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Hiroshima for Global Peace

Hiroshima Report 2019Chapter 2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation1

(1) Acceptance and Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Obligations

A) Accession to the NPT

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has 191 adherents (including North Korea, the Holy See and Palestine). Among the current 193 United Nations (UN) Member States, those remaining outside the NPT are: India and Pakistan, both of which tested and declared having nuclear weapons in 1998; Israel, which is widely believed to possess them; and South Sudan, which declared its independence and joined the United Nations in July 2011, and does not possess any nuclear weapons; and, arguably, North Korea. North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, but there is no agreement among the states parties on North Korea’s official status. It has refused to return to the Treaty despite UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) demanding that it do so at an early date.

With the NPT celebrating the 50th anniversary of opening for signature, the three depositary states (Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) issued a joint statement, in which they reaffirmed the significance of the NPT in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.2

B) Compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT and the UNSC resolutions on non-proliferation

North Korea

Since the NPT entered into force, no case of non-compliance with Articles I and II of the Treaty has been officially reported by the United Nations or any other international organization.3 However, if North Korea’s withdrawal is not interpreted as legally valid or if it acquired nuclear weapons before announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, such acquisition of nuclear weapons would constitute non- compliance with Article II. The U.S. Department of State clearly stated in its 2017 report, titled “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” that North Korea was in violation of its obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT and in non-compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement at the time it announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003.4

UNSCR 1787, adopted in October 2006, stipulates that:

[T]he DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA.5

The Security Council also decided that North Korea “shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.” In defiance, North Korea has failed to respond to the UN Security Council’s decisions, and has continued nuclear weapon and ballistic missile-related activities, including its sixth nuclear test in September 2017.

However, North Korea suddenly initiated a diplomatic offensive in 2018. In his New Year address of January 2018, while flaunting possession of a claimed nuclear deterrent and urging cancelation of U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises, Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, stated: “The north and the south should desist from doing anything that might aggravate the situation, and they should make concerted efforts to defuse military tension and create a peaceful environment. The south Korean authorities should respond positively to our sincere efforts for a detente, instead of inducing the exacerbation of the situation by joining the United States in its reckless moves for a north[1]targeted nuclear war that threatens the destiny of the entire nation as well as peace and stability on this land.”6 Responding positively, South Korea repeated an offer to hold bilateral high[1]level talks and announced that the United States and South Korea agreed to postpone their joint military exercises until after the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and Paralympic Games in February-March 2018. South-North high-level talks were subsequently held on January 9, 2018. In a Joint Statement they said that they agreed on: the North’s participation in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and Paralympic Games; alleviation of the military tension; and resolution of the South-North issues bilaterally. However, North Korea reportedly insisted that it had no intention to discuss nuclear issues with the South.

On April 27, the third inter-Korea summit— the first since October 2007—was held on the South Korean side of the Joint Security Area. In the Panmunjom Declaration adopted at the summit, the two leaders made the following nuclear-related commitments:7

  • South and North Korea confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear[1]free Korean Peninsula.
  • During this year that marks the 65th anniversary of the Armistice, South and North Korea agreed to actively pursue trilateral meetings involving the two Koreas and the United States, or quadrilateral meetings involving the two Koreas, the United States and China with a view to declaring an end to the War, turning the armistice into a peace treaty, and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.
  • South and North Korea affirmed the principle of determining the destiny of the Korean nation on their own accord and agreed to bring forth the watershed moment for the improvement of inter-Korean relations by fully implementing all existing agreements and declarations adopted between the two sides thus far.

Following this, on June 12, the first U.S.-North Korean summit meeting was convened in Singapore by President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un. According to the joint statement signed by them after the meeting, “President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un conducted a comprehensive, in-depth, and sincere exchange of opinions on the issues related to the establishment of new U.S.-DPRK relations and the building of a lasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”8 Furthermore, they agreed:

  • The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity;
  • The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula;
  • Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and
  • The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.

The inter-Korean relationship has steadily improved. After the April summit meeting, the two leaders met again in May and September, and agreed the Pyongyang Declaration at the summit meeting on September 18-19. The Pyongyang Declaration adopted on this occasion stated “[t]he two sides shared the view that the Korean Peninsula must be turned into a land of peace free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats, and that substantial progress toward this end must be made in a prompt manner,” and stipulated, inter alia, the following measures:9

  • [T]he North will permanently dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of experts from relevant countries.
  • The North expressed its willingness to continue to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, as the United States takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement.
  • The two sides agreed to cooperate closely in the process of pursuing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In April 2018, North Korea announced that it no longer needed to conduct nuclear tests or test launches of intermediate and intercontinental range ballistic missiles because it had completed the development of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it would close down its nuclear test site. The next month, in the presence of select foreign journalists but no international inspectors, the North blew up tunnels at its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri in May. It later began dismantling key facilities located at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station,10 tearing down the steel base structure and apparently removing fuel and oxidizer tanks from dismantled bunkers.11 This was done without international observers, although activity could be observed via overhead imagery. According to the U.S. Department of State, during a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo in October, Chairman Kim indicated his intention to invite inspectors to visit the Punggye-ri nuclear test site to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled.12 While the announced missile launch moratorium pertained to longer-range systems, North Korea did not conduct test launches of missiles of any range in 2018.

The United States responded positively to these steps. Ata press conference after the U.S.-North Korean summit meeting in June, President Trump announced the suspension of U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises. Accordingly, planned joint exercises, including the Ulchi Freedom Guardian in August were cancelled. U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said in November, “Foal Eagle [conducted in Spring 2019] is being reorganized a bit to keep it at a level that will not be harmful to diplomacy,”13 implying that its scale would be reduced. In addition, the United States stopped demanding the “complete verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID)” by North Korea, a term that North Korea has opposed, and changed the terminology to “final and fully verified denuclearization (FFVD).”

However, further progress towards de-nuclearization of North Korea was not seen during 2018. For instance, Pyongyang refused to accept the U.S. proposals that North Korea hand over 60 to 70 percent of its nuclear warheads within six to eight months, to the United States or a third party for removal from North Korea.14 Rather, North Korea blamed the U.S. attitudes as follows:

The State Department of the U.S. in charge of negotiations with the DPRK is nowadays claiming that it will not lift sanctions before the denuclearization and that the escalation of sanctions is the way to enhance the negotiating power. The U.S. Department of Treasury, too, claims that it has no plan to lift the sanctions against the DPRK and will further escalate the sanctions. As if to prove the facts, the U.S. Congress is drawing up bills related with the escalation of sanctions against the DPRK. And American media and experts are building up an opinion for sanctions, contending that the Trump administration reconfirmed the keynote of “denuclearization first, lifting of sanctions next” and it will turn to the policy of “maximum pressure” unless north Korea takes denuclearization step.15

In addition, the North’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho reportedly said at the meeting in August with the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Ali Larijani, “Dealing with Americans is difficult, and as our main goal is total disarmament of the whole Korean Peninsula, it is necessary that the Americans also abide by their commitments but they refuse to do so…Although North Korea has agreed on disarmament to deliver on its commitments in negotiations with US, we will preserve our nuclear science as we know that the Americans will not abandon their hostility toward us.”16

Furthermore, the North Korean state-run Korean Central News Agency wrote: “When we refer to the ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,’ it means the removal of all sources of nuclear threat not only from the North and the South but also from all neighboring areas targeting the peninsula,” the official Korean Central News Agency said in a published commentary on Thursday. “The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be defined as ‘completely eliminating the U.S. nuclear threat to Korea’ before it can eliminate our nuclear deterrent.”17 Analysts interpreted this to mean an end to the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” extended over South Korea and Japan. North Korea’s attachment of this conditionality raised doubts about its intention to denuclearize.


The E3/EU+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom/European Union plus China, Russia and the United States) and Iran agreed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015 in Vienna.18 Since then, the IAEA has submitted quarterly reports to the Board of Governors confirming Iran’s adherence to its nuclear obligations under the JCPOA. The main points of the IAEA August 2018 report are:19

  • At the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, there have been no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuges;
  • Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms). The quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium;
  • Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235;
  • Iran’s stock of heavy water was 122.9 metric tonnes. Throughout the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water;
  • Iran has continued to permit the Agency to use on-line enrichment monitors and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices;
  • Iran has continued to permit the Agency to monitor…that all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced in Iran or obtained from any other source is transferred to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan;
  • Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force. The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.
  • The Agency’s verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments set out in Sections D, E, S and T of Annex I continues. (Section T prohibited certain activities relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, but the JCPOA did not say how these prohibitions were to be verified.)

