A) Minimization of HEU and plutonium stockpile in civilian use

Since HEU, in addition to fueling some research reactors, can also be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, it is regarded as “two sides of the same coin” for weapons and civilian use. Therefore, from the viewpoint of “attractiveness” to terrorists, it is difficult to deny the possibility that fissile materials will pose a nuclear security risk to the country holding such nuclear material. HEU has long been considered to pose a proliferation risk in terms of state-to-state technology transfers. More recently, the “9.11” terrorist attacks in the United States triggered nuclear security concerns regarding the spread of fissile material to non-state actors, including international terrorists.115 To address this particular concern, the United States in 2004 introduced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), to manage the return of Russian and U.S.-origin HEU located in civilian sites to its country of origin, and the conversion of research reactors to operate with low enriched uranium (LEU).

It can be said that GTRI raised a caution for the international community about the risk of “attractive” fissile material being stolen for terrorist use, and encouraged concrete counter measures. However, it was then U.S. President Barack Obama’s “Prague speech” in April 2009 that was a major factor in raising world public awareness, including international media, about the importance of nuclear security. Then, as a measure to pursue strengthening of nuclear security, the need to minimize HEU and plutonium became better understood in concerned countries.116

Throughout the Nuclear Security Summit process, minimization of HEU in civilian use had been treated as one of the top priority issues. The 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué stipulates keeping state stockpiles of separated plutonium to the minimum level consistent with national requirements.117 According to the U.S. fact sheet published at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in March 2016, HEU and plutonium have been removed or down-blended at 50 facilities in 30 countries.118 In addition, as a result of Indonesia completing the withdrawal of domestic HEU in 2017,119 Southeast Asia, following South America and Central Europe, has become a region where there is no nuclear material attractive for terrorists.

Meanwhile, there was a discussion at the 61st IAEA General Conference in 2017 about the need to give a high level of protection to nuclear materials used for military purposes. Specifically, it was suggested that nuclear security should not be isolated from wider efforts to promote nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In particular, from the viewpoint of realizing a sustainable global nuclear security strategy, it was pointed out that the security measures that are applied to civil-use nuclear materials should also be applied to the vast stocks of HEU and separated plutonium in states possessing nuclear weapons.120 It was also noted that fissile material used for military purposes, which accounts for 85% of the existing nuclear material in the world, represents a risk factor for peace and international security, and that these substances should also be treated as subjects for nuclear security protection.121 Although it is an issue beyond the category of civilian use, it can be said that these are points to be noticed when considering the direction of arguments over future nuclear security. In another development at the conference, Kazakhstan expressed an intention to hold a Global Summit on Nuclear Security in its capital Astana.122 Since this proposal was made by Kazakhstan, the host country of the IAEA’s LEU bank, attention needs to be paid to how this initiative develops.

In the above regard, at the 61th IAEA General Conference, International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities organized by the IAEA, and on other occasions, the following updates on commitments to minimize HEU and plutonium use were made:

• China promoted the conversion of Ghana’s Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) to an LEU fuel system in cooperation with the IAEA, the US and Ghana, and the conversion work was completed in August 2017.123
• Poland completed the removal of HEU fuel for research reactors by the end of 2016. As a result all research reactors in Poland operate with LEU.124
• In Belgium, conversion of the HEU-type research reactor “BR 2” to an LEU fuel system continued.125
• Canada promotes the reliable management and removal of high-level radioactive material derived from Canada in Brazil under the cooperation of the IAEA.126
• Indonesia is implementing a process of down-blending nuclear fuel from HEU to LEU.127
• Norway will host the 3^rd International Symposium on HEU Minimization in June next year, in cooperation with the IAEA.128
• The U.S. Senate and House Armed Services Committees completed on November 9, 2017 their work on the policy framework relating to military activities in the form of a Conference Report on the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The report discussed the development of LEU fuel for naval reactors and the disposition of excess weapons plutonium.129
• Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd, operator of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, in December 2017 announced that the opening of the facility was again delayed, this time for about three years. Japan Nuclear Fuel does not expect operations of the plant to begin earlier than the first half of 2021 fiscal year.130 Also, the fast breeder reactor “Monju”, whose decommissioning was decided in December 2016, was completely closed in December 2017.131 In this connection, as a result of the revision of the Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Fund Act in 2016, the nuclear reprocessing business became a project matter to be approved by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.132 In addition, it was also decided by a supplementary resolution at the National Diet that the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry had to seek advice of the Atomic Energy Commission about the plutonium balance.133

B) Prevention of illicit trafficking

Nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, research and development of new technologies to strengthen enforcement capacity of law enforcement machinery and customs department, participation for the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Base (ITDB) have been regarded as important measures for preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. In particular, the IAEA ITDB is the database on incidents related to unauthorized possession, illicit trafficking, illegal dispersal of radioactive material, and discovery of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The ITDB has been regarded not only as an essential component of the information platform supporting the IARA’s Nuclear Security Plan, but also in terms of statistics, which bring to light the real existence of a nuclear security threat.134

