Russia and the United States have implemented verification measures, including on-site inspections, under the New START.

One of the noticeable activities on verification is the “International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV),” launched by the United States in December 2014. With 26 participating countries (and the EU and Vatican),170 the IPNDV continues to study verification measures and technologies on dismantlement of nuclear weapons, as well as fissile material derived from dismantled nuclear warheads. In November-December 2017, its fifth plenary meeting was held in Buenos Aires, where 22 participating countries discussed the completion of Phase I of the Partnership’s work, as well as launching Phase II. According to the fact sheet issued by the U.S. State Department, “[d]uring the initial two-year phase of the Partnership’s work, the working grops have focused on the dismantlement phase of the nuclear weapons lifecycle. In this context, the Partnership developed a scenario involving the dismantlement of a notional nuclear weapon, the inspection of that dismantlement by a multilateral team of inspectors, and the related technologies that could support such an inspection. This scenario has allowed the three working groups to coordinate their efforts and develop common understandings of the challenges and potential solutions associated with nuclear disarmament verification.”171 The IPNDP, in its summary report, identified several specific verification areas for additional analysis as following:179

• Declarations, including within the wider nuclear disarmament process and as complements to more specific monitoring and inspection of nuclear weapon dismantlement;
• Data handling requirements across the inspection process;
• Information barrier technologies;
• Technologies enabling measurements of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and High Explosives (HE), as well as the development of nuclear weapon templates; and
• Testing and exercising potentially promising technologies and procedures.

For Phase II, the IPNDV will deepen its understanding of effective and practical verification options to support future nuclear disarmament verification and demonstrate its work through tangible activities such as exercises and demonstrations. For these purposes, the following three working group will be established: Verification of Nuclear Weapons Declarations; Verification of Reductions; and Technologies for Verification.173

Regarding nuclear disarmament verification measures, the respective U.K.-U.S. and U.K.-Norway joint developments were carried out.174 In addition, some NNWS call for the involvement of the IAEA regarding, for instance, development and conclusion of legally binding verification arrangements, which would apply to all fissile material permanently removed from nuclear weapons programs.175

In the meantime, Article 4 of the TPNW stipulates procedures regarding verifications of nuclear weapons elimination as following

• Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme…Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole.
• [E]ach State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of State Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the State Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the State Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure.

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[170] The participating countries include three NWS (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and UAE. China and Russia participated in the Phase I of the project as observers, but do not join the Phase II.

[171] The U.S. Department of State, “The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Phase I,” December 8, 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2017/276402.htm.

[172] International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, “Phase I Summary Report: Creating the Verification Building Blocks for Future Nuclear Disarmament,” November 2017, p. 4.

[173] The U.S. Department of State, “The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Phase II,” December 8, 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2017/276403.htm.

[174] See the Hiroshima Report 2017.

[175] See the Hiroshima Report 2017.

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