On the other hand, statements by the U.S. new administration raised concerns about the future of the JCPOA. President Trump criticized the agreement even before his inauguration. In March 2016, he said, “My number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.” In January 2018, he again threatened to withdraw from the JCPOA unless the Congress adopted legislation that included “four critical components.”20 He said:

  • “First, it must demand that Iran allow immediate inspections at all sites requested by international inspectors.
  • Second, it must ensure that Iran never even comes close to possessing a nuclear weapon.
  • Third, unlike the nuclear deal, these provisions must have no expiration date. My policy is to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon—not just for ten years, but forever. If Iran does not comply with any of these provisions, American nuclear sanctions would automatically resume.
  • Fourth, the legislation must explicitly state in United States law—for the first time—that long-range missile and nuclear weapons programs are inseparable, and that Iran’s development and testing of missiles should be subject to severe sanctions.”

The Congress did not pass such legislation, waiting instead for the U.S. negotiations with France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the “E3”) to find ways to address Trump’s demands. Although the negotiators came close to reaching agreement on a way forward, President Trump on May 8, announced withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. He stated that: “we will be working with our allies to find a real, comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. This will include efforts to eliminate the threat of Iran’s ballistic missile program; to stop its terrorist activities worldwide; and to block its menacing activity across the Middle East. In the meantime, powerful sanctions will go into full effect.”21 On the same day, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced that sanctions against Iran, whose targets included critical sectors of Iran’s economy, such as the energy, shipping and shipbuilding, and financial sectors, would be re-imposed subject to certain 90-day and 180- day wind-down periods.22 In accordance with this decision, the United States re-imposed a ban on trade with Iran in automobiles, gold, steel and other metal-related products effective on August 7, and sanctions on the energy sector effective on November 5. These measures include secondary sanctions against countries trading with Iran.

Two weeks after President Trump’s announcement on withdrawing from the JCPOA, Secretary of State Pompeo stated that the United States would negotiate with Iran on a new deal if the following 12 demands were met:23

  1. Iran must declare to the IAEA a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program, and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.
  2. Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This includes closing its heavy water reactor.
  3. Iran must also provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country.
  4. Iran must end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems.
  5. Iran must release all U.S. citizens, as well as citizens of our partners and allies, each of them detained on spurious charges.
  6. Iran must end support to Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
  7. Iran must respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government and permit the disarming, demobilization, and reintegration of Shia militias.
  8. Iran must also end its military support for the Houthi militia and work towards a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.
  9. Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria.
  10. Iran, too, must end support for the Taliban and other terrorists in Afghanistan and the region, and cease harboring senior al-Qaida leaders.
  11. Iran, too, must end the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRG) Qods Force’s support for terrorists and militant partners around the world.
  12. Iran must end its threatening behavior against its neighbors – many of whom are U.S. allies. This certainly includes its threats to destroy Israel, and its firing of missiles into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It also includes threats to international shipping and destructive cyberattacks.

In a October 15 journal article, Pompeo added a 13th demand: for Iran to make substantial improvements on its human-rights record.24

Iranian President Rouhani’s immediate response to Trump’s withdrawal was to keep patient, though stating that: “[I]f necessary, we can begin our industrial enrichment without any limitations.” He added that “Until implementation of this decision, we will wait for some weeks and will talk with our friends and allies and other signatories of the nuclear deal, who signed it and who will remain loyal to it. Everything depends on our national interests.”25 At the same time, Iran emphasized that maintaining the JCPOA would need a clear assurance of Iran’s rights relating to oil export, banking, investment and insurance, especially by the E3.26 In addition, Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei clarified seven conditions to stay with the JCPOA on May 24,27 and Foreign Minister Zarif added 15 demands to the United States.28

Leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom released a joint statement on the day of the U.S. announcement of the withdrawal, and stated that they would work on maintaining the JCPOA.29 In this regard, and as a measure for preventing Iran’s withdrawal, the European countries launched a process of updating the 1996 Blocking Statute, aiming to prevent and protect European entities and legitimate commerce with Iran from compliance with U.S. extra-territorial sanctions.30 The update entered into force on August 7.31 In addition, the JCPOA participants, except the United States, agreed at a ministerial meeting on September 24 that they would continue to work on building a framework for maintaining trade with Iran including crude oil. According to their joint statement, “the participants welcomed practical proposals to maintain and develop payment channels, notably the initiative to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle, to facilitate payments related to Iran’s exports (including oil) and imports, which will assist and reassure economic operators pursuing legitimate business with Iran.”32

While the United States reiterated that it had an intention to negotiate a new agreement with Iran and reportedly made several offers to talk,33 Iran clearly rejected the U.S. proposals. In the meantime, at a summit-level meeting of the UN Security Council on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) over which he presided, President Trump harshly criticized the JCPOA, whereas the leaders of the other member states insisted on the importance and necessity of maintaining the agreement.

Despite the U.S. withdrawing from the JCPOA and reimposing sanctions, Iran did not follow suit but continued to comply with the agreement in 2018. At the same time, however, Iran warned against the U.S. activities. For example, Iran notified the IAEA in a letter of June 2018 that it was making arrangements for production of UF4 and UF6 gases as well as rotors for centrifuges.34 In September, it was reported that Iran completed a facility to build advanced centrifuges.35 Furthermore, Iran also informed the IAEA in a letter dated January 6 that Iran decided to construct naval nuclear propulsion in future.36

Separately, Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu on April 30 revealed 55,000 pages of dated documents about nuclear weapons development he said Israeli agents had seized from a warehouse in Tehran that January.37 Much of the information was in line with documents previously in IAEA possession related to concerns about the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.38 New information revealed by Netanyahu included that Iran allegedly: intended to build five nuclear warheads, each with an explosive yield of 10 kilotons; obtained explicit weapons[1]design information from a foreign source and was on the cusp of mastering key bomb-making technologies when the research was ordered halted 15 years ago; measured radiation from a neutron-generating explosive test; conducted experiments in making a form of uranium metal.39 Iran denied Israel’s claims as “laughably absurd.”40

Withdrawal from the NPT

Although Article X-1 of the NPT contains some guidance on how a state can legitimately withdraw from the treaty, there remains a lack of clarity over some aspects of this process.

Concerns have focused on a state choosing to withdraw from the NPT, after first acquiring nuclear weapons in violation of the Treaty. Japan, South Korea and other several Western countries have proposed measures to prevent the right of withdrawal from being abused.

At the 2018 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2020 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), the so-called Vienna Group of Ten in its working paper argued that “withdrawal from the Treaty carries inherent risks to non-proliferation efforts and could constitute a threat to international peace and security,” and proposed that exercise of the right of withdrawal under Article X of the Treaty be governed by the following principles:41

  • The right of withdrawal from the NPT can only be exercised in the face of extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty;
  • The withdrawing State is still liable for violations of the Treaty perpetrated prior to withdrawal;
  • Withdrawal should not affect any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing State and each of the other States parties created through implementation of the Treaty prior to withdrawal, including those related to IAEA safeguards;
  • Every diplomatic effort should be made to persuade the withdrawing State to reconsider its decision;
  • All nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired by a State party under Article IV prior to withdrawal must remain under IAEA safeguards or fallback safeguards even after withdrawal; and
  • Nuclear-supplying States should be encouraged to exercise their right to incorporate dismantling and/or return clauses or fallback safeguards in the event of withdrawal into contracts or other arrangements concluded with the withdrawing State, and to adopt standard clauses for this purpose.

Germany stated that it is necessary to “arriv[e] at a common understanding of States parties on how to respond effectively to a State party’s withdrawal from the NPT.”42

At the 2015 NPT Review Conference (RevCon),43 western countries insisted that withdrawal from the NPT should be made difficult by adding several conditions, while they also acknowledged the right of states parties to withdraw. Among NWS, Chinese and Russian positions on this issue seem more cautious than those of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Some NNWS, including the Non[1]Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, argue that there is no need to revise or reinterpret Article X on grounds that withdrawal from the NPT is the right of all state parties.

C) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) have entered into force in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty), the South Pacific (Rarotonga Treaty), Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty), Africa (Pelindaba Treaty), and Central Asia (Central Asian NWFZ Treaty). In addition, Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1992, and the UNGA has been adopting a resolution entitled “Mongolia’s International Security and Nuclear-Weapon[1]Free-Status” every two years since 1998, in support of Mongolia’s declaration.44 All the states eligible to join the NWFZs in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Central Asia are parties to the respective NWFZ treaties.

