(2) Status of Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety-Related Conventions, Participation in Nuclear Security-Related Initiatives, and Application to Domestic Systems
A) Accession status to nuclear security-related conventions
Since the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001, terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants have been recognized as a real threat. Accordingly, ongoing work has focused not only on nuclear security, but also on overlapping areas, including nuclear safety to prevent accidents at nuclear power plants, as well as military diversion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.45 As part of this effort, the IAEA published “The Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security Interface: Approaches and National Experiences (Technical Reports Series No. 1000)” in March 2021.46 This technical report covers the following six topics: legal and regulatory framework; nuclear installations; radioactive sources and associated facilities and activities; management systems and nuclear safety and nuclear security culture; emergency preparedness and response; and cross-cutting aspects.47
This section examines the accession status of the surveyed countries to international conventions related to nuclear security and safety, namely: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); the Amendment to the CPPNM (CPPNM/ A); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention); the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
Some, if not all, of these nuclear safety-related conventions have provisions on physical protection measures from the perspective of safety. As these measures can also serve for nuclear security purposes, those nuclear safety-related conventions are regarded as nuclear security-related conventions in this report. Table 3-4 shows the adherence status of each surveyed country to the six conventions mentioned above.
The latest status of international conventions related to nuclear security are as follows:
➢ CPPNM (Entry into Force: 1987)48 State Parties: 164 (as of Sep. 2021)
– New Adherents: Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe
– Two or three countries have joined the CPPNM every year since 2016, with the exception of 2017. The continuous increase in adherence has been maintained.
➢ CPPNM/A (EIF: 2016)49
– Ratifications: 127 (as of Sep. 2021)
– New Adherents: the Philippines and Rwanda
– New ratifications: 15 in 2016, 7 in 2017, 3 in 2018, and 5 in 2019, and 2 in 2020. Ratifications have been consistently increasing. However, the number in 2021 is the lowest to date, the same as 2020.
➢ ICSANT (EIF: 2007)50
– States Parties: 118 (as of Nov. 2021)
– New Adherent: Botswana
– New ratifications: 6 in 2017, 1 in 2018, 2 in 2019, and 1 in 2020.
➢ Nuclear Safety Convention (EIF: 1996)51
– State Parties: 91 (as of Mar. 2021)
– New Adherents: Republic of Congo and Qatar
– New ratifications in 2019: 3
➢ Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (EIF: 1986)52
– State Parties 130 (as of Sep. 2021)
– New Adherents: Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe
– New ratifications in 2020: 2
➢ Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (EIF: 1987)53
– State Parties: 124 (as of Sep. 2021)
– New Adherents: Rwanda and Zimbabwe
– New ratifications in 2020: 3
➢ Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (EIF: 2001)54
– State Parties: 86 (as of March 2021)
– New Adherents: Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe
– New ratifications in 2020: 1
As seen above, much like 2020, there were gradual increases in the number of adhering countries across all conventions. It is worth mentioning that one country has joined multiple conventions and all the countries that have newly joined these conventions were African countries. These facts indicate that focused efforts to promote the universalization of these conventions have come to fruition, and such efforts should be continued.
Regarding developments in adherence to nuclear security-related international conventions, the Philippines announced at the IAEA General Conference in September 2021 that it has ratified the CPPNM/A, which entered into force in the country on 16 June 2021.55 In addition, South Africa announced that it is in the final stage of its domestic process to ratify the CPPNM/A.56
Other than these two countries, no significant developments in the surveyed countries were observed in 2021 with respect to national efforts in adhering to those international instruments.
Pertaining to the application of nuclear security measures stipulated in nuclear security-related conventions to the national nuclear security regime, there were no announcements by the surveyed countries found in public sources in 2021. Yet, at the IAEA General Conference, the UAE noted “the significance of the CPPNM and its Amendment, and its relevance to establishing a global mechanism to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material,” and it “adheres with full compliance to the CPPNM as amended.”57
The universalization and universal implementation of these nuclear security-related conventions are important issues for the international community. In this regard, active efforts have been made to date by international organizations, such as the IAEA and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
In 2020, the IAEA Director General sent official letters to States not party to the CPPNM, as well as to those party to the CPPNM but not its Amendment, encouraging them to adhere to both the CPPNM and its Amendment. In 2021, the Director General sent follow-up letters and repeated the same encouragement.58 In addition, the IAEA organized one virtual international seminar to encourage adherence to the CPPNM and its Amendment focusing on Russian speaking countries and Western Asia and the Middle East in May 2021.59 The UNODC organized an online event to universalize the ICSANT with the participation of more than 90 people from 22 countries and 9 international organization and non-governmental organizations.60 Moreover, to continue to assist Member States with the strengthening of their legal frameworks, the UNODC and the IAEA held their first ever joint event to promote the universalization of the CPPNM/A and the ICSANT in November 2021 and approximately 40 people from 20 countries participated in this event.61 Canada, the United States and the EU made financial contributions to this event.62 Efforts made by the surveyed countries for the uncivilization of nuclear security-related conventions include the convening of the Regional Workshop on Asia’s Considerations of Nuclear Security in March 2021 by the Korea Nuclear Safety and Security Commission and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). to promote Asian countries’ understanding of the CPPNM/A ahead of the first its Review Conference to take place in 2022.63
2021 marks the fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the CPPNM/A and its Conference of the Parties (Review Conference) was scheduled to be held in that year pursuant to Article XVI of the Convention. However, it was postponed to March 2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.64 In preparing for this Conference, in February 2021, the IAEA convened virtual meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of the Parties to the CPPNM/A. The Preparatory Committee undertook preparations for the Conference including with respect to a draft Rules of Procedure and a draft annotated agenda.65
The following are remarks made by the surveyed countries at the 2021 IAEA General Conference on CPPNM/A review conference:
➢ Japan66: “As a single nation cannot alone ensure global nuclear security, Japan stresses the important role of legal frameworks such as the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Japan continues to make efforts to promote the universalization of these conventions, including through contributions to the 2022 CPPNM Review Conference.”
➢ Turkey67: “Turkey is looking forward to and ready to actively engage in the upcoming review processes of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the CPPNM and its Amendment.”
➢ Switzerland68: “This Conference will be an important milestone for further strengthening the international legal framework for nuclear security. It will be an opportunity to promote the further universalization and a more effective implementation of the Convention and its Amendment.”
➢ U.S.69: “We encourage all parties to participate fully, including delivering national statements that address the adequacy of the Convention in light of the ‘then prevailing situation,’ and look forward to having a final RevCon document that reflects the parties’ conclusion on this matter. We continue to call on all states that have not yet done so to become a party to not only the A/CPPNM but also to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.”
This Review Conference will be the first of its kind since the CPPNM/A came into effect in 2016 and thus will be a significant one in setting the modus operandi for review conferences going forward. At the Review Conference in 2022, it is expected that participating State Parties will share their experiences and best practices on the implementation of the CPPNM/A, in addition to reporting on the detailed status of their sustainable efforts and improvement of nuclear security measures taken by State Parties. Also, active discussions on the possible impact of emerging technologies on nuclear security, evolving threats, and measures to further strengthen nuclear security are expected to be conducted proactively.70
In relation to the full implementation of the CPPNM, Article XIV of the Convention obligates a State Party to inform the depositary of its laws and regulations which give effect to the Convention. Considering the importance of transparency and sharing of information regarding the implementation of the Convention, the submission of such information has been increasingly regarded as important.
In this respect, according to the IAEA Nuclear Security Report 2021, 13 States provided information on their national laws and regulations to the IAEA in accordance with Article XIV during the period from July 2020 to June 2021.71
Application Status of Each Surveyed Country of the Measures Recommended in INFCIRC/ 225/Rev.5
As of 2021, the latest version of “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” is INFCIRC/225/ Rev.5, published by the IAEA as its Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 13 in 2011. It is entirely the responsibility of the state to determine how the recommended measures of INFCIRC/ 225/Rev.5 are implemented, to address remaining issues, and to come up with suitable measures, and it is up to regulators and operators to take actions as necessary.
As such, it is important for each country to communicate proactively with the public concerning the implementation status of measures recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Despite this, such communications have decreased since the end of the Nuclear Security Summit process in 2016. Table 3-5 shows the status of application with respect to recommended measures of INFCIRC/ 225/Rev.5 by each of the surveyed countries.
More than ten years have now passed since the publication of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and through review of the IAEA Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations,72 including INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, “to determine whether there is a need to revise these publications in the near future was completed in December 2020.”73 As part of this review, a virtual process, including several meetings and exchanges of information, for the conduct of the second “Open-ended Meeting of Legal and Technical Experts on IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 and INFCIRC/225 Rev 5” was held from July to November 2020, involving over 100 participants from 60 Member States.74
The following is a summary of the major international efforts as well as the dissemination of information and efforts taken by the surveyed countries in 2021 regarding the main elements of the national physical protection system for nuclear materials and nuclear facilities in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
Establishment and Strengthening of National Legislation
International efforts to support States in this area include the convening of the Technical Meeting to Share Approaches to and Experiences in the Management of Regulatory Oversight for the Operation of a First Nuclear Power Plant held by the IAEA in June 2021. The meeting provided “a platform for Member States to share good practices and challenges faced during the development and implementation of regulatory oversight activities at various stages in the life cycle of nuclear power plants.”75
As for efforts by surveyed countries, the following statement was made at the IAEA General Conference in 2021:
➢ Poland76: “Poland continues to improve its nuclear safety and security framework. Implementing the Polish nuclear power program, we fully understand the priority to assure our regulatory readiness to oversee safety and security of new nuclear-build. …we developed Policy and strategy for nuclear safety and radiological protection, which is expected to be approved by the Government this year. The Strategy follows IAEA safety standards and formulates single and clear national document, expressing fundamental safety principles and directions for further strengthening of nuclear safety and radiological protection.”
The following surveyed counties made remarks at the IAEA General Conference on the issue of sabotage.
➢ Israel77: “As demonstrated last May, thousands of missiles and rockets were launched towards the civilian population in Israel. This past round of escalation, as well as Israel’s long history of security threats from its neighboring countries, reinforces our need to constantly upgrade the protection and security of our nuclear facilities. These facilities are regularly maintained in line with the IAEA safety and security guidelines, in order to withstand any attack. Israel remains fully committed and adheres to the most stringent nuclear safety and security guidelines.”
➢ Iran78: “My country’s IAEA safeguarded installations have been under sabotage and terrorist attacks for several times. It is clear that Iran will defend itself by all possible means and manners, but it is a necessity that the world community unequivocally and strongly condemns and take a stand on the act of terrorism against safeguarded nuclear installations.”
The following represents information made publicly available regarding the efforts by the surveyed countries in the area of measures against sabotage: the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the United States held an event entitled “Asia Regional Technical Exchange: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) & Counter UAS (CUAS) in June. Australia, India, Japan, South Korea and Thailand participated in this event.79 Also, in the United States, the Y-12 National Security Complex, which contains HEU for military purposes, has deployed a system to counter UAS.80
Identification and Assessment of Threats (including Insider Threats)
In taking measures against nuclear security threats, it is vital to pay due attention to insider threats.81 In this regard, in Japan, an incident was made public in January 2021 in which at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Holdings, an employee had used another person’s ID card to enter the building inside the nuclear power station in September 2020.82 This employee misrepresented himself at multiple personnel ID checks at several gates and had the biometric information necessary for passage reregistered, thereby entering the main control room.83 It was pointed out that both TEPCO and contractor guards had not even consider the notion that employees could pose an insider threat. Furthermore, according to analysis conducted by an independent commission, one of the causes of this incident was the fact that those guards did not fully understand insider threats as a serious risk.84
Regarding insider threats, it has been pointed out that strengthening countermeasures is even more important now during the COVID-19 pandemic. There is no doubt the pandemic will also directly or indirectly affect personnel in nuclear facilities, leading to potential insider threats.85
As for international efforts in the area of threat assessment, the IAEA published in May 2021 their Implementing Guide National Nuclear Security Threat Assessment, Design Basis Threats and Representative Threat Statements as IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 10-G (Rev. 1).86 The IAEA “continued to advise States on threat characterization and assessment; the development, use and maintenance of design basis threats (DBTs) or representative threat statements; vulnerability analysis; and the development of methodologies for performance assessment of physical protection systems.”87 In addition, the IAEA “delivered one virtual regional workshop on threat assessment and DBTs for Member States in the Balkans in April 2021.”88
The following is a summary of information on the surveyed countries’ efforts in 2021 with regard to measures taken against insider threats.
➢ Nigeria89: In October, Nigeria held a national workshop on nuclear security and physical protection of nuclear facilities and discussed modern ways to mitigate insider threats in all ramifications in line with the recent security challenges in the country.
➢ Russia90: In November, Russia held an IAEA Regional Training Course on Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats to Nuclear Material.
In terms of international efforts in this area in 2021, the IAEA published “Computer Security for Nuclear Security No. 42-G,”91 in July, which became the first Implementing Guide to comprehensively address the issue of computer security. Also, the IAEA published its Technical Guidance on “Computer Security Techniques for Nuclear Facilities No. 17-T (Rev. 1)” in September.92 In addition, from January to April, the IAEA held “four webinars on enhancing computer security incident analysis at nuclear facilities.”93 Moreover, the IAEA completed the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) entitled “Enhancing Computer Security Incident Analysis at Nuclear Facilities” in January, with this CRP producing a technical simulator of a hypothetical nuclear facility.94 This simulator allows users to explore the application of computer security measures and evaluate their performance, as well as to explore new approaches to the creation of realistic threat scenarios.95
As for computer security efforts by the surveyed country, South Korea held its Annual Workshop for Physical Protection and Cyber Security in February, with about 70 people participating.96
Nuclear Security Culture
In recent years, it has become increasingly recognized and accepted that fostering and maintaining a nuclear security culture is extremely important for ensuring the continued effectiveness of nuclear security measures, including cyber security and measures against insider threats. In all nuclear-related organizations, it is necessary that both regulators and operators recognize the nuclear terrorism threat as well as the importance of nuclear security, and that each and every person is aware of his or her role in nuclear security and fulfills all responsibilities that entails.
In this regard, in Japan, in addition to the aforementioned incident of the unauthorized use of an ID card at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, it was further revealed that during the period between March 2020 and February 2021, intrusion detection equipment at the same Station was out of order at 16 places, and its nuclear material protection function was partially lost for an extended period of time.97 This situation was the result of insufficient alternative/backup measures at 10 out of the 16 places. This troubling situation came to light through an inspection conducted by the NRA from February to March in 2021. Concerning these two incidents at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, the NRA assessed on the severity of deterioration in its nuclear material protection performance as “importance: red,” representing the highest degree of deterioration, at four levels.98 “The Independent Review Committee on Nuclear Material Protection,” set up in response to the two incidents at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa conducted investigations on the root cause and the signs of degradation in nuclear security culture at the station, pointing out the following issues, among others: the TEPCO president and other executives did not convey the message sufficiently to their employees that nuclear security is as important as nuclear safety and the duties of the nuclear security department was not respected.99
Fostering and maintaining a robust nuclear security culture remains an important issue not only for TEPCO but also for the NRA, as it initially assessed the incident of the unauthorized use of an ID card as less significant and this incident was not reported from the department in charge to the NRA commissioners.100
Regarding international efforts in the area of fostering nuclear security culture in 2021, the IAEA published in March “Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture in Organization Associated with Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material 38-T.”101 This publication contains good practices from the CRP carried out between 2018 and 2020 to develop practical tools and effective solutions for improving the nuclear security culture. Among the surveyed countries, Brazil, Japan, Poland and the United States participated in this CRP.102 The Nuclear Security Resolution adopted at the 2020 IAEA General Assembly encouraged the IAEA to organize an international workshop on nuclear security culture. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the workshop was not held in 2021.103
Although dissemination of information by the surveyed countries on their efforts to foster nuclear security culture could not be observed in 2021, lively discussions are nonetheless taking place in and among academic societies and researchers, as well as through conferences including webinars and publications.104
45 International Nuclear Safety Group, “INSAG-24: The Interface Between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants,” IAEA, 2010.
46 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 15.
47 IAEA, “The Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security Interface: Approaches and National Experiences,” Technical Report Series No. 1000, March 2021. In the section on Cross-cutting aspects, regarding some of the future developments in technology and the latest changes in risks relating to the interface between nuclear safety and nuclear security that may impact the interface and where the production of further guidance may be necessary, the report lists new nuclear power plant technologies such as small modular reactors and medium seized reactors, insider threat, and falsification of documents.
48 The CPPNM is the only legally binding undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material. It establishes measures related to the prevention, detection and punishment of offenses relating to nuclear material.