As of 31 December 2016, 134 states participate in the ITDB program.135 According to the latest IAEA Annual Report 2016, states confirmed 189 incidents during 2016.136 Considering that the number of reports to ITDB was 226 in 2015,137 the number of cases decreased by 37 in 2016. On the other hand, the IAEA Nuclear Security Report138 specified the following details. During the reporting period, states reported, or otherwise confirmed to the ITDB program, a total of 162 incidents. Of these, 115 occurred between 1 July 2016 and 30 June 2017, and the remaining cases had occurred prior to 1 July 2016 but were not reported by that date. Of the 162 newly reported incidents, four were related to trafficking, two related to attempted malicious use and one was a scam. All of the material involved in these incidents was seized by the relevant competent authorities within the reporting state. No incident involved high enriched uranium, plutonium or Category I sources. On the other hand, there were 30 reported incidents in which the intent to conduct trafficking or malicious use could not be determined. These included 13 thefts and 17 incidents of missing materials. In 19 incidents the materials were not recovered, including one incident relating to Category II and Category III radioactive sources. In addition to this, there were also 125 reported incidents in which the material was out of regulatory control, but not related to trafficking malicious use or scams. Most of these incidents involved unauthorized disposal, unauthorized shipments and unexpected discoveries of material such as previously lost radioactive sources.

As of 31 December 2016, the ITDB contained a total of 3,068 confirmed incidents reported by participating states since 1993. Of these 3,068 confirmed incidents there are 270 incidents that involved a confirmed or likely act of trafficking or malicious use (Group I), 904 incidents for which there is insufficient information to determine if it is related to trafficking or malicious use (Group II), and 1,894 incidents that are not related to trafficking or malicious use (Group III).139

In order to protect sensitive information, detailed information on incidents and illicit trafficking is not published.140 Therefore, as it is not possible to assess the involvement of the surveyed countries, this report considers only their respective participation status.

Preventive measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material include the development of legal instruments for export control and enforced detection capability, such as the installation of sensing devices for radiological material at national borders and reinforcing nuclear forensic capabilities. The following describe some of efforts taken from 2016 to 2017 as preventive measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material:

• Canada provided assistance to Jordan for strengthening illegal transfer detection and prevention capacity of nuclear materials.141
• The Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission promotes the nuclear material detection project near the border. In September 2017, Chile conducted an emergency management exercise (Paihuen II) on radioactive materials in collaboration with Argentina, and verified their responses in their respective territories and countermeasures against nuclear terrorism threats between the two countries.142
• Egypt introduced into the penal code sanctions that severely punish illegal acts on nuclear materials and other radioactive materials.143
• Indonesia has installed a radiation measurement portal monitor at major domestic ports.144
• Pakistan has set up radiation monitoring posts at the entry and departure points as part of a nuclear detection architecture.145

In terms of international and regional organization efforts, INTERPOL provides a forum for collecting data on prevention of nuclear terrorism, supporting investigation, and confidence building and coordination among national law enforcement agencies. In accordance with the INTERPOL report, radiological and nuclear investigations-related courses and counter illicit trafficking exercises were held in Ukraine and Tanzania (July), in Panama (August) and in the Czech Republic (November) respectively.146 These exercises and training initiatives are intended to expand the recognition of illegal transfers of nuclear materials as nuclear security measures of INTERPOL.147 The exercises include: Operation STONE (Stop Trafficking Of Nuclear Elements), which is aimed at strengthening the nuclear and nuclear detection and deterrence capacity of law enforcement agencies; Operation Conduit, which is carried out at international airports and seaports, and aims to improve the ability of police, customs and border security agencies to coordinate cross-border investigations into the smuggling of nuclear materials; a workshop on countermeasures against smuggling of nuclear materials; and radioactive/ nuclear-related investigation courses, or table top exercises.

Table 3-6 shows the implementation status regarding the minimization of HEU for peaceful purposes, participation status for the ITDB and measures for the prevention of illegal transfer of nuclear material and other radiological materials, based on official statements made at the Washington Nuclear Security Summits, IAEA Nuclear Security Conference in 2016, and any other opportunities.