Regarding efforts for establishing a Middle East Zone Free of WMD, the convening of an international conference, agreed at the 2010 NPT RevCon, could not be achieved before the 2015 NPT RevCon. Furthermore, at the latter RevCon, a final document was not adopted due to a lack of consensus on the language regarding that international conference. The NAM in its working paper submitted to the 2018 NPT PrepCom urged the convening of the conference no later than 2020.45 On the other hand, the United States opposed addressing the Middle Eastern issue in the NPT review cycle, arguing that: the task of creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, or in any other region of the world, is fundamentally a regional task which must be pursued by the regional States concerned in a cooperative and pragmatic manner, through direct, inclusive and consensus-based dialogue; that the Middle East faces several principal challenges, including lack of trust among the States of the region, non-compliance in the region, regional security challenges, and lack of political will among the regional States; that the NPT review cycle cannot be the primary mechanism for progress on a Middle East zone free of WMD; and the recommendations on the Middle East contained in the Final Document of the 2010 RevCon can no longer be considered an appropriate basis for action on this issue.

The League of Arab States submitted a draft decision, titled “Convening a conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction,” to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in 2018. In this draft resolution, the co-sponsors requested to, inter alia: entrust to the Secretary-General the convening, no later than 2019 for a duration of one week at United Nations Headquarters, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD; and to convene annual sessions of the conference for a duration of one week at United Nations Headquarters until the conference concludes the elaboration of a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD.46 The draft decision was sent to the General Assembly from its First Committee by 103 in favor, 3 against and 71 abstentions, and then adopted at the UNGA by a narrow margin—88 in favor, 4 against (Israel, the United States and others) and 75 abstentions (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and others).47

At past UNGAs from 1980 to 2017, a resolution titled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon[1]free zone in the region of the Middle East” was adopted without a vote. However, the resolution in 201848 was taken to a vote: Israel and the United States were against, and five countries, including the United Kingdom, abstained. In explaining its decision to vote against this resolution, Israel blamed the Arab League for breaking consensus on the subject by proposing the new resolution calling for a conference in 2019.49

Concerning Northeast Asia and South Asia, while initiatives for establishing NWFZs have been proposed by non-governmental groups in the respective regions, there are few indications that state parties in these regions are taking any serious initiative toward such a goal. One exception is Mongolia, which in its report submitted to the 2015 NPT RevCon expressed a willingness to “[p]lay an active role in promoting the idea of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in north-east Asia.”50

(2) IAEA Safeguards Applied to the NPT NNWS

A) Conclusion of IAEA Safeguards Agreements

Under Article III-1 of the NPT, “[e]ach Non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The basic structure and content of the safeguards agreement are specified in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), known as INFCIRC/153, which each state negotiates with the IAEA and then signs and ratifies. As of December 2018, 12 NPT NNWS have yet to conclude CSAs with the IAEA.51

In accordance with a strengthened safeguards system in place since 1997, an NPT NNWS or any other state may also conclude with the IAEA an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement, based on a model document known as INFCIRC/540. As of December 2018, 128 NPT NNWS have ratified Additional Protocols. No additional country ratified them in 2018. Iran started provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol in January 2016, while it has yet to ratify the Protocol.

A state’s faithful implementation of the Additional Protocol, along with the CSA, allows the IAEA Secretariat to draw a so-called “broader conclusion” that “all nuclear material in the State has remained in peaceful activities.” This conclusion is that the Agency finds no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities or any undeclared nuclear material or activities in that country. Subsequently, the IAEA implements so-called “integrated safeguards,” which is defined as the “optimized combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under [CSAs] and [Additional Protocols], to maximize effectiveness and efficiency within available resources.” As of the end of 2017, 65 NNWS have applied integrated safeguards.52

The current status of the signature and ratification of the CSAs and the Additional Protocols and the implementation of integrated safeguards by the NPT NNWS studied in this project is presented in the following table. In addition to the IAEA safeguards, EU countries accept safeguards conducted by EURATOM, and Argentina and Brazil conduct mutual inspections under the bilateral Brazilian[1]Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

In the resolution, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards” adopted in September 2018, the IAEA General Conference called on all States with unmodified Small Quantity Protocols (SQPs) to either rescind or amend them.53 As of September 2018, the amended SQPs for 57 countries were entered into force. Among states that have announced an intention to introduce nuclear energy, Saudi Arabia has yet to accept an amended SQP.

B) Compliance with IAEA Safeguards Agreements

The IAEA Annual Report 2017 stated:

Of the 127 States that had both a CSA and an AP in force the Agency drew the broader conclusion that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities for 70 States; for the remaining 57 States, as the necessary evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing, the Agency concluded only that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. For 46 States with a CSA but with no AP in force, the Agency concluded only that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.54

North Korea

North Korea Because North Korea since 2002 has refused to accept IAEA safeguards, the agency has attempted to analyze the North’s nuclear activities through satellite images and other information. The IAEA Director-General summarized the current situation of North Korea’s nuclear issues in relation to the implementation of the IAEA safeguards in August 2018, as follows.55

  • Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5MW(e)): During the reporting period there have been indications consistent with the reactor’s operation.
  • RadiochemicalLaboratory: Between late[1]April and early-May 2018, there were indications of the operation of the steam plant that serves the Radiochemical Laboratory. The duration of the steam plant’s operation was not sufficient to have supported the reprocessing of a complete core from the 5MW(e) reactor.
  • Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant: There have been indications consistent with the use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility located within the plant, including the operation of the cooling units as well as regular movements of vehicles.

In this report, the IAEA admitted that “its knowledge of the DPRK’s nuclear programme is limited and, as further nuclear activities take place in the country, this knowledge is declining” because the IAEA could not carry out verification activities in North Korea. Still, the IAEA also stated: “an Executive Group was formed within the Secretariat and a DPRK Team was formed within the Department of Safeguards in August 2017. Since the Director General’s previous report, the DPRK Team and the Executive Group have intensified their efforts. The DPRK Team has increased monitoring of the DPRK’s nuclear programme through more frequent collection of satellite imagery and has enhanced its readiness to promptly undertake any activities it may be requested to conduct in the DPRK.”56


The IAEA verifies and monitors implementation of Iran’s nuclear obligations under the JCPOA, as well as the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. IAEA Director-General reports have been regularly submitted to the Board of Governors every quarter. At the 2018 IAEA General Conference, Director-General Amano stated: “Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA…The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran continue.”57 In March, he also stated: “We have carried out more than 60 complementary accesses and visited more than 190 buildings since JCPOA Implementation Day.”58 In addition, the IAEA Annual Report noted that “[t]he Agency … has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.”59

The Trump administration, as mentioned by the President in his statement in May 2018 regarding the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, has criticized that the agreement cannot prevent Iran’s nuclear development since it does not give the IAEA the right to conduct unconditional inspections of Iran’s military facilities.60 The IAEA argued that it has conducted the highest standard of inspections, and that it is unrealistic to inspect military facilities in the absence of suspicion.61 On the other hand, Iran’s envoy to the IAEA said Iran would “not heed a call to cooperate more fully with U.N. nuclear inspectors until a standoff over the future of its agreement with major powers is resolved.”62 President Rouhani cautioned that Iran could reduce its co-operation with the IAEA if the U.S. attitudes against Iran and the JCPOA continued.63


As for Syria, the IAEA Director-General judged in May 2011 that the facility at Dair Alzour, which was destroyed by an Israeli air raid in September 2007, was very likely a clandestinely constructed, undeclared nuclear reactor. While the IAEA repeatedly called on Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency so as to solve the outstanding issues, Syria has not responded to that request.64

(3) IAEA Safeguards Applied to NWS and Non-Parties to the NPT

Under the NPT, a NWS is not required to conclude a CSA with the IAEA. However, to alleviate the concerns about the discriminatory nature of the NPT, the NWS have voluntarily agreed to apply safeguards to some of their nuclear facilities and fissile material that are not involved in military activities. All NWS have also concluded tailored Additional Protocols with the IAEA.

The IAEA Annual Report 2017 (Annex), published in September 2018, lists facilities in NWS under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material.65 For these five NWS, the IAEA “concluded that nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.”66 The IAEA does not publish the number of inspections conducted in the NWS. The safeguarded facilities include:

  • China: Two power reactors, a research reactor, and an enrichment plant
  • France: A fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, and an enrichment plant
  • Russia: A separate storage facility
  • The United Kingdom: An enrichment plant and two separate storage facilities
  • The United States: A separate storage facility

Each NWS has already concluded an IAEA Additional Protocol. Among them, the respective Protocols by France, the United Kingdom and the United States stipulate that the IAEA can conduct complementary access. Among them, the United States is the only country that has hosted a complementary access visit by the IAEA. Compared to the three NWS mentioned above, application of IAEA safeguards to nuclear facilities by China and Russia are more limited. No provision for complementary access visits is stipulated in their Additional Protocols.

