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Hiroshima for Global Peace

(3) Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security

(3) Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security

A) Minimization of HEU and plutonium stockpile in civilian use
Today, minimizing HEU and plutonium inventory is one of the key factors in reaching the highest level of nuclear security. In the first place, since HEU can also be used in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, it has been said that its existence itself is the “two sides of the same coin” for weapons and civilian use. Therefore, from the viewpoint of “attractiveness” to terrorists, it is difficult to deny the possibility that fissile materials will pose a nuclear security risk to the country holding such nuclear material. As a result of the 2004 GTRI69, and efforts to minimize the use of HEU and plutonium, which has been identified in a series of nuclear security summit processes since 2010, South America, Central Europe, and Southeast Asia have become areas where there are no highrisk nuclear materials.

In the above regard, at the 63rd IAEA General Conference and on other occasions, the following updates on commitments to minimize HEU and plutonium use were made:
➢ Australia: Australia, along with other suppliers, announced that it has removed 75 percent of its HEU from the world’s molybdenum-99 supply chain, thereby proving that such an approach is technically and commercially feasible.70
➢ Belgium: Belgium has announced that it is working to reduce domestic HEU and recognizes that it needs to immediately apply technologies to replace the use of high-level sealed sources, if technically and economically possible.71
➢ Nigeria: Nigeria has been working to convert its HEU-fueled research reactor to use Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel instead, and that this conversion has been concluded by repatriating HEU fuel to China.72
➢ Norway: Norway released a national report on civil-use HEU inventory in August 2019 as part of its efforts to minimize HEU use.73

B) Prevention of illicit trafficking

Nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, research and development of new technologies to strengthen enforcement capacity of law enforcement machinery and customs department, as well as participation in the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) have been regarded as important measures for preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. In particular, the IAEA ITDB is a database on incidents related to unauthorized possession, illicit trafficking, illegal dispersal of radioactive material, and discovery of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The ITDB has been regarded not only as an essential component of the information platform supporting the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan, but also in terms of statistics, which bring to light the real existence of a nuclear security threat.74 The number of ITDB participants is 138 (as of the end of December 2018), an increase of two countries compared to last year with the participation of Benin and Congo.75

According to the latest IAEA Annual Report 2018, states confirmed 166 incidents during 2018; and 253 cases were reported to the ITDB in 2018, an increase of 87 reports compared to the 166 cases in 2017.76 According to the IAEA’s 2019 Nuclear Security Report,77 3,565 cases have been reported by the end of June 2019 since the ITDB was launched in 1993. If this is separated into the one-year period from July 2018 to June 2019, 117 cases have been reported to the database.

A total of 186 cases were reported during the 2018-2019 reporting period, taking into the following examples of those that were not covered in past reports prior to July 2018. Of the 186 newly reported incidents, seven were related to trafficking and four were scams. All of the material involved in these incidents was seized by the relevant competent authorities within the reporting state. No incident involved highly enriched uranium, plutonium or Category I sources. On the other hand, there were 33 reported incidents in which the intent to conduct trafficking or malicious use could not be determined. These included 18 thefts, one case of unauthorized possession, and 14 incidents of missing materials. In 27 incidents the materials were not recovered, including one incident related to Category III radioactive sources. In addition to this, there were also 146 reported incidents in which the material was out of regulatory control, but not related to trafficking, malicious use, or scams. Most of these incidents involved unauthorized disposal, unauthorized shipments and unexpected discoveries of material such as previously lost radioactive sources.

As of 31 December 2018, the ITDB contained a total of 3,497 confirmed incidents reported by participating states since 1993. Of these 3,497 confirmed incidents, there are 285 incidents that involved a confirmed or likely act of trafficking or malicious use (Group I), 965 incidents for which there is insufficient information to determine if it is related to trafficking or malicious use (Group II), and 2,247 incidents unrelated to trafficking or malicious use (Group III).78 In order to protect sensitive information, detailed information on incidents and illicit trafficking is not published.79 Therefore, as it is not possible to assess the involvement of the surveyed countries, this report considers only their respective participation status.

