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Hiroshima for Global Peace

(4) Cooperation with the IAEA

(4) Cooperation with the IAEA

One of the most important measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system is to promote the universal application of the Additional Protocol. Among the countries surveyed in this project, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States consider the Additional Protocol “an integral part” of the current IAEA safeguards system.

On the other hand, the NAM countries argued that, “additional measures related to safeguards shall not affect the rights of the [NNWS], which are already committed to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option.”68 Brazil also said at the 2019 NPT PrepCom, “We are opposed, in particular, to any attempts to establish the Additional Protocol as the standard for non-proliferation verification under the NPT, which would accentuate the imbalance among the pillars of the Treaty beyond its breaking point.”69 Meanwhile, South Africa argued: “Whilst the Additional Protocol is a voluntary instrument, South Africa believes that it is an extremely important confidence building measure, especially with regard to those States with advanced nuclear programmes and facilities. It is our country’s view that the Additional Protocol is also indispensable in enabling the IAEA to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.”70

In the resolution titled “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards,” adopted at the IAEA General Conference in 2019, the following points were stated, based on divergent views regarding Additional Protocols:71
➢ “Bearing in mind that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force, the additional protocol is a legal obligation, encourages all States which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force in
conformity with their national legislation.”
➢ “[I]n the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.”      
The IAEA has contemplated a statelevel concept (SLC), in which the Agency considers a broad range of information about a country’s nuclear capabilities and tailors its safeguards activities in each country accordingly, so as to make IAEA safeguards more effective and efficient. In the resolution titled “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards,” adopted at the IAEA General Conference in 2019, important assurances about the SLC mentioned below were welcomed:72
➢ The SLC does not, and will not, entail the introduction of any additional rights or obligations on the part of either States or the Agency, nor does it involve any modification in the interpretation of existing rights and obligations;
➢ The SLC is applicable to all States, but strictly within the scope of each individual State’s safeguards agreement(s);
➢ The SLC is not a substitute for the Additional Protocol and is not designed as a means for the Agency to obtain from a State without an Additional Protocol the information and access provided for in the Additional Protocol;      
➢ The development and implementation of State-level approaches requires close consultation with the State and/or regional authority, particularly in the implementation of in-field safeguards measures; and
➢ Safeguards-relevant information is only used for the purpose of safeguards implementation pursuant to the safeguards agreement in force with a particular State—and not beyond it.

According to the IAEA, as of June 2019, state-level safeguards approaches (SLAs) were developed and approved for implementation for 67 States with a CSA and an Additional Protocol in force, and a broader conclusion; 35 States with a CSA and an Additional Protocol in force but without a broader conclusion; 28 States with a CSA but no Additional Protocol in force; and one State with a Voluntary Offer Agreement and an AP in force.73

Regarding research and development of safeguards technologies, under its longterm plan,74 the IAEA conducted the “Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 2018-2019,”75 in which 20 countries (including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the European Commission (EC) participated.

68 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.17, March 21, 2019.
69 “Statement by Brazil,” Cluster 2, 2019 NPT PrepCom, May 3, 2019.
70 “Statement by South Africa,” Cluster 2, 2019 NPT PrepCom, May 2, 2019.
71 GC(63)/RES/11, September 19, 2019.
72 Ibid.
73 GC(63)/13, July 31, 2019.
74 IAEA, “IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012-2023,” January 2013.
75 IAEA, “Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 2018-2019,” January 2018.

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