France and the United Kingdom respectively have offered to make certain civil nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards under trilateral agreements with EURATOM and the IAEA. However, because of the prospective withdrawal of the United Kingdom from EU in March 2019, or “Brexit”, the United Kingdom will withdraw from the EURATOM. The United Kingdom stated at the IAEA General Conference: “the UK is establishing a domestic nuclear safeguards regime which will deliver to existing Euratom standards. This will ensure that the IAEA retains its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities, and will continue to receive all current safeguards reporting, ensuring that international verification of our safeguards activity continues to be robust.”67 In June 2018, the United Kingdom and the IAEA signed a new safeguards agreement along with an Additional Protocol.

Between 1996 and 2002, Russia, the United States and the IAEA undertook to investigate technical, legal and financial issues associated with IAEA verification of fissile material derived from dismantled nuclear warheads. However, such material has not yet been under the IAEA verification.

India, Israel and Pakistan have concluded facility-specific safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66. These non-NPT states have accepted IAEA inspections of the facilities that they declare as subject to these agreements. In this regard, Pakistan and the IAEA brought into force a safeguards agreement based on INFCIRC/66, under which two nuclear reactors provided by Pakistan are subject to the IAEA safeguards. According to the IAEA Annual Report 2017, the facilities placed under IAEA safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material in non-NPT states as of December 31, 2016 are as follows:68

  • India: Eight power reactors, two fuel fabrication plants, two reprocessing plants, and a separate storage facility
  • Israel: A research reactor
  • Pakistan: Six power reactors and two research reactors

Regarding their activities in 2017, the IAEA “concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.”69

Concerning the protocols additional to non[1]NPT states’ safeguards agreements (which differ significantly from the model Additional Protocol), the Indian-IAEA Additional Protocol entered into force on July 25, 2014. This Additional Protocol is similar to ones that the IAEA concluded with China and Russia, with provisions on providing information and protecting classified information but no provision on complementary access. No negotiation has yet begun for similar protocols with Israel or Pakistan.

Some NNWS call on the NWS for further application of the IAEA safeguards to their nuclear facilities in order to alleviate a discriminative nature that NNWS are obliged to accept full scope safeguards to their respective nuclear activities while NWS do not need to do so. The NAM countries, in particular, continue to demand that the NWS and non-NPT states should accept full-scope safeguards.70

(4) Cooperation with the IAEA

One of the most important measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system is to promote the universal application of the Additional Protocol. Among the countries surveyed in this project, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States consider that the Additional Protocol is “an integral part” of the current IAEA safeguards system.71

On the other hand, the NAM countries argued that, “additional measures related to safeguards shall not affect the rights of the [NNWS], which are already committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option.”72 Brazil also said at the 2018 NPT PrepCom, “the Additional Protocol does not establish a safeguards standard under the NPT. For countries that belong to NWFZ, that are committed to the NPT’s comprehensive safeguards and to additional layers of non-proliferation obligations and systems of verification and accountability, the AP is unnecessary.”73

Still, there are certain NAM countries which have concluded Additional Protocols and consider that a safeguards agreement with an Additional Protocol represents the safeguards standard. While arguing that acceptance of the Additional Protocol is a voluntary measure, South Africa nonetheless regards it as “an indispensable instrument which enables the IAEA to build confidence and provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.”74 Russia stated: “We find it necessary to ensure gradual strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system through universalisation of the Additional Protocols that together with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement should become a globally recognized verification standard. At the same time, we stress that signing Additional Protocol with the Agency remains a purely voluntary for the NPT States Parties.”75

In the resolution titled “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards,” adopted at the IAEA General Conference in 2018, the following points were stated, based on divergent views regarding additional protocols:76

  • “Bearing in mind that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force, the additional protocol is a legal obligation, encourages all States which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force in conformity with their national legislation.”
  • “Notes that, in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.”

The IAEA has contemplated a state-level concept (SLC), in which the Agency considers a broad range of information about a country’s nuclear capabilities and tailors its safeguards activities in each country accordingly, so as to make IAEA safeguards more effective and efficient. In the resolution titled “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards,” adopted at the IAEA General Conference in 2018, important assurances about the SLC mentioned below were welcomed:77

  • The SLC does not, and will not, entail the introduction of any additional rights or obligations on the part of either States or the Agency, nor does it involve any modification in the interpretation of existing rights and obligations;
  • The SLC is applicable to all States, but strictly within the scope of each individual State’s safeguards agreement(s);
  • The SLC is not a substitute for the Additional Protocol and is not designed as a means for the Agency to obtain from a State without an Additional Protocol the information and access provided for in the Additional Protocol;
  • The development and implementation of State-level approaches requires close consultation with the State and/or regional authority, particularly in the implementation of in-field safeguards measures; and
  • Safeguards-relevant information is only used for the purpose of safeguards implementation pursuant to the safeguards agreement in force with a particular State—and not beyond it.

According to the IAEA, as of June 2018, State level safeguards approaches (SLAs) “had been developed and approved for implementation for 67 States with a CSA and an AP in force, and a broader conclusion; 34 States with a CSA and an AP in force but without a broader conclusion; 29 States with a CSA but no AP in force (of which 28 have SQPs); and one State with a VOA and an AP in force.”78

Regarding research and development of safeguards technologies, under its long-term plan,79 the IAEA conducted the “Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 2018-2019,”80 in which 20 countries (including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, South Korea, the Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the European Commission (EC) participated.

(5) Implementing Appropriate Export Controls on Nuclear-Related Items and Technologies

A) Establishment and implementation of the national control systems

On establishing and implementing national control systems regarding export controls on nuclear-related items and technologies, there were few remarkable developments in 2017. As described in the previous Hiroshima Report, the following countries surveyed in this Report belong to the four international export control regimes,81 including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), have national implementation systems in place, and have implemented effective export controls regarding nuclear- (and other WMD-) related items and technologies through list and catch-all controls: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

These countries have also proactively made efforts to strengthen export controls. For example, Japan held the 25th Asian Export Control Seminar in February-March 2018. The purpose of this annual seminar is to “assist export control officers in Asian countries and regions.” Persons in charge of export control from 33 Asian and other regional major countries participated in the seminar.

Among other countries surveyed in this project, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey are members of the NSG. These countries have set up export control systems, including catch-all controls. As for non-NSG members, the UAE and the Philippines have been developing their respective national export control systems, whereas Egypt, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have yet to establish sufficient export control legislations and systems.

India, Israel and Pakistan have also set up national export control systems, including catch[1]all controls.82 India’s quest for membership in the NSG is supported by some member states, but consensus on the matter was not reached in 2018. Pakistan has also sought to join the NSG. Meanwhile, in March 2018, the United States imposed sanctions on seven Pakistani companies over claims that they were involved in procurement activities with those already on the U.S. “Entity List.”83

At the time of writing, the status of export control implementation by North Korea, Iran and Syria is not clear. Rather, cooperation among these countries in ballistic missile development remains a concern, as mentioned below. In addition, North Korea was involved in the past in constructing a graphite-moderated reactor in Syria to produce plutonium.

A U.S. think tank assessed that among the 122 countries voting in favor of adopting the TPNW, only 29 (or 24 percent) have adequate export control legislation.84

B) Requiring the conclusion of the Additional Protocol for nuclear export

Article III-2 of the NPT stipulates, “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear[1]weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.” In the Final Document of the 2010 NPT RevCon, “[t]he Conference encourage[d] States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls” (Action 36). Under the NSG Guidelines Part I, one of the conditions for supplying materials and technology designed specifically for nuclear use is to accept the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In addition, NSG member states agreed on the following principle in June 2013:85

Suppliers will make special efforts in support of effective implementation of IAEA safeguards for enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology and should, consistent with paragraphs 4 and 14 of the Guidelines, ensure their peaceful nature. In this regard suppliers should authorize transfers, pursuant to this paragraph, only when the recipient has brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional Protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol or, pending this, is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.

The NPDI and the Vienna Group of Ten have argued that conclusion and implementation of the CSA and the Additional Protocol should be a condition for new supply arrangements with NNWS.86 Some of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements that Japan and the United States concluded recently with other capitals make the conclusion of the Additional Protocol a prerequisite for their cooperation with respective partner states. On the other hand, the NAM countries continue to argue that supplier countries should refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other states parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.87

Issues on enrichment and reprocessing under the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements

Enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel by NNWS is not prohibited under the NPT if the purpose is strictly peaceful and the activities are under IAEA safeguards, yet they are highly sensitive activities in light of nuclear proliferation. The spread of enrichment and reprocessing (E&R) technologies would mean that more countries would acquire the potential for manufacturing nuclear weapons. As mentioned above, NSG guidelines make implementation of the Additional Protocol by the recipient state a condition for transfer of enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology.

