS have argued for a step-by-step approach, NNWS allied with the United States have proposed a “progressive approach” based on building-block principles, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries have called for launching negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

At the 2020 UNGA, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa) said that it was “established [with]…the belief that the only protection against this existential threat is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again,” and stated, “Since its establishment, the NAC has advocated for the implementation of concrete, transparent, mutually reinforcing, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament measures and the fulfilment of obligations and commitments within the framework of the NPT.”26 Regarding the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, the NAC argued, “Although some progress has been achieved over this period, it is far from sufficient. We are deeply concerned by the slowness in progress and by the efforts of some States to justify this, based on existing or new international security challenges. For the NAC, the global security environment is not an excuse for inaction, but rather, it reinforces the need for urgency. What is lacking is not favorable conditions, but political will and determination.”27

The NAM countries also criticized the situation surrounding nuclear disarmament and stated, “It has become obvious that existing approach adopted by NWS, the so-called step-by-step approach, has failed to make concrete and systematic progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite tangible and indisputable positive developments on nuclear nonproliferation in past decades, forward movement on nuclear disarmament continues to be held hostage by misguided notions, including strategic stability. It is time to take a new and comprehensive approach on nuclear disarmament.”28 In the UNGA resolution proposed by the NAM countries, they “[reiterated] its call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in 2021 and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time.”29

At the 2020 UNGA, Japan made the following statement:

As Prime Minister Mr. Suga stated in his address at the UNGA, Hiroshima and Nagasaki must never be repeated. With this resolve, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during the war, Japan will spare no effort in order to realize a world without nuclear weapons.

…At the same time, we are undeniably living in a severe and unstable security environment with growing international tensions. The measures that we take to reach our shared goal – the realization of a world without nuclear weapons – must take into account this reality. Realizing a world without nuclear weapons requires nuclear weapon states to take concrete measures.30

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the NPT’s entry into force in March 2020, a number of NNWS issued statements welcoming it. For instance, Japan released the following statement by Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi:

Japan highly appreciates NPT’s invaluable contribution to the consolidation and maintenance of international peace and security as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The international community is currently facing the growing threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as a divergence of views on nuclear disarmament. Against this backdrop, we must uphold and strengthen the NPT regime in order to take realistic and concrete measures with the participation of both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Looking ahead to the upcoming 2020 NPT Review Conference, Japan calls on the international community to unite in order to ensure this Treaty will continue to play a significant role. Japan stands ready to work tirelessly to proceed steadily towards the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.31

Meanwhile, 17 countries (including Austria, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines and South Africa) expressed their sense of urgency as follows:

Though some progress on nuclear disarmament has been achieved over the last five decades, it is far from sufficient and the obligation of nuclear disarmament has still not been fulfilled. Current modernization and upgrading programmes put the progress achieved in danger of reversal. At the same time, we see a highly concerning erosion of the multilateral nuclear disarmament and arms-control architecture with existing agreements being terminated and others in danger. The contemporary global security environment and challenges warrant urgent progress.”32

They also argued, “It is now time that States Parties translate words into concrete actions backed by clear and agreed upon benchmarks and timelines. Only through such efforts can we look ahead towards a successful next 50 years of the NPT, improving on the important achievements of the last 50 years, which we presently commemorate.33

In addition, a statement by the NAC countries said: “It is fundamental to recall that the basis for the adoption of the NPT and its indefinite extension is the Grand Bargain: nuclear-weapon States legally committed themselves to pursuing and achieving nuclear disarmament, in return for which nonnuclear weapon States legally committed themselves not to develop nuclear weapons. Any presumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons would run counter to the object and purpose of the NPT and threatens to erode its credibility and effectiveness.”34

Stockholm Initiative

In 2019, Sweden proposed a “Steppingstone approach,” in which it argued “the need for ‘actionable’ implementation measures” and listed concrete measures as “stepping stones” under the four principles: reducing the salience of nuclear weapons; rebuilding habits of cooperation; reducing nuclear risks; and taking steps to enhance transparency.35

In its document issued in February 2020, Sweden re-clarified that the purpose of the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, based on the steppingstone approach, is “to build political support for a pragmatic and results-oriented disarmament agenda within the NPT framework. The initiative aims to reach common ground and promote a successful outcome of the NPT review conference.” It also states, “[The Stockholm Initiative] seeks to complement others by building broad political support for an ambitious and realistic disarmament agenda…The Stockholm Initiative has a collaborative and inclusive approach. It is an invitation to all states-parties to the NPT, nuclear-and non-nuclear-weapon states, to engage in a results-oriented dialogue.”36