C) Acceptance of international nuclear security review missions

The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) provides recommendations to improve the physical protection system of nuclear material, associated facilities, and transport systems of the state, upon the request of a member state. In IPPAS missions, an IPPAS team, consisting of physical protection experts organized by the IAEA, visits government organizations and nuclear facilities in a state, reviews the physical protection system of the facility in detail, and conducts hearing investigations, in order to assess whether or not the reviewed physical protection system is in line with the recommendations of the IAEA INFCIRC/225, and to provide advice where necessary for its improvement. As was pointed in the previous issue of this report,148 acceptance of the IAEA missions is a valuable opportunity for member states to have an authoritative third-party peer review of their national nuclear security systems. Of course, there are various nuclear security-related treaties and guidelines. However, since the details of concrete implementation will ultimately be left to the governments of each country, measures to strengthen nuclear security tend to be self-righteous in some cases. For this reason, the peer review process that points out the items and methods to be improved mutually by external organizations is useful for implementing nuclear security related measures. In this sense, the external evaluation and recommendations obtained from the IPPAS mission are useful for reviewing the policy of future nuclear security enhancement in the host country. According to the nuclear security-related events list released by the IAEA in 2017, there were 14 events related to international evaluation missions.149 Since the number of events in the previous year was 26,150 the number in 2017 decreased by 12. In 2017 the IAEA announced the completion of an IPPAS mission in China in September,151 Germany in October152 and Australia in November.153 Outside the surveyed countries, the IAEA announce that IPPAS missions were completed in Hungary in July 2017,154 in Lithuania in October155 and in the Democratic Republic of Congo in December.156 In addition, at the IAEA General Conference in 2017, New Zealand announced acceptance of an IPPAS mission.157 In this regard, Turkey has announced that it intends to accept an IPPAS mission in 2018.158 Also, Switzerland announced its intention to accept an IPPAS mission in 2018 at the GICNT Plenary Meeting in 2017.159 Japan announced that it is in talks with the IAEA over the acceptance of an IPPAS follow-up mission in 2018.160

Apart from the IPPAS missions, the IAEA also provides the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), for the sake of developing nuclear security systems and capabilities. In accordance with the IAEA, the INSServ provides recommendations to improve a broad spectrum of nuclear security activities of the state, by reviewing its nuclear security system and requirements.161 Also, INSSP provides a platform for nuclear security work to be implemented over a period of time, thus ensuring sustainability. INSSP review missions enable the IAEA, the state concerned, and any donor financing the work, to plan and coordinate activities from both a technical and a financial point of view-optimizing the use of resources and avoiding duplications.162

Regarding advisory services by IAEA other than IPPAS, a Topical Meeting on INSSPs: Benefits to Members States from their Development to their Implementation was held in Vienna in January 2017.163 In March, a regional coordination meeting on Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans for Southern African Development Community was held in Gaborone, Botswana.164

D) Technology development ― nuclear forensics

Since the first Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, it has been recommended at each summit to build nuclear forensic capability and multilateral cooperation for that purpose.165 In fact, at the fourth Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2016, 30 concerned states issued a Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security, reflecting the growing awareness of the international community about the importance of nuclear forensics.166 In accordance with the “IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.2-G (Rev.1) Nuclear Forensics Support (2006)”167 definition, nuclear forensics is the technological method for the investigation of nuclear and other radiological material that has been removed without authorization from regulatory control and seized by a law enforcement authority of state. Following the increased threat perception of nuclear terrorism, technological development of nuclear forensics has been required so as to complement existing efforts to strengthen nuclear security. In particular, analysis on intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material and any associated material, to provide evidence for nuclear attribution, is the subject matter of nuclear forensics. Therefore, nuclear forensic analysis includes the characterization of the material and correlation with its production history.168

As initiatives on nuclear forensics conducted in 2017, a regional training course on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics was held in Pretoria, South Africa in April,169 and the JAEA/ISCN International Symposium on Nuclear Forensics and Regional Cooperation was held in Tokyo, Japan in June.170 In July 2017, the technical meeting on Nuclear Forensics Peer Review Advisory Missions171 and Technical Meeting on Nuclear Forensics and Cooperation with African States172 were held in Vienna. In September 2017, a regional seminar on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics was held in Moscow, Russia,173 and in October an international training course on Practical Introduction to Nuclear Forensics was held in Budapest, Hungary.174

As for a case of multilateral cooperation on nuclear forensics, the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), was established in 1996 under the auspices of the G8 Non-Proliferation Expert Group (NPEG), for the purpose of addressing the issue of illegal transfers following the end of the Cold War. The ITWG serves as the platform to support the technological development and sharing of nuclear forensic methods. Over the past few years, it has pursued a number of activities. These include conducting comparative nuclear material exercises (CMX) that socialize nuclear forensic techniques and identify best practices. Also, ITWG conducted exercises that clarify the uses and utility of national nuclear forensic libraries in helping identify the origin of nuclear or other radioactive material found outside regulatory control.175 The ITWG has been focusing on the promotion of nuclear forensic best practice through the development of guidelines for forensic analysis of nuclear, radioactive, and radiologically contaminated materials, and published “Guidelines for Evidence Collection in a Radiological or Nuclear Contaminated Crime Scene (2011)”176 and “Proposed Framework for National Nuclear Forensics Libraries and International Directories (2011).”177 In 2017 the 22^nd ITWG annual meeting was held in Karlsruhe, Germany.178 At the annual meeting, reviews on the outcomes and lessons of CMX-5, discussions on the nuclear forensics library exercise (Galaxy Serpent) in progress, and new CMX planned to be implemented in 2018 were conducted. The 2018 annual meeting of ITWG will be held in Switzerland.179

