EvaluationHiroshima for Global Peace

Hiroshima Report 2019Evaluation

Evaluation :Country-by-Country Analysis

Evaluation Points and Criteria

In this “Evaluation” part, the performances of the 36 countries surveyed in this project on three areas, that is, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security, are evaluated numerically, based upon study and analysis compiled in the “Report” section.

Evaluation of the four groups—nuclear-weapon states (NWS), non-parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), non-nuclear- weapon states (NNWS), and one particular state (North Korea)—is made separately because of their different characteristics. Since different sets of criteria are applied to different groups of countries, full points differ according to the group each country belongs to. Then, as a measure to visualize a comparison of 36 countries’ relative performances, each country’s performances in each area is shown on a chart in percentage terms.

Following is point and scale of measurement of each evaluation criteria.

[Nuclear Disarmament]

Evaluation criteria	Maximum points	Scale of measurement
1. Status of Nuclear Forces (estimates)	-20
Status of nuclear forces (estimates)	(-20)	-5 (〜50); -6 (51〜100); -8 (101〜200); -10 (201〜400); -12 (401〜1,000); -14 (1,001〜2,000); -16 (2,001〜 4,000); -17 (4,001〜6,000); -19 (6,001〜8,000); -20 (8,001〜)
Status of nuclear forces (estimates)	(-20)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
2. Commitment to Achieving a World without Nuclear Weapons	11
A) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on nuclear disarmament proposals by Japan, NAC and NAM	(6)	On each resolution: 0 (against); 1 (abstention); 2 (in favor)
B) Announcement of significant policies and important activities	(3)	Add 1 point for each policy, proposal and other initiatives having a major impact on global momentum toward a world without nuclear weapons (maximum 3 points).
	(3)	-3~-1 (activities that are not covered by the existing evaluation items but contrary to nuclear disarmament)
C) Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons	(2)	On each resolution: 0 (against); 0.5(abstention); 1 (in favor)
3. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)	10
A) Signing and ratifying the TPNW	(7)	0 (not signing); 3 (not ratifying); 7 (ratifying)
B) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on a legal prohibition of nuclear weapons	(3)	On each resolution: 0 (against); 0.5 (abstention); 1 (in favor)
4. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons	22
A) Reduction of nuclear weapons	(15)	・Add 1~10 points in accordance with the decuple rate of reduction from the previous fiscal year for a country having declared the number of nuclear weapons ・For a country having not declared it, add some points using the following formula: (the previous target – the latest target)÷the estimated number of nuclear weapons×10 ・Add 1 (engaging in nuclear weapons reduction over the past 5 years); add 1 (engaging in nuclear weapons reduction under legally-binding frameworks such as New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty); add 1 (announcing further reduction plan and implementing it in 2018) ・Give a perfect score (15 points) in case of the total abolition of nuclear weapons ・-1 (increase of the number of possessed nuclear weapons in the past five years without any reductions)
A) Reduction of nuclear weapons	(15)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
B) Concrete plans for further reduction of nuclear weapons	(3)	0 (no announcement on a plan of nuclear weapons reduction); 1 (declaring a rough plan of nuclear weapons reduction); 2 (declaring a plan on the size of nuclear weapons reduction); 3 (declaring a concrete and detailed plan of reduction)
B) Concrete plans for further reduction of nuclear weapons	(3)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
C) Trends on strengthening/modernizing nuclear weapons capabilities	(4)	0 (modernizing/reinforcing nuclear forces in a backward move toward nuclear weapons reduction); 2 ~3 (modernizing/reinforcing nuclear forces which may not lead to increasing the number of nuclear weapons); 4 (not engaging in nuclear modernization/reinforcement)
	(4)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
5. Diminishing the Role and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategies and Policies	8
A) Current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons	(-8)	-7~-8 (judged based on the declaratory policy)
	(-8)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
B) Commitment to no first use, “sole purpose,” and related doctrines	(3)	0 (not adopting either policy); 2 (adopting a similar policy or expressing its will to adopt either policy in the future); 3 (already adopting either policy)
	(3)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
C) Negative security assurances	(2)	0 (not declaring); 1 (declaring with reservations); 2 (declaring without reservations)
C) Negative security assurances	(2)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
D) Signing and ratifying the protocols of the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones	(3)	Add 0.5 point for the ratification of one protocol; a country ratifying all protocols marks 3 points
	(3)	(not applicable to countries except NWS)
E) Relying on extended nuclear deterrence	(-5)	(not applicable to the NWS and Non-NPT Parties)
E) Relying on extended nuclear deterrence	(-5)	applied solely to the NNWS): -5 (a country relying on the nuclear umbrella and participating in nuclear sharing); -3 (a country relying on the nuclear umbrella); 0 (a country not relying on the nuclear umbrella)
6. De-alerting or Measures for Maximizing Decision Time to Authorize the Use of Nuclear Weapons	4
De-alerting or measures for maximizing decision time to authorize the use of nuclear weapons	(4)	0~1 (maintaining a high alert level); 2 (maintaining a certain alert level); 3 (de-alerting during peacetime); add 1 point for implementing measures for increasing the credibility of (lowered) alert status
	(4)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
7. CTBT	11
A) Signing and ratifying the CTBT	(4)	0 (not signing); 2 (not ratifying); 4 (ratifying)
B) Moratoria on nuclear test explosions pending CTBT’s entry into force	(3)	0 (not declaring); 2 (declaring); 3 (declaring and closing nuclear test sites)
	(3)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
C) Cooperation with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission	(2)	0 (no cooperation or no information); 1~2 (paying contributions, actively participating in meetings, and actively engaging in outreach activities for the Treaty’s entry into force)
D) Contribution to the development of the CTBT verification systems	(2)	Add 1 point for establishing and operating the IMS; add another 1 point for participating in the discussions on enhancing the CTBT verification capabilities
E) Nuclear testing	(-3)	-3 (conducting nuclear test explosions in the past 5 years);-1 (conducting nuclear tests without explosions or tests with unclear status); 0 (not conducting any nuclear tests)
E) Nuclear testing	(-3)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
8. FMCT	10
A) Commitment, efforts, and proposals toward immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT	(5)	Add 1 (expressing a commitment); add 1~2 (actively engaging in the promotion of early commencement); add 1~2 (making concrete proposals on the start of negotiations)
B) Moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons	(3)	0 (not declaring); 1 (not declaring but not producing fissile material for nuclear weapons); 2 (declaring); 3 (declaring and taking measures for the cessation of production as declared)
	(3)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
C) Contribution to the development of verification measures	(2)	0 (no contribution or no information); 1 (proposing research on verification measures); 2 (engaging in R&D for verification measures)
9. Transparency in Nuclear Forces, Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Strategy/Doctrine	6
Transparency in nuclear forces, fissile material for nuclear weapons, and nuclear strategy/doctrine	(6)	Add 1~2 (disclosing the nuclear strategy/doctrine); add 1~2 (disclosing the status of nuclear forces);add 1~2 (disclosing the status of fissile material usable for nuclear weapons)
	(6)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
10. Verifications of Nuclear Weapons Reductions	7
A) Acceptance and implementation of verification for nuclear weapons reduction	(3)	0 (not accepting or implementing); 2 (limited acceptance and implementation); 3 (accepting and implementing verification with comprehensiveness and completeness); deduct 1~2 points in case of non- compliance or problems in implementation
	(3)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
B) Engagement in research and development for verification measures of nuclear weapons reduction	(1)	0 (not engaging or no information); 1 (engaging in R&D)
C) The IAEA inspections to fissile material declared as no longer required for military purposes	(3)	0 (not implementing), 1(limited implementation); 3 (implementing); add 1 point if a country engages in efforts for implementing or strengthening implementation, except in the case of already implementing
	(3)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
11. Irreversibility	7
A) Implementing or planning dismantlement of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles	(3)	0 (not implementing or no information); 1 (perhaps implementing but not clear); 2~3 (implementing)
	(3)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
B) Decommissioning/conversion of nuclear weapons-related facilities	(2)	0 (not implementing or no information); 1 (implementing in a limited way); 2 (implementing extensively))
	(2)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
C) Measures for fissile material declared excess for military purposes, such as disposition or conversion to peaceful purposes	(2)	0 (not implementing or no information); 1 (implementing in a limited way); 2 (implementing extensively)
	(2)	(not applicable to the NNWS)
12. Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and Cooperation with Civil Society	4
Disarmament and non-proliferation education and cooperation with civil society	(4)	Add 1 (mentioning in a statement or participating in the joint statement or mentioning at the NPT PrepCom/ Revcon, etc); add 1~2 (implementing disarmament and non-proliferation education); add 1~ 2 (cooperating with civil society) Maximum 4 points
13. Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies	1
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies	(1)	0 (not attending);0.5 (not attending in 2018 but has attended at least once during the past 3 years); 1 (attending any one of the ceremonies)

[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]

1. Acceptance and Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Obligations	20
A) Accession to the NPT	(10)	0 (not signing or declaring withdrawal); 3 (not ratifying); 10 (in force)
B) Compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT and the UNSC resolutions on non-proliferation	(7)	0 (non-complying with Article I and II of the NPT); 3 ~4 (having not yet violated Article I and II of the NPT but displaying behaviors that raise concerns about proliferation, or not complying with the UNSC resolutions adopted for relevant nuclear issues); 5 (taking concrete measures for solving the non- compliance issue); 7 (complying)
		As for the non-NPT states (maximum 3 points); 2 (not complying with the UNSC resolutions adopted for relevant nuclear issues); 3 (other cases)
		-2~-1 (activities that are not covered by the existing evaluation items but contrary to nuclear non- proliferation)
C) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones	(3)	1 (signing the NWFZ treaty); 3 (ratifying the treaty)
2. IAEA Safeguards Applied to the NPT NNWS	18
A) Signing and ratifying a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement	(4)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 4 (in force)
B) Signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol	(5)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 3 (provisional application); 5 (in force)
C) Implementation of the integrated safeguards	(4)	0 (not implementing); 2 (broader conclusion) 4 (implementing)
D) Compliance with IAEA Safeguards Agreement	(5)	0 (not resolving the non-compliance issue); 2 (taking concrete measures for solving the non- compliance issue); 5 (complying)
3. IAEA Safeguards Applied to NWS and Non-Parties to the NPT	7
A) Application of the IAEA safeguards (Voluntary Offer Agreement or INFCIRC/66) to their peaceful nuclear in facilities	(3)	0 (not applying); 2 (applying INFCIRC/66); 3 (applying Voluntary Offer Agreement)
B) Signing, ratifying, and implementing the Additional Protocol	(4)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 3 (in force); add 1 point if widely applied to peaceful nuclear activities
4. Cooperation with the IAEA	4
Cooperation with the IAEA	(4)	Add 1 (contributing to the development of verification technologies); add 1~2 (contributing to the universalization of the Additional Protocol); add 1 (other efforts)
5. Implementing Appropriate Export Controls on Nuclear-Related Items and Technologies	15
A) Establishment and implementation of the national control systems	(5)	0 (not establishing); 1 (establishing but insufficient); 2 (establishing a system to a certain degree); 3 (establishing an advanced system, including the Catch- all); add 1~2 (if continuing to implement appropriate export controls); deduct 1~2 (not adequately implementing)
B) Requiring the conclusion of the Additional Protocol for nuclear export	(2)	0 (not requiring or no information); 1 (requiring for some cases); 2 (requiring)
C) Implementation of the UNSCRs concerning North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues	(3)	0 (not implementing or no information); 2 (implementing); 3(actively implementing); deduct 1~ 3 (depending on the degree of violation)
D) Participation in the PSI	(2)	0 (not participating); 1 (participating); 2 (actively participating)
E) Civil nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT	(3)	0 (exploring active cooperation); 1~2 (contemplating cooperation, subject to implementing additional nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures); 3 (showing a cautious attitude or being against it)
6. Transparency in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy	4
A) Reporting on the peaceful nuclear activities	(2)	0 (not reporting or no information); 1 (reporting but insufficiently); 2 (reporting)
B) Reporting on plutonium management	(2)	0 (not reporting or no information); 1 (reporting); 2 (reporting on not only plutonium but also uranium);add 1 (ensuring a high level of transparency in plutonium although not being obliged to report)