49 The CPPNM/A makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. Regarding the universalization of the CPPNM/A, it is important for States not parties to the CPPNM yet to become a party to the CPPNM and ratify the CPPNM/A at the same time. Also, diplomatic efforts focusing on the CPPNM parties but not yet ratified its Amendment to encourage their ratification and provide support towards that end is important.
50 The ICSANT obligates State Parties to criminalize offences related to nuclear terrorism and to make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material.
51 This Convention aims at ensuring and enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants. State Parties are required to take legal and administrative measures, to report to the review committee established under this convention, and to accept peer review in order to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants under their jurisdiction.
52 This Convention obligates State Parties to immediately report to the IAEA when a nuclear accident has occurred, including the type, time, and location of the accident as well as relevant information.
53 This Convention establishes an international framework that enables the provision of equipment and dispatch of experts with the goals of preventing and/or minimizing nuclear accidents and radioactive emergencies.
54 The Joint Convention calls for its State Parties to take legal and administrative measures, report to its review committee, and undergo peer review by other parties, for the purpose of ensuring safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
55 “Statement by the Philippines,” IAEA General Conference, September 2021.
56 “Statement of South Africa,” IAEA General Conference, September 2021.
57 “Statement of the United Arab Emirates,” IAEA General Conference, September 2021, pp. 2-3.
58 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 4.
59 Ibid., p.25. As there are countries which do not have any nuclear material and thus feel no necessity to join the CPPNM, universalization efforts have been made focusing on raising awareness on the merits of joining the Convention.
60 “UNODC Launches New Website on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT),” UNODC, 2021, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/latest-news/2021_unodc-launches-new-website-on-the-international-convention-for-the-suppression-of-acts-of-nuclear-terrorism-icsant.html.
61 “UNODC and IAEA Joint Forces to Promote Key International Legal Instruments Against Nuclear Terrorism,” UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/latest-news/2021_unodc-and-iaea- join-forces-to-promote-key-international-legal-instruments-against-nuclear-terrorism.html.
63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea, “Regional Workshop on Asia’s Consideration of Nuclear Security,” Press Releases, March 25, 2021. The Workshop was organized through consultation with the IAEA and the National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S.
64 IAEA, “Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convection on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 2022,” https://www.iaea.org/events/acppnm2022.
65 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 25.
66 “Statement of Japan,” IAEA General Conference, September 2021, p. 7.
67 “Statement of Turkey,” IAEA General Conference, September 2021.
68 “Statement of Switzerland,” IAEA General Conference, September 2021.
69 The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, “Statement of the United States of America at 65th General Conference, Agenda Item 16: Nuclear Security,” September 22, 2021, https://vienna. usmission.gov/iaea-gc-2021-nuclear-security/.
70 See, Samantha Neakrase, “Strengthening Nuclear Security with A Sustainable CPPNM Regime,” paper prepared for the 2020 IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, January 2020.
71 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 25. It was 8 States during the period from July 2019 to June 2020. IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC (64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 23.
72 Two other Recommendations are: on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities (NSS No. 14) and on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control (NSS No. 15). These Recommendations present best practices that should be adopted by Member States in the application of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals.
73 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 30. Discussions on the need to revise INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, see Mathew Bunn, Laura Holgate, Dmitry Kovchegin, Nickolas Roth and William Tobey, “IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC/225): The Next Generation,” Stimson Center, July 2020, https://www. stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/IAEA-225-Recommendations.pdf.
74 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 30.
75 Ibid., p. 15.
76 “Statement of Poland,” IAEA General Conference, September 2021.
77 “Statement of Israel,” IAEA General Conference, September 2021.
78 “Statement of Iran,” IAEA General Conference, September 2021, p. 6.
79 “Asia Regional Technical Exchange: Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) & Counter-UAS (CUAS),” National Nuclear Security Administration, June 16-17, 2021.
80 “NNSA Release: Y-12 Deploys System to Counter Unauthorized Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” Y12 National Security Complex, June 8, 2021.
81 Regarding other incidents related to insider threat, for example, in 2014 at the Doel nuclear power plant in Belgium, a nuclear reactor was shut down as a result of the improper discharge of turbine lubricants by dissatisfied insiders. “The Enduring Need to Protect Nuclear Material from Insider Threats,” CRDF Global, April 26, 2017, https://www.crdfglobal.org/insights/enduring-need-protect-nuclear-material-insider-thr eats.
