Nobushige Takamizawa

The G7 Summit in 2023, hosted by Japan, took place in Hiroshima, the first city to suffer atomic bombing. Many participants, including leaders from G7 and invited countries, and representatives of seven international organizations, offered prayers at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, visited the Peace Memorial Museum, listened to survivors’ stories, and deepened their understanding of the realities of the atomic bombing. Awareness of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has continued to grow not only domestically, but also internationally, leading to an increase in visitors to these museums. The significance of the visits facilitated by the summit is widely appreciated.

The “G7 Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament” is seen as the first joint document by the G7 leaders with a specific focus on nuclear disarmament. Its content is diverse and includes comprehensive measures to be implemented, covering not only nuclear disarmament but also nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It incorporates all five pillars of the “Hiroshima Action Plan” proposed by Prime Minister Kishida during the 10th NPT Review Conference in 2022: (1) Continuing the record of non- use of nuclear weapons; (2) Enhancing transparency; (3) Maintaining the trend toward decreasing the global nuclear stockpile; (4) Securing nuclear non-proliferation and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (5) Encouraging visits to the atomic-bombed sites (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) by international leaders and others.

While the significance of holding the summit in Hiroshima, a bombed city is highly appreciated, evaluations of the “Hiroshima Vision” vary. Some question the practicality of G7 members advocating for “a world without nuclear weapons” amid the increasing importance of nuclear deterrence. Practitioners and experts, among others, appreciate the issuing of the “Hiroshima Vision” itself as an accomplishment, as it involved reconciling differing opinions among G7 countries. They believe the concrete measures outlined in the vision are reflecting the G7 leaders’ collective understanding of the current status of arms control and disarmament as a starting point. What is more important is to embody and implement these specific measures. I share this assessment, particularly given the height of confrontation right now.

However, the most common criticism is that this vision is not worthy of being associated with Hiroshima, an atomic-bombed city. This is directed at the statement in the Hiroshima Vision that asserts, “Our security policy, as long as nuclear weapons exist, is based on the understanding that they play a role for defense purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war and intimidation.” The criticism is that clinging to nuclear deterrence theory even when it is considered flawed justifies the G7’s possession of nuclear weapons. The 2023 Peace Declaration by the Mayor of Hiroshima emphasized that world leaders need to confront the fact that nuclear deterrence theory is flawed, and underscores the importance of urging policymakers to break free from it. The political declaration from the second TPNW conference in December 2023 also acknowledges that justifying nuclear deterrence theory increases the risk of nuclear proliferation.

The existing perception gap is huge, and it appears that the divisive debate over whether we should be choosing deterrence or disarmament is intensifying. In reality, the “Hiroshima Vision” does not clearly articulate why nuclear deterrence remains effective as the fundamental security policy of G7 amid changes in the international security environment or how our understanding of the role of nuclear weapons differs from the past. Moreover, there are no stated goals for reducing both the role of nuclear weapons and dependence on them.

Nevertheless, the “Hiroshima Vision” does not just attest to the persistence of nuclear deterrence but includes the premise of “as long as it exists.” It emphasizes that the overall decline in global nuclear arsenals achieved since the end of the Cold War must continue and not be reversed.

Additionally, the United States’ national security strategy refers to reducing the salience and the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy as well as seeking to identify and assess the ability of non-nuclear capabilities to contribute to deterrence, as well as integrating these capabilities into operational plans, as appropriate. It further elaborates that “while taking steps to advance the goal of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, more far-reaching opportunities to move in this direction will require enduring improvement in the security environment, a commitment to verifiable arms control among the major nuclear powers, further progress in developing non-nuclear capabilities, and an assessment of how nuclear-armed competitors and adversaries may react.”

The United States deeply recognizes various challenges to traditional nuclear deterrence in its strategic approach and is considering responses from both hard and soft perspectives. While the outcome of this consideration is uncertain, it is worth noting that the United States is exploring possibilities such as “reducing the role of nuclear weapons” and “decreasing dependence on nuclear weapons,” including the issue of “no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons.” While not necessarily achieving the goal of “building security without relying on nuclear deterrence,” it is important to observe that the United States has committed to the overall reduction of nuclear weapons, as reflected in the Hiroshima Vision.

How do we ensure national security while avoiding overreliance on the U.S. extended deterrence and ensuring security without increasing the number of nuclear weapons? How can we enhance “comprehensive security capabilities” by taking measures in various fields—both hard and soft aspects—not limited to the military? Discussions should address how to achieve peace and stability while reducing dependence on nuclear weapons under different environmental and temporal conditions. Broader discussions need to be undertaken among governments on this important question.

“The Hiroshima Vision” calls for nuclear-weapon states to “engage with non-nuclear-weapon states in a meaningful dialogue on transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals and limiting nuclear competition, including through an open explanation of national reports coupled with an interactive discussion with non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society participants at future NPT-related meetings.” The explicit mention of civil society participants is crucial and serves as an important foundation. The 2023 UNGA resolution on nuclear disarmament proposed by Japan also endorses the role of civil society in this context. This will facilitate dialogues among stakeholders, including all five nuclear-armed nations, on effectiveness or collapse of nuclear deterrence in a professional manner with civility in discourse during disarmament processes such as the NPT.

To capitalize on such opportunities and set in stone the trend of “mainstreaming” nuclear disarmament, both the government and civil society must sincerely and earnestly address these “challenging issues” both from their respective positions and collectively. From this perspective, it is important to deepen discussions in international forums, such as the “International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons,” the “Japan Chair for a world without nuclear weapons,” and a global network of young people for nuclear abolition, making use of the Youth Leader Fund for a World Without Nuclear Weapons. During these discussions, information should be made as clear and understandable as possible—not only for think tanks and experts but also for civil society as a whole. Prime Minister Kishida’s words, “There is nothing stronger than national understanding and support in diplomacy and security,” are increasingly applicable to the relationship between deterrence and disarmament.

 

Nobushige Takamizawa：Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo; Former Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva