Russia and the United States have implemented verification measures, including on-site inspections, under the New START. Since its entry into force, they have conducted on-site inspections as stipulated in the treaty. However, as mentioned above, on-site inspections have been suspended since April 1, 2020. (See Section 5 (A) of this chapter.)

One notable activity on verification is the “International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV),” launched by the United States in December 2014. With 28 participating countries (plus the EU and the Vatican),305 the IPNDV continues to study verification measures and technologies related to dismantling nuclear weapons, as well as fissile material derived from dismantled nuclear warheads.

During Phase III, which began in 2020, partner countries were to “build on current working methods and engage in further hands-on activities, including scenario-based discussions, practical exercises and technology demonstrations.”306 The following activities were listed:

➢Use a scenario-based approach based on a full, representative national case study of a notional nuclear weapon possessing state (Country X), and its nuclear enterprise to demonstrate how concepts and other elements of the overall verification “tool kit” developed in Phases I and II can be implemented;

➢Continue deeper exploration of issues related to the design of verification, such as irreversibility, transparency and the non-production of nuclear weapons, among others, to build confidence over time;

➢Address gap areas identified through Phases I and II, such as the detection of the presence or absence of nuclear-weapon materials, information barrier concepts and technologies; and

➢Conduct outreach activities to engage senior political leaders, and the nuclear disarmament verification expert community and maintain focus on nuclear disarmament verification.

In Phase III, three working groups on inspectors, host and technologies are to be established in order to “focus on a scenario developed by a dedicated task force describing a notional nuclear weapon possessing state and elements of a nuclear disarmament verification regime to test possible verification measures against the scenario.”307

In June 2021, “[t]he IPNDV brought together more than 40 technical and policy experts from 13 members countries for a four-day virtual exercise during the week of June 14, 2021 to simulate the verification and monitoring of the removal, and subsequent placement in storage, of a warhead from its road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).”308 In September, the IPNDV held a virtual two-day symposium in which participants, with reports from U.S. and European government officials, reviewed the IPNDV’s activities over the past six years and discussed technologies enabling nuclear disarmament verification in a wide range of contexts.309 In December 2022, the plenary meeting was held in Australia, and participating countries reviewed the tasks under Phase III and set out a work plan for 2023.310

In another effort on nuclear disarmament verification, the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway and Sweden launched the “Quad” initiative in 2015, and have continued its work since then. In their working paper submitted to the NPT RevCon, these countries noted that two separate workstreams of verification strategies and verification technologies are being organized for study and analysis, based on the lessons learned from the multilateral exercise conducted in 2017; and “the two workstreams [would] mainly focus on their respective programmes of work in the period up to 2022 … [and] the partnership will then build on their results and integrate them into a common, substantive deliverable, possibly including an exercise, within the time frame of the 2025 NPT review cycle.”311

Regarding the Nuclear Disarmament Verification Exercise (NuDiVe) conducted in September 2019 and April 2022 on the initiative of France and Germany within the framework of IPNDV, those countries stated that “the exercises sought to simulate inspection procedures so as to ensure that nuclear materials were not being diverted during the dismantlement of a nuclear warhead, which has to be conducted behind closed doors, without inspectors’ presence, pursuant to non-proliferation obligations and national security constraints.”312At the NPT RevCon, the NAM countries requested IAEA’s involvement in developing verification measures, including those applied to fissile material removed from nuclear weapons programs. They also called for the establishment by the 2020 NPT RevCon of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the NWS.313

The draft final document of the NPT RevCon stated, “States parties commit to strengthen support for initiatives to develop multilateral disarmament verification and capacity-building in support of nuclear disarmament and as an effective step towards the implementation of Article VI, and to further conceptual and practical work on nuclear disarmament verification, taking into account the importance of partnerships between [NWS] and [NNWS] on this matter and encourage broad participation by all States parties.”

 

 

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305 In addition to three NWS (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UAE and others participated in the IPNDV. China and Russia attended in Phase I (2015-2017) as observers, but did not join in Phase II (2018-2019).
306 IPNDV, “Phase III Programme of Work,” https://www.ipndv.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ IPNDV_Phase_III_Programme_of_Work.pdf.

307 IPNDV, “Working Groups,” https://www.ipndv.org/about/working-groups/.

308 IPNDV, “IPNDV Conducts Virtual Nuclear Disarmament Verification Exercise,” June 21, 2021, https://www.ipndv.org/news/inpdv-conducts-virtual-nuclear-disarmament-verification-exercise/.
309 IPNDV, “Innovations in Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Summary of the IPNDV Virtual Symposium,” October 26, 2021, https://www.ipndv.org/news/innovations-in-nuclear-disarmament-verification-summary-of-the-ipndv-virtual-symposium/.
310 The U.S. Department of State, “International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) Sydney Plenary,” December 2, 2022, https://www.state.gov/international-partnership-for-nuclear-disarmament-verification-ipndv-sydney-plenary/.

311 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.2, November 4, 2021.
312 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.18/Rev.1, July 7, 2022.

313 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.24, November 21, 2021.