[Nuclear Security]

Evaluation criteria	Maximum points	Scale of measurement
1. The Amount of Fissile Material Usable for Weapons	-16
The amount of fissile material usable for weapons	(-16)	Firstly, -3 (if possessing fissile material usable for nuclear weapons). Then, deduct if: ・ HEU: -5 (>100t); -4 (>20t); -3 (>10t); -2 (>1t); -1 (possessing less than 1t) ・Weapon-grade Pu: -5 (>100t); -4 (>20t); -3 (>10t); -2 (>1t); -1 (possessing less than 1t) ・Reactor-grade Pu: -3 (>10t); -2 (>1t); -1 (possessing less than 1t)
2. Status of Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety-Related Conventions, Participation in Nuclear Security-Related Initiatives, and Application to Domestic Systems	21
A) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention	(3)	0 (not signing the Treaty); 1 (not ratifying the Treaty); 2 (Treaty in force, not ratifying the Amendment); 3 (both the Treaty and Amendment in force)
B) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	(2)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 2 (in force)
C) Convention on Nuclear Safety	(2)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 2 (in force)
D) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident	(2)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 2 (in force)
E) Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management	(2)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 2 (in force)
F) Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency	(2)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 2 (in force)
G) INFCIRC/225/Rev.5	(4)	0 (not applying or no information); 2 (applying to the national implementation system); 4 (applying and implementing adequately)
H) Enactment of laws and establishment of regulations for the national implementation	(4)	0 (not establishing domestic laws and regulations and the national implementation system); 1~2 (establishing them but insufficiently); 4 (establishing appropriately)
3. Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security	20
A) Minimization of HEU and Plutonium stockpile in civilian use	(4)	0 (no effort or no information); 1 (limited efforts); 3 (active efforts); add 1 (committed to further enhancement)
B) Prevention of illicit trafficking	(5)	0 (not implementing or no information); 2 (limited implementation); 4 (active implementation); add 1 (committed to further enhancement)
C) Acceptance of international nuclear security review missions	(2)	0 (not accepting or no information); 1 (accepting); 2 (actively accepting)
D) Technology development―nuclear forensics	(2)	0 (not implementing or no information); 1 (implementing); 2 (actively implementing)
E) Capacity building and support activities	(2)	0 (not implementing or no information); 1 (implementing); 2 (actively implementing)
F) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund	(2)	0 (no effort or information); 1 (participating); 2 (actively participating)
G) Participation in international efforts	(3)	0 (not participating); 1 (participating in a few frameworks); 2 (participating in many or all frameworks); add 1 (if contributing actively)

As for the evaluation section, a set of objective evaluation criteria is established by which the respective country’s performance is assessed. Along with the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), its signature and ratification status was newly added to the evaluation item in the Hiroshima Report 2018.

The Research Committee of this project recognizes the difficulties, limitations and risk of “scoring” countries’ performances. However, the Committee also considers that an indicative approach is useful to draw attention to nuclear issues, so as to prompt debates over priorities and urgency.

The different numerical value within each category (i.e., nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security) reflects each activity’s importance within that area, as determined through deliberation by the Research Committee of this project. However, the differences in the scoring arrangements within each of the three categories does not necessarily reflect its relative significance in comparison with others, as it has been driven by the differing number of items surveyed. Thus, the value assigned to nuclear disarmament (full points 101) does not mean that it is more than twice as important as nuclear non-proliferation (full points 61) or nuclear security (full points 41).

Regarding “the number of nuclear weapons” (in the nuclear disarmament section) and “the amount of fissile material usable for nuclear weapons” (in the nuclear security section), the assumption is that the more nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile material a country possesses, the greater the task of reducing them and ensuring their security. However, the Research Committee recognizes that “numbers” or “amounts” are not the sole decisive factors. It is definitely true that other factors—such as implications of missile defense, chemical and biological weapons, or conventional force imbalance and a psychological attachment to a minimum overt or covert nuclear weapon capability—would affect the issues and the process of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and nuclear security. However, they were not included in our criteria for evaluation because it was difficult to make objective scales of the significance of these factors. In addition, in view of the suggestions and comments made to the Hiroshima Report 2013, the Research Committee modified criteria of the following items: current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons in national security strategies and policies; reliance on extended nuclear deterrence; and nuclear testing.

After all, there is no way to mathematically compare the different factors contained in the different areas of disarmament, nonproliferation and nuclear security. Therefore, the evaluation points should be taken as indicative of the performances in general but by no means as an exact representation or precise assessment of different countries’ performances. Since the Hiroshima Report 2014, such items as “relying on extended nuclear deterrence” and “nuclear testing” have been negatively graded if applicable.

Chapter 1. Area Summary

(1) Nuclear Disarmament

6-point Nuclear Disarmament Radar Charts

For the NWS, radar charts were produced to illustrate where each country stands in different aspects of nuclear disarmament. For this purpose the 12 issues used for nuclear disarmament evaluation were grouped into six aspects: (1) the number of nuclear weapons, (2) reduction of nuclear weapons, (3) commitment to achieving a “world without nuclear weapons,” (4) operational policy, (5) the status of signature and ratification of, or attitudes of negotiation to relevant multilateral treaties, and (6) transparency.