While the U.S.-UAE and U.S.-Taiwan Nuclear Cooperation Agreements stipulate a so-called “gold standard”—the recipients are obliged to forgo enrichment and reprocessing activities— other bilateral agreements concluded and updated by the United States, such as that with Vietnam in 2014, do not stipulate similar obligations.88

The Japan-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which stipulates comprehensive prior consent to Japan’s E&R activities, was automatically extended since neither side notified an intention to terminate or re-negotiate the agreement by January 2018, six months prior to its expiration. Whether that a nuclear cooperation agreement being negotiated between Saudi Arabia and the United States will include the gold standard has been the subject of considerable public attention. Saudi Arabia plans to build 16 nuclear reactors for power generation over the next 25 years. Riyadh explains that the purpose is strictly civilian, that is, to increase both domestic energy supply and to diversity beyond oil exports. However, Saudi Arabia, which has confronted Iran, has repeatedly made clear is intention to acquire nuclear weapons should Iran develop them. For instance, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman commented that, “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”89 There is thus concern that Saudi Arabian nuclear development would increase the possibility of nuclear proliferation. Under former President Obama, the United States asked Saudi Arabia to forego enrichment and reprocessing activities, but Saudi Arabia did not accept this. Although the policy of the Trump administration is not necessarily clear, several U.S. lawmakers from both parties introduced legislation that would require the House of Representatives and the Senate to affirmatively approve any so-called 123 agreement with the kingdom. Typically, such agreements go into effect unless majorities of Congress pass joint resolutions of disapproval.90

C) Implementation of the UNSCRs concerning North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues

With regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, UN Member States are obliged to implement measures set out in the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, including embargos on nuclear-, other WMD-, and ballistic missile[1]related items, material, and technologies. The Panel of Experts, established pursuant to UNSCR 1874 (2009), has published annual reports on its findings and recommendations about the implementation of the resolutions. As for the Iranian nuclear issue, the Iran Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts ceased to exist after the conclusion of the JCPOA, at the insistence of Iran, and the UN Security Council now has responsibility of oversight of remaining limitations.91

North Korea

The UN Security Council has adopted numerous resolutions criticizing North Korean nuclear and missile activities. In 2018, as mentioned above, expectations for North Korean denuclearization increased, and inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean relationships improved. However, no concrete steps concerning North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons and missiles were agreed. Meanwhile, although sanctions against North Korea were not officially eased, Russia and China relaxed implementation of these measures.

The annual Report of the Panel Experts published in March 2018 pointed out North Korea’s activities in defiance of the UNSCRs, such as:92

  • North Korea flouted the most recent resolutions adopted in 2017 by exploiting global oil supply chains, complicit foreign nationals, offshore company registries and the international banking system.
  • The Panel investigated illicit ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum.
  • North Korea continued to export almost all the commodities prohibited in the resolutions, generating nearly $200 million in revenue between January and September 2017.
  • In continuing its illicit coal exports to China, South Korea, Malaysia, Russia and Vietnam, the North combined deceptive navigation patterns, signals manipulation, trans-shipment and fraudulent documentation to obscure the origin of the coal.  
  • North Korea was involved in prohibited military cooperation projects stretching from Africa to Asia-Pacific region, including ongoing ballistic missile cooperation with Syria and Myanmar.
  • North Korean diplomats continue to play a key role in its prohibited programs and activities under the resolutions.
  • North Korea is accessing the global financial system through deceptive practices combined with critical deficiencies in the implementation of financial sanctions. Financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including designated banks, maintain more than 30 overseas representatives who live and move freely across borders in the Middle East and Asia, where they control bank accounts, facilitate transactions and deal in bulk cash.

A midterm report by the Panel of Experts in September 2018 pointed out North Korea’s smuggling of refined petroleum beyond the annual upper limit through illicit ship-to-ship transfers, some of which involved Russian vessels. The Panel could not submit the final report to the Security Council due to Russian pressure to revise these finding.93 By the end of 2018, the midterm report had not been published.

At a UN Security Council Briefing on Nonproliferation and the Implementation and Enforcement of UN Sanctions on North Korea in September, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, stated that during January[1]August 2018 “the United States tracked at least 148 instances of oil tankers delivering refined petroleum products obtained through illegal ship-to-ship transfers. We estimate that at the least, North Korea has obtained over 800,000 barrels of refined petroleum products in the first eight months of this year. That’s 160 percent of the 2018 annual cap of 500,000. In reality, we think they have obtained four times the annual quota in the first 8 months of this year.”94 She also criticized Russia, saying: “Russia is actively working to undermine the enforcement of the Security Council’s sanctions on North Korea. Its violations are not one-offs. They are systematic. Russia has not simply looked the other way as its nationals and entities engage in activities explicitly prohibited by UN sanctions. Russia has engaged in a concerted campaign in the Security Council to cover up violations of sanctions, whether they’re committed by Russia or citizens of other states.”95 Russia denied the U.S. allegations.

Although the whole picture of such illegal activities by North Korea has not been elucidated, it is alleged to have engaged in various activities, including earning foreign currency to support nuclear weapons development by utilizing foreign networks. Some news articles highlighted the following alleged cases:

  • The head of Germany’s BfV domestic intelligence agency said that North Korea has been using its embassy in Berlin to procure parts for its nuclear and missile program.96
  • North Korea has used cryptocurrencies to avoid the U.S. sanctions.97
  • According to South Korea’s customs agency, three South Korean firms imported coal from North Korea disguised as Russian products in violation of U.N. resolutions. 35,000 tons of coal was brought into South Korea between April and October in 2017, worth 6.6 billion won ($5.8 million).98
  • Russia has been letting more than 10,000 new North Korean laborers enter the country and issuing fresh work permits since such activities were prohibited under the Security Council resolutions. In addition, some companies hiring North Koreans are joint ventures with North Korean entities, an apparent violation of sanctions banning “all joint ventures or cooperative entities” with North Korean companies and citizens.99

Regarding sanctions against North Korea, China’s behavior has been drawing attention because of its close relationship with North Korea. Although China has also been criticized for its inadequate enforcement efforts, it implemented some measures to strengthen sanctions against North Korea in 2018, inter alia:

  • Chinese Commerce Ministry announced in January that it would restrict exports of crude oil, refined petroleum products and metals (including steel) to North Korea;100 and
  • In April, as a measure in accordance with the Security Council resolution adopted in September 2017, China announced a list of 32 dual-use items that could be used for WMD development and are prohibited for export to North Korea.101

In the meantime, China and Russia have sought to alleviate sanctions against North Korea, following the improvement of circumstances regarding the nuclear concern. On June 28, 2018, after the U.S.-North Korean summit meeting, China submitted to the Security Council a draft press statement that would have expressed an intention to relax sanctions against the North. However, the press statement was not issued due to strong opposition by some members, including the United States.102 At a ministerial meeting of the Security Council on September 27, China and Russia argued that the sanctions should have been alleviated, partly because of improvement of the inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean relations, and partly because of necessity to send a positive signal to the North for extracting concessions. Furthermore, the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, China and North Korea said in a joint communique released after their consultations in October, “Taking into account the important steps towards denuclearization made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the sides believe the UN Security Council should start in due time revising the sanctions against the DPRK.”103 In addition to those countries, South Korea has indicated that providing humanitarian assistances and relaxing sanctions would be needed for promoting North Korean denuclearization. However, many Western countries, including the United States, oppose the easing of sanctions at this moment, as prerequisites for providing such rewards are that the North takes concrete and substantial actions toward denuclearization.

