Under the NPT, nuclear-weapon states (NWS) are not required to conclude a CSA with the IAEA. However, to alleviate concerns about the discriminatory nature of the NPT, the NWS have voluntarily agreed to apply safeguards to some of their nuclear facilities and fissile material that are not involved in military activities. All NWS have also concluded tailored Additional Protocols with the IAEA.

The IAEA Annual Report 2021 (Annex), published in September 2022, lists facilities in NWS under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material during 2021.110 The IAEA does not publish the number of inspections conducted in NWS. The safeguarded facilities include the following.

➢ China: A power reactor, a research reactor, and an enrichment plant

➢ France: A fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, and an enrichment plant

➢ Russia: A separate storage facility

➢ The United Kingdom: An enrichment plant and two separate storage facilities

➢ The United States: A separate storage facility

In its Safeguards Statement, “the [IAEA] Secretariat concluded for [five NWS] that nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements. There were no such withdrawals from the selected facilities in France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom.”111

Each NWS has already concluded an IAEA Additional Protocol. Among them, the respective protocols by France, the United Kingdom and the United States stipulate that the IAEA can conduct complementary access. The United States was the first NWS that has hosted a complementary access visit by the IAEA. Compared to the three NWS mentioned above, application of IAEA safeguards to nuclear facilities by China and Russia have been more limited. Their Additional Protocols do not stipulate any provision for complementary access visits.

France stated in its national report submitted to the NPT RevCon, “all French facilities holding civil nuclear materials are subject to Euratom inspection.” It also reported that certain nuclear fuel cycle facilities in France (including uranium enrichment plant, reprocessing plant and MOX fuel fabrication plant) are subject to IAEA safeguards verification, in addition to those by the EURATOM.112 The United Kingdom also reported in its national report submitted to the NPT RevCon that all enrichment and reprocessing in the United Kingdom has been conducted under international safeguards, and that its safeguards agreement with the IAEA “allows for the application of safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in facilities within the United Kingdom, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only.”113
India, Israel and Pakistan have concluded facility-specific safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66. These non-NPT states have accepted IAEA inspections of the facilities that they declare are subject to these agreements. According to the IAEA Annual Report 2021, the facilities placed under IAEA safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material in non-NPT states as of December 31, 2021 are as listed below.114 (The IAEA does not publish the number of inspections conducted in those countries.)

➢ India: Ten power reactors, three fuel fabrication plants, two separate storage facilities

➢ Israel: One research reactor

➢ Pakistan: Seven power reactors (an increase from six in the previous year) and two research reactors

Regarding these countries’ activities in 2021, the IAEA “concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.”115

In terms of protocols additional to non-NPT states’ safeguards agreements (which differ significantly from the model Additional Protocol), the India-IAEA Additional Protocol entered into force in July 2014. This Additional Protocol is similar to ones that the IAEA concluded with China and Russia, with provisions on providing information and protecting classified information, but not on complementary access. No negotiation has begun to date similar protocols with Israel or Pakistan.

Some NNWS call on the NWS for further application of the IAEA safeguards to their nuclear facilities in order to alleviate a discriminative nature that NNWS are obliged to accept full-scope safeguards whereas NWS are not. At the NPT RevCon, the NAM countries, in particular, continue to demand that the NWS undertake to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards.116

 

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110 IAEA Annual Report 2021, GC(66)/4/Annex, Table A35(a).
111 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2021.”

112 NPT/CONF.2020/42/Rev.1, August 1, 2022.
113 NPT/CONF.2020/33, November 5, 2021.
114 IAEA Annual Report 2021, GC(66)/4/Annex, Table A35(a).
115 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2021.”
116 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.22, November 22, 2021.