According to the following radar charts illustrating where each nuclear-weapon state stands in different aspects of nuclear disarmament, China is required to improve its efforts for nuclear weapons reduction and transparency. To a lesser extent, France could be more transparent regarding its nuclear weapons-related issues. Russia and the United States are urged to undertake further reductions of their nuclear arsenals. The performances of the United Kingdom are relatively well-balanced.

Aspects	Issue
Number	Numcer of nuclear weapons
Reduction	Reduction of nuclear weapons
Commitments	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
	Commitments to achieving a world without nuclear weapons
	Disarmament and non-proliferation educations and cooperation with the civil society
	Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies
Operational policy	Diminishing roles and significance of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies and policies
Operational policy	De-alerting, or measures for maximizing decision time to authorize the use of nuclear weapons
Multilateral treaties	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Multilateral treaties	issile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
Transparency	Transparency regarding nuclear forces, fissile material for nuclear weapons, and nuclear strategy/doctrine
	Verifications of nuclear weapons reductions
	Irreversibility

(2) Nuclear Non-Proliferation

(3) Nuclear Security

Chapter2. Country-by-Country Summary

(1) Nuclear-Weapon States

1. China ■ Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	8　Points	Full Points　101	7.9%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-2
China, which is the only NWS that has not reduced its nuclear arsenals, possessing approximately 280 nuclear warheads, has promoted active modernization programs for its nuclear forces (particularly, ICBMs and SLBMs). It has not signed the TPNW. While China has not yet ratified the CTBT, establishing the stations for international monitoring system (IMS) has gradually advanced. Meanwhile, it was reported that China conducted simulations for nuclear explosions and construction of a facility for non-explosive tests. China continues not to declare a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It has declared no first use of nuclear weapons and the unconditional negative security assurance. While arguing the importance of transparency in intention, China has maintained the least transparency about nuclear weapons capabilities among the NWS.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	30　Points	Full Points　47	63.8%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1
China acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, in which no provision for complementary access visits is stipulated. It has announced to take efforts to strengthen implementation of sanction measures vis-à-vis North Korea under the UN Security Council Resolutions, as well as its export-control mechanisms. Questions remain as to whether China is conducting adequate and strict implementation, however. China has also been criticized for exporting two nuclear power reactors to Pakistan, which may constitute a violation of the NSG guidelines.
Nuclear Security	27　Points	Full Points　41	65.9%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+2
China has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has also advanced legislation based on INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. China is actively engaged in strengthening nuclear security, including international cooperation to minimize the use of HEU and emphasis on capacity building through utilization of the COE.

2. France ■ Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	20　Points	Full Points　101	19.8%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-3
France has announced its maximum number of nuclear warheads as 300, and has reduced its overall nuclear forces. It has also converted fissile material excess for military purpose to civilian purposes, which has been placed under the international safeguards. It voted against most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament, and showed a negative attitude to the issues on humanitarian dimensions, as well as legal prohibition of nuclear weapons, in particular. It has not signed the TPNW. There was little progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	38　Points	Full Points　47	80.9%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-2
France acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, with the provision for complementary access visits. All of its civilian nuclear material covered by the EURATOM Treaty is subject to its safeguards. France has engaged in nuclear non-proliferation proactively, including contributions to the IAEA safeguards systems, and the establishment and implementation of its export control systems.
Nuclear Security	26　Points	Full Points　41	63.4%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
France has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions. In addition, France continues to implement the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and is active in strengthening nuclear security, including involvement in international efforts such as nuclear forensics. In 2018 France also accepted an IPPAS follow-up mission.

3. Russia ■ Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	5.7　Points	Full Points　101	5.6%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-2.1
The number of Russia’s nuclear weapons has been reduced. It also continues to implement the New START, and proposed its five-year extension. Still, it is estimated to possess approximately 6,850 nuclear warheads, and has actively developed and deployed new ICBMs and SLBMs for replacing aged delivery vehicles, as well as hypersonic boost glide weapons and nuclear-powered torpedo. Furthermore, Russia is alleged to have violated the INF Treaty. It voted against most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament, and showed a negative attitude to the issues on humanitarian dimensions as well as legal prohibition of nuclear weapons, in particular. It has not signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	35　Points	Full Points　47	74.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Russia acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, in which no provision for complementary access visits is stipulated. It considers that the conclusion of an Additional Protocol should be voluntary. Russia supported a proposal by the Arab states on convening a UN conference on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
Nuclear Security	19　Points	Full Points　41	46.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Russia has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In 2018 Russia also contributed to international efforts to strengthen nuclear security, including co-chairing the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) with the United States.

4. The United Kingdom ■ Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	25　Points	Full Points　101	24.8%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
The size of the U.K. nuclear arsenal has decreased incrementally. The United Kingdom plans to reduce to no more than 120 operationally available warheads and a total stockpile of no more than 180 warheads by the mid-2020s. Construction of a new class of four SSBNs, as replacement for the existing Vanguard-class vessels, was commenced. It has not signed the TPNW. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has engaged in joint developmental works on nuclear disarmament verification measures with the United States and Norway, respectively.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	39　Points	Full Points　47	83.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
The United Kingdom acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol with the provision for complementary access visits. All of its civilian nuclear material is subject to the international safeguards. The United Kingdom and the IAEA signed a new safeguards agreement along with an Additional Protocol, for replacing the existing EURATOM safeguards when the United Kingdom withdraws from it. It has proactively engaged in nuclear non-proliferation, including implementation of export controls.
Nuclear Security	25　Points	Full Points　41	61.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
The United Kingdom has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In addition to holding nuclear forensics training in the framework of the GICNT in 2018, the United Kingdom is focusing on multilateral cooperation to strengthen nuclear security, such as expressing contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) of the IAEA.

5. The United States ■ Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	16　Points	Full Points　101	15.8%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-0.7
The Unied States possesses 6,450 nuclear warheads, and continues to dismantle retired warheads. In October, it announced to withdraw from the INF Treaty. While the Unied States continues to implement the New START, it has yet to indicate its position regarding its extension. The Unied States has not signed the TPNW. In the meantime, it proposed a Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND). In its new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Unied States implies to rely more on nuclear deterrence by, inter alia, reserving a possibility to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear strategic attacks, and developing nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), as well as low-yield nuclear warheads for SLBMs. Negative responses to the CTBT have also gradually appeared, including shortening the lead time for resuming a nuclear test, as well as conducting a subcritical test in late 2017. The Unied States remains the most transparent among the NWS on nuclear issues. It has established and led the “International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV).”
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	40　Points	Full Points　47	85.1%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1
The Unied States has proactively led the efforts to bolster nuclear non-proliferation, including contributions to the IAEA safeguards systems and implementation of stringent export controls. It acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol with the provision for complementary access visits. In June, the Unied States convened the first summit meeting with North Korea. On the other hand, it announced to withdraw from the JCPOA in May and reimpose sanctions against Iran.
Nuclear Security	25　Points	Full Points　41	61.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1
The United States has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the United States has promoted international efforts, such as cooperation to minimize the use of HEU, for many years. In 2018, the United States co-chaired with Russia at the GICNT IAG meeting, and efforts to directly support the IAEA, such as the recycling of nuclear material mainly used for medical purposes, also contributed to the strengthening of the global nuclear security standards.

(2) Non-Parties to the NPT

6. India ■ Non-Party to the NPT

Nuclear Disarmament	2　Points	Full Points　98	2.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-2
India is estimated to possess approximately 130-140 nuclear warheads, having added incrementally. It also continues to actively develop nuclear delivery vehicles, including ICBM and SLBM, and to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Its first domestically built nuclear-powered submarine completed a “deterrence patrol.” India voted positively to some extent in the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament. However, it has not signed the TPNW. India maintains a moratorium on nuclear test explosions, but refuses to sign the CTBT.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	15　Points	Full Points　43	34.9%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
India acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, in which no provision for complementary access visits is stipulated. India’s quest for membership in the NSG is supported by some member states, but the group has not yet made a decision.
Nuclear Security	23　Points	Full Points　41	56.1%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1
Apart from the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, India has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, and contributes to capacity building through the activities at its COE.

7. Israel ■ Non-Party to the NPT

Nuclear Disarmament	-2　Points	Full Points　98	-2.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-2
Israel has consistently pursued the policy of “nuclear opacity” while estimated to possess approximately 80 nuclear warheads. Due to such a policy, its nuclear capabilities and posture remain unclear. Israel has yet to ratify the CTBT. Nor has it declared a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It voted against most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament. Israel has not signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	13　Points	Full Points　43	30.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Israel argues that improvement of the regional security is imperative for establishing a Middle East Zone free of WMD. It voted against the UNGA resolution “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” for the first time since 1980. It has established solid export control systems. However, Israel has not acceded the IAEA Additional Protocol.
Nuclear Security	22　Points	Full Points　41	53.7%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1
Israel is adopting the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and is also participating in multilateral nuclear security-related activities through the GICNT.

8. Pakistan ■ Non-Party to the NPT

Nuclear Disarmament	0　Points	Full Points　98	0.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-2
Pakistan seems to be increasing its nuclear arsenal incrementally, and is estimated to possess 140-150 nuclear warheads. In addition to continuing to develop short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, it revealed possession of low-yield, small nuclear weapons. Such developments raise concerns about the increased possibility for early use of nuclear weapons. It has not signed the TPNW. While maintaining a moratorium on nuclear test explosions, it refuses to sign the CTBT. Pakistan continues to block the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT at the CD. It has yet to declare a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	10　Points	Full Points　43	23.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Pakistan has not yet acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol. It argues that it has made efforts to enhance its export control systems: however, it is still unclear how robust or successfully implemented such export control systems are in practice.
Nuclear Security	19　Points	Full Points　41	46.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1
Pakistan is adopting the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and contributes to capacity building through the activities at its COE in cooperation with IAEA.

(3) Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

9. Australia ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	17.5　Points	Full Points　42	41.7%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Along with other U.S. allies, Australia advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through incremental, practical measures. Australia has engaged in promoting the CTBT’s entry into force, and developing its verification systems. It has not signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	56　Points	Full Points　61	91.8%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Australia is also a state party to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty. It acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was adopted in 2015.
Nuclear Security	32　Points	Full Points　41	78.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Australia has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC.225/Rev.5. Australia also cooperates in strengthening the global nuclear security standards in the context of multilateral cooperation.

10. Austria ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	33　Points	Full Points　42	78.6%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+3
Austria has played a leading role for promoting the issue on the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons, and adopting the TPNW. It has already ratified the treaty. It has also proactively engaged in cooperation with the civil society.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	52　Points	Full Points　61	85.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Austria has participated in and implemented the related treaties and measures. It acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards.
Nuclear Security	28　Points	Full Points　41	68.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Austria has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and is also involved in the minimization of the HEU and the prevention of illicit trafficking.

11. Belgium ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	13.5　Points	Full Points　42	32.1%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Belgium is hosting U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy. It has not signed the TPNW. Along with other U.S. allies, Belgium advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through implementing practical measures. It has engaged in promoting the CTBT’s entry into force, and developing its verification systems.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	54　Points	Full Points　61	88.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Belgium acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. It has engaged in non-proliferation, including the establishment of the solid export control systems.
Nuclear Security	28　Points	Full Points　41	68.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Belgium has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and is also working on the introduction of the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, in particular the protection measures for sabotage actions against nuclear material and related facilities. Belgium plans to accept an IPPAS mission in 2019.

12. Brazil ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	26.5　Points	Full Points　42	63.1%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-0.5
Brazil has played a leading role of adopting the TPNW, which it has signed. It voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	43　Points	Full Points　61	70.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Brazil is also a state party to the Latin America Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. While it complies with nuclear non-proliferation obligations, Brazil continues to the reluctant about accepting the IAEA Additional Protocol. It considers that the conclusion of an Additional Protocol should be voluntary.
Nuclear Security	28　Points	Full Points　41	68.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Brazil has ratified all nuclear- and safety-related conventions, except the CPPNM Amendment. It has been working on the introduction of the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, in particular the protection measures for sabotage actions against nuclear materials and related facilities.

13. Canada ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	19　Points	Full Points　42	45.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Along with other U.S. allies, it advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through implementing practical measures. It has not signed the TPNW. Canada has engaged in promoting the CTBT’s entry into force, and developing its verification systems. Canada has also undertaken active cooperation with civil society.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	52　Points	Full Points　61	85.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Canada acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. Canada exported uranium to India, as their civil nuclear cooperation.
Nuclear Security	33　Points	Full Points　41	80.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Canada has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Canada has actively engaged in multilateral efforts to strengthen nuclear security, such as funding for the removal of radiation sources for medical purposes and support for the sustainable management of sealed sources.

14. Chile ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	22　Points	Full Points　42	52.4%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-4.5
Chile voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament, and has expressed approval of the issues on the humanitarian dimensions and legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. It also signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	52　Points	Full Points　61	85.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Chile is also a state party to the Latin America Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It has acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. Meanwhile, more efforts are needed to strengthen its nuclear-related export controls system./span>
Nuclear Security	30　Points	Full Points　41	73.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Chile has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In recent years, Chile has been working on preventing illicit trafficking and minimizing the use of HEU.

15. Egypt ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	16　Points	Full Points　42	38.1%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-2
Egypt voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament, and has expressed approval of the issues on the humanitarian dimensions and legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, it has not yet signed the TPNW. Nor has it actively engaged in promotion of nuclear disarmament. Egypt has not ratified the CTBT, either.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	37　Points	Full Points　61	60.7%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Egypt has been active toward establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, and taken an initiative to adopt the UNGA decision on convening a UN conference on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Meanwhile, it has yet to conclude the IAEA Additional Protocol. Egypt has made efforts for, inter alia, putting export control legislation in place and setting enforcement agencies. Still, its export controls remain at an insufficient level, due to a lack of introduction of important elements including list control and catch-all control provisions. While signing, it has not yet ratified the Africa Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.
Nuclear Security	14　Points	Full Points　41	34.1%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Egypt has signed the CPPNM, the CPPNM Amendment, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, etc., but has not yet ratified these conventions. In recent years, Egypt has been working on the development of legal instruments on the prevention of illicit trafficking, and the spread of a nuclear security culture through the activities of its COE.

16. Germany ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	14.5　Points	Full Points　42	34.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+0.5
While Germany has proactively engaged in nuclear disarmament, it was against, or abstained, in the votes on the other UNGA Resolutions related to the humanitarian dimensions as well as legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. It has not signed the TPNW. Along with other U.S. allies, Germany advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through incremental practical measures. Germany is hosting U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	56　Points	Full Points　61	91.8%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Germany acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. It has engaged in non-proliferation, including the establishment of solid export control systems.
Nuclear Security	30　Points	Full Points　41	73.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+2
Germany has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions. In addition, Germany continues to implement the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and is active in strengthening nuclear security, including involvement in international efforts such as cyber and computer security. Germany has also made contributions to the NSF of the IAEA for many years.

17. Indonesia ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	25　Points	Full Points　42	59.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Indonesia has actively advocated promotion of nuclear disarmament at various nuclear disarmament fora, including the OEWG and the UNGA. It voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament. Indonesia signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	48　Points	Full Points　61	78.7%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Indonesia is also a state party to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It has concluded the IAEA Additional Protocol, of which the NAM countries are less enthusiastic about acceptance. Indonesia is applied the integrated safeguards. On export controls, however, Indonesia has yet to prepare a list of dual-use items and technologies, or to implement catch-all control.
Nuclear Security	31　Points	Full Points　41	75.6%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1
Indonesia has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and is also working on the introducing of the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 including the development of legal instruments relevant to the nuclear security. Indonesia has completed the removal of the HEU in the country and is working to prevent illicit trafficking with the cooperation of the IAEA, and is also actively involved in capacity building through the activities of its COE.

18. Iran ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	14　Points	Full Points　42	33.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1
Iran voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament, including the UNGA resolution titled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations,” and other UNGA Resolutions related to the humanitarian dimensions as well as legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, it has not actively engaged in promotion of nuclear disarmament. Iran has neither ratified the CTBT nor signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	37　Points	Full Points　61	60.7%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Iran has complied with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed in July 2015, despite the U.S. withdraw from it and re-imposition of sanction against Iran. While Iran has not ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol, it has accepted its provisional application, under which the IAEA conducted complimentary access visits. Still, Iran warned against the U.S. pressure activities.
Nuclear Security	10　Points	Full Points　41	24.4%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Iran has made some progress in introducing the recommended measures of INFCIR/225/Rev.5. However, so far, no significant progress has been made in the ratification of nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, the minimization of use of the HEU and the participation in multilateral efforts on prevention of illicit trafficking.

19. Japan ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	22.5　Points	Full Points　42	53.6%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1
Along with other U.S. allies, Japan advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through incremental practical measures. It has not signed the Treaty. Japan has proactively engaged in nuclear disarmament, as one of the countries that lead efforts to promote and strengthen those areas, particularly for achieving a world without nuclear weapons, promoting entry into force of the CTBT, and undertaking disarmament and non-proliferation education. Japan announced a voluntary contribution to the CTBTO for, inter alia, procuring and deploying a mobile noble gas detection system.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	53　Points	Full Points　61	86.9%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Japan has acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. It has proactively engaged in nuclear non-proliferation, including the establishment of solid export control systems and conducting outreach activities. The Japan-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was automatically extended in July 2018. It announced a new policy on reducing the size of its plutonium stockpile.
Nuclear Security	29　Points	Full Points　41	70.7%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Japan has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In 2018, Japan revised the Basic Principles, upholding the principle of not possessing plutonium that does not have a specific purpose under the Atomic Energy Basic Act, and launched measures to reduce the size of its plutonium stockpile. In addition to accepting IPPAS follow-up missions, Japan is actively involved in capacity building utilizing its experienced COE (JAEA-ISCN).

20. Kazakhstan ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	26　Points	Full Points　42	61.9%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+2
Kazakhstan has actively advocated the importance of the CTBT. It voted for the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament, and has expressed approval of the issues on the humanitarian dimensions and legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. It has signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	49　Points	Full Points　61	80.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+2
Kazakhstan is also a state party to the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It has acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. The IAEA LEU Fuel Bank established in Kazakhstan started to be operational in 2017.
Nuclear Security	28　Points	Full Points　41	68.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+2
Kazakhstan has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and is working on measures to prevent illicit trafficking.

21. South Korea ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	15　Points	Full Points　42	35.7%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1
Along with other U.S. allies, South Korea advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through incremental practical measures. It has not signed the TPNW. South Korea has engaged in promoting the CTBT’s entry into force, and developing its verification systems.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	51　Points	Full Points　61	83.6%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
South Korea convened summit meetings with North Korea three times in 2018. It acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. It has proactively engaged in the issue of how to make withdrawal from the NPT more difficult.
Nuclear Security	37　Points	Full Points　41	90.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
South Korea has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and engaged in various multilateral efforts such as nuclear forensics cooperation.

22. Mexico ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	29　Points	Full Points　42	69.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1.5
Mexico has played a leading role for promoting the issue on the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons, as well as adopting the TPNW, which it has already ratified.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	50　Points	Full Points　61	82.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Mexico is also a state party to the Latin America Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Mexico acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, but has not yet been drawn a broader conclusion.
Nuclear Security	33　Points	Full Points　41	80.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+3
Mexico has newly ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and has completely ratified the nuclear security- and safety-related conventions. Mexico is also involved in multilateral efforts such as organizing IAEA’s regional training courses and GICNT field exercises related to nuclear forensics.

23. The Netherlands ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	13.5　Points	Full Points　42	32.1%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1.5
The Netherlands is the only U.S. ally that participated in the negotiation conference of the TPNW, at which it voted against its adoption. The Netherlands has not signed the treaty. Along with other U.S. allies, it advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through incremental practical measures. It is hosting U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	55　Points	Full Points　61	90.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
The Netherlands acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. It has actively engaged in non-proliferation activity, including the establishment of solid export control systems.
Nuclear Security	32　Points	Full Points　41	78.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
The Netherlands has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. The Netherlands is working to minimize the use of HEU and contributes to international efforts such as holding regional workshops of the IAEA.

24. New Zealand ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	32　Points	Full Points　42	76.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+2
New Zealand was actively involved in the process of adopting the TPNW, and has already ratified it. It has also proactively advocated promotion of nuclear disarmament at various fora, including the UN General Assembly. It has engaged in promoting the CTBT’s entry into force, and developing its verification systems.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	57　Points	Full Points　61	93.4%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+2
New Zealand is also a state party to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. It has acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards.
Nuclear Security	28　Points	Full Points　41	68.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1
New Zealand is adopting the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and is actively involved in international efforts such as co-sponsoring the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) meeting.

25. Nigeria ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	22　Points	Full Points　42	52.4%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1.5
Nigeria voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament. It has already signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	45　Points	Full Points　61	73.8%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Nigeria is also a state party to the Africa Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, but has not been drawn the broader conclusion. Its implementations on export controls and nuclear security-related measures are not necessarily adequate.
Nuclear Security	30　Points	Full Points　41	73.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+7
Nigeria has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has also advanced legislation based on INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In addition to completing the removal of HEU in the country in 2018, Nigeria is also working on the prevention of illicit trafficking.

26. Norway ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	14.5　Points	Full Points　42	34.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1
Along with other U.S. allies, Norway advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through incremental practical measures. It has not signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	54　Points	Full Points　61	88.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Norway acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. It has engaged in non-proliferation, including the establishment of the solid export control systems.
Nuclear Security	28　Points	Full Points　41	68.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Norway has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, co-hosted an international symposium on HEU minimization with the IAEA to help prevent illicit trafficking, and is promoting international efforts such as extending a partnership to assist Romania in strengthening its regulatory infrastructure for nuclear safety and security.

27. The Philippines ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	25.5　Points	Full Points　42	60.7%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1.5
The Philippines voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament. It has already signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	52　Points	Full Points　61	85.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+2
The Philippines is also a state party to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It has concluded the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied integrated safeguards. The Philippines introduced list control and catch-all control in its export control system.
Nuclear Security	28　Points	Full Points　41	68.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
The Philippines is adopting the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and in 2018 accepted the IAEA’s Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP).

28. Poland ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	12　Points	Full Points　42	28.6%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Like other NATO countries, Poland maintains a cautious stance on legally banning nuclear weapons. It has not signed the TPNW. Along with other U.S. allies, it advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through implementing practical measures.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	52　Points	Full Points　61	85.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Poland acceded to the IAEA Additional protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. It has engaged in non-proliferation, including the establishment of solid export control systems.
Nuclear Security	30　Points	Full Points　41	73.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Poland has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and is working to prevent illicit trafficking and minimize the use of HEU.

29. Saudi Arabia ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	12　Points	Full Points　42	28.6%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1
Saudi Arabia voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament related to the humanitarian dimensions as well as legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, it has not signed the TPNW or the CTBT.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	36　Points	Full Points　61	59.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Saudi Arabia has not acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol. Its national implementation regarding export controls also came up short. Saudi Arabia plans to introduce nuclear power reactors, but it has repeatedly stated an intention to acquire nuclear weapons should Iran develop them. Saudi Arabia has yet to accept an amended Small Quantity Protocol. It opposes renouncing a right to conduct enrichment and reprocessing activities in negotiations on a Saudi-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
Nuclear Security	21　Points	Full Points　41	51.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Saudi Arabia has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and has also advanced legislation based on INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.

30. South Africa ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	25　Points	Full Points　42	59.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-0.5
South Africa has played a leading role for promoting the issue on the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons, as well as adopting the TPNW. It has already signed the treaty.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	53　Points	Full Points　61	86.9%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
South Africa is also a state party to the Africa Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied integrated safeguards. It considers that the conclusion of an Additional Protocol should be voluntary.
Nuclear Security	25　Points	Full Points　41	61.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Apart from the CPPNM Amendment, South Africa has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions. In addition to working to prevent illicit trafficking, plans are being made to accept the IAEA’s INSSP.

31. Sweden ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	25　Points	Full Points　42	59.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1
Sweden participated in the negotiation conference on the TPNW, at which it voted in favor of adopting the treaty. However, Sweden has not yet signed the TPNW. It has actively advocated promotion of nuclear disarmament. It has engaged in promoting the CTBT’s entry into force, and developing its verification systems.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	53　Points	Full Points　61	86.9%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Sweden acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. It has engaged in non-proliferation, including the establishment of solid export control systems.
Nuclear Security	38　Points	Full Points　41	92.7%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Sweden has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions and is also working on the introduction of the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 including the development of legal instruments relevant to the nuclear security. Sweden co-hosts nuclear forensics related seminar and is actively involved in international efforts such as capacity building.

32. Switzerland ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	25　Points	Full Points　42	59.5%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+0.5
Switzerland participated in the negotiation conference on the TPNW, at which it voted in favor of adopting the treaty. However, Switzerland published a report, in which it concluded not to sign the TPNW from disarmament diplomacy and security policies point of view. It has actively advocated promotion of nuclear disarmament. It has engaged in promoting the CTBT’s entry into force, and developing its verification systems. It has also taken a proactive attitude regarding cooperation with civil society. It enacted national laws, which restrict financing for nuclear weapons production.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	50　Points	Full Points　61	82.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Switzerland acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol. It was drawn the broader conclusion. It has engaged in nonproliferation, including the establishment of solid export control systems.
Nuclear Security	32　Points	Full Points　41	78.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Switzerland has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, accepted the second IPPAS mission, and contributed to international efforts such as holding the ITWG annual meeting.

33. Syria ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	9　Points	Full Points　42	21.4%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1
Syria voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions related to the humanitarian dimensions, as well as legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, Syria, which has not signed the TPNW or the CTBT, has not actively engaged in promotion of nuclear disarmament.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	21　Points	Full Points　61	34.4%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Syria has yet to address and resolve the allegation of constructing a clandestine nuclear power plant, despite repeated requests by the IAEA. Syria has not concluded the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has yet to take appropriate measures on export controls.
Nuclear Security	5　Points	Full Points　41	12.2%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+2
With the ratification of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in 2018, Syria has advanced its accession to the nuclear security- and safety-related conventions. On the other hand, the introduction of the recommended measures of INFCIR/225/Rev.5 and participation in international efforts are still insufficient.

34. Turkey ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	9　Points	Full Points　42	21.4%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+1
Along with other U.S. allies, Turkey advocates the “progressive approach” toward a world without nuclear weapons, through incremental practical measures. It has not singed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	50　Points	Full Points　61	82.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Turkey acceded to the IAEA Additional protocol, and has been applied the integrated safeguards. It has engaged in non-proliferation, including the establishment of solid export control systems.
Nuclear Security	28　Points	Full Points　41	68.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
Apart from the Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Turkey has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, and is also working on the introduction of the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In recent years, it has also been working on the minimization of the use of HEU and the prevention of illicit trafficking.

35. UAE ■ Non-Nuclear-Weapon State

Nuclear Disarmament	20.5　Points	Full Points　42	48.8%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　-1.5
The UAE voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions related to the humanitarian dimensions as well as legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, it has not yet signed the TPNW.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	45　Points	Full Points　61	73.8%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
The UAE acceded to the IAEA Additional protocol, but has not been drawn a broader conclusion. On export controls, it established national legislation, which includes a catch-all control, but it is not clear how effectively the uAE has implemented such measures.
Nuclear Security	28　Points	Full Points　41	68.3%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
The UAE has ratified all nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, adopted the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and is working on the prevention of illicit trafficking, including participation in the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB).

(4) Other

36. North Korea ■ Other

Nuclear Disarmament	-2　Points	Full Points　98	-2.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　+6
North Korea turned to a peace offensive in 2018. It convened summit meetings with the United States and South Korea, respectively. While North Korea pledged “denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula,” it is unclear whether it has made a strategic decision to renounce its nuclear weapons. North Korea did not conduct nuclear and ballistic missile tests throughout the year, and dynamited the Punggye-ri tunnels. However, it is not clear whether the nuclear test site was irreversibly destroyed. It has not signed the TPNW or the CTBT.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	0　Points	Full Points　61	0.0%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
North Korea, which declared to withdraw from the NPT in 2003, ignores or reneges on most of the nuclear-related treaties, agreements, obligations and norms. It is reported to actively engage in illicit transfers and procurements of nuclear and missile related items. It was frequently reported that North Korea smuggled refined petroleum beyond the annual upper limit through illicit ship-to-ship transfers.
Nuclear Security	-2　Points	Full Points　41	-4.9%
	Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2018　0
In North Korea, no noticeable progress has yet been observed in the areas such as ratification of nuclear security- and safety-related conventions, minimization of HEU and adoption of measures recommended in the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

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