At the meeting on the Ministerial Meeting of the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament held in Berlin in February 2020, fifteen participating countries (including Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) issued a joint statement, in which they proposed, inter alia: reducing nuclear risks; maximizing transparency on nuclear weapons; reducing the role of nuclear weapons; extending the U.S.- Russian New START; further reducing nuclear weapons; promoting negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; supporting the development of a multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capacity; and promoting disarmament education and gender issues.37

B) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on nuclear disarmament proposals by Japan, NAC and NAM

In 2020, the UNGA again adopted the following resolutions titled: “Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons”38 proposed by Japan and others; “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”39 proposed by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC); and “Nuclear disarmament”40 proposed by NAM members. The voting behavior of the countries surveyed in this project on the three resolutions at the UNGA in 2020 is presented below.

➢ Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons

◇ Proposing: Japan, Turkey, the UAE, the United Kingdom, the United States and others
◇ 150 in favor (Australia, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the UAE, the United Kingdom, the United States and others); 4 against (China, North Korea, Russia and Syria); 35 abstentions (Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and others)

➢ Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

◇ Proposing: Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa and others
◇ 138 in favor (Austria, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, the UAE and others); 33 against (Belgium, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others); 15 abstentions (Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Pakistan and others)

➢ Nuclear disarmament

◇ Proposing: Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines and others
◇ 123 in favor (Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE and others); 41 against (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others); 22 abstentions (Austria, India, Japan, North Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa, Sweden and others)

The resolution proposed by Japan in 2020, like the previous one, was simplified compared to the resolutions adopted before 2018. It proposed “guidelines for joint action,” and listed measures that could be taken in a relatively short period of time, such as improving transparency and confidence-building by NWS, reducing nuclear risks, declaring a moratorium on the production of weapons-grade fissile materials, signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), contributing to nuclear disarmament verification, and promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education. The resolution also called for “future oriented dialogues.” Furthermore, it mentioned “[the NWS’s] special responsibility to initiate arms control dialogues in good faith on effective measures to prevent nuclear arms racing and help to prepare the way for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.”41

Unlike the other two resolutions on nuclear disarmament mentioned above, two NWS—the United States (which abstained in 2019) as well as the United Kingdom—voted in favor of this resolution proposed by Japan, and even became co-sponsors. However, France and some western NNWS, which had voted in favor of the previous year’s resolution, abstained on the 2020 resolution.

Some NNWS which abstained or voted against the resolution in the UNGA First Committee criticized as follows: the language calling for the implementing the agreements adopted at previous NPT RevCons was removed from the resolution; it reverted to the phrase the “ultimate” goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons; neither the TPNW nor a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction were mentioned; and the resolution has turned signing and ratifying the CTBT into one item in a list of options aimed at preventing nuclear weapon testing.42

Furthermore, the resolution was criticized because, as was the one adopted in 2019, it continued not to use the expression “deep concern” but rather employed the weakened expression “recognizing” regarding the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons.”

C) Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons

Since the 2015 NPT RevCon, the Humanitarian Group, which focuses on the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons, has emphasized the significance of starting negotiations on a legally binding instrument on prohibiting nuclear weapons. The result was the adoption of the TPNW in 2017.

At the 2020 UNGA First Committee, many countries, including the Humanitarian Group, reiterated deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the risks posed by their continued existence.

At the 2020 UNGA, the Humanitarian Group, as in the previous year, proposed a resolution titled “Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.”43 The voting behavior of countries surveyed in this project on this resolution is as follows:

➢ Proposing: Austria, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and others
➢ 146 in favor (Austria, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, the UAE and others); 13 against (France, Israel, South Korea, Poland, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and others); 29 abstentions (Australia, Belgium,
Canada, China, Germany, North Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Turkey and others)

Furthermore, voting behavior on the resolution titled “Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world”44 led by South Africa was:

➢ Proposing: Austria, Egypt, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa and others
➢ 134 in favor (Austria, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, the UAE and others); 37 against (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others), 14 abstentions (China, India, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland and others)

NWS have not been receptive to humanitarian issues in nuclear disarmament from the outset. While the United Kingdom and the United States attended the Third International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in 2014, NWS kept their distance from these issues, especially when the Humanitarian Group began to officially pursue a legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. For example, NWS did not use the term “humanitarian” in their statements made at the 2020 UNGA First Committee.