In addition to sanctions under the UNSCRs, some countries impose respective unilateral sanctions against North Korea. For example, Japan, South Korea and the United States have expanded their respective lists of entities and individuals subject to a travel ban and/or asset freeze over their involvement in the North’s nuclear and missile developments. The lists include not just North Korean but also Chinese and Russian entities and individuals. In 2018, the United States imposed sanctions on North Korean and Russian banks for knowingly facilitating a significant transaction on behalf of an individual designated for WMD-related activities in connection with North Korea. The United States also sanctioned companies based in China, Russia and Singapore, as well as the head of the Russian firm, accusing them of helping the North evade sanctions.104

Regarding illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean-flagged vessels prohibited by UNSCRs, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has engaged in monitoring and surveillance activities in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea since December 2017. Japan’s Foreign Ministry posted the North’s illicit activities on the website.105 Japan also issued a press release in September 2018 on the monitoring and surveillance activities conducted by Japan and the United States, together with Australia, Canada and New Zealand.106


In accordance with the JCPOA, approval of the Procurement Working Group, establishment under the agreement, is required for Iranian procurement of nuclear-related items and material. From December 15, 2017 to June 15, 2018, the Procurement Working Group received 13 procurement proposals. Among these proposals, eight were approved, two were withdrawn and three were under review.107 From June 15 through December 11, 2018, five new proposals were submitted, and four of them were approved and one was under review. The report also noted that “some of the proposals that had been submitted during the previous reporting period were processed during this reporting period, of which two were withdrawn by the submitting Member State and one was disapproved.”108

Nuclear-related cooperation between concerned states

In addition to the (reported) illicit activities mentioned above, it is often alleged that North Korea and Iran have been engaged in nuclear and missile development cooperation. Bilateral cooperation has been well documented in the area of missiles. In 2016, the United States imposed sanctions regarding such cooperation.109 However, no concrete evidence has been revealed to support allegations of nuclear-related cooperation.110

Meanwhile, a London-based think tank assessed that the engines of North Korea’s Hwasong-12 IRBM and Hwasong-14 ICBM are likely RD250s that were developed by the Soviet Union for the SS-18 ICBM, and may have been transferred to North Korea by entities in Russia or Ukraine. Both countries denied the allegation.111

In addition, the annual Report of the Panel Experts published in March 2018 indicated that North Korea and Syria continue to cooperate on WMD and ballistic missile-relate activities. According to the report, examples of North Korea’s activities in defiance of the UNSCRs included: a group of ballistic missile technicians affiliated with the designated North Korean Academy of National Defence Science visited Syria in November 2016; and that there were more than 40 previously unreported shipments from North Korea to Syria between 2012 and 2017 by entities considered as front companies for the Syrian Scientific Studies Research Centre, which is alleged to be involved in chemical weapons development.112

D) Participation in the PSI

As of 2018, a total of 106 countries—including 21 member states of the Operational Expert Group (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others) as well as Belgium, Chile, Israel, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Sweden, the UAE and others—have expressed their support for the principles and objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Many of them have participated and cooperated in PSI-related activities.113

The interdiction activities actually carried out within the framework of the PSI are often based on information provided by intelligence agencies; therefore, most of them are classified. However, several cases were reported of interdictions involving shipments of WMD-related material to North Korea and Iran. Additionally, participating states have endorsed the PSI statement of interdiction principles and endeavored to reinforce their capabilities for interdicting WMD through exercises and outreach activities. In July 2018, Japan hosted an interdiction exercise, named “Pacific Shield 18,” in which six countries (Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore and the United States) participated, together with 19 observer countries.114

In January 2018, several PSI participating countries released a joint statement reiterating their commitment to impede and stop North Korea’s illicit activities, including smuggling, and to take measures such as: inspecting proliferation-related shipments on vessels with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items prohibited under UNSCRs; and prohibiting their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK.115

E) Civil nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT

In September 2008, the NSG agreed to grant India a waiver, allowing nuclear trade with the state. Since then, some countries have sought to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India, and several countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Russia and the United States, have concluded bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreements with India.

Actual nuclear cooperation with India has not necessarily been concluded,116 except India’s import of uranium from France, Kazakhstan and Russia, and its conclusion of agreements to import uranium from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mongolia and Namibia.117

Again in 2018, the NSG could not achieve consensus on India’s membership application. China, the main opponent, has argued that applicant countries must be parties to the NPT. It is also reported that China will not accept India’s participation in the NSG unless Pakistan is also accepted as a member.118 Pakistan has argued that, as a state behaving responsibly regarding nuclear safety and security, it is qualified to be accepted as an NSG member. The NSG has considered a draft set of nine criteria to guide membership applications from states that are not party to the NPT. Items of condition written in a draft document in December 2016 included safeguards, moratorium on nuclear testing, and support of multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament regime.119

Meanwhile, China has been criticized for its April 2010 agreement to export two nuclear power reactors to Pakistan, which may constitute a violation of the NSG guidelines. China has claimed an exemption for this transaction under the “grandfather clause” of the NSG guidelines (i.e. it was not applicable as China became an NSG participant after the start of negotiations on the supply of the reactors). China will also supply enriched uranium to Pakistan for running those reactors.120 Their construction started in November 2013 in Karachi. Because all other Chinese reactors that were claimed to be excluded from NSG guidelines under the grandfather clause were built at Chashma, there is a question about whether the exemption can also apply to the Karachi plant.121

The NAM countries have been critical of civil nuclear cooperation with non-NPT states, including India and Pakistan, and continue to argue that exporting states should refrain from transferring nuclear material and technologies to those states which do not accept IAEA comprehensive safeguards.122

(6) Transparency in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

A) Efforts for transparency

In addition to accepting IAEA full-scope safeguards, as described earlier, a state should aim to be fully transparent about its nuclear[1]related activities and future plans, in order to demonstrate that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. A state that concludes an Additional Protocol with the IAEA is obliged to provide information on its general plans for the next ten-year period relevant to any nuclear fuel cycle development (including nuclear fuel cycle[1]related research and development activities). Most countries actively promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy have issued mid- or long[1]term nuclear development plans, including the construction of nuclear power plants.123 The international community may be concerned about the possible development of nuclear weapon programs when states conduct nuclear activities without publishing their nuclear development plans (e.g., Israel, North Korea and Syria), or are engaged in nuclear activities which seem inconsistent with their plans (e.g., allegedly, Iran).

From the standpoint of transparency, communications received by the IAEA from certain member states concerning their policies regarding the management of plutonium, including the amount of plutonium held, are also important. Using the format of the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549) agreed in 1997, the five NWS, Belgium, Germany, Japan and Switzerland annually publish data on the amount of civil unirradiated plutonium under their control. By December 2018, NWS except Russia had not declared their civilian plutonium holdings as of December 2017. Germany had reported its holdings of not only civil plutonium but also HEU.124 Japan’s report submitted to the IAEA was based on the annual report “The Current Situation of Plutonium Management in Japan” released by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission.125

In July 2018, Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) issued a new policy paper, “The Basic Principles on Japan’s Utilization of Plutonium,” which for the first time stated that: “Japan will reduce the size of its plutonium stockpile.” It also reaffirms that “the stockpile is not to increase from the current level” through, inter alia, following measures: “Instruct the operators so as to secure a balance between demand and supply of plutonium, minimize the feedstock throughout the process between reprocessing and irradiation, and reduce the feedstock to a level necessary for proper operation of the RRP and other facilities”; and “Work on reducing Japan’s plutonium stockpile stored overseas through measures including promoting collaboration and cooperation among the operators.”126

Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, Iran, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey and the UAE have published the amount of fissile material holdings, or at least have placed their declared nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. From this, it may be concluded that these states have given clear evidence of transparency about their civil nuclear activities.

B) Multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle

Several countries have sought to establish multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle, including nuclear fuel banks, as one way to dissuade NNWS from adopting indigenous enrichment technologies. Austria, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU, as well as six countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) jointly, have made their respective proposals.

Among those proposals, nuclear fuel banks have actually and concretely made progress. Subsequent to the establishment of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) in Angarsk (Russia) and the American Assured Fuel Supply, the IAEA LEU fuel bank in Kazakhstan was inaugurated in August 2017. The LEU fuel bank was mainly funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Kuwait, Norway, the UAE, the United States and the EU. The IAEA LEU bank will store up to 90 tons of LEU—sufficient to run a 1,000 MW light-water reactor—in the form of uranium hexafluoride.127 This is the first fuel bank under the direct support of the international organization: the IAEA will bear the costs of purchase and delivery of LEU; and Kazakhstan will meet the cost of LEU storage.128 In June 2018, IAEA Director-General Amano stated that, “the Agency’s internal procurement process for low enriched uranium continues and we are evaluating proposals. Our intention is that a contract, or contracts, for the supply of the LEU will be signed in 2018 and that the LEU will be delivered to the IAEA LEU Storage Facility in 2019. Negotiations on transport contracts with China, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation are well advanced.”129 In November, the IAEA signed LEU acquisition contracts with French and Russian suppliers, and LEU transport contracts with companies in the Russia and Kazakhstan.130

[1] This chapter is written by Hirofumi Tosaki.

[2] “Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Depositary Governments for the Treaty on the Non[1]Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” U.S. Department of State, 28 June, 2018, ps/2018/06/283593.htm.

[3] No international body is explicitly mandated with a responsibility for assessing compliance with these articles, apart from the IAEA’s safeguards verification mandate.

[4] U.S. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” April 2017, htm.

[5] S/RES/1718, October 14, 2006. The UN Security Council Resolution 1874 in June 2009 also demanded that North Korea “immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006).”

[6] “Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year’s Address,” January 1, 2018,

[7]     “Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula,” April 27, 2018.

[8] “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” June 12, 2018, https://www.

