Hiroshima Report 2024(4) Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
A) Signature and Ratifications
The number of countries signing and/or ratifying the TPNW which was adopted on September 20, 2017, has steadily increased. As the number of ratifying countries reached 50 on October 24, 2020, the TPNW entered into force on January 22, 2021, in accordance with Article 15 of the treaty. As of the end of 2023, 69 of the 93 have ratified the treaty. Among the countries surveyed, those that have ratified are Austria, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa, and those that have only signed are Brazil and Indonesia.
B) Meeting of States Parties
The Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) was held on November 27-December 1 at the UN Headquarters. The conference was attended by 56 states parties, international organizations such as the UN, and 122 nongovernmental organizations. In addition, 33 countries, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Norway, and Switzerland participated as observers.49
During the five-day meeting, the High-level session, Thematic discussion on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, General exchange of views, and Consideration of the status and operation of the Treaty and other matters important for achieving the objectives and purpose of the Treaty were held.
The following reports were submitted to the 2MSP from the intersessional structure for the implementation of the Treaty, which was established based on the Decision of the First Meeting of States Parties:
➢ Report of the Co-Chairs of the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance;
➢ Report of the co-chairs of the informal working group on universalization;
➢ Report of the gender focal point;
➢ Report of the informal facilitators to further explore and articulate the possible areas of tangible cooperation between the TPNW and the NPT, and other relevant nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments;
➢ Report of the Scientific Advisory Group on its annual activities;50
➢ Report of the Scientific Advisory Group on the status and developments regarding nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon risks, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and related issues; and
➢ Report of the Co-Chairs of the informal working group on the implementation of Article 4.
In addition, discussions were undertaken to formulate final documents, among others, based on the following working papers.
➢ Working paper 1: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: toward an ethic of disarmament (submitted by Holy See)
➢ Working paper 2: Intersessional structure for the implementation of the Treaty (submitted by the Chairperson)
➢ Working paper 3: Thematic debates of Meetings of States Parties to the Treaty (submitted by the Chairperson)
➢ Working paper 9: Universalizing the security concerns of States under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (submitted by Austria)
On the last day of the 2MSP, participating countries adopted the “Declaration” and “Decisions.”
Declaration
In the “Declaration,” titled “Our commitment to upholding the prohibition of nuclear weapons and averting their catastrophic consequences,”51 participating countries stated their intention to deny the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, and to pursue a global ban on nuclear weapons under the TPNW, including the following points:
➢ We reaffirm our grave concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival and well-being and would be incompatible with respect for the right to life.
➢ The catastrophic humanitarian consequences and risks associated with nuclear weapons underpin the moral and ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which, among other drivers, inspired the creation of the Treaty and guide its implementation. These considerations must be at the center of all disarmament policies, highlighting the human cost of nuclear weapons and the need to protect human life and the environment.
➢ New scientific research has underscored the multifaceted and cascading effects of the catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and associated risks.
➢ The continued existence of nuclear weapons and lack of meaningful progress on disarmament undermine the security of all States, aggravate international tensions, heighten the risk of nuclear catastrophe and pose an existential threat to humanity as a whole. The only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination and the legally binding assurance that they will never be developed again.
➢ We remain deeply alarmed by and firmly deplore threats to use nuclear weapons, as well as increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric. We stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and further underscore that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to international humanitarian law. … We condemn unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.
➢ We reject attempts to normalize nuclear rhetoric and any notion of so-called “responsible” behavior as far as nuclear weapons are concerned.
➢ Far from preserving peace and security, nuclear weapons are used as instruments of policy, linked to coercion, intimidation and heightening of tensions. The renewed advocacy, insistence on and attempts to justify nuclear deterrence as a legitimate security doctrine gives false credence to the value of nuclear weapons for national security and dangerously increases the risk of horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation.
➢ The TPNW clearly prohibits receiving the transfer of, or control over, nuclear weapons or to allow their stationing, installation or deployment. We urge all States with such nuclear arrangements to put an end to them, and join the Treaty.
➢ We are more determined than ever in our unyielding commitment to delegitimizing, stigmatizing and totally eliminating nuclear weapons.
➢ We are playing our part to advance and strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole, including under other complementary treaties such as the [NPT], … the [CTBT], and treaties establishing nuclear-weapon free-zones.
➢ As fully committed States Parties to the NPT, the TPNW States Parties reaffirm the complementarity between the TPNW and the NPT. We continue to implement our obligations and comply with our responsibilities, undertakings and agreements under the NPT. We are pleased to have advanced the implementation of Article VI of the NPT by bringing into force a comprehensive legal prohibition of nuclear weapons.
➢ We unequivocally affirm that our commitment to the TPNW and its object and purpose remains unaffected when completing fulfilment of obligations emanating from treaties previously subscribed to, where these do not conflict with obligations of the TPNW.
Decisions: Agreements on institutional issues
The “Decisions”52 on the institutional issues adopted at the 2MSP, firstly as Decision 1, stipulated to establish three informal working groups as the Intersessional structure for the implementation of the Treaty: Universality (co-chaired by South Africa and Uruguay); Victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance (co-chaired by Kazakhstan and Kiribati); and Implementation of Article 4 (co-chaired by Malaysia and New Zealand). Mexico was also appointed as a gender focal point to assist in the implementation of the gender provisions of the TPNW. In addition, Ireland and Thailand were appointed as informal intersessional facilitators on the complementarity of the TPNW with the existing nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
Decision 4 states that “focused discussions will be held under the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance,” and that “a report will be submitted to the third Meeting of States Parties with recommendations related to the feasibility of, and possible guidelines for, the establishment of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation, with the aim of examining the establishment of such a trust fund at the third Meeting of States Parties as a priority.”
Decision 5 stipulates to establish a “Consultative process on security concerns of States under the TPNW,” and to appoint Austria as a coordinator for this consultative process. In this process, states parties to and signatories of the TPNW, with the involvement of the Scientific Advisory Group, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and other stakeholders and experts, are expected to consult and submit a report to the third MSP containing a comprehensive set of arguments and recommendations:
➢ To better promote and articulate the legitimate security concerns, threat and risk perceptions enshrined in the Treaty that result from the existence of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence; and
➢ To challenge the security paradigm based on nuclear deterrence by highlighting and promoting new scientific evidence about the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons and juxtaposing this with the risks and assumptions that are inherent in nuclear deterrence.
C) Arguments by signatory and ratification countries
Countries that support the TPNW advocated the importance of TPNW at the NPT PrepCom in 2023, particularly in terms of the humanitarian consequences and legal prohibition of nuclear weapons as well as effective measures to implement NPT Article VI, and argued that it is complementary to the NPT. In their joint statement, the states parties and signatory states to the TPNW stated, “As fully committed states parties to the NPT, we continue to fully implement our obligations, comply with our responsibilities and agreements under the NPT and under other complementary treaties, such as the CTBT, those establishing nuclear weapons free-zones and the TPNW itself.” They also said, “We urge all states to join the [TPNW] without delay. We appeal to those states that are not yet ready to take this step to engage cooperatively and constructively with the TPNW States parties and Signatory States, and encourage all states to attend the upcoming Second Meeting of TPNW States Parties.”53
The NAC also argued, “The TPNW seeks to address the imbalance in the global disarmament architecture and the disparity between the treatment of biological and chemical weapons, on the one hand, and nuclear weapons on the other. It reinforces and complements the NPT, including in the way it incorporates a humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons, and emphasises the urgency of the implementation of Article VI. We expect to see the complementarity between the two treaties reflected appropriately.”54
At the 2023 UNGA, a resolution was adopted titled “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,”55 which called upon all states that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the treaty at the earliest possible date. The voting behavior of countries surveyed in this project on this resolution was as follows.
➢ 123 in favor (Austria, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, the UAE and others); 43 against (Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others); 17 abstentions (Australia, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and others) – Syria did not vote.
Regarding the legal prohibition of nuclear weapons, the UNGA in 2022 adopted resolutions “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”56 and “Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.”57 The voting behaviors of respective countries with respect to these resolutions were as follows:
➢ “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”— 135 in favor (Austria, Brazil, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Switzerland, Syria and others); 35 against (Australia, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others); 15 abstentions (Canada, India, Japan, North Korea, the Netherlands, Norway and others)
➢ “Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons”—120 in favor (China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, South Africa, Syria and others); 50 against (Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others); 14 abstentions (Brazil, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and others)
D) Countries not signing the TPNW
Nuclear-armed states maintained their position of refusing to sign the TPNW. They maintained that the TPNW has not attained the status of customary international law concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapons. They also assert that the treaty does not create any legal obligations for states that have not signed the treaty.
Most NWS did not necessarily express strong criticism of the TPNW at the NPT PrepCom. However, Russia voiced stern objections: “We believe that schemes involving a ‘shortcut’ to ‘nuclear zero,’ including by simply outlawing nuclear weapons, are completely unfeasible. Guided by these considerations, we have consistently stated that such endeavors as the TPNW are counterproductive. While sharing the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free world as the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, we are at the same time convinced that the hasty drafting and conclusion of the TPNW have not brought this goal closer. They have only deepened the divisions among the parties to the NPT and thereby have weakened its viability.”58
Among the NNWS surveyed in this report that have not signed or ratified the TPNW, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Norway and Switzerland participated in the 2MSP as observers. In their speeches at the meeting, Belgium, Germany and Norway, respectively, argued their support for nuclear deterrent posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and also explicitly ruled out joining the TPNW. Meanwhile, Germany expressed its intention “to support concrete project work on victim assistance and environmental remediation. This includes, inter alia, support for international cooperation and workshops on victim assistance and environmental remediation, statistical research on the effects of nuclear testing, feminist perspectives on victims assistance as well as further research on the effects of radiation on women and girls.”59
As at the previous MSP, Japan did not attend the 2MSP. At a press conference, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maki Kobayashi said, “[T]he TPNW is an important treaty, but there is no roadmap toward an exit to ‘a world without nuclear weapons’ without the participation of any [NWS]. In this situation, as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan will make efforts to involve [NWS], and it is from this perspective that Japan has decided not to participate as an observer at the meeting.”60 In the meantime, Japan’s 2023 UNGA resolution on nuclear disarmament, as did the resolution in 2022, referred to the TPNW, albeit only in factual terms, such as the treaty’s adoption and entry into force.
49 At the First Meeting of States Parties in 2022, 34 countries, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland participated as observers.
50 The Scientific Advisory Group was established in March 2023, and 15 members were appointed. The Group’s report focused on the status of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon risks, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, and related issues in accordance with the Group’s mandate.
51 TPNW/MSP/2023/14, December 13, 2023.
52 Ibid.
53 “Joint Statement on the TPNW,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
54 “Statement by Mexico on behalf of the NAC,” First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, July 31, 2023.
55 A/RES/78/35, December 4, 2023.
56 A/RES/78/33, December 4, 2023.
57 A/RES/78/55, December 4, 2023.
58 “Statement of Russia,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
59 “Statement by Germany,” TPNW 2MSP, November 29, 2023.
60 “Press Conference by Foreign Press Secretary KOBAYASHI Maki,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 22, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaikenwe_000001_00002.html.