Preventive measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material include the development of legal instruments for export control and enforced detection capability, such as the installation of sensing devices for radiological material at national borders and reinforcing nuclear forensic capabilities. Described below are some of efforts taken from 2018 to 2019 as preventive measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material:
➢ Chile: Chile announced that it has actively engaged in informal consultations with coastal countries and transportation companies, and has conducted constant cooperation and information exchange between the parties concerned. In October 2019, a regional meeting was held in cooperation with Chile and the IAEA to coordinate requirements and procedures for the import and export of radioactive materials and traffic. Also, Chile has announced that it is considering regulations and norms for physical protection during the transport of radioactive materials at the Atomic Energy Commission, and is expected to adopt them in 2021.80
➢ The UAE: the UAE has announced that it has submitted information on the laws and regulations of the Country in connection with the IAEA in fulfillment of its obligations under Article I Section 14 of the CPPNM/A.81
➢ Iran: Iran co-hosted the Interregional Workshop on Introduction to Nuclear Security Detection Architecture with the IAEA in July 2019.82
➢ Indonesia: With the cooperation of the IAEA, Indonesia has established a radioactivity portal monitor (RPM) and a radiation data monitoring system (RDMS) at the entry point and border. In addition, the country announced that it has continuously developed and strengthened its nuclear security infrastructure by improving its capacity building program and through coordination with related stakeholders.83
In terms of international and regional organization efforts, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) provides a forum for collecting data on prevention of nuclear terrorism, supporting investigation, and building confidence and coordination among national law enforcement agencies. At the IAEA technical meeting on nuclear forensics in April 2019, the INTERPOL reported on the role of nuclear forensics in the fight against the threat of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.84 The following events have also been reported as a warning of nuclear security to senior officials in each country by INTERPOL. In July, the Jordanian Interior Minister and Secretary-General of INTERPOL met to discuss coordination of counterterrorism drills, including nuclear security with the country.85
Nuclear security relevant initiatives by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) are also notable. In June 2019, the UNODC TPB held regional workshops in South America and the Caribbean with the aim of universalizing the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, CPPNM and CPPNM/A and promoting effective implementation, and 25 experts from these regions participated in the exchange of information.86

Meanwhile, the IAEA also launched a new Coordinated Research Project (CRP) in January 2019 with Albania, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Greece, India, Kenya and Thailand to maintain, repair and calibrate radiation detection devices. The project will run until 2022 to improve the efficiency and cost of radiation detection devices used to prevent illicit transfers.87

Table 3-6 shows the implementation status regarding the minimization of HEU for peaceful purposes, participation status for the ITDB and measures for the prevention of illegal transfer of nuclear material and other radiological materials, based on official statements made at the past Nuclear Security Summits, IAEA Nuclear Security Conferences, and any other opportunities.

 C) Acceptance of international nuclear security review missions

The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) provides recommendations to improve the physical protection systems of nuclear material, associated facilities, and transport systems of the state, upon the request of a member state. In the IPPAS missions, an IPPAS team, consisting of physical protection experts organized by the IAEA, visits government organizations and nuclear facilities in a state, reviews the physical protection system of the facility in detail, and conducts hearing investigations, in order to assess whether or not the reviewed physical protection system is in line with the recommendations of the IAEA INFCIRC/225, and to provide advice where necessary for its improvement. According to the IAEA’s announcement in 2019, there were five events involved in the IPPAS mission.88 However, given that there were 14 in 2017 and five in 2018, the number of IPPAS missions accepted has gradually decreased in recent years.

According to the results in the surveyed countries, Lebanon, Belgium, Madagascar, Uruguay and Paraguay accepted the IPPAS mission in 2019. Both Uruguay and Paraguay ratified CPPNM/A in 2016, and the acceptance of the IPPAS mission was implemented as part of efforts to raise the level of nuclear security in these countries.89

Apart from the IPPAS missions, the IAEA also provides the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), for the sake of developing nuclear security systems and capabilities. In accordance with the IAEA, the INSServ provides recommendations to improve a broad spectrum of nuclear security activities of the state, by reviewing its nuclear security system and requirements. Also, the INSSP provides a platform for nuclear security work to be implemented over a period of time, thus ensuring sustainability. The INSSP review missions enable the IAEA, the state concerned, and any donors financing the work, to plan and coordinate activities from both a technical and a financial point of view, optimizing the use of resources and avoiding duplications.