[9] “Pyongyang Declaration,” the Inter-Korean Summit Meeting in Pyongyang, September 18-20, 2018,

[10]     Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Korea Begins Dismantling Key Facilities at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station,” 38 North, July 23, 2018,

[11]     Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “More Progress on Dismantling Facilities at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station,” 38 North, August 7, 2018, It is argued that “Since these facilities are believed to have played an important role in the development of technologies for the North’s intercontinental ballistic missile program, these efforts represent a significant confidence building measure on the part of North Korea.” (Bermudez Jr., “North Korea Begins Dismantling Key Facilities.”) However, other experts doubt its significance since North Korea may dismantle sites or facilities which are no longer important for its nuclear and missile developments or could rebuild them in a relatively short period. See, for example, Ankit Panda, “US Intelligence: North Korean Engine Dismantlement at Sohae Reversible ‘Within Months,’” Diplomat, July 25, 2018,[1]dismantlement-at-sohae-reversible-within-months/.

[12]     Office of the Spokesperson, “Secretary Pompeo’s Meetings in Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” U.S. Department of State, October 7, 2018,

[13] Corey Dickstein, “US, South Korea to Scale Back Foal Eagle Exercise This Spring,” Stars and Stripes, November 21 2018,[1]spring-1.557571.

[14] Alex Ward, “Pompeo Told North Korea to Cut Its Nuclear Arsenal by 60 to 70 Percent,” Vox, August 8, 2018,

[15] “U.S. Will Get Nothing with Its “Pressure Diplomacy”: Rodong Sinmun,” KCNA, August 6, 2018, http://

[16] Oliver Hotham, “N. Korea Will Retain “Nuclear Science” Following Disarmament: Foreign Minister,” NK News, August 10, 2018,[1]disarmament-foreign-minister/.

[17] “North Korea Media Says Denuclearization Includes Ending ‘U.S. Nuclear Threat,’” Reuters, December 20, 2018,

[18] “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” Vienna, July 14, 2015. JCPOA is posted on the U.S. State Department’s website (

[19] GOV/2018/33, August 30, 2018.

[20] Donald Trump, “Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” January 12, 2018, https://www.

[21] “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” May 8, 2018, https://www.

[22] See, for instance, “Statement by Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin on Iran Decision,” Department of Treasury, May 8, 2018,

[23] Mike Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, May 21, 2018,

[24] Michael R. Pompeo, “Confronting Iran; The Trump Administration’s Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, October 15, 2018,

[25] Nasser Karimi and Amir Vahdat, “Iran President: Uranium Enrichment May Resume If Deal Fails,” Associated Press, May 8, 2018,

[26]     “Without Definite Guarantee of 3 EU Countries, We Won’t Stick with JCPOA,”, May 9, 2018,; Patrick Wintour and Julian Borger, “EU Rushes to Arrange Crisis Meeting with Iran over Nuclear Deal,” Guardian, May 9, 2018,[1]firms-from-us-sanctions-on-iran.

[27] “Ayatollah Khamenei Sets Seven Conditions for Europe to Save Nuclear Deal,” Teheran Times, May 25, 2018,[1]to-save-nuclear.

[28] “Zarif’s Response to Pompeo’s 12 Demands,” Iran Daily, June 20, 2018, News/217019.html.

[29] “Joint Statement from Prime Minister May, Chancellor Merkel and President Macron following President Trump’s Statement on Iran,” May 8, 2018,

[30] European Commission, “Updated Blocking Statute in Support of Iran Nuclear Deal,” https://ec.europa. eu/fpi/what-we-do/updated-blocking-statute-support-iran-nuclear-deal_en.

[31]     Ibid. It was reported that despite such efforts, some of the European companies operating in the United States suspended transactions, investments and operations with Iran. Ted Regencia, “What Sanctions Will the US Reimpose against Iran on Tuesday?” Al Jazeera, August 6, 2018, sanctions-iran-snap-tuesday-180804193910915.html.

[32] “Implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Joint Ministerial Statement,” September 24, 2018,[1]comprehensive-plan-action-joint-ministerial-statement_en.

[33] “Brian Hook’s Written Remarks,” Hudson Institute, September 19, 2018, research/14577-brian-hook-s-written-remarks; “Iran Dismisses U.S. Offer of Talks, Says Washington Broke Last Deal,” Reuters, September 20, 2018,[1]dismisses-u-s-offer-of-talks-says-washington-broke-last-deal-idUSKCN1M01XN.

[34] “Iran Tells UN It Plans to Boost Uranium Enrichment Capacity, Associated Press, June 5, 2018, https://

[35] “Iran Completes Facility to Build Centrifuges: Nuclear Chief,” Reuters, September 10, 2018, https://[1]idUSKCN1LP0RE.

[36] GOV/2018/7, February 22, 2018.

[37] “Nuclear Deal: Netanyahu Accuses Iran of Cheating on Agreement,” Guardian, 30 April 2018, https://

[38]     Jeffrey Lewis, “Bibi’s Infomercial for the Iran Deal,” Foreign Policy, May 1, 2018, http://foreignpolicy. com/2018/05/01/netanyahus-informercial-for-the-iran-deal/.

[39] Joby Warrick, “Papers Stolen in Daring Israeli Raid on Tehran Archive Reveal Extent of Iran’s Past Weapons Research,” Chicago Tribune, July 15, 2018,[1]iran-israel-nuclear-weapons-20180715-story.html. See also David Albright, “What is New in the Iran Nuclear Archive?” Institute for Science and International Security, June 6, 2018, detail/what-is-new-in-the-iran-nuclear-archive#When:15:26:00Z. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told at the UN General Assembly in September that Iran concealed 15 kg radioactive material for nuclear weapons in Tehran, and urged the IAEA for dispatching inspectors immediately. John Irish, and Arshad Mohammed, “Netanyahu, in U.N. Speech, Claims Secret Iranian Nuclear Site,” Reuters, September 28, 2018,[1]material-for-weapons-program-idUSKCN1M72FZ.

[40]     “Iran Calls Israel’s Reported Theft of Nuclear Trove ‘Laughably Absurd,’” New York Times, July 18, 2018,

[41] NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.5, March 7, 2018.

[42] “Statement by Germany,” Cluster II, the 2018 NPT PrepCom, April 27, 2018.

[43] On the arguments and proposals made at the 2015 NPT RevCon by countries surveyed in this report, see the Hiroshima Report 2016.

[44] 53/77D, December 4, 1998.

[45] NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.16, March 22, 2018.

[46]     A/C.1/73/L.22/Rev.1, October 17, 2018.

[47] United Nations, “General Assembly Adopts 16 Texts Recommended by Fifth Committee, Concluding Main Part of Seventy-Third Session,” Meeting Coverage, December 22, 2018, ga12117.doc.htm.

[48] A/RES/73/28, December 5, 2018.

[49] Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “UN Body Seeks Mideast WMD-Free-Zone Talks,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 48, No. 10 (December 2018),

[50] NPT/CONF.2015/8, February 25, 2015.

[51] This number includes Palestine, which acceded to the NPT in 2015. Those 12 countries have little nuclear material, or do not conduct nuclear-related activities.

[52] IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2017, September 2018, p. 15.

[53] GC(62)/RES/10, September 21, 2018.

[54] IAEA Annual Report 2017, September 2018, p. 90.

[55] GOV/2018/34-GOV(62)/12, August 20, 2018.

[56] Ibid.

[57] “Director General’s Statement to Sixty-second Regular Session of IAEA General Conference,” September 17, 2018,

[58]     Francois Murphy, “Collapse of Iran Nuclear Deal Would be ‘Great Loss’, IAEA Tells Trump,” Reuters, March 5, 2018,

[59] GOV/2018/33, August 30, 2018.

[60] “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” Besides, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, in August 2017 encouraged the IAEA to seek access to Iranian military bases to ensure that Iran did not conceal activities prohibited by the JCPOA, particularly nuclear weapons-related activities prohibited under Section T. “Nuclear Inspectors Should Have Access to Iran Military Bases: Haley,” Reuters, August 26, 2017,

[61]     “IAEA: ‘Conducting World Highest Level Inspections,’” Mainichi Shimbun, May 9, 2018, https://mainichi. jp/articles/20180510/k00/00m/030/016000c. (in Japanese)

[62] “Iran Says in No Mood to Go Extra Mile on Nuclear Inspections,” Reuters, June 6, 2018, https://www.

[63] Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Iran Threatens to Cut Cooperation with Nuclear Body after Trump Move,” Reuters, July 4, 2018,

[64] IAEA Annual Report 2017, September 2018, p. 92.

[65] IAEA Annual Report 2017, GC(62)/3/Annex, Table A36(a). See also the Hiroshima Report 2017.