Another international cooperation initiative, the Nuclear Forensic Working Group (NFWG), has been established under the framework of the GICNT, which actively organized a number of workshops and tabletop exercises.180 In June 2017 the 10^th senior-level Plenary Meeting of GICNT was held in Tokyo.181 In relation to NFWG, Australia announced that it is implementing nuclear forensics-related activities with Southeast Asian countries from 2017 to 2018.182

As part of the countermeasures against nuclear terrorism, the importance of nuclear forensics is definitely increasing. However, public information on the nuclear forensics capabilities of each country has been limited. For reference, Table 3-7 below outlines the nuclear forensics capabilities of the surveyed countries (based on the reports made at the ITWG-17 in 2012, and as posted in a previous edition of the Hiroshima Report).183

E) Capacity building and support activities

Around the time when the Nuclear Security Summit process started, in many states and regions, capacity in nuclear security also began to be built up and international cooperation efforts for nuclear security were actively promoted. As an example of these efforts, in 2017, Canada announced the implementation of financial support for the IAEA’s activities to enhance regulatory capacity in Africa and South America.184 These activities included developing teaching and training in nuclear security, for example, by setting up training courses in that field, and establishing Centers of Excellence (COE) for experts from these states and regions, to improve their capacity in nuclear security. In particular, it is remarkable that many states concerned with this issue established COEs. In this regard, trends in 2017 on the development of COEs for nuclear security are as follows. China expressed its intention to utilize the COE set up in 2016 for nuclear security education and training in the Asia-Pacific region.185 The Pakistan Center of Excellence for Nuclear Security COE (PCENS) carries out education for domestic and foreign experts on nuclear safety, nuclear security, cyber security, insider threats, nuclear material accounting and control. In addition, the Pakistan National Security and Security Research Institute (NISAS) and Engineering Applied Science Institute (PIEAS) conduct similar training for domestic and foreign experts.186 Canada has implemented international cooperation on physical protection of nuclear material in nuclear facilities for Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.187 Indonesia has established its COE (I-CoNSEP) for nuclear security and emergency response.188 Via the Asian Regional Network (ARN) that was established with each COE within the region, Japan has strengthened interagency exchanges between the JAEA-ISCN, SNSTC in China and INSA in Korea.189 JAEA-ISCN also holds joint seminars with countries including Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Jordan, Turkey and Saudi-Arabia.190 Egypt implemented training that leads to the promotion of nuclear security culture and technical cooperation to relevant organization in the country by utilizing the Egypt Nuclear Security Support Center (ENSSC) established in 2012. In cooperation with the IAEA, Egypt is also strengthening its capacity on radiation detection and physical protection of nuclear material.191 Russia has established the Institute for Global Nuclear Safety & Security (GNSSI) under the ROSATOM Technical Academy, and is implementing education and training related to nuclear security. As of 2017, 896 people from 54 countries participate in this training.192 Each country’s efforts, to set up the COE and implement training as described above, not only helps capacity building related to global nuclear security, but also contributes to promoting understanding of nuclear security to regional experts, operators and related organizations. Moreover, strengthening cooperation with each country’s COE has advantages such as mutual exchange of instructors among COEs. At the same time, it is an important tasks to avoid duplication in the activities of each COE that has been installed in each region during the past several years, to promote efficient cooperation and closer information sharing. These tasks include building a broad network around the IAEA and strengthening education and training through international support.

To maintain and further facilitate exchange of experts, information and training material, the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network) was established in 2012 under the leadership of the IAEA. In this relationship, in February 2017, the Annual Meeting of the NSSC Network was held in Vienna.193 In addition, as an approach of the same kind, there is the activity of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN network) by IAEA, to further advance technology development and information sharing related to nuclear security education. In July 2017, the Annual Meeting of the INSEN was also held in Vienna.194

F) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund

The IAEA’s fifth Nuclear Security Plan covering the period 2018-2021,195 was approved in September 2017 and has been executed. For the sake of successful implementation of this plan, since 2002, when the IAEA established the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) as a voluntary funding mechanism to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism, the Agency has been calling on member states to make voluntary contributions to the Fund. According to the 2016 IAEA Annual Report (the latest at the time of writing this report), the countries that declared financial commitment to NSF are as follows. Belgium, Canada, China, Estonia, Finland, France Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States. Actual NSF revenue for FY 2016 was €47.4 million.196 It is an increase of €17 million compared with the previous year.

