A) Accession status to nuclear security-related conventions

This section examines the accession status of each country to the following nuclear security and safety-related conventions that are mentioned in the Nuclear Security Summit communiqué,78 namely: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); Amendment to CPPNM (CPPNM Amendment); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention); the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention); the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

• The CPPNM became effective in 1987. As of January 2018, 156 countries have signed and 44 countries have ratified this treaty.79 The CPPNM requires its party states to take appropriate protection measures for international transfer of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, and not permit its transfer in the case that such measures are not in place. It also calls for the criminalization of acts including unauthorized receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material, and which cause damage to any person or property, as well as theft or robbery of nuclear material.
• The CPPNM Amendment became effective in 2016. As of January 2018, 116 states have approved the Amendment.80 The Amendment makes it legally binding for states to establish, implement and maintain an appropriate physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and nuclear facilities under their jurisdiction. It provides for the criminalization of new and extended specified acts, and requires countries to put in place measures to protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities against sabotage. In this sense, the Amendment expands the existing offences identified in the CPPNM, including the theft and robbery of nuclear material, and establishes new ones, such as the smuggling of nuclear material and the actual or threatened sabotage of nuclear facilities. A number of the offences were also expanded to include substantial damage to the environment. As the key legally binding international undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material, ratification of the Amendment should be continuously promoted.
• The Nuclear Terrorism Convention, which entered into force in 2007, requires party states to criminalize acts of possession and use of radioactive material81 or nuclear explosive devices with malicious intent, and against those seeking to use and damage nuclear facilities in order to cause radioactive dispersal. The convention and the CPPNM Amendment are mutually necessary to support a legal framework for nuclear security.
• The Nuclear Security Convention became effective in 1996. This treaty is aimed at ensuring and enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants. Party states of this Convention are required to take legal and administrative measures, report to the review committee established under this convention, and accept peer review in order to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants under their jurisdiction.
• The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident entered into force in 1986. It obligates its party states to immediately report to the IAEA when a nuclear accident has occurred, including the type, time, and location of the accident and relevant information.
• The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management became effective in 2001. It calls for its member states to take legal and administrative measures, report to its review committee, and undergo peer review by other parties, for the purpose of ensuring safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
• The Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency entered into force in 1987. This convention establishes the international framework that enables equipment provision and dispatch of experts with the goals of preventing and/or minimizing nuclear accidents and radioactive emergencies.

Some, if not all, of these nuclear safety-related conventions can be interpreted as providing protective measures for nuclear security purposes, and thus could be listed as nuclear security-related international conventions. Table 3-4 summarizes the signature and ratification status of each country to these conventions.

B) INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

In 2011, the IAEA published a fifth revision of the “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5)” in 2011. In comparison with the INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, this latest prevision introduced new measures on nuclear security: inter alia, creation of limited access area, graded approached, the enhancement of defense-in-depth, and protection against “Stand-off Attack” and airborne threat, counter measures against insider threat, development of nuclear security culture as a preventive measure against security breaches by insiders, and the provision of redundancy measures to ensure the functions of the central response station during an emergency. Implementation of the protective measures in accordance with the recommendation made by this fifth revision has been encouraged internationally, with a view to establishing a stronger nuclear security system. Furthermore, this revision stipulates a number of state responsibilities for establishing a contingency plan, including interfaces with safety, as appropriate, ensuring that operator prepares contingency plans to effectively counter the threat assessment or DBT taking actions of the response forces into consideration, evaluating effectiveness of the physical protection system through exercises, and determining the trustworthiness policy.

Since the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 was released at the same time as the start of the nuclear security summit, when participating in the Summit, countries tended to announce the introduction of physical protection measures in accordance with the fifth revision of the recommendation. This trend continued until the last nuclear security summit in 2016 82 and confirms the high-level attention that countries gave to introducing the IAEA’s recommended measures.

In this regard, the application status of the recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 can serve as a significant indicator to assess the nuclear security system of this report’s surveyed countries. This report refers to official statements made available in the 61^st IAEA General Conference and 10^th Plenary Meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), as well as other opportunities to evaluate the national nuclear security stance and performance of each state.

APPLICATION STATUS OF EACH COUNTRY OF THE MEASURES RECOMMENDED IN INFCIRC/225/REV.5

As a result of the end of the nuclear security summit, held four times over seven years, opportunities for disseminating information on the introduction and application of the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 are gradually decreasing. The reason for the reduction of information dissemination is not entirely clear. It may be because there are few items to be newly added in each country with regard to INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, which, at the time of preparing this report, had been announced seven years earlier. Or it may be because opportunities to mention the application of the recommendation measures themselves have diminished as a result of shrinking occasions to disseminate information. The cases where there were statements on the introduction of recommendation measures of INFCIRC225/Rev.5 directly or indirectly in the surveyed country are as follows.