With regard to these advisory services, Nigeria accepted the INSSP review mission in 2019 and held an awareness raising workshop on nuclear security in cooperation with the IAEA.90 In this connection, the IAEA held a scenariobased European Regional Workshop in Romania in July to share good practices for the implementation of the INSSP and identify common nuclear security needs.91

D) Technology development ―nuclear forensics

Since its importance was pointed out in the Ministerial Declaration of 2016,92 nuclear forensics has become the key nuclear security technology. Through provision of nuclear forensic relevant guidance and training, organizations such as the IAEA have supported the development of technology and systems for seamless management of crime using nuclear and radioactive materials from the site where the target material was seized to the analytical laboratory.93

As for multilateral cooperation on nuclear forensics, the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) serves as the platform to support the technological development and sharing of nuclear forensic methods. In 2019, the ITWG-related meeting was held in June, “ITWG 6th Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX-6) Data Review Meeting was held in Poland, and the 24th Annual Meeting of the ITWG was held in Romania in the same month.94 Although only six analytical labs were originally participated in the CMX-1, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Canada, Czech, China, the European Commission (Joint Research Center: JRC), France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States are participating in the CMX-6, and the scale of participation has increased markedly.95
Another international cooperation initiative, the Nuclear Forensic Working Group (NFWG), chaired by Canada96 and established under the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), actively organized a number of workshops and tabletop exercises.97 In April 2019, a meeting of experts from the GICNT NFWG was held in Finland in cooperation with the IAEA to discuss the NFWG work plan for 2019-2021, as well as the use of selfdiagnosis tools for nuclear forensics, and future NFWG-related exercises were examined.98 In June, the 11th GICNT Senior Level Plenary Meeting was held in Argentina.99
The IAEA also announced the launch of a nuclear forensics cooperation project in 2018.100 As part of this relationship, in April 2019, with the participation of scientists, police officers, prosecutors, nuclear regulators and policy makers, the IAEA Technical Meeting on Nuclear Forensics: Beyond the Science, aimed at strengthening the ability to track stolen or lost radioactive materials and helping them carry out legal proceedings was held in Vienna.101 In November, a workshop on the on-site management of radioactive material crimes was held in Armenia.102 In this way, the IAEA continues to actively engage in nuclear forensics.

E) Capacity building and support activities

Before the start of the Nuclear Security Summit process, many countries and regions set up domestic training courses for nuclear security, strengthened their education and training functions, and established centers of excellence (COE) for experts in regional countries. Such capacity building efforts on nuclear security have been carried out continuously since then. Related examples in 2019 include the following: On September 10, China signed a cooperation agreement with the IAEA on the establishment of a Nuclear Security Technology Cooperation Center to further strengthen the building of nuclear security capabilities in the Asia Pacific region and around the world.103 Iran has announced that it is ready to share knowledge with all regional countries, stressing the strengthening of nuclear power and building a regional network to deal with emergencies.104 Based on the experience of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident at TEPCO, Japan announced that it is contributing to the strengthening of global nuclear safety through support for Fukushima’s IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET), as well as supporting the development of infrastructure and human resources in nuclear power-based countries.105 In the above regard, at the 63rd IAEA General Conference and on other occasions, the following updates on the development and utilization of the COEs were made:
➢ Russia’s Rosatom Tech and the IAEA signed a cooperation agreement in 2019 for knowledge management and human resource development on nuclear energy and nuclear security, and the Academy was designated as the IAEA Collaborating Centre.106 Russia also announced that it is conducting permanent training at the Academy on nuclear safety culture and is working to digitize nuclear safety culture education.107
➢ China’s China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and the IAEA signed a cooperation agreement in 2019 to develop, test and train to enhance the functions of radiation detection devices and physical protection systems. The country’s State Nuclear Security Technology Centre (SNSTC) and the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) have been designated as IAEA Collaborating Centres.108
➢ Mexico announced that it has contributed to the highest standards of nuclear safety, RI security and physical security and enhancement of nuclear security in member countries through its support for the activities of the Ibero-American Forum, with which the IAEA also cooperates.109
➢ Japan announced that it will continue to carry out human resource development activities in the region in the future, with cooperation between the IAEA and the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA).110

Other countries’ efforts on capacity building in 2019 are as follows. In February, Bulgaria’s University of National and World Economy and the IAEA renewed their agreement, in effect since 2015, to provide nuclear security education and human resource development, and until 2021, the university will operate a master’s program in the field of nuclear security with the cooperation of the IAEA.111 The International Center for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in Italy, co-hosted with the IAEA, opened the International School on Nuclear Security from March to April. The school was attended by young experts from 47 countries over a two-week schedule to train them to detect and track illicitly transferred radioactive materials.112 In addition, the CORN Training Center (CADEXCBRN) in Spain was designated as an IAEA Collaborating Centre in March for the development of the first law enforcement curriculum for nuclear security and for the purpose of holding and conducting workshops and training sessions.113 In November 2019, Japan held an international symposium on the transport security of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials. About 120 people from 37 countries interested in transport security of nuclear materials and other international organizations such as the IAEA and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) participated in the meeting to share best practices on experiences, initiatives, and systems from practitioners involved in transportation security. Discussions and exchanges of opinions were held on common issues related to transportation security.114