82 “TEPCO Employee, Entered a Building in Nuclear Power Station Using Other’s ID Card Kashiwazaki-Kariwa,” Asahi Shimbun Digital, January 23, 2021, https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASP1R3GRLP1RU OHB003.html. (in Japanese)
83 Independent Review Committee on Nuclear Material Protection, Verification Report, September 22, 2021, p. 30. (in Japanese)
84 Ibid., p. 64.
85 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Insider Threats and Nuclear Security During a Pandemic,” The Diplomat, April 23, 2021.
86 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 9.
89 “3-Day National Workshop on Nuclear Security and Physical Protection of Facilities,” Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission, https://www.nigatom.org.ng/nuclear-security-workshop/.
90 IAEA, “Regional Training Course on Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats to Nuclear Material,” https://www.iaea.org/events/evt1906346.
91 Eni Lamce and Sarah Henry Bolt, “Now Available: IAEA Guidance on Computer Security for Nuclear Security,” October 21, 2021, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/now-available-iaea-guidance-on-computer-security-for-nuclear-security. The guidance supports the development and implementation of an integrated national strategy, regulatory approach, and adherent computer security programmes designed to protect computer-based systems, the compromise of which could adversely affect nuclear security or nuclear safety.
92 “Computer Security Techniques for Nuclear Facilities,” IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/publications/ 14729/computer-security-techniques-for-nuclear-facilities.
93 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 12.
94 Ibid., p. 13.
95 Ibid. This simulator provides a means of developing complementary computer security measures and techniques to support prevention of, detection of and response to cyberattacks.
96 “Annual Workshop for Physical Protection and Cyber Security Held by KINAC,” KINAC News, February 8, 2021.
97 Independent Review Committee on Nuclear Material Protection, Verification Report, p. 30. According to a report by a third-party committee established by TEPCO, it was found that there were 111 cases in which it took more than 30 days from the failure of the detection equipment to the recovery from FY2018. “Intrusion Detection 111 Cases Long-term Failure Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station ID Un- authorized Use 12 More Cases,” Niigata Nippo, September 24, 2021, https://www.niigata-nippo.co. jp/news/national/20210924643714.html. (in Japanese)
98 Nuclear Regulation Authority, “Temporary Evaluation of the Scale of Inspection Observations in the Nuclear Regulatory Inspection (Nuclear Material Protection) in 2020 (Regarding the partial loss of the function of the nuclear material protection equipment) (Notice),” March 16, 2021.
99 Independent Review Committee on Nuclear Material Protection, Verification Report.
100 NRA, “Instruction Statement by Chairman Fuketa on the Occasion of 10th Anniversary of TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident,” March 11, 2021, https://www.nsr.go.jp/nra/kaiken/20210311_01. html.
101 “Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture in Organizations Associated with Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material,” IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/publications/13405/enhancing-nuclear-security-culture-in-organi zations-associated-with-nuclear-and-other-radioactive-material.
102 Yo Nakamura and Muhammad Khaliq, “CRP Success Story: Development of Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Solutions (Jo2007),” May 25, 2021, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/crp-success-story-development-of-nuclear-security-culture-enhancement-solutions-j02007.
103 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2021, p. 15.
104 For example, see “Nuclear Security Culture Programme Webinars,” King’s College London, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/events/series/nuclear-security-culture-programme-webinars; Tahir Mahmood Azad, “Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Security Culture,” South Asia Voices, November 15, 2021. In Japan, at the Atomic Energy Society of Japan meeting in September, the issue of nuclear safety and nuclear security as well as organizational culture was included in the discussion agenda. The Atomic Energy Society of Japan, “Fall Meeting,” https://confit.atlas.jp/guide/event/aesj2021f/subject/1J_PL03/detail. (in Japanese) In addition, the nuclear industry, the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan announced an industry-wide initiative on nuclear security culture in June 2021, in response to the above-mentioned incidents involving TEPCO. The initiative includes efforts such as mutual review among operators related to nuclear material protection work, promotion of cyber security measures, and continuous improvement of activities fostering a culture nuclear safety are being promoted. The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, “Industry-wide Efforts Taking into Account Nuclear Material Protection Incidents at TEPCO HD,” June 18, 2021, https://www.fepc.or.jp/about_us/pr/pdf/ kaiken_s1_20210618.pdf. (in Japanese)