A) Approaches toward a world without nuclear weapons

According to the preamble of the NPT, states parties “[declare] their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, [and urge] the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective.” Article VI of the Treaty stipulates that “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

No country openly opposes the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons or the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Their commitment to nuclear disarmament has been reiterated in various fora, including the NPT review process and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). However, such “commitment” does not necessarily mean that nuclear-armed states are actively pursuing the realization of a world without nuclear weapons. In the wake of the recent intensification of strategic competition, as well as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine accompanied by nuclear intimidation in 2023, the nuclear armed states have reemphasized the role of nuclear weapons in their national security, and there have been few proactive efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

 

Nuclear-armed states

Prior to the Russia’s invasion in Ukraine commenced in February 2022, the five NWS had engaged in a degree of cooperative efforts on nuclear disarmament issues in the context of the NPT, such as holding regular meetings and issuing joint statements at the NPT RevCons and their Preparatory Committees (PrepComs). Although no NWS meeting had been held since the Russia’s invasion, a NWS working group was reportedly convened in Dubai in early February 2023 to discuss nuclear nonproliferation issues.6 In addition, on June 13-14, as part of “a routine, continuing dialogue” (according to John Kirby, Coordinator for Strategic Communications),7 a working-level expert meeting of the five NWS was held in Cairo to discuss strategic risks and risk reduction measures. The United States as a chair country stated, “[Five NWS] welcomed the professional approach of the delegations and noted the significance of the substantive and informative expert-level discussions over the course of the last year. They also affirmed the need to continue these challenging but important discussions.”8 Meanwhile, as at the 10th NPT RevCon in 2022, the five NWS did not issue a joint statement at the First Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT RevCon (hereafter “NPT PrepCom) held in July-August 2023, again demonstrating the seriousness of the rift among the NWS.

Each NWS also individually expressed its commitment and approach to nuclear disarmament at the NPT PrepCom and other forums in 2023.

China stated, “The international community should practice true multilateralism, uphold a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, resolutely resist the cold war mentality and bloc confrontation, uphold the object and purpose of the [NPT], strengthen the universality, authority and effectiveness of the NPT, and jointly promote the international nuclear disarmament process.”9 China proposed to: maintain the international consensus on nuclear disarmament; strive to reduce strategic risks; effectively reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security policies; and maintain and strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime with NPT as its cornerstone.

France explained that it “has taken considerable unilateral disarmament measures, as part of a gradual and credible approach based on the strategic context, in line with its commitments under the NPT.”10 France also emphasized that the elimination of nuclear weapons requires a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament based on a strategic context, which is the only credible approach to a world without nuclear weapons.11

Russia stated that it remained “unwaveringly committed to seeking ways towards a world free of nuclear threat, in full compliance with Article VI of the NPT in its entirety.” It also argued that “[i]n the current circumstances, the validity of the argument we have consistently advocated about the counter-productivity of those approaches to nuclear disarmament that imply an immediate and complete ban on nuclear weapons or the establishment of both tight and artificial deadlines for reaching ‘nuclear zero’ becomes doubly evident. It is important to understand that a sustainable and secure nuclear-weapon-free world is not equal to the world in its current deplorable state minus nuclear weapons. Radicalism contradicts the NPT logic and will not lead to the ultimate goal of enhanced security for all.”12 Moreover, Russia insisted that “further progress on the nuclear disarmament track will require the West to abandon its destructive policy of undermining Russia’s security.”13

The United Kingdom stated, “[It] remains committed to our Article VI obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith toward disarmament. We must lay the groundwork for future disarmament while recognising the challenges of the deteriorating security environment. The UK will continue our efforts on practical initiatives, based on the fundamental principles of irreversibility, verification and transparency on which we have all agreed, to help bring the prospect of a world without nuclear weapons closer.”14

The United States stated, “[It] stands by our obligation under the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures on nuclear disarmament—in bilateral treaties, through multilateral fora, and actions to advance NPT disarmament goals. It is a commitment based on our national security interests and our understanding of the humanitarian impacts of the use of nuclear weapons.”

In its statement, the United States also outlined nuclear disarmament measures which it is addressing or focusing on.15
While no progress was reported in 2023 concerning the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND)—which the United States launched in 2019, and in which 43 countries, including NWS, NNWS, non-NPT states, NAM countries, U.S. allies, and proponent countries of the Treaty on the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), have participated—, the three subgroups continue to work on the following issues with the support of nongovernmental expert facilitators:

➢ Reducing perceived incentives for states to retain, acquire, or increase their holdings of nuclear weapons and increasing incentives to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons (co-chaired by the Netherlands and Morocco);

➢Mechanisms to bolster nonproliferation efforts and build confidence in and further advance nuclear disarmament (co-chaired by South Korea and the United States); and

➢Interim measures to reduce the risks associated with nuclear weapons (co-chaired by Finland and Germany).

