The Hiroshima Report 2023: Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in 2022 (hereinafter referred to as Hiroshima Report 2023”) is a result of the “Hiroshima Report Publication Project,” 1 commissioned by the Hiroshima Organization for Global Peace (HOPe) to the Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology (CDAST), the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). As with the previous reports issued since 2013 , the Hiroshima Report 2023 is published inNboth Japanese and English.

The prospect of total elimination of nuclear weapons remains a distant one at best. Even more worrying, the circumstances surrounding nuclear weapons are becoming ever more complex. The year 2022, in particular, was a year of major upheaval in the nuclear order.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and subsequent campaign of aggression accompanied by nuclear intimidations not only raised urgent concerns in the international community that nuclear weapons would be used for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also served to deepen the rift between the various actors over nuclear disarmament. While three documents were adopted at the First Meeting of States Parties of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in June, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) in August failed to adopt a final document due to opposition by a single country, Russia. In the meantime, the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the NPT —China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States —and other nuclear-armed states —India, Is rael and Pakistan —as well as North Korea continue to perceive their nuclear weapons as indispensable components of their national security.
They also have taken measures with a view to sustaining nuclear deterrence for a longer period, such as modernizatio n of nuclear forces and development of new delivery vehicles. Non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) allied with NWS also appear to have stepped up their reliance on the extended nuclear deterrence. There were few concrete efforts by the nuclear-armed states to toward agreeing on or  implementing further nuclear disarmament.

Meanwhile, the status and prospects regarding nuclear non-proliferation remain gloomy as well. North Korea has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons and continues to aggressively develop and test various ground-launched missiles and submarine submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) capable of carrying nuclear warheads, striving to further develop its nuclear forcesforces. It is likely to be developing and introducing tactical nuclear weapons , and repeatedly suggested a possibility of first use of nuclear weapons.
Regarding the Iran nuclear issue, indirect negotiations between the United States and Iran to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) were held intermittently, but failed to reach agreement, and by year’s end the talks were moribund. During this period, Iran increased its stockpile of enriched uranium as well as the level of enrichment far beyond the limits set by the JCPOA, reaching a point where it could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in less than a week.

The situation regarding nuclear security has also changed dramatically. In the midst of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it conducted unprecedented shelling and occupation of an operating nuclear power plant. These attacks brought about a precarious situation where the nuclear safety and security of the facility could have been seriously compromised. Such circumstances highlighted a new challenge of responding to threats by States that go beyond the conventional approach to nuclear safety and measures within the framework of the definition of “conventional nuclear security,” which is focused on threats by non-state actors. The new challenge involves physical protection of nuclear facilities and prevention of theft of nuclear and other radiological materials in a conflict situation. With regard to “conventional nuclear security,” the threat of sabotage against nuclear facilities through cybercyber-attacks and us use of drones continues to require close attention, and some developed countries are taking countermeasures. Meanwhile , the Review Conference on the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material ( A/ CPPNM) was held in March for the first time since the entry into force of the Amended Convention, and the Conference confirmed its adequacyadequacy.

The Hiroshima Report seeks to assist the movement toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, first and foremost , by clarifying the current status of issues and efforts surrounding nuclear disarmament, non – proliferation and nuclear security. In doing so, it aims to encourage increased debate on these issues among policymakers, experts both within and outside governments, and civil society. Furthermore, by issuing the “Report” and the “Evaluation” from Hiroshima, which once suffered the wartime use of a nuclear weapon, it endeavors to help bring attention to and further promote actions across various fields toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons.

The Research Committee was established to conduct this project, namely producing the “Report” and the “Evaluation.” This Committee met once within the Japanese fiscal year 2022 to discuss its content. The members of the Research Committee are as follows:

Chairperson and Project Coordinator

Hirofumi Tosaki (Director, CDAST, JIIA)

Research Members

Nobumasa Akiyama (Professor, Hitotsubashi University)
Kazuko Hikawa (Professor, Osaka Jogakuin University)
Junko Horibe (Associated Professor, Nagoya University of Foreign Studies)

Akira Kawasaki (Executive Committee Member, Peace Boat)
Masahiro Kikuchi ( Former Board Member, Nuclear Material Control Center)
Mitsuru Kurosawa (Professor Emeritus, Osaka University)
Kazumi Mizumoto (Professor Emeritus, Hiroshima City University)
Michiru Nishida (Professor, Nagasaki University)
Hiroshi Tamai (Executive Secretary, Mentor Subcommittee, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Japan Chapter)

The Research Committee appreciates the comments and advice to the “Report” given by the following experts:

Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe (Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and former Commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission)
Mr. Mark Fitzpatrick ( Former Executive Director of the Americas Office and head of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program, International Institute for Strategic Studies)
Dr. Tanya Ogilvie-White (Senior Research Adviser, Asia Pacific Leadership Network)

Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki ( Vice Director and Professor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University)

In this edition, experts posted columns on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security issues. 2 The Research Committee extends its appreciation to Professor Yosuke Sunahara (Kobe University), Associate Professor Tomomi Yanagisawa (Josai University) and Professor Kiyoshi Yamaya (Doshisha University) for their guidance and advice regarding the methodology of the evaluation . It also appreciates the efforts of Yuya Kato, Kazuki Kimura, Ritsuko Takahashi and Akio Tamura assisting to edit the Hiroshima Report.

The views or opinions expressed in the “Report,” “Evaluation” and “Columns” are those of the members of the Research Committee or respective authors, and do not necessarily represent the view of the HOPe, the Hiroshima Prefecture, the JIIA, or the organizations to which they belong. Not all of the members necessarily agree on all of the points discussed.

 

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1 This project has been conducted as part of the “Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan launched by Hiroshima Prefecture in 2011.

2 The views or opinions expressed in the columns are those of the respective authors, and do not represent the view of the HOPe, the Hiroshima Prefecture, the JIIA, or the organizations to which they belong.