Such efforts to set up COEs and implement training as described above not only help capacity building related to global nuclear security, but also contribute to promoting understanding of nuclear security among regional experts, operators and related organizations. Moreover, strengthening cooperation with each country’s COE has advantages such as mutual exchange of instructors among COEs. At the same time, to promote efficient cooperation and closer information sharing, it is important to avoid duplication in the activities of the COEs that have been established during the past several years. These tasks include building a broad network around the IAEA and strengthening education and training through international support. To maintain and further facilitate exchange of experts, information and training material, the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network) was established in 2012 under the leadership of the IAEA. In March 2019, the NSSC Network Annual Meeting in Beijing was futureattended by 85 participants from 48 countries to share knowledge on the theme of internal threat countermeasures. Opinions were exchanged over the strengthening of international cooperation to protect nuclear materials and prevent illicit transfer of nuclear materials.115 In addition, as an approach of the same kind, there is the activity of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) by IAEA, to further advance technology development and information sharing related to nuclear security education. According to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Report 2019, the Network now has 184 institutions from 64 Member States.116 INSEN, which has seen an increasing number of participating educational institutions in recent years, announced in May 2019 that it would open a public offering of a 2020 international nuclear security paper for students under the age of 35 and young professionals under the IAEA. The competition is part of the ICONS program for 2020 with the IAEA and INSEN, and the three winners will be awarded a prize of EUR 2,000.117 In July, the INSEN annual meeting was held in Vienna, and with the participation of 100 people from 50 countries, a panel discussion was carried out on the theme of women’s role in nuclear security, and education outreach activities related to nuclear security were implemented.118

F) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund

The IAEA’s fifth Nuclear Security Plan, covering the period 2018-2021,119 was approved in September 2017 and has been executed. For the sake of successful implementation of this plan, since 2002, when the IAEA established the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) as a voluntary funding mechanism to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism, the Agency has been calling on member states to make voluntary contributions to the Fund. According to the latest 2018 IAEA Annual Report (covering January to December 2018), NSF revenue for the year was EUR 22.2 million.120 This is a significant decrease of EUR 21.9 million from the previous year. Although no individual country names have been disclosed regarding their involvement in the NSF, 16 countries and non-traditional donors are alleged to have committed financial involvement. Specific involvement in the NSF was identified in statements at the 63rd IAEA General Meeting and other meetings as follows: Canada has announced that it has contributed more than 59 million dollars to the NSF so far.121 China has announced that it will donate multiple detection devices to the IAEA through its continued contribution to the NSF, although it does not specify the amount.122 Also, Germany has not announced the amount, but has said it supports the IAEA’s commitment to nuclear security through contributions to the NSF.123 South Korea did not mention the contribution to the NSF itself, but urged countries to strengthen nuclear security through the NSF.124 New Zealand has declared that it will contribute 100,000 New Zealand dollars to the NSF in 2019.125

G) Participation in international efforts

International efforts to raise the level of nuclear security today form a multilayered architecture. In fact, those efforts to improve the level of nuclear security that this report draws attention to are not limited to the IAEA’s ICONS, the Nuclear Security Summit process that ended in 2016, UN Security Council Resolution 1540126 and various contributions made by the INTERPOL. In the present circumstances, various other multilateral frameworks relevant to nuclear security are operating around the world to be noted, including the “G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (G7GP, formerly the G8 Global Partnership) and the GICNT. Regarding the G7GP, in July 2019, the Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) issued a message to G7 leaders on nuclear safety and security, stating that all countries must fulfill the importance of the NPT in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the highest standards for nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear non-proliferation. It was pointed out that each country is required to fully implement the conventions and safeguards related to the above.127 In addition to the aforementioned message, the 2019 NSSG report at the Biarritz G7 Summit in France in 2019 states that emerging technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs) will be a challenge for nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards. From the view point of effective nuclear safety and nuclear security at nuclear facilities, the NSSG report observed that cyber security frameworks in the private sector must be addressed from the political and regulatory perspectives, and the results of the ICONS in 2020 will be reflected in the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan, “Sixth Action Plan for 2022-2025,” so the recommendation called on ICONS participants to include new challenges such as cybersecurity into the agenda.128