In this regard, the state of commitments to the NSF by the surveyed countries, which was clarified from the statements at the 61st IAEA General Conference and GICNT plenary meeting in 2017, is as follows. The United Kingdom expressed a contribution of £8.5 million to the NSF.197 Pakistan did not mention the amount, but expressed its willingness to contribute to the NSF in 2018.198 The Netherlands declared a contribution of €1 million to NSF for the implementation of a new Nuclear Security Plan.199 New Zealand also pledged to contribute $150,000 to NSF in the future.200 Belgium, for its part, revealed that its contributions to NSF since 2010 have exceeded $ 2 million.201

G) Participation in international efforts

The international efforts on nuclear security that this report draws attention to are not limited to the IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security, the NSS process that ended in 2016, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 202 and various contributions made by INTERPOL. In the present circumstances, various other multilateral frameworks relevant to nuclear security are operating around the world. The establishment of a “Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (G8GP) was agreed at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in 2002. It committed the G8 to raising up to $20 billion over the next 10 years to fund nonproliferation projects, principally in Russia but also in other nations. The so-called “10 plus 10 over 10” initiative called for the United States to contribute $10 billion, and the other original G7 nations a combined $10 billion to help the projects.203

In addition to the G8 member states (including France, Germany, Japan the U.K., the U.S. and Russia), other donor participants (Australia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, etc.) have participated in the G8GP and carried out various projects, in particular denuclearization cooperation in Russia. This work also includes destruction of chemical weapons, secure dismantling and transport of decommissioned nuclear powered submarines, improved detection of nuclear and radiological materials, re-employment of former WMD scientists and technicians to civilian programs, and the removal and safe transportation of nuclear material in Kazakhstan. In relation to nuclear security, the Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) has been established under the G8GP and has been working with nuclear security summits and the IAEA’s international conference on nuclear security. However, due to Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the leaders of the G-7 collectively decided to expel Russia from the G8 as a punitive measure.204 As a result, the former G8 initiative has officially changed the name to “G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.”205

In May 2017, on the premise of global expansion of peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Communique of the Taormina Summit in Italy pointed out the importance of nuclear security along with nuclear safety and nonproliferation.206 Besides this, the G7GP, on the initiative of the Presidency of Italy, launched a new policy focusing on Africa, as well as responding to potential threats that chemical and biotechnology are diverted to malicious actions.207 In the NSSG report, a policy was stated for avoiding overlap with existing international nuclear security measures, such as the IAEA, United Nations, INTERPOL and GICNT, and to strengthen the global nuclear security system by effectively managing the limited resources of the NSSG.208

On the other hand, GICNT, which was agreed by the U.S.-Russia initiative at the St. Petersburg Summit in 2006, is another important international effort in the field of nuclear security. GICNT is a framework of voluntary international cooperation by concerned states. As mentioned in the previous section on nuclear forensics technology development, the presence of multilateral activities by GICNT for strengthening nuclear security has greatly increased in recent years. The GICNT now includes participation from 88 partner countries (including Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.) and five international organizations as official observers.209 All partner nations have voluntarily committed to implementing the GICNT Statement of Principles (SOP), a set of broad nuclear security goals encompassing a range of deterrence, prevention, detection, and response objectives.210 The eight principles contained within the SOP aim to improve accounting, control, and protection of nuclear/ radiological material, enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities, detect and suppress illicit trafficking of nuclear/radiological material, assure denial of safe haven and resources from terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear/ radiological material, and so on. Since 2010, the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) was established as a working arm of the GICNT partnership. IAG has several priority functional areas with working groups, such as the Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDWG, chaired by the U.K.), the Nuclear Forensic Working Group (NFWG, chaired by Canada) and Response and the Mitigation Working Group (RMWG, chaired by Argentina).211

Individual efforts concerning GICNT are as follows. In January 2017 a workshop entitled “Vigilant Marmot,” organized by Canada, the United Nations Drug and Criminal Offices (UNODC) and Slovakia, was held in Bratislava, Slovakia. In this workshop, issues related to reviewing the legal framework of nuclear security in each country were examined.212 In addition, a workshop called “Magic Maggiore,” aimed at enlightenment and promotion of nuclear material detection architecture, was held by EC-JRC in March in Ispra, Italy.213 In May, the workshop “Sentinel” was held, with cooperation of the United Kingdom and Bulgaria, on the theme of preparing nuclear security exercise plans at the national level, to maintain the nuclear security capacity of each country.214 In June 2017, the 10^th Senior Level GICNT Plenary Meeting was held in Japan and agreed on the GICNT plan for 2017 to 2019, including priority issues in NDWG, NFWG and RMWG.215 Regarding the plan after 2017, China shows the intention to host a regional seminar on nuclear emergency response and a regional workshop on the safety of radioactive sources from 2018 to 2019.216 Likewise, the United Kingdom expressed its intention to hold a GICNT workshop focusing on recovery systems and resource management in preparing for recovering from terrorist attacks involving nuclear or radioactive materials in February 2018.217