[66] IAEA Annual Report 2017, September 2018, p. 90.

[67] “Statement by the United Kingdom,” IAEA General Conference, September 18-22, 2017, https://www.

[68] IAEA Annual Report 2017, GC(62)/3/Annex, Table A36(a).

[69] IAEA Annual Report 2017, September 2018, p. 90.

[70] NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.23, March 26, 2018.

[71] See statements addressed by respective countries at the IAEA General Conferences and the NPT Review Conference.

[72] NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.21, March 23, 2018. During the negotiations on the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, the NAM countries opposed a proposal to stipulate an obligation of concluding an Additional Protocol in the treaty. As a result, the TPNW obliges states parties without possessing nuclear weapons to conclude just a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.

[73] “Statement by Brazil,” Cluster 2, 2018 NPT PrepCom, April 27, 2018.

[74] “Statement by South Africa,” Cluster 2, 2018 NPT PrepCom, April 27, 2018.

[75] “Statement by Russia,” Cluster 2, 2018 NPT PrepCom, April 27, 2018.

[76] GC(62)/RES/10, September 21, 2018.

[77] Ibid.

[78]     IAEA, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards,” GC(62)/8, July 31, 2018.

[79]     IAEA, “IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012-2023,” January 2013.

[80]     IAEA, “Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 2018-2019,” January 2018.

[81] Aside from the NSG, Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).

[82] Regarding a situation of Pakistani export controls, see Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” CRS Report, August 1, 2016, pp. 25-26.

[83] Drazen Jorgic, “U.S. Sanctions Pakistani Companies Over Nuclear Trade,” Reuters, March 26, 2018,

[84]     David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach and Andrea Stricker, “Most Nuclear Ban Treaty Proponents are Lagging in Implementing Sound Export Control Legislation,” Institute for Science and International Security, September 27, 2017,[1]are-lagging-in-implementing-sound-export.

[85] INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, November 13, 2013.

[86] See, for instance, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.5, March 7, 2018.

[87] NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.20, March 23, 2018.

[88] The U.S.-Mexican Nuclear Cooperation Agreement concluded in May 2018, it is stated in the preamble that Mexico will not conduct sensitive nuclear activities, which is called a “silver standard.”

[89] “Saudi Crown Prince Says Will Develop Nuclear Bomb If Iran oes: CBS TV,” Reuters, March 15, 2018, See also Nicole Gaouette, “Saudi Arabia Set to Pursue Nuclear Weapons If Iran Restarts Program,” CNN, May 9, 2018,

[90]     Timothy Gardner, “U.S. Lawmakers Seek Oversight Over Any Saudi Nuclear Power Deal,” Reuters, December 20, 2018,

[91] David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “JCPOA Procurement Channel: Architecture and Issues,” Institute for Science and International Security, December 11, 2015, Parts_1_and_2_JCPOA_Procurement_Channel_Architecture_and_Issues_Dec_2015-Final.pdf.

[92] S/2018/171, March 5, 2018.

[93] Hamish Macdonald, “Report Originally Blocked by Russia in August, Subsequently Released to the UNSC,” NK News, September 14, 2018,

[94] Nikki Haley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Nonproliferation and the Implementation and Enforcement of UN Sanctions on North Korea,” September 17, 2018,

[95] Ibid.

[96] “German Spy Chief Alleges North Korea Uses Berlin Embassy for Procurement,” Reuters, February 3, 2018,[1]berlin-embassy-for-procurement-idUSKBN1FN0J2.

[97] Alex Ward, “How North Korea Uses Bitcoin to Get Around US Sanctions,” Vox, February 28, 2018, https://

[98] Hyonhee Shin, “Three South Korean Firms Imported North Korean Coal in Breach of Sanctions – Customs Service,” Reuters, August 10, 2018,[1]south-korean-firms-imported-north-korean-coal-in-breach-of-sanctions-customs-service-idUKKBN1KV0EL.

[99] Ian Talley and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Thousands of North Korean Workers Enter Russia Despite U.N. Ban,” Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2018,[1]work-permits-despite-u-n-ban-1533216752.

[100] He Huifeng, China Tightens Crude Oil Supplies to North Korea in New Sanctions,” South China Morning Post, January 6, 2018,[1]tightens-crude-oil-supplies-new-sanctions-north.

[101] “China Bans Exports of ‘Dual Use’ Items to North Korea,” Reuters, April 9, 2018, article/uk-northkorea-missiles-china/china-bans-exports-of-dual-use-items-to-north-korea-idUKKBN1HF11I.

[102] “China submitted a draft statement to the Security Council,” Asahi Shimbun, June 30, 2018, https:// (in Japanese)

[103] “Russia, China, North Korea Call for Review of Sanctions against Pyongyang,” Tass, October 10, 2018,

[104]     Matthew Lee, “Nuke Talks Uncertain, US Hits Shippers with NKorea Sanctions,” Associated Press, August 16, 2018,; U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Bank and Other Facilitators of North Korean United Nations Security Council Violations,” Press Release, August 3, 2018, https://home.

[105]     See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Suspicion of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea-related vessels,” November 30, 2018,

[106] “Monitoring and Surveillance Activities by Partner Countries Against Illicit Maritime Activities Including Ship-to-Ship Transfers,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 7, 2018, press/release/press1e_000088.html. See also Department of State, “International Efforts to Implement UN Security Council Resolutions on DPRK’s Illicit Shipping Activities,” Prese Statement, September 22, 2018,

[107] S/20187/624, June 21, 2018.

[108] S/20187/1106, December 11, 2018.

[109] U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic Missile Procurement for Iran,” January 17, 2016,

[110] John Park and Jim Walsh, Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Security Program, 2016), p. 33; Paul K. Kerr, Steven A. Hildreth and Mary Beth D. Nilitin, “Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation,” CRS Report, February 26, 2016, pp. 7-9.

[111] Michael Elleman, “The Secret to North Korea’s ICBM Success,” IISS Voices, August 14, 2017, https://[1]3abb. Ukraine’s report of investigation is “Report of Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Head of the Working Group Oleksandr Turchynov on Investigation of the Information Stated in the Article of The New York Times,” National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, August 22, 2017, http://

[112] S/2018/171, March 5, 2018.

[113] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative Participants,” June 9, 2015, In December 2018, Palau endorsed the PSI.

[114]     “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise “Pacific Shield 18” Hosted by Japan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 13, 2018, html. As observers, eight countries from OEG (Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Russia), six PSI participants in Asia-Pacific region (Brunei, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam), and five non-PSI participants (India, Laos, Maldives, Myanmar and Pakistan) joined the exercise.

[115] “Joint Statement from Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Partners in Support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2375 and 2397 Enforcement,” January 12, 2018, psi-info-en/aktuelles/-/2075616. Originally, 17 countries signed the joint statement. By the end of 2018, 47 countries became signatories, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

[116] See, for example, the Hiroshima Report 2017.

[117]     Adrian Levy, “India Is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons, Experts Say,” Foreign Policy, December 16, 2015, secret_china_pakistan_barc/.

[118] “China and Pakistan Join Hands to Block India’s Entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group,” Times of India, May 12, 2016,

[119] See Kelsey Davenport, “Export Group Mulls Membership Terms,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January/February 2017), p. 50.

[120] “Pakistan Starts Work on New Atomic Site, with Chinese Help,” Global Security Newswire, November 27, 2013,

[121] Bill Gertz, “China, Pakistan Reach Nuke Agreement,” Washington Free Beacon, March 22, 2013, http:// china-pakistan-reach-nuke-agreement/.

[122] NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.20, March 23, 2018. See also NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.1, March 6, 2018.

[123] The World Nuclear Association’s website ( provides summaries of the current and future plans of civil nuclear programs around the world.

[124] “2017 Civilian Plutonium Declarations Submitted to IAEA,” IPFM Blog, September 19, 2018, http://

[125]     Office of Atomic Energy Policy, Cabinet Office, “The Status Report of Plutonium Management in Japan—2017,” July 31, 2018,

[126] Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “The Basic Principles on Japan’s Utilization of Plutonium,” July 31, 2018, It was reported that the United States called on Japan to reduce its high levels of stockpiled plutonium. “US Demands Japan Reduce its Plutonium Stockpiles,” Nikkei, June 10, 2018,

[127]     IAEA, “IAEA and Kazakhstan Sign Agreement to Establish Low Enriched Uranium Bank,” August 27, 2015,

[128] “Kazakhstan Signs IAEA ‘Fuel Bank’ Agreement,” World Nuclear News, May 14, 2015,

[129] Yukiya Amano, “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” IAEA, June 4, 2018,[1]to-the-board-of-governors-4-june-2018.

[130] “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” IAEA, November 22, 2018,


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