The UNGA resolutions on nuclear disarmament led by Japan in 2017 and 2018 were criticized by some NNWS, including the Humanitarian Group, and civil society for the removal of the word “any” in the resolutions, which the 2016 resolution text read: “[e]xpressing deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.” They called the removal an unacceptable step backward. In addition, the sentence—“deep concerns about the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons continue to be a key factor that underpins efforts by all States towards a world free of nuclear weapons”—which had been written in the 2018 resolution, was not included in the 2019 and 2020 resolutions.

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9 António Guterres, “Message on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” September 26, 2020, http://www.unic-eg.org/eng/?p=30121.
10 Nishikawa Mitsuko, “UN Disarmament Chief: Learn from Coronavirus Pandemic to Build toward Nuclear-Free World,” NHK, August 13, 2020, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/1250/.
11 “UN Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu Argues ‘Risks of Nuclear War Should Be Reduced,’” Jiji Press, August 11, 2020, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020081100854&g=int. (in Japanese)
12 “Conference on Disarmament Holds First Plenary under the Presidency of Argentina,” United Nations Geneva, February 21, 2020, https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/F5EF6594A65D6B9CC12585150060F211?OpenDocument.
13 “Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” March 10, 2020, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-china-france-russiathe-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-on-the-fiftieth-anniversary-of-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/.
14 “France on behalf of the P5 countries,” First Committee, UNGA, October 19, 2020.
15 “Statement by China,” First Committee, UNGA, October 12, 2020.
16 “Statement by Russia,” First Committee, UNGA, October 9, 2020. On the other hand, the United States has argued that it withdrew from the INF Treaty because of Russia’s non-compliance with the INF Treaty by testing and deploying the ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) prohibited under the treaty and its failure to rectify the non-compliance.
17 “Statement by the United States,” First Committee, UNGA, October 9, 2020.
18 Ibid.
19 “Statement by France,” First Committee, UNGA, October 16, 2020.
20 “Statement by the United Kingdom,” First Committee, UNGA, October 15, 2020.
21 “Statement by India,” First Committee, UNGA, October 14, 2020.
22 “Despite Crumbling Disarmament Machinery, States Must Return to Multilateral Path towards Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons, Delegates Tell First Committee,” United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, October 16, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gadis3628.doc.htm.
23 “Statement by Israel,” First Committee, UNGA, October 19, 2020.
24 Christopher Ashley Ford, “Reframing Disarmament Discourse,” CEND Leadership Group Meeting, September 3, 2020, https://www.state.gov/reframing-disarmament-discourse/. Participating countries and the details of their discussion of this meeting is not disclosed.
25 Christopher Ashley Ford, “From ‘Planning’ to ‘Doing’: CEND Gets to Work,” CEND Working Group Civil Society Outreach Event, November 24, 2020, https://www.state.gov/cend-gets-to-work.
26 “Statement by Mexico on Behalf of the NAC,” First Committee, UNGA, October 14, 2020.
27 Ibid.
28 “Statement by Indonesia on Behalf of the NAM,” First Committee, UNGA, October 9, 2020.
29 A/RES/75/63, December 7, 2020.
30 “Statement by Japan,” First Committee, UNGA, October 16, 2020.
31 “50th Anniversary of the Entry into Force of the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) (Statement by Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu),” March 5, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000145.html.
32 “Joint Communiqué to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” May 19, 2020, https://www.un.int/philippines/statements_speeches/jointcommuniqu%C3%A9-commemorate-50th-anniversary-treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear.
33 Ibid.
34 “Statement by Mexico on Behalf of the NAC,” First Committee, UNGA, October 14, 2020.
35 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP33, April 25, 2019.
36 “Statement by Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde,” Conference on Disarmament, February 24, 2020, https://www.government.se/speeches/2020/02/national-statement-at-the-conference-on-disarmament/.
37 “Ministerial Meeting of the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament,” February 25, 2020, https://www.swedenabroad.se/en/embassies/un-geneva/current/news/stockholm-initiative-for-nuclear-disarmament/.
38 A/RES/75/71, December 7, 2020.
39 A/RES/75/65, December 7, 2020.
40 A/RES/75/63, December 7, 2020.
41 In the UNGA First Committee vote on this paragraph, only China voted against it, and 30 countries, including North Korea, abstained, while 136 countries, including the other nuclear-armed states, voted in favor of it.
42 GA/DIS/3657, November 4, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/gadis3657.doc.htm. See also Ray Acheson, “The Unsustainability of Hypocrisy,” First Committee Monitor, Vol. 18, No. 4 (November 8,
2020), pp. 1-2.
43 A/RES/75/39, December 7, 2020.
44 A/RES/75/73, December 7, 2020.