In this report, it is expected that the acceptance of international nuclear security review missions such as IPPAS by the IAEA, national efforts regarding nuclear forensics, and commitments to nuclear security capacity-building and support will contribute to enhancing surveyed countries’ nuclear security-related capabilities and performances, and make more effective their respective nuclear security systems. Furthermore, the contributions to the IAEA NSF, and participation in the G8GP (G7GP) and the GICNT are indicators of the desire of states to enhance their commitment to nuclear security and can be used to undertake an overall evaluation of each country’s nuclear security system. Table 3-8 below shows the participation status and efforts regarding these nuclear security initiatives.

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[115] “Past and Current Civilian HEU Reduction Efforts,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, December 20, 2017, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/past-and-current-civilian-heu-reduction-efforts/.

[116] Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 5, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered.

[117] “Hague Communiqué,” 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, March 25, 2014.

[118] The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: The Nuclear Security Summits: Securing the World from Nuclear Terrorism,” March 29, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/29/fact-sheetnuclear-security-summits-securing-world-nuclear-terrorism.

[119] NTI, “Civilian HEU Dynamic Map,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, December 2017, http://www.nti.org/gmap/other_maps/heu/index.html.

[120] Statement by H. E. Ambassador Marcel Biato, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the IAEA at the 61st IAEA General Conference, Vienna, September 18-22, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-brazil-statement.pdf.

[121] Chile Declaration of the Permanent Representative Ambassador Armin Andereya at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 20, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-chile-final-statement.pdf.

[122] Statement of the Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan K.A Bozumbayev at the 61st Session of the IAEA General Conference, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-kazakhstan-statement.pdf.

[123] Statement at the 61th IAEA General Conference by TANG Dengjie, Head of the Chinese Delegation, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-china-final-statement.pdf.

[124] Statement By Andrzej J. Piotrowski, Undersecretary of State Ministry of Energy Poland on the occasion of the 61th Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-statementpoland-final.pdf.

[125] Declaration Nationale Belge, Intervention de Monsieur Jan Bens, Directeur Général de l’Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire, 61ème Session De La Conférence Générale De L’AIEA, Septembre 20, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-belgium-statement.pdf.

[126] Canadian Statement at the IAEA 61th General Conference, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-canadastatement.pdf.

[127] Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Dr. Darmansjah Djumala, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary/Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia Head of Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia At the 61^st General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-indonesia-statementfinal.pdf.

[128] Norway National Statement at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-norway-statement.pdf.

[129] Frank von Hippel, “Fissile Material Issues in the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,” IPFM Blog, December 17, 2017, http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2017/12/fissile_material_issues_i.html.

[130] “Rokkasho Plant will not start until 2021,” IPFM Blog, December 22, 2017, http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2017/12/rokkasho_plant_will_not_s.html.

[131] “Monju Reactor is Finally Shut Down,” IPFM Blog, December 13, 2017, http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2017/12/monju_reactor_is_finally_.html.

[132] “Saisyori Tou Kyosyutsu Kin Hou Ga Kakugi Kettei Saremasita” (Cabinet decision on “Spent Nuclear Fuel

Reprocessing Fund Act” was decided), METI website, http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2015/02/20160205001/20160205001.html.

[133] “Dai 190 Kai Kokkai Kakuhou Dai 17 Gou Hutai ketsugi” (The 190th National Diet Cabinet Law No.17 Supplementary Resolution) House of Councilors website, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_rchome.nsf/html/rchome/Futai/keizaiA434A071B3E18FCE49257F9C00271C6D.htm.

[134] IAEA, “ITDB: Incident and Trafficking Database,” https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/12/16-3042_ns_to_itdb_web-20160105.pdf.

[135] IAEA, “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Out of Regulatory Control,” IAEA Website, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/12/itdb-factsheet-2017.pdf.

[136] IAEA Annual Report 2016, GC(61)/3, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2016/gc61-3.pdf,  p. 86.

[137] IAEA Annual Report 2015, GC(60)/9, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC60/GC60Documents/English/gc60-9_en.pdf,  pp. 90-91.

[138] IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2017, GOV/2017/31-GC(61)/14, July 25, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC61/GC61Documents/English/gc61-14_en.pdf,  p. 3.

[139] IAEA, IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control 2017 Fact Sheet, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/12/itdb-factsheet-2017.pdf , p. 2.

[140] Ibid., p. 1.

[141] Canadian Statement at the IAEA 61th General Conference, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-canadastatement.pdf.

[142] Chile Declaration of the Permanent Representative Ambassador Armin Andereya at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 20, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-chile-final-statement.pdf.