On the other hand, it is necessary to pay attention to the “Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Statement”129 in the 2019 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Communique of the G7GP. The statement expressed the importance of the effective and sustainable implementation of nuclear safety and nuclear security, as well as the promotion of participation in multilateral nuclear safety- and security-relevant treaties as a response to the threat of nuclear and radioactive terrorism. The statement also referred to initiatives by the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG) and the GICNT, and stressed that these contributions will help fulfill its commitment to strengthening nuclear security on a global scale as shared by the G7GP.

Elsewhere, the GICNT, which was agreed to by the US-Russia initiative at the St. Petersburg Summit in 2006, is another important international effort in the field of nuclear security. The GICNT is a framework of voluntary international cooperation by concerned states. As mentioned in the previous section on nuclear forensics technology development, the presence of multilateral activities by the GICNT for strengthening nuclear security has greatly increased in recent years. The GICNT now includes participation from 89 partner countries (including Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) and six international organizations, including the IAEA, INTERPOL and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) as official observers.130

In January 2019, the “Joint Exercise on Nuclear Detection and Nuclear Forensics to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Joint Exercise Resolute Sentry” was held in Canada. In February, the “Cunning Carl Nuclear Detection Support Workshop” was held in the European Union with the aim of sharing the best technical and scientific practices for detecting radioactive materials and nuclear materials. In April, the “Valiant Eagle Response Coordination and Legal Framework Workshop” was held in Nigeria, dealing with the use of existing regional frameworks for counter terrorism and disaster response related to nuclear security events.

In this report, it is expected that the acceptance of international nuclear security review missions such as IPPAS by the IAEA, national efforts regarding nuclear forensics, and commitments to nuclear security capacity-building and support will contribute to enhancing the surveyed countries’ nuclear securityrelated capabilities and performances, and make more effective their respective nuclear security systems. Furthermore, the contributions to the IAEA NSF, and participation in the G7GP and the GICNT, are indicators of the desire of states to enhance their commitment to nuclear security and can be used to carry out an overall evaluation of each country’s nuclear security system. Table 3-7 below shows the participation status and efforts regarding these nuclear security initiatives.

69 Even before GTRI’s efforts, measures have been taken to reduce the concentration of fuel for research reactors in each country. As an example, Japan has been promoting low concentration from the viewpoint of nuclear non-proliferation since the late 1970s. On the other hand, in recent years, such measures to reduce the concentration of nuclear fuel have been advanced in the context of strengthening nuclear security. Source: “The 14th Atomic Energy Commission Materials No. 1-2: Interim Report on the Role of Research Reactors, etc. in Japan,” Subcommittee on Examination and Recommendation of the Research Reactors, Special Expert Committee of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan, March 2016 (in Japanese); “About Research Reactor Fuel,” Cabinet Office Website, siryo4/siryo7.htm (in Japanese).

70 “Statement of Australia,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

71 “Statement of Belgium,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

72 “Statement of Nigeria,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

73 “Statement of Norway,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

74 IAEA, “ITDB: Incident and Trafficking Database.”

75 IAEA, “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control 2019 Fact Sheet,” p. 1.

76 IAEA Annual Report 2017, GC(62)/3,” p. 85. 

77 IAEA, “Nuclear Security Report 2019, GOV/2019/31-GC(63)/10,” July 31, 2019, pp. 3-4.

78 “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control 2019 Fact Sheet,” IAEA,, p. 2.

79 Ibid., p. 1.

80 “Statement of Chile,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

81 “Statement of the UAE,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

82 “Statement of Iran,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

83 “Statement of Indonesia,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

84 Jerry Davydov, David Kenneth Smith and Nicola Vorhofer, “The IAEA Technical Meeting on Nuclear Forensics: Sharing Global Success in Nuclear Forensics Development and Implementation,” ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update, No.11, June 2019, p. 2.

85 “Jordanian Authorities Welcome INTERPOL Chief for High-Level Discussions,” INTERPOL, July 17, 2019, TERPOL-Chief-for-high-level-discussions.

86 “UNODC/TPB Promotes the Universalization of the International Legal Framework Against Nuclear Terrorism in Latin America and the Caribbean,” UNODC, 2019, terrorism/latest-news/2019_latinamerica.html.

