(1)Overview

 

Uncertainty on the future of nuclear issues has been increasing furthermore. The number of countries which have already signed and ratified the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) –opened for signature on September 20, 2017–are raising steadily, and its entry into force in the near future is on the horizon. However, nuclear-armed states and their allies continue to clearly state that they do not sign the TPNW. While none of the nuclear-armed states, including the United States which released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in February 2018, have made major changes in their declaratory policies on nuclear strategy, they are increasingly dependent on nuclear deterrents, and modernizing their respective nuclear forces amid raising tensions among the great powers, as well as geostrategic competitions. Furthermore, the future of U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear arms control, continuing from the Cold War era, is in doubt since there is no progress on extending the deadline of the U.S.-Russian New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START); and, more seriously, the U.S. President Donald Trump declared his intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear-Forces Treaty (INF treaty) in October. No indication could be seen that the impasse over multilateral nuclear disarmament, including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), are headed for resolution.

Regarding nuclear non-proliferation, North Korea’s aggressive diplomatic offensive, and the convening of the inter-Korean and the U.S.-North Korean summits, brought about the increased expectation of North Korea neither conducted nuclear and missile test nor threatened uses of nuclear weapons in 2018, which it did repeatedly in the previous year. However, Pyongyang has not yet agreed on concreted and substantive measures for denuclearization. Its numerous illicit activities, that skillfully avoided sanctions against North Korea under the UN Security Council resolutions, have also been reported. As for the Iran nuclear issue, as was concerned, the United States announced withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May, and reimposed unilateral sanctions against Iran. Despite strong pressure and domestic opposition, Iran continued to comply with JCPOA through 2018. At the same time, Tehran also suggested the possibility of withdrawal from the consensus if the U.S. sanctions prevail over Iran’s national interest.

As regards nuclear security, no large-scale international forum was held in 2018, and the degree of appeal by each country toward strengthening nuclear security tended to decrease from the previous year. On the other hand, the importance of continuing the discussion on nuclear security at the multilateral forum level, where high-level participants are gathered, was argued. There was also a discussion that the relationship between the three pillars of the NPT (nuclear-non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear peaceful use) and nuclear security should be reviewed. In addition, the utilization of The Amendment of the Convention on the Physical protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM Amendment) and its framework that came into effect in 2016, and the comprehensive evaluation of the nuclear security summit process that ended in 2016, were also subject to discussions on international efforts towards nuclear security. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) has been considered attractive to terrorists. Regions where such nuclear material no longer exists are steadily increasing, and the removal of high-level radiation sources is also proceeding. On the other hand, as a new concern over nuclear security, the threat of drone attacks, together with cyber security, gained the attention of stakeholders.

 

(2) Items

 

In the Hiroshima Report 2019, 65 items (32 for nuclear disarmament, 17 for nuclear non-proliferation and 16 for nuclear security) for study, analysis and evaluation of the selected countries’ performance are identified and based mainly upon the following documents that reflected widely supported views on the issues of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security:

• The Action Plan and recommendations pertaining to the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution contained in the Final Document adopted int he 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Reveiw Conference;

• The final draft of a Final Document for the 2015 NPT Review Conference;

• Seventy six recommendations contained in the 2009 International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) report titled Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers;

• Proposals sponsored or co-sponsored by Japan at the Preparatory Committees for the 2015 NPT Review Conference; and

• “Resolution towards the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons” launched by the Mayors for Peace in 2011.

Items were also chosen with the aim of providing a certain degree of objective measurements for evaluation.

 

1 Nuclear Disarmament

(1) Status of Nuclear Forces (estimates)

(2) Commitment to Achieving a World without Nuclear Weapons

A) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on nuclear disarmament proposals by Japan, NAC and NAM

B) Announcement of significant policies and important activities

C) Humanitarian Consequences of nuclear weapons

(3) Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

A) Signing and ratifying the TPNW

B) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions regarding a legal prohibition of nuclear weapons

(4) Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

A) Reduction of nuclear weapons

B) A concrete plan for further reduction of nuclear weapons

C) Trends on strengthening/modernizing nuclear weapons capabilities

(5) Diminishing the Role and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in the National Security Strategies and Policies

A) The current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons

B) Commitment to “sole purpose,” no first use, and related doctrines

C) Negative security assurances

D) Signing and ratifying the protocols of the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones

E) Relying on extended nuclear deterrence

(6) De-alerting or Measures for Maximizing Decision Time to Authorize the Use of Nuclear Weapons

(7) CTBT

A) Signing and ratifying the CTBT

B) Moratoria on nuclear test explosions pending CTBT’s entry into force

C) Cooperation with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission

D) Contribution to the development of the CTBT verification systems

E) Nuclear testing

(8) FMCT

A) Commitment, efforts, and proposals toward immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT

B) Moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons

C) Contribution to the development of verification measures

(9) Transparency in Nuclear Forces, Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Strategy/Doctrine

(10) Verifications of Nuclear Weapons Reductions

A) Acceptance and implementation of verification for nuclear weapons reduction

B) Engagement in research and development for verification measures of nuclear weapons reduction

C) The IAEA inspections to fissile material declared as no longer required for military purposes

(11) Irreversibility

A) Implementing or planning dismantlement of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles

B) Decommissioning/conversion of nuclear weapons-related facilities

C) Measures for fissile material declared excess for military purposes, such as disposition or conversion to peaceful purposes

(12) Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and Cooperation with Civil Society

(13) Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies

 

2 Nuclear Non-Proliferation

(1) Acceptance and Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Obligations

A) Accession to the NPT

B) Compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT and the UNSC resolutions on non-proliferation

C) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

(2) IAEA Safeguards Applied to the NPT NNWS

A) Signing and ratifying a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

B) Signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol

C) Implementation of the integrated safeguards

D) Compliance with IAEA Safeguards Agreement

(3) IAEA Safeguards Applied to NWS and Non-Parties to the NPT

A) Application of the IAEA safeguards (Voluntary Offer Agreement or INFCIRC/66) to their peaceful nuclear in facilities

B) Signing, ratifying, and implementing the Additional Protocol

(4) Cooperation with the IAEA

(5) Implementing Appropriate Export Controls on Nuclear-Related Items and Technologies

A) Establishment and implementation of the national control systems

B) Requiring the conclusion of the Additional Protocol for nuclear export

C) Implementation of the UNSCRs concerning North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues

D) Participation in the PSI

E) Civil nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT

(6) Transparency in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

A) Reporting on the peaceful nuclear activities

B) Reporting on plutonium management

 

3 Nuclear Security

(1) The Amount of Fissile Material Usable for Weapons

(2) Status of Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety-Related Conventions, Participation in Nuclear Security-Related Initiatives, and Application to Domestic Systems

A) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention

B) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

C) Convention on Nuclear Safety

D) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

E) Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

F) Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

G) INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

H) Enactment of laws and establishment of regulations for the national implementation

(3) Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security

A) Minimization of HEU and Plutonium stockpile in civilian use

B) Prevention of illicit trafficking

C) Acceptance of international nuclear security review missions

D) Technology development ―nuclear forensics

E) Capacity building and support activities

F) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund

G) Participation in international efforts

 

(3) Countries Surveyed in This Project

 

In the Hiroshima Report 2018, the performances of 36 countries were surveyed, based on their nuclear significance and geographical distribution—including members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), participants of the Joint Statements on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons. The Hiroshima Report 2019 maintains to survey those same countries, as follows:

• Five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States);
• Non-state parties to the NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan);
• Non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey and UAE); and
• Other (North Korea1)

 

(4) Approach

 

This project focuses on the time period of calendar year 2018. Reference documents are basically from open sources, such as speeches, remarks, votes and working papers delivered at disarmament fora (e.g., NPT Review Conference, UN General Assembly, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, Conference on Disarmament, Nuclear Security Summit, and the Negotiation Conference on the TPNW) and official documents published by governments and international organizations.

As for the evaluation section, a set of objective evaluation criteria is established by which the respective country’s performance is assessed.

The Research Committee of this project recognizes the difficulties, limitations and risks of “scoring” countries’ performances. However, the Committee also considers that an indicative approach is useful to draw attention to nuclear issues, so as to prompt debates over priorities and urgency.

The different numerical value within each category (i.e., nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security) reflects each activity’s importance within that area, as determined through deliberation by the Research Committee of this project. However, the differences in the scoring arrangements within each of the three categories do not necessarily reflect their relative significance in comparison with others, as it has been driven by the differing number of items surveyed. Thus, the value assigned to nuclear disarmament (full points 101) does not mean that it is more important than nuclear non-proliferation (full points 61) or nuclear security (full points 41).

Regarding “the number of nuclear weapons” (in the nuclear disarmament section) and “the amount of fissile material usable for nuclear weapons” (in the nuclear security section), the assumption is that the more nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile material a country possesses, the greater the task of reducing them and ensuring their security. However, the Research Committee recognizes that “numbers” or “amounts” are not the sole decisive factors. It is definitely true that other factors—such as implications of missile defense, chemical and biological weapons, conventional force imbalances and a psychological attachment to a minimum overt or covert nuclear weapon capability—would affect the issues and the process of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security. However, they were not included in our criteria for evaluation because it was difficult to make objective scales of the significance of these factors. In addition, in view of the suggestions and comments made to Hiroshima Report 2013, the Research Committee modified criteria of the following items: current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons in national security strategies and policies; relying on extended nuclear deterrence; and nuclear testing. Since the Hiroshima Report 2014, these items have been negatively graded if applicable.

As there is no way to mathematically compare the different factors contained in the different areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security, the evaluations should be taken as indicative of the performances in general and not as an exact representation or precise assessment of different countries’ performances.

The Hiroshima Report 2019 basically maintains the same structure and items as previous years while one item on the TPNW has been added since the Hiroshima Report 2018.

Besides, since the Hiroshima Report 2019, the Research Committee adds it as an evaluation item whether respective countries attended the Hiroshima or the Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies while attendance only on the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony had been evaluated until the Hiroshima Report 2018. (full points 3 in this item remain the same).

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[1] North Korea declared its suspension from the NPT in 1993 and its withdrawal in 2003, and conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and 2017. However, there is no agreement among the states parties on North Korea’s official NPT status.