[143] Fathi Elsisi, “Sanctions as a Legal Deterrence Mean in the National Physical Protection Regime,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-elsisi-presentation.pdf.

[144] Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Dr. Darmansjah Djumala, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary/Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia Head of Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia At the 61^st General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-indonesia-statementfinal.pdf.

[145] Statement by Khalil Hashmi, Director General (Disarmament), MFA Head of Pakistan Delegation at the 10^th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT, June 2, 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/statements/documents/2017-plenary/Pakistan.pdf.

[146] “News and Events,” INTERPOL website, https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/CBRNE/News-and-Events.

[147] Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, INTERPOL website, March 2017, https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/34610/453663/version/5/file/Radnuc-trifold-EN-web.pdf.

[148] Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, The Japan Institute of International Affairs ed., 2016 Edition Hiroshima Report: Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in 2015, Hiroshima Prefecture, March 2016, http://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/206407.pdf ,p.133.

[149] “Meetings, Conferences and Symposia: Meetings on Nuclear Safety and Security,” IAEA website, http://www-ns.iaea.org/meetings/default.asp?tme=ns&yr=2017&s=10&l=79&submit.x=7&submit.y=7.

[150] “Meetings, Conferences and Symposia: Meetings on Nuclear Safety and Security,” IAEA website, http://www-ns.iaea.org/meetings/default.asp?tme=ns&yr=2016&s=10&l=79&submit.x=5&submit.y=7.

[151] IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in China, September 8, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-china.

[152] IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Germany, October 6, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-germany.

[153] IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Australia, November 10, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-australia.

[154] IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Hungary, July 7, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-hungary.

[155] IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Lithuania, October 20, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-lithuania.

[156] IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, December 15, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-the-democraticrepublic-of-the-congo.

[157] New Zealand Statement Delivered by H.E. Nicole Roberton, New Zealand Ambassador at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-new-zealand-statement.pdf.

[158] Republic of Turkey Statement Delivered by Ambassador Birnur Fertekligil at the IAEA 61st General Conference, September 18-22, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-turkey-statement.pdf.

[159] Statement by Minister Peter Nelson, Deputy Head of Mission of the Embassy of Switzerland in Japan at the 10^th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT, June 1, 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/statements/documents/2017-plenary/Switzerland.pdf.

[160] Naohito Uetake, “Current Nuclear Security Regime and Regulatory Framework in Japan:Efforts for Compliance with NSS-13 and CPPNM Amendment,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-uetake-presentation.pdf.

[161] International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ), IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/services/reviewmissions/international-nuclear-security-advisory-service-insserv.

[162] Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), IAEA website, http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/inssp.asp?s=4.

[163] Topical Meeting on INSSPs: Benefits to Member States from their Development to their Implementation, January 23, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/topical-meeting-on-inssps-benefits-to-member-states-from-their-development-totheir-implementation.

[164] Regional Coordination Meeting on Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans for Southern African Development Community States, March 6–10, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/regional-coordination-meeting-on-integratednuclear-security-support-plans-for-southern-african-development-community-states.

[165] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Work Plan of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit,” April 13, 2010.

[166] “Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security,” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016, http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-forensics-in-nuclear-security.

[167] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.2-G (Rev.1), “Nuclear Forensics Support,” 2006, http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10797/Nuclear-Forensics-in-Support-of-Investigations.

[168] Ibid., p. 3.

[169] Regional Training Course on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics, April 3-6, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/regional-training-course-on-introduction-to-nuclear-forensics.

[170] “ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update,” No.3, June 2017, https://www.nf-itwg.org/newsletters/ITWG_Update_no_3.pdf,  p. 5.

[171] Technical Meeting on Nuclear Forensics Peer Review Advisory Missions, July 11-13, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/technical-meeting-on-nuclear-forensics-peer-review-advisory-missions.

[172] Technical Meeting on Nuclear Forensics and Cooperation with African States, July 11-13, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/technical-meeting-on-nuclear-forensics-and-cooperation-with-african-states.

[173] Regional Seminar on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics, September 4-8, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/regional-seminar-on-introduction-to-nuclear-forensics.

[174] International Training Course on Practical Introduction to Nuclear Forensics, October 2-6, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/international-training-course-on-practical-introduction-to-nuclear-forensics.

[175] “EU-US Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) Joint Statement,” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 1, 2016, http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/eu-us-nuclearforensics-international-technical-working-group-itwg-joint-statement.

[176] ITWG “Guideline,” ITWG website, http://www.nf-itwg.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ITWG_Guideline_for_RN_Evidence_Collection_FINAL.pdf.

[177] “Nuclear Forensics Libraries,” ITWG website, http://www.nf-itwg.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/National_Nuclear_Forensic_Libraries_TOR_FINAL.pdf.