Nuclear-armed states outside the NPT have stated their commitment to nuclear disarmament and their own approaches at the UN General Assembly, its First Committee, and other fora. India stated, “We remain firmly committed to global nuclear disarmament, which must be universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable. We are convinced that this goal can be achieved in a time-bound manner by a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework. This framework must be global and non-discriminatory.”16 Pakistan also made a similar statement, arguing that “[it] remains committed to the goal of a nuclear weapons free world that is achieved in a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory manner.”17 On the other hand, Israel did not mention in its speeches to the UNGA First Committee any policies regarding a world without nuclear weapons or the abolition of nuclear weapons.

North Korea reiterated its criticism of the United States and its allies and stated, “Building a world free of war and nuclear weapons has been the task of utmost importance for humanity since the founding of the UN. However, today, international nuclear disarmament regime is on the brink of collapse and international peace and security are faced with unprecedented challenges owing to the persistent arms build-up and nuclear criminal acts perpetrated by the U.S. in pursuance of excessive ambition for hegemony and military supremacy.”18

 

NNWS

Regarding approaches to nuclear disarmament, while the five NWS have argued for a step-by-step approach, some NNWS allied with the United States have proposed a “progressive approach” based on building-block principles, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries have called for launching negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

At the NPT PrepCom in 2023, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa) stated, “Our approach is based not on frustration, but firmly rooted in the legal obligations enshrined in the NPT, and on the clear evidence of urgency regarding the implementation of those obligations. In our 25th year as a group, we remain determined that the nuclear disarmament commitments, voluntarily entered into by all States Parties, can be fully implemented without delay.”19

The NAM countries “reaffirm[ed] the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame.” The group also “reiterate[d] its call to the Conference on Disarmament [(CD)] to immediately establish, as the highest priority, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.”20
Among the TPNW-promoting countries, Austria stated:

We cannot afford to wait for some utopic day to make progress on nuclear disarmament. Nuclear armed states have tried to focus all attention on security perspectives of nuclear possessors. But undiminished and increased security concerns the security of all of us. And all our common security is being critically and potentially catastrophically diminished by nuclear weapons. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons do not know borders. In fact, their effects already extend globally in even a limited nuclear conflict, thereby diminishing all of our security. The principle of undiminished security for all must therefore be seen correctly as a call for acceleration of disarmament efforts, rather than as a conditionality or a means to delay or avoid the implementation of [Article VI].
Moreover, the mantra of needing nuclear weapons for security is a powerful driver of proliferation and in clear contradiction to the goals of the NPT. We urge all of those who point to the current security environment as an argument to re-emphasize the alleged security benefit of nuclear weapons to consider that they are providing a driver for the proliferation of these weapons. 21

Brazil also said, “We are not naïve to the point of denying that the security environment has a bearing on disarmament. But disarmament – and expressions of willingness to engage towards that goal – shapes and alters said environment by breeding confidence and good will.”22
Among the NNWS allied with the United States, Japan stated, “‘G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament’ issued at the G7 Hiroshima Summit this May has provided a solid platform to work towards a world without nuclear weapons. Japan will continue to advance realistic and practical efforts in line with the ‘Hiroshima Action Plan.’”23 Germany said that “the Stockholm Initiative’s Stepping Stones remain important suggestions to fulfil disarmament obligations and related commitments.”24 South Korea also argued, “[T]he reality is that nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved overnight, as we learned from more than half a century of experience. In this regard, a gradual and long-term approach is realistic and essential. We must continue various efforts to make meaningful progress, however small, and bridge the gap between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states.”25

At the NPT PrepCom, many NNWS were highly critical of the current state of nuclear disarmament. For instance, the NAC pointed out that nuclear disarmament commitments remain unmet and unimplemented even after the 10th NPT RevCon, and that “disarmament-related multilateral fora are increasingly becoming politicised.” The NAC also argued that “[t]his new Review Cycle must break the negative pattern.”26 South Africa stated, “There continues to be an implementation gap between the disarmament and non- proliferation obligations, which destroys confidence in the grand bargain between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The 1995, 2000 and 2010 commitments [agreed at the NPT RevCons], many of which continue to be unfulfilled, remain valid until fully implemented. Attempts to reinterpret, backtrack or even abandon these commitments continue to erode trust and undermine the NPT process, casting doubt on the value of new commitments.”27

 

B) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on nuclear disarmament proposals by Japan, NAC and NAM

In 2023, the UNGA again adopted the following three resolutions: “Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons”28 proposed by Japan and others; “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”29 proposed by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC); and “Nuclear disarmament”30 proposed by NAM members. The voting behavior of the countries surveyed in this project on these three documents is presented below.