In the field of the development of legal instruments, China’s National People’s Congress adopted a Nulcear Safety Act in 2017.83 In addition, China is in the stage of completing a public comment on the Regulation on Nuclear Security (2016) and measures necessary for adopting the bill are finally in place.84 In the United Kingdom, the Office of Nuclear Regulation established Security Assessment Principles85 in 2017m as a new regulatory framework for contractor.86 Nigeria drafted the Nigerian Regulations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities based on the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 in 2015.87 Also, Nigeria established an autonomous Regulatory and Nuclear Safety Authority (ARSN) and adopted the law on security and peaceful use of the Atomic Energy.88 Saudi Arabia will set up an independent regulatory authority on the safety of nuclear and radioactive materials by the third quarter of 2018 and will prepare relevant domestic laws based on a review by the IAEA.89 UAE established a Regulation for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities-FANR-REG-08 based on INFCIRC225/Rev.5 in 2010 and revised it in 2016.90 Pakistan has introduced a comprehensive nuclear security regime and regularly reviews it according to IAEA guidance documents and best practices.91 Although it is not directly related to application of the measures recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, France adopted the law on the use of drone in 2016 in the context  of nuclear security.92 It was a remarkable new movement for the drone flight problem near the nuclear facilities, which is a concern of recent years in physical protection of nuclear material.

Regarding the field of strengthening physical protection of nuclear material, Russia’s ROSATOM established guidelines for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear material protection systems at nuclear facilities in 2015. It introduced computer programs called “Vega-2” and “Polygon” as a means of evaluating the effectiveness of these guidelines.93 Israel has taken measures under the guidelines of the IAEA for the protection of nuclear facilities, and the protection of nuclear material used for research and application.94 Belgium temporarily placed its nuclear facilities under army protection, to compensate for the delayed implementation of resident measures of a specially formed armed policy unit.95 In Pakistan, regulations for the protection of nuclear materials and nuclear-related facilities are underway, and it is expected that final approval will be obtained after review process at relevant ministries and agencies.96 In connection with this issue, a regional training course on Introduction to Physical Protection System Effectiveness Evaluation was held in October 2017 in Daejeon, South Korea.97

Protection measures for sabotage actions against nuclear materials and related facilities are as follows. Pakistan launched an independent nuclear security special unit consisting of land, sea and air components. Pakistan also established an early warning system dedicated to nuclear security.98 In France, the Ministry of the Interior launched the Specialized Command for Nuclear Security (CoSSeN) and is promoting safety of transportation and physical protection of nuclear material.99 In South Korea, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) is using virtual reality to develop an evaluation system for sabotage acts on nuclear facilities.100 China launched a nuclear emergency rescue team, capable of immediate response.101

Regarding response to cyber threats, the U.K. Office for Nuclear Regulation in 2017 announced a new regulatory framework called Security Assessment Principles, and strengthened measures against cyber threats in the domestic nuclear industry.102 Belgium established a center for cyber security in 2014 and is expected to strengthen further collaboration with the nuclear safety authorities.103 Germany held an international conference on computer security in 2015. After holding this conference, Germany has made some progress as a result of continuing to create additional computer security guidance for this field.104 In connection with these cyber threat issues, a regional training course on Computer Security for Industrial Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in April 2017.105 In May, a technical meeting on Engineering and Design Aspects of Computer Security in Instrumentation and Control Systems for Nuclear Power Plants was held in Gloucester, the United Kingdom.106 Regarding cyber security in nuclear facilities, information disclosure in each country regarding cases occurred in the past was limited, so it was extremely difficult to grasp the essence of the problem. Therefore, it is pointed out that the contractors of each country may not have adequate risk assessment and response.107 In any case, cyber security is considered to be a new issue in strengthening nuclear security in each country.

Regarding the safety of transportation, in October 2017, an international training course on Security of Nuclear Material in Transport was held in Karlsruhe, Germany.108 In December, the 35 the Technical Meeting of the Transport Safety Standards was held in Vienna.109

In the field of countermeasures against insider threats, although it does not impose a legal obligation, Japan introduced the revision of related Nuclear Regulation Authority Ordinances Publishing Guideline for Trustworthiness Check in 2016, and announced strengthening measures to monitor suspicious acts of insiders within protected areas.110 As an event related to this field, a regional training course on Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats was conducted in Tokai, Japan from 27^th February to 3^rd March 2017.111 The importance of internal threats is a new point raised at INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and legislation for countermeasures against internal threats is also a subject to be considered in each country. However, it should be noted that experts point out that internal threats cannot be prevented only by determining the trustworthiness of individuals.112

Regarding nuclear security culture, in India, the Homi Bhabha National Institute (HBNI) conducts nuclear security culture education through one year of training for scientists and engineers.113 In addition, as an event on this field, a technical meeting to Share Experiences Related to Activities under the Coordinated Research Project Development of Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Solutions was held in Vienna in October 2017.114

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[78] “Nuclear Security Summit 2016 Communiqués,” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 1, 2016.

[79] Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, January 11, 2018, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_status.pdf.

[80] Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, January 11, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.pdf.

[81] International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, United Nations, 2005, https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/english-18-15.pdf , Article 1.

[82] “Highlights of National Progress Reports,” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016, http://www.nss2016.org/news/2016/4/5/highlights-from-national-progress-reports-nuclear-security-summit.　