87 “New CRP: Maintenance, Repair, and Calibration of Radiation Detection Equipment (J02014),” IAEA, February 5, 2019, radiation-detection-equipment-j02014.

88 “Peer Review and Advisory Services Calendar,” IAEA, ions/calendar?type=3170&year%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&location=All&status=All.

89 “IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Uruguay,” IAEA, November 22, 2019,; “IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Paraguay,” IAEA, December 13, 2019,

90 “Statement of Nigeria,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

91 “Identifying Common Nuclear Security Needs: IAEA Tests New Scenario-based Workshop,” IAEA, July 19, 2019, new-scenario-based-workshop.

92 IAEA, “Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021, GC(61)/24,” September 14, 2017, p. 4.

93 Ibid., p. 14.

94 “Upcoming Trainings and Meetings,” ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update, No.10, March 2019, p. 7.

95 Jon M. Schwantes, “Trends in Nuclear Forensic Analyses: 20 Years of Collaborative Materials Exercises,” ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update, No.10, March 2019, p. 6.

96 “Fact Sheet,” GICNT, August 2019, 2019.pdf.

97 “Key Multilateral Events and Exercises,” GICNT, Multilateral_Events_August2019.pdf.

98 “Upcoming Trainings and Meetings,” ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update, No.10, March 2019, p. 7.

99 “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 2019 Plenary Meeting Joint Co-Chair Statement,” GICNT, pdf.

100 David Kenneth Smith and Timofey Tsvetkov, “NEW CRP: Applying Nuclear Forensic Science to Respond to a Nuclear Security Event (J02013),” IAEA website, May 7, 2018.

101 “Connecting Experts and Institutions to Increase the Effectiveness of Nuclear Forensics,” IAEA, April 17, 2019, of-nuclear-forensics.

102 “Managing Radiological Crime Scenes: Learning through Practice,” IAEA, November 28, 2019,

103 “Statement of China,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

104 “Statement of Iran,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

105 “Statement of Japan,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

106 “IAEA, Rosatom Technical Academy to Cooperate to Strengthen Knowledge Management and Nuclear Security,” IAEA, October 10, 2019, academy-to-cooperate-to-strengthen-knowledge-management-and-nuclear-security.

107 “Statement of Russia,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

108 “China’s Atomic Energy Authority and IAEA to Collaborate to Improve Nuclear Security Equipment,” IAEA, September 26, 2019, iaea-to-collaborate-to-improve-nuclear-security-equipment.

109 “Statement of Mexico,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

110 “Statement of Japan,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

111 “IAEA and Bulgaria’s University of National and World Economy Agree to Strengthen Cooperation in Nuclear Security Education,” IAEA, February 20, 2019, bulgarias-university-of-national-and-world-economy-agree-to-strengthen-cooperation-in-nuclearsecurity- education.

112 “International School on Nuclear Security Helps Participants Strengthen Skills,” IAEA, April 9, 2019, skills.

113 “Spain’s Guardia Civil Training Centre Becomes IAEA Collaborating Centre in Nuclear Security,” IAEA, March 8, 2019, iaea-collaborating-centre-in-nuclear-security.

114 “International Symposium on Transportation Security,” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 14, 2019. (In Japanese)

115 “International Cooperation and Sharing of Best Practices in Nuclear Security,” IAEA, March 26, 2019, security.

116 IAEA, “Nuclear Security Report 2019, GOV/2019/31-GC(63)/10,” July 31, 2019, p. 15.

117 “What’s the Future of Nuclear Security? IAEA Launches Essay Competition for Students and Early Career Professionals,” IAEA, May 10, 2019,

118 “Nuclear Security Education Meeting Highlights Role of Education to Reach Gender Parity,” IAEA, July 9, 2019, education-to-reach-gender-parity.

119 IAEA, “Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021, GC(61)/24,” September 14, 2017.

120 IAEA Annual Report 2018, p. 95.

121 “Statement of Canada,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

122 “Statement of China,” 63rd IAEA General Conference, September 2019.

123 “Statement of Germany,” Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the NPT, May 2019.

124 “Statement of South Korea,” Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the NPT, May 2019.

125 “Statement of New Zealand,” Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the NPT, May 2019.

126 “Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004),” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016.

127 “NSSG Key Messages on Nuclear Safety and Security to the G7 Leaders,” July 2019.

128 “2019 Report Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG),” French G7 Presidency Biarritz, 2019.

129 “2019 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, April 6, 2019.

130 “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Partner Nations List.”

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