➢ “Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons”—148 in favor (Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and others); 7 against (China, Iran, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia, South Africa, Syria and Syria); 29 abstentions (Austria, Brazil, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and others)

➢ “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”—133 in favor (Austria, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Switzerland, Syria and others); 26 against (France, India, Israel, North Korea, Poland, Russia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and others); 25 abstentions (Australia, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden and others)

➢ “Nuclear disarmament”—121 in favor (Brazil, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Syria and others); 44 against (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and others); 17 abstentions (Austria, India, Japan, North Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa and others)

Regarding the UNGA resolution on nuclear disarmament proposed by Japan, Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa stated, “Cognizant of the need to present a way forward for realistic and practical measures to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, the Government of Japan calls on, inter alia, the implementation of concrete measures related to FMCT …and enhancement of transparency, taking into account the deliberations at the G7 Hiroshima Summit and the NPT Preparatory Committee held this year. The resolution aims to embody and promote the ‘Hiroshima Action Plan’ proposed by Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio at the 10th NPT Review Conference held in August 2022.”31 And the resolution proposed a series of measures, as follows:

➢ Urging all States, especially the NWS, to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric concerning the use of nuclear weapons;

➢ Calling upon the NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS (negative security assurances: NSA);

➢ Calling upon all States, in particular the NWS, to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their obligations under the NPT, and to pursue enhanced transparency measures by providing information regarding nuclear weapons stockpiles and arsenals, including status of production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

➢ Emphasizing that maintaining the overall decreasing trend of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons is vital in getting closer to a world free of nuclear weapons, and urging all States, especially the NWS, to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons;

➢ Calling upon the CD to immediately commence and bring to an early conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT, and upon the NWS to maintain or declare voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices;

➢ Emphasizing that the transparency of the management of civil plutonium must be maintained;

➢ Urging all States that have yet to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear−Test−Ban Treaty (CTBT) to do so in all expediency;

➢ Calling upon all States, in particular the NWS, to commit to further identifying, exploring and implementing effective risk reduction measures;

➢ Calling upon all States to strengthen support for initiatives to develop multilateral disarmament verification and capacity-building in support of nuclear disarmament;

➢ Underscoring the importance of complying with non-proliferation obligations and addressing all non-compliance matters;

➢  Reaffirming the commitment to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as all other existing WMD and ballistic missile programs, of North Korea, urging North Korea to return at an early date to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards, and confirming that North Korea cannot and will never have the status of a NWS under the NPT; and

➢ Welcoming various concrete measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education.

In addition, following the previous year’s version, the preamble of the resolution proposed by Japan in 2023 acknowledged that “the [TPNW] was adopted on 7 July 2017, and noting that it was opened to signature by the Secretary General of the United Nations on 20 September 2017, entered into force on 22 January 2021 and held its first Meeting of States parties from 21 to 23 June 2022.” The resolution also mentioned “[r]eiterating deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and reaffirming that this awareness ought to continue to underpin our approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament, and welcoming the visits of leaders, youth and others to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in this regard.”

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6 “Five Nuclear Powers Held Talks in Dubai in February: Kommersant,” Bloomberg, February 8, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-08/five-nuclear-powers-held-talks-in-dubai-in-february-kommersant.
7 “US Convenes Nuclear Weapons Meeting with China, France, Russia, UK,” Reuters, June 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-convenes-nuclear-meeting-with-china-france-russia-uk-state-dept-2023-06-23/.
8 U.S. Department of State, “Nuclear Weapon States Working-Level Experts Meeting on Strategic Risk Reduction,” August 4, 2023, https://www.state.gov/nuclear-weapon-states-working-level-experts-meet ing-on-strategic-risk-reduction/.
9 “Statement of China,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.

10 “Statement of France,” General Debate, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 1, 2023.
11 “Statement of France,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
12 “Statement of Russia,” General Dabate, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 1, 2023.
13 “Statement of Russia,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
14 “Statement of the United Kingdom,” General Dabate, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, July 31, 2023.

15 “Statement of the United States,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
16 “Statement by India,” Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons, First Committee, UNGA, October 16, 2023.
17 “Statement by Pakistan,” Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons, First Committee, UNGA, October 16, 2023.
18 “Statement of North Korea,” Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons, First Committee, UNGA, October 16, 2023.

19 “Statement by Mexico on behalf of the NAC,” General Debate, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, July 31, 2023.
20 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.8, June 14, 2023. Meanwhile, in its working paper on nuclear disarmament, Iran repeated its criticism of the United States and the United Kingdom, but made no mention of Chinese and Russian attitudes regarding nuclear disarmament. NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.20, July 6, 2023.

21 “Statement by Austria,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
22 “Statement by Brazil,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
23 “Statement by Japan,” General Debate, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, July 31, 2023.
24 “Statement by Germany,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
25 “Statement by South Korea,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
26 “Statement by Mexico on behalf of the NAC,” First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, July31, 2023.
27 “Statement by South Africa,” First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, July31, 2023.

28 A/RES/78/40, December 4, 2023.
29 A/RES/78/42, December 4, 2023.
30 A/RES/78/53, December 4, 2023.
31 “Adoption of the Draft Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons submitted by Japan to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (Statement by Foreign Minister KAMIKAWA Yoko),” October 28, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_003321.html.