(3) IAEA Safeguards Applied toNWS and Non-Parties to the NPT

Under the NPT, a NWS is not required to conclude a CSA with the IAEA. However, to alleviate the concerns about the discriminatory nature of the NPT, the NWS have voluntarily agreed to apply safeguards to some of their nuclear facilities and fissile material that are not involved in military activities.All NWS have also concluded tailored Additional Protocols with the IAEA.

The IAEA Annual Report 2018 (Annex), published in September 2019, lists facilities in NWS under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material.63 For these five NWS, the IAEA “concluded that nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.”64 The IAEA does not publish the number of inspections conducted in the NWS. The safeguarded facilities include the following.
➢ China: A power reactor (two in previous year), a research reactor,and an enrichment plant
➢ France: A fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, and an enrichment plant
➢ Russia: A separate storage facility
➢ The United Kingdom: An enrichment plant and two separate storage facilities
➢ The United States: A separate storage facility

Each NWS has already concluded an IAEA Additional Protocol. Among them, the respective Protocols by France, the United Kingdom and the United States stipulate that the IAEA can conduct complementary access. Among them, the United States is the only country that has hosted a complementary access visit by the IAEA. Compared to the three NWS mentioned above, application of IAEA safeguards to nuclear facilities by China and Russia are more limited. No provision for complementary access visits is stipulated in their Additional Protocols.

France and the United Kingdom, respectively, have offered to make certain civil nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards under trilateral agreements with EURATOM and the IAEA. However, because of the prospective withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, or “Brexit,” the United Kingdom will withdraw from the EURATOM. The United Kingdom stated that it would establish a domestic nuclear safeguards regime which will deliver to existing EURATOM standards and the IAEA retained its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities. In June 2018, the United Kingdom and the IAEA signed a new safeguards agreement along with an Additional Protocol.

India, Israel and Pakistan have concluded facility-specific safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66. These non-NPT states have accepted IAEA inspections of the facilities that they declare as subject to these agreements. According to the IAEA Annual Report 2018, the facilities placed under IAEA safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material in non-NPT states as of December 31, 2018 are as follows.65 (The IAEA does not publish the number of inspections conducted in those countries.)
➢ India: Nine power reactors (eight in the previous year), two fuel fabrication plants, two separate storage facilities (one in the previous year)
➢ Israel: A research reactor
➢ Pakistan: Seven power reactors (six in the previous year) and two research reactors

Regarding their activities in 2018, the IAEA “concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.”66

Concerning the protocols additional to non-NPT states’ safeguards agreements (which differ significantly from the model Additional Protocol), the Indian-IAEA Additional Protocol entered into force on July 25, 2014. This Additional Protocol is similar to ones that the IAEA concluded with China and Russia, with provisions on providing information and protecting classified information but no provision on complementary access. No negotiation has yet begun for similar protocols with Israel or Pakistan.

Some NNWS call on the NWS for further application of the IAEA safeguards to their nuclear facilities in order to alleviate a discriminative nature that NNWS are obliged to accept full scope safeguards to their respective nuclear activities while NWS do not need to do so. The NAM countries, in particular, continue to demand that the NWS and non-NPT states should accept full-scope safeguards, and urge to establish, by the 2020 RevCon, a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclearweapon States.67