[83] China National Statement at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-china-final-stat.pdf.　

[84] Jia Jinlei, “The Legal and Regulatory Systems for Nuclear Security in China,” paper presented at the International　Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria.

[85] “New Internal Guidance – Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs),” Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy-Office for Nuclear Regulation, April 2017, http://www.onr.org.uk/documents/2017/rpc-3625-1-decc-onr.pdf.

[86] UK National Statement at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-uk-statement.pdf.

[87] Nasiru-Deen A. Bello, “Legislative and Regulatory Framework for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities in Nigeria,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-bello2-presentation.pdf.

[88] Republic of Niger National Statement at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-niger-statement_fr.pdf.

[89] Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Statement by HE Dr. Hashim Yamani, President, King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, at the Nuclear Power in the 21st Century – International Ministerial Conference, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, October 30-November 1, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/cn-247-saudi-arabia-statement_ar.pdf.

[90] Sara Al Saadi, “Nuclear Security Regulatory Authorization and Assessment Process for Barakah NPP in United Arab Emirates,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-alsaadi-presentation.pdf .

[91] Statement by Khalil Hashmi, Director General (Disarmament), MFA Head of Pakistan Delegation at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT, June 2, 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/statements/documents/2017-plenary/Pakistan.pdf.

[92] “National Statement by France” at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT, June 1, 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/statements/documents/2017-plenary/France.pdf.

[93] Alexander Izmaylov, “Systematic Aspects of High Effective Physical Protection Systems Design for Russian Nuclear Sites,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-izmaylov-presentation.pdf.

[94] Statement by Mr. Zeeb Snir, Head, Israel Atomic Energy Commission at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-israel-statement.pdf.

[95] Declaration Nationale Belge, Intervention de Monsieur Jan Bens, Directeur Général de l’Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire, 61ème Session De La Conférence Générale De L’AIEA, Septembre 20, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-belgium-statement.pdf.

[96] Syed Majid Hussain Shah, “Development of Physical Protection Regulatory Requirements in Pakistan,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-shah-presentation.pdf.

[97] Regional Training Course on Introduction to Physical Protection System Effectiveness Evaluation, October 16-20, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/regional-training-course-on-introduction-to-physical-protection-systemeffectiveness-evaluation.

[98] Statement by the Leader of the Pakistan Delegation, 61th Annual General Conference of the IAEA, September 18-22, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-pakistan-statement.pdf.

[99] S. Basille, “Specialized Command for Nuclear Security: Coordinate the Response of State Security Forces to Nuclear Threats and Breaches,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria,https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-basillepresentation.pdf.

[100] Yeonwook Kang, “TESS: Tool for evaluation security system Introduction and Development status, paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,” November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-kang2-presentation.pdf.

[101] Remarks by Chinese Delegation at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT, June 1, 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/statements/documents/2017-plenary/China.pdf.

[102] UK National Statement at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-uk-statement.pdf.

[103] Declaration Nationale Belge, Intervention de Monsieur Jan Bens, Directeur Général de l’Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire, 61ème Session De La Conférence Générale De L’AIEA, Septembre 20, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-belgium-statement.pdf.

[104] Germany Statement at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 19, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-germany-statement.pdf.

[105] Regional Training Course on Computer Security for Industrial Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities, April 24-28, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/regional-training-course-on-computer-security-for-industrial-control-systems-atnuclear-facilities.

[106] Technical Meeting on Engineering and Design Aspects of Computer Security in Instrumentation and Control Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, May 8-12, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/technical-meeting-on-engineering-anddesign-aspects-of-computer-security-in-instrumentation-and-control-systems-for-nuclear-power-plants.

[107] Caroline Baylon, Roger Brunt and David Livingstone, “Chatham House Report Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks,” September 2015, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20151005CyberSecurityNuclearBaylonBruntLivingstone.pdf.

[108] International Training Course on Security of Nuclear Material in Transport, October 9-13, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/international-training-course-on-security-of-nuclear-material-in-transport.

[109] 35th Technical Meeting of the Transport Safety Standards, December 11-15, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/35th-technical-meeting-of-the-transport-safety-standards.

[110] Naohito Uetake, “Current Nuclear Security Regime and Regulatory Framework in Japan-Efforts for Compliance with NSS-13 and CPPNM Amendment-,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-uetake-presentation.pdf.

[111] Regional Training Course on Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats, February 27-March 3, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/regional-training-course-on-preventive-and-protective-measures-against-insiderthreats.

[112] Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan, “A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past

Mistakes,” American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2014, https://www.amacad.org/multimedia/pdfs/publications/researchpapersmonographs/insiderThreats.pdf , p. 4.

[113] Jayarajan Kutuvan, Building Robust Nuclear Security Culture in Nuclear Research Centers, paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-kutuvan-presentation.pdf.

[114] Technical Meeting to Share Experiences Related to Activities under the Coordinated Research Project Development of Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Solutions, October 23-25, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/technicalmeeting-to-share-experiences-related-to-activities-under-the-coordinated-research-project-development-of-nuclearsecurity-culture-enhancement-solutions.

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