[178] “Nuclear Forensics Practitioners Strengthen Best Practices and International Cooperation,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation website, July 12, 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/2017/272553.htm.

[179] Ibid.

[180] “Key Multilateral Events and Exercises,” GICNT website, http://www.gicnt.org/documents/GICNT_Past_Multilateral_Events_June2015.pdf.

[181] “ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update,” No.3, June 2017, https://www.nf-itwg.org/newsletters/ITWG_Update_no_3.pdf , p. 5.

[182] Australia Statement at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT, June 1-2, 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/statements/documents/2017-plenary/Australia.pdf.

[183] This table was originally shown in the “Hiroshima Report-Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: 2014,” March 2014, p. 82.

[184] Canadian Statement at the IAEA 61th General Conference, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-canadastatement.pdf.

[185] Statement at the 61th IAEA General Conference by Tang Dengjie, Head of the Chinese Delegation, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-china-final-statement.pdf.

[186] Statement by the Leader of the Pakistan Delegation, 61st Annual General Conference of the IAEA, September 18-22, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-pakistan-statement.pdf.

[187] Canadian Statement at the IAEA 61th General Conference, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-canadastatement.pdf.

[188] Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Dr. Darmansjah Djumala, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary/Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia Head of Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia At the 61st General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-indonesiastatement-final.pdf.

[189] Naoko Noro, “ISCN’s Activities to Promote Universalization of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 (NSS 13),” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-noro-presentation.pdf.

[190] Nobumasa Akiyama, “Japan’s Commitment to the Universalization of CPPNM and Its Amendment,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13- 17, Vienna, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-akiyama-presentation.pdf.

[191] Mohamed Helmyhazzaa, “A Proposal for the Role of Nuclear Security Support Center to Sustain a National Nuclear Security Regime,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-hazzaa-presentation.pdf.

[192] A. Kuskov, “Training and additional professional education of the specialists in the field of nuclear security in RF,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, November 13-17, Vienna, Austria, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/cn-254-kuskov-presentation.pdf.

[193] Annual Meeting of the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network), February 20–24, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/annual-meeting-of-the-international-network-for-nuclear-securitytraining-and-support-centres-nssc-network.

[194] Annual Meeting of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), July 24–28, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/events/annual-meeting-of-the-international-nuclear-security-education-network-insen.

[195] Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021, GC(61)/24, September 14, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC61/GC61Documents/English/gc61-24_en.pdf.

[196] IAEA, “IAEA Annual Report 2016,” https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC61/GC61Documents/English/gc61-3_en.pdf , p. 87.

[197] UK National Statement at the 61th General Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-uk-statement.pdf.

[198] Statement by the Leader of the Pakistan Delegation, 61st Annual General Conference of the IAEA, September 18-22, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-pakistan-statement.pdf.

[199] Statement by Ms Anke ter Hoeve-van Heek, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the IAEA, September 20, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-netherlands-statement.pdf.

[200] New Zealand Statement Delivered by H.E. Nicole Roberton, New Zealand Ambassador at the 61th General

Conference of the IAEA, September 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-new-zealand-statement.pdf.

[201] Belgium Statement at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT, June 1-2, 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/statements/documents/2017-plenary/Belgium.pdf.

[202] Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016, http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-1540-committee.

[203] NTI, “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (“10 Plus 10 Over 10 Program”),” June 20, 2017, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/global-partnership-against-spread-weaponsand-materials-mass-destruction-10-plus-10-over-10-program/.

[204] Ibid.

[205] “G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” G7 2017 Italy website, http://www.g7italy.it/it/node/190.

[206] G7 Taormina Leaders’ Communiqué, http://www.g7italy.it/sites/default/files/documents/G7%20Taormina%20Leaders%27%20Communique_27052017_0.pdf.

[207] Ibid.

[208] “Italian G7 Presidency 2017 Report,” Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG), http://www.g7italy.it/sites/default/files/documents/NSSG-Report_FINAL_0.pdf.

[209] “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Partner Nations List,” June 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/documents/GICNT_Partner_Nation_List_June2017.pdf.

[210] “Overview,” GICNT website, http://www.gicnt.org/index.html.

[211] “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet,” GICNT website, November 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/documents/GICNT_Fact_Sheet_Nov2017.pdf.

[212] “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 2017 Plenary Meeting Joint Co-Chair Statement,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000261774.pdf.

[213] Ibid.

[214] Ibid.

[215] Statement by Japan at the 61th IAEA General Conference, Minister of State Masaji Matsuyama, September 18, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc61-japan-statement_v2.pdf.

[216] Remarks by Chinese Delegation at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT, June 1, 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/statements/documents/2017-plenary/China.pdf.

[217] UK National Statement at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT, June 1-2, 2017, http://www.gicnt.org/statements/documents/2017-plenary/UK.pdf.

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