Hideya Kurata

Prior to the April 2018 Inter-Korean summit, Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Chairman Kim Jong-un declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches beyond intermediate range, saying that “there is no longer any need for any nuclear test, intermediate-long-range or intercontinental ballistic rocket launch tests” and that “the nuclear test site in the north [Punggye-ri] has finished its mission.” By signaling a “moratorium,” Kim Jong-un sought corresponding measures from President Donald Trump at the U.S.-North Korea Summit scheduled to follow the Inter-Korean summit. In the U.S.-North Korea Joint Statement (June 12, 2018) released at the first U.S.-North Korea Summit in Singapore, Kim Jong-un reaffirmed his “firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” while Trump pledged to give North Korea “security guarantees,” as well as to suspend the joint U.S.-South Korea military exercise “Ulchi Freedom Guardian” for that year. The aforementioned “security guarantees,” at least in North Korea’s perception, referred to measures that would lead to the neutralization of extended deterrence, as opposed to negative security assurances (NSAs) on nuclear non-proliferation.

After the second U.S.-North Korea Summit in Hanoi (February 28-29, 2019) ended, North Korea repeatedly conducted launch tests, including that of a short-range missile called the KN-23—an improved version of the Russian “Iskander”—further accelerating its launch tests when the decision to resume Ulchi Freedom Guardian was made. These actions did not, however, break the “moratorium.” The reason for this is that—in addition to nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests—the intermediate-long ballistic missiles included in the moratorium were the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) and Hwasong-12, with a range of 3,200 to 5,000 km targeting Guam. North Korea refrained from launching ballistic missiles of that kind.

One indication that North Korea would break the moratorium was Kim Jong-un’s report to the 8th Congress of the WPK in January 2021, which coincided with the start of the Biden administration. Here, Kim Jong-un determined that the “security guarantees” promised in the first U.S.-North Korea joint would not be realized in light of President Trump’s failure to be reelected and the Biden administration’s commitment to restoring alliances, in particular that with South Korea—and sought to expand nuclear deterrence capabilities. At this time, Kim Jong-un provided a list of “strategic tasks” (later called the “Five-Year Defense Plan”) to be accomplished by the next party congress, beginning with tactical nuclear weapons and to be followed by multiple warheads and ICBMs with a range of 15,000 km—weapons which cannot be tested without breaking the “moratorium.”

In fact, a year later, on January 19, 2022, Kim Jong-un gave an order at a meeting of the WPK’s Politburo to “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporary-suspended activities.” The Hwasong-12, an intermediate-long-range ballistic missile was subsequently launched on January 30, followed by a “new ICBM” called the Hwasong-17 on March 24. With these ballistic missile tests, the “moratorium” was now broken and a portion of Kim Jong-un’s “strategic tasks” were accomplished. While there were some suspicions that this new ICBM was not the Hwasong-17 but rather the Hwasong-15 originally launched in November 2017, it was nevertheless observed to have a range of over 15,000 km in a normal orbit. In a direct path, 15,000 km from North Korea would reach beyond the East Coast of the United States, and east of the Caribbean Sea. Even if the total weight of the ballistic missile were to increase and its range to shrink due to the introduction of multiple warheads—also one of North Korea’s stated “strategic tasks”—its maximum range of 15,000 km would still allow it to reach the East Coast of the United States. Moreover, North Korea conducted another ICBM test on November 18, 2022, which it again called the Hwasong-17. This time, however, no doubts arose that it might, in fact, be the Hwasong-15. In light of this, the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 15,000 km—cited by Kim Jong-un as a “strategic task”—can be considered a success in the form of the Hwasong-17.

 

Hideya Kurata: Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan