A) Minimization of HEU and separated plutonium stockpile in civilian use

Today, minimizing HEU and separated plutonium inventory is a key indicator for achieving the highest level of nuclear security.168 As a result of the 2004 GTRI, and through a series of efforts through Nuclear Security Summit process since 2010 to minimize the use of HEU and plutonium, South America, Central Europe, and Southeast Asia have become areas with no high-risk nuclear materials at present. The issue was also discussed at the 10th NPT RevCon. The EU “encouraged the minimization of HEU for civilian use where technically and economically feasible.”169 South Korea, the Netherlands and Norway submitted a working paper on the topic, encouraging international cooperation and experience- sharing in minimizing and eliminating HEU for civilian use.170 The draft final document of the 10th NPT RevCon stated, “We welcome voluntary efforts by relevant countries (to minimize HEU) and, where technically and economically feasible, efforts by relevant countries to further minimize the inventory and use of HEU for civilian use.”171

 

HEU

In 2022, Japan and Kazakhstan made significant progress in their efforts to minimize HEU.
The following progress was made in Japan:

➢ In March, all HEU was removed from the University of Tokyo’s “Yayoi” research reactor, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s Deuterium Critical Assembly and its research reactor JRR-4.172 This fulfills a commitment first announced at the 2018 U.S.-Japan Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Meeting in Tokyo. According to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), removal involved the transfer of more than 30 kg of HEU from Japan to the U.S..173 “The HEU was securely transported to the Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina, and the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. It will be down blended to low-enriched uranium and/or dispositioned.”174 A senior NNSA official said, “This HEU removal is the result of years of close cooperation and hard work—made all the more challenging by the pandemic and travel restrictions.”175 The removal of this HEU from Japan was mentioned in the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement of May 23, welcoming recent progress in cooperation on nuclear security, including the return of all HEU fuel from the University of Tokyo research reactor Yayoi and other research reactors in Japan to the U.S.176

➢ Japan removed 45 kg of HEU from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA) and transferred them to the U.S.177

➢ Japan announced that it “has decided to remove HEU fuel from the Kinki University Reactor.” This reactor is the last HEU reactor in Japan and will be converted to use [Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)] in September.178

Kazakhstan made the following progress.

➢ “In March 2022, the IVG.1M reactor was converted from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fule, the culmination of over 10 years of collaboration between Kazakhstan and the United States. This was the third research reactor converted to LEU fuel in Kazakhstan.”179    

➢ “[As of September], operations are completed for dilution of fresh unirradiated graphite [HEU] fuel from another Kazakhstan research reactor, the Impulse Graphite Reactor (IGR). In order to dispose irradiated fuel of this reactor, Kazakhstan specialists have developed a dry mixing technology, which in the future will solve the problem of disposal of irradiated graphite fuel.”180

In addition to these countries, Norway announced it is still working with the U.S. to dilute and eliminate the remaining HEU inventory in Norway.181 Also, Belgium announced that it “continues its efforts to minimise the use of HEU for civilian application when technically and economically feasible.”182

Several countries are therefore pursuing HEU minimization efforts, all requiring significant efforts over several years. The working paper submitted by South Korea, the Netherlands and Norway encourages international cooperation in HEU minimization efforts, and strongly advocates that the experience from past minimization efforts “must be shared” and “must be used” to maintain momentum in this effort.183 This is important when the international community attempts to continue HEU minimization efforts.

In regard to voluntary reporting of civilian HEU inventories to the IAEA, the only surveyed countries that reported in 2022 were France, Germany and the U.K. in their Plutonium Management Reports (INFCIRC/549) as in previous years. Such reporting is encouraged in the Joint Statement on Minimizing and Reducing HEU for Civilian Use (INFCIRC/912), issued in 2017, using the standardized form for voluntary reporting attached to this Joint Statement.184 Using the standardized form allows the desired information to be disclosed and if submitted on a regular basis it allows the international community to evaluate the country’s efforts to minimize HEU. Twenty-one countries from those surveyed are participating in the Joint Statement, including Australia, Canada, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the U.K. and d the U.S..185 The working paper submitted by South Korea, the Netherlands and Norway to the 10th NPT RevCon urges countries to endorse INFCIRC/912 and to consider implementing this reporting mechanism.186 To date, two of these countries, Australia and Norway, have submitted reports to the IAEA using this form.187

 

Separated plutonium

In regard to separated plutonium, 2014 Nuclear Security Summit communiqué encourages states to keep their stockpiles “to the minimum level, as consistent with national requirements.”188 The following is available from publicly available information on the surveyed countries efforts and status in 2022.

➢ Japan: In February 2022, the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan announced its plutonium utilization plan for fiscal years 2022 through 2024. Kansai Electric Power Co. plans to use 0.7 tons of plutonium in new reactors at its Takahama NPP Units 3 and 4, respectively.189 Also in June, the JAEA announced that it had contracted with a French company to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from the new conversion reactor Fugen (currently undergoing decommissioning). The plutonium extracted will be transferred to the French side. The JAEA stated that it decided on the transfer in consideration of the government’s policy of the principles of not possessing plutonium without specific purposes.190

 

➢ U.S.A.191: “In 2021, the U.S. Department of Energy and the IAEA removed excess plutonium from the IAEA’s Nuclear Material Laboratory. “The U.S. is working toward the permanent disposition of plutonium deemed surplus for national security needs and is consulting with the IAEA to ensure that material currently under IAEA safeguards is maintained throughout the disposition process. As the U.S. works towards the permanent disposition of plutonium designated surplus to national defense needs, we are in consultation with the IAEA so that material currently under IAEA safeguards remains so throughout the disposition process. Those safeguards approaches, once in place, will enable the IAEA to verify the disposition of 40 tons of plutonium designated surplus.” 

 

B) Prevention of illicit trafficking

Nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, research and development of new technologies to strengthen capacity of law enforcement and customs, as well as participation in the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) are all regarded as important in preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. In particular, the ITDB, which is a database on incidents related to unauthorized possession, illicit trafficking, illegal dispersal of radioactive material and discovery of nuclear and other radioactive material outside regulatory control is regarded not only as an essential component of the information platform supporting the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan, but is also appreciated as providing useful statistics that enable us to realize the real threat of nuclear terrorism.192 According to the ITDB 2022 Fact Sheet, the number of countries participating in the ITDB as of 2021 is 142.193 (See Table 3-8 for the participation status of the surveyed countries.)

According to the IAEA Annual Report 2021 which is the latest available at the time of writing this report, 120 cases were reported to the ITDB in 2021.194 In addition, according to the IAEA’s “ Nuclear Security Review 2022,” 3,928 incidents were reported to the ITDB between 1993, when it began, and the end end of December 2021.195 The ITDB classifies incident types as (1) incidents that are, or are likely to be connected with trafficking or malicious use; (2) incidents of undetermined intent; and (3) incidents that are not, or are unlikely to be, connected with trafficking or malicious use. Of the 3,928 cases, 320 fell into (1), 1,034 into (2) and 2,574 into (3). Of these, 14% of all cases involved nuclear materials.196 This includes 12 cases involving highly enriched uranium, 3 cases involving plutonium and 5 cases involving plutonium-beryllium neutron sources.197 In addition, 49% of the incidents were related during transportation, revealing the importance of measures for radioactive materials during transportation. The ninth Triennial Technical Meeting of States’ Points of Contact for the ITDB was held in Vienna in April 2022 to exchange information between the Agency and ITDB Points of Contact.198

Table 3-8 shows the cases where there have been declarations of intent in various official statements regarding efforts to minimize HEU in civilian use, as well as the status of ITDB participation.

In connection with illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the IAEA held a webinar on “the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Radiation Detection and Surveillance,” in January 2022 and a webinar on “the Nuclear Security Implications of Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspected Items” in March.199 Two workshops on nuclear security information exchange and coordination were also held in May and June.200 These workshops aimed to strengthen national, regional and international capabilities to prevent and respond to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials through enhanced information exchange and cooperation.

The 10th NPT RevCon draft final document included a following paragraph201:

stressing the importance of improving domestic capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials in the territory of States Parties. (para. 48)

 

C) Acceptance of international nuclear security review missions

The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) is an international assessment mission that provides international expert advice on implementing international instruments and IAEA guidance on protecting nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as related facilities and activities.202 During the 25-year period from 1996 to the end of 2021, 96 reviews (including 22 follow-up reviews) took place in 57 countries.203
In 2022, Finland was the only country that hosted an IPPAS mission,204 but the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Review 2022 says there is “strong interest” among member states as six countries hosted IPPAS mission in 2021.205 Finland hosted the first IPPAS mission in 2009, followed by a follow-up mission in 2012, and now its third time in 2022. The IPPAS team reviewed Finland’s implementation of the A/CPPNM, which they ratified in 2011.206 The team said they “observed that Finland has further strengthened its nuclear security capabilities, confirming the country’s well-established nuclear security regime.”207 In recent years, an increasing number of countries have voluntarily undergone such objective assessments and have also accepted follow-up missions to review the nuclear security of their countries and facilities.

This trend is clear among the countries surveyed in this study. In 2022, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. announced plans to host missions in the near future. Switzerland announced that it plans to host a follow-up mission in 2023, while the U.K. is considering hosting an IPPAS mission.208 In addition, the U.S. announced at the A/CPPNM Review Conference that, it is requesting an IPPAS mission to the IAEA, which will be their second.209 Also, on October 26, Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) approved to make a formal request to the IAEA to host an IPPAS mission around mid-2024.210 While such active acceptance of IPPAS missions is evident in some of the western countries covered by this study, there are a number of countries that have never utilized this review service, indicating a dichotomy. (See Table 3-9)

A recent trend regarding IPPAS missions is to make part of the IPPAS mission report open to the public while protecting sensitive information, from the perspective of transparency and accountability about the status of nuclear security implementation in each country. In response to this trend, Japan, following the Netherlands,211 Sweden,212 Australia213 and Canada,214 released part of the reports of its IPPAS and follow-up mission reports in December 2019.215 (See Table 3-6)

The IAEA has a database of good practices observed in IPPAS missions, called the IPPAS Good Practices database. To date it has registered 532 cases of good practices.216 In this regard, the Netherlands said in the national report submitted to the 10th NPT RevCon that “it has invited IAEA to conduct International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions. Recommendations of these missions have been implemented and good practices have been shared.”217 

In addition to the IPPAS, the IAEA also provides other services to support nuclear security system development and reinforcement, including the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ)218 and missions to develop Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP),219 which are carried out on request. According to the IAEA Nuclear Security Report 2022, INSSP missions took place in six countries (Guinea, Armenia, Benin, Hungary, Sudan and the Philippines) from January 2022 to June 2022.220

The A/CPPNM Review Conference Outcome Document encouraged on a voluntary basis the use of those mission services which may help to strengthen a State Party’s implementation of the A/CPPNM.221 A similar paragraph was also included in the draft final document of the 10th NPT RevCon.222

 

D) Technology development – nuclear forensics

Nuclear forensics is an important technology for nuclear security as it can identify perpetrators of illicit trafficking and malicious acts involving nuclear and radiological materials and be used in prosecuting them. There have been efforts and support for further advancement of this technology and national system and international networking systems have been established. According to the IAEA, interest in capacity building in the radiological crime scene management and nuclear forensics science field continues to increase.223 Japan, in cooperation with Western countries, is developing nuclear forensics technology to analyze seized and collected nuclear materials and determine their origin.224 Cooperation on nuclear forensics is also taking place under Japan-U.S. Nuclear Security Working Group (NSWG). “JAEA and the U.S. Department of Energy have improved nuclear forensics capabilities through four technical cooperation projects on uranium dating, nuclear fuel characterization, and the launch of a pilot version of a national nuclear forensics library at JAEA.” Furthermore, “U.S. and Japanese nuclear forensics experts continue to collaborate on projects such as fresh uranium dating methods and electron microscope image analysis.”225

International activities in this area include “The Hybrid Technical Meeting on Nuclear Forensics: From National Foundations to Global Impact,” held by the IAEA in April to discuss applying nuclear forensics to preventing and responding to events involving nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control.226 The meeting was attended by 190 participants from 64 IAEA member states, the European Commission, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and other international organizations.227 In terms of the countries surveyed, participants from Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and the U.S. made keynote speeches at the Meeting.228
One important multilateral cooperation effort on nuclear forensics technology is the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) (formerly known as the International Technical Working Group on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials), which was established in 1995. To date, more than 50 countries have participated in ITWG annual meetings.229 From among the countries surveyed, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, the U.K. and the U.S. have participated.
One of the ITWG’s main activities is to advance best practices in nuclear forensics orgazanizing Cooperative Material Comparison Exercises (CMXs). Seven CMXs have been held as of 2022. Each CMX is completed with a review of the data obtained from it. The data review meeting for the 7th CMX was held in Prague in October 2022.230 Preparations are underway for the 8th CMX. Note that, although the CMX began with only six participating analytical laboratories initially, more than 20 laboratories have participated in the CMX in recent years.231 The ITWG has also been conducting the Galaxy Serpent Exercise, a virtual tabletop exercise on nuclear forensics library development, and four such exercises have been conducted so far.

Another important multilateral nuclear forensics cooperation framework is the Nuclear Forensics Working Group (NFWG, chaired by Canada), established  within the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which is discussed below. The NFWG also runs a number of workshops and desk exercises to enhance nuclear forensics capabilities through multilateral cooperation, and cooperates closely with the ITWG. However, the GICNT has temporarily suspended all official meetings and working group activities in 2022. (See (3) G) of this Chapter)

The U.S. stated in its national report submitted to the 10th NPT RevCon that they “[have] provided partner countries with training and capacity building support to promote nuclear forensics expertise necessary to prosecute crimes related to the trafficking of radioactive/nuclear material. The U.S. has cooperated extensively with the IAEA on training and development of implementing guides on nuclear forensics methodologies.”232

 

E) Capacity building and support activities

There is still a pressing need for human resource development and capacity building in the nuclear security field, and according to the IAEA’s 2022 Nuclear Security Review, more than 10,000 participants from 138 countries attended 110 IAEA training activities in 2021.233 While about half the training activities took place via webinars due to constraints caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, but there were more than twice as many activities than in 2020, indicating that the IAEA is making significant efforts to provide training activities even during the period.234 In addition, the number of participants in activities to train leaders has tripled, indicating that more countries have established their own training systems and are interested in developing independent and sustainable human resources. Pakistan is one such country offering training widely, saying in its national statement at the 66th IAEA General Conference that “COEs are functional in training personnel required in nuclear security, and these training facilities are open and available to other regions and internationally.”235 At the same Conference, Japan, which referred to human resource development as in previous years, stated that it “will continue to contribute to strengthening international nuclear security, in cooperation with the IAEA, through activities for regional human resource development, including more effective trainings by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN), based on the experiences under the COVID-19 pandemic.”236

IAEA activities in this field in 2022 include, organizing the hybrid Leadership Academy for Nuclear Security in Vienna in May 2022 to help build leadership skills among middle and senior managers working in the field of nuclear security.237

 

International Network for Training and Support

The International Network of NSSCs, established by the IAEA in 2012, plays an important role as a keystone for collaboration and networking between national NSSCs.238 Seventy-five institutions from 66 countries participate in the NSSC network: by region, 25 institutions are in the Asia-Pacific, 22 in Europe, 20 in Africa, 6 in Latin American, and 2 in North America. Participating countries surveyed include Brazil, Canada, China, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the U.S. The annual meeting was held in Vienna on July 18-22, 2022, with 59 participants from 38 countries.239

The U.S. stated in its national report to the 10th NPT RevCon that “working with international partners, jointly designed, completed, or upgraded several training centers to expand nuclear security training capabilities in partner countries, including the International Network for NSSC.”240

 

International Networking in Education

The IAEA has established the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) to assist its member institutions and States in establishing and enhancing on nuclear security educational programmes. INSEN has 198 participating educational institutions from 66 countries.241 Participating countries surveyed include Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S.242 Relevant activities in 2022 include the annual INSEN meeting in Vienna in July and the International Nuclear Security School held by the IAEA in cooperation with Italy in April.243

 

F) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund

The IAEA has produced a Nuclear Security Plan every four years, and in 2022 activities took place in line with the Sixth Plan covering the 2022-2025 period, which was adopted in September 2021.244

To implement the Nuclear Security Plan, the IAEA established the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) for the prevention, detection and response to nuclear terrorism in 2002 since which time its Member States have been asked to contribute funds on a voluntary basis.

Information on states’ contributions to the NSF was previously included in IAEA annual reports as well as annual Nuclear Security reports, but is no longer included as of 2022. Instead, the IAEA published its first Nuclear Security Review report in 2022.245 This report includes the global trends and the IAEA’s activities in 2021. The report complements the traditional annual Nuclear Security Report.246 According to the 2022 Nuclear Security Review, 15 countries contributed to the NSF in 2021, including the countries surveyed: China, Finland, France, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.247 According to the IAEA, total contributions pledged to the NSF in 2021 amounted to 34 million euros, roughly the same level as in 2018 and 2019 (33 million and 38 million euros, respectively), but a decrease compared to 2020 (45 million euros).248
The EU is a major contributor to the NSF and announced that it has contributed 60 million euros between 2009 and 2023.249 Germany said at the 2022 IAEA General Conference it is contributing to the NSF and is preparing a considerable contribution to the Seibersdorf training center.250 Canada also announced that it has made over $78 million in in extra-budgetary contributions to the IAEA’s NSF since 2012.251 Canada also said about the IAEA’s budget for nuclear security. They said it is increasingly dependent on voluntary contributions rather than on its regular budget, which implies unpredictability for the IAEA and undermines its ability to respond adequately to Member States’ needs. It said “we must avoid over-reliance on extra-budgetary funding” and called on States to ensure that the IAEA has reliable and sufficient technical, financial and human resources to carry out its mandate.” 252 In turn, the U.K. said it will “continue to urge further member States to make financial contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund, and for a greater share of the IAEA regular budget to be allocated to support its nuclear security activities.253

 

G) Participation in international efforts

Today, there is a multilayered structure of international efforts to raise the level of nuclear security. Major nuclear security efforts by the international community include support for implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)254 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and multilateral forums such as the ICONS hosted by the IAEA and the Nuclear Security Summit Process, which concluded in 2016. In addition to above, there are efforts by the G7 and the GICNT as a framework for multilateral cooperation on nuclear security.
Security Council Resolution 1540 stated that States should take effective measures to establish and strengthen national control systems to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and calls for the development and maintenance of appropriate and effective measures of physical protection to that end.255 It also calls for national reports to be submitted the UN on the obligations set out within this resolution. Submitting these reports will increase transparency regarding the nuclear security measures taken by states and contribute to international assurance about implementing such measures. See Table 3-7 for the status of submission of reports by the countries surveyed.
The Nuclear Security Summit was initiated in 2010 at the initiative of U.S. President Barack Obama and has been held four times up to 2016. The 2016 Summit established a mechanism for continued international efforts to raise the level of nuclear security after the process ends. Central to this effort is the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG), established through the Joint Statement on Sustained Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security.256 At the time of its establishment, only some 40 countries participated in the NSCG. However, Canada subsequently became the lead country and issued an IAEA Information Document INFCIRC/899, which clearly states the NSCG’s Statement of Principles and invites non-participating countries to join.257 As of November 2022, 48 countries including Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as four regional and international organizations (the EU, IAEA, INTERPOL, and the UN) are participating as observers.258

The Nuclear Security Summit Process saw several “Basket Initiatives” launched to promote initiatives on specific nuclear security themes through a joint statement by the like-minded countries.259 These include Transportation Security (INFCIRC/909) led by Japan and Insider Threat Mitigation (INFCIRC/908) led by the U.S.260 and Nuclear Forensics (INFCIRC/917) led by Australia. In 2022, activities related to these could not be identified from publicly available information.

The G7’s nuclear security framework includes the Non-Proliferation Director-Generals’ Meeting, the Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) and the G7 Global Partnership against Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (G7GP, formerly the G8 Global Partnership). In 2022, the G7 issued several statements at Foreign Minister and Non-Proliferation Director-General levels at critical points regarding the critical situation of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities.261 These statements reiterated their condemnation of Russia and their immediate support for the IAEA and the IAEA Director General’s efforts and proposals to deal with this issue.262

The NSSG263meets three times every year and produces a report on its activities. In June 2022, Germany, the current G7 Chair, released a report on the NSSG’s activities.264 This report states that the NSSG exchanged information on possible support for nuclear safety and security at the Chernobyl site and that it was decided that the NSSC will continue to work together to improve global nuclear security, including universalizing and promoting implementation of safety and security-related Conventions.265
The GICNT was jointly announced by Russia and the U.S. at the 2006 G8 Saint Petersburg Summit to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism through international efforts.266 This is a voluntary international partnership of 89 countries and six international organizations including the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the UN Office on Counterterrorism (UNOCT) that are committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.267 According to the GICNT website, it has conducted over 100 multilateral activities and eleven senior-level Plenary Meetings to date.268 It has been active in three main working groups: “Response and Mitigation,” “Nuclear Forensics” and “Nuclear Detection.” In addition to focusing on conducting training and workshops among like-minded states, the working groups have also been active in developing practical nuclear security guidelines.269 However, as of 2022 its website states that “the GICNT is pausing all official meetings of the GICNT and its working groups until further notice.” Presumably this is in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, as Russia is one of the co-Chairs of the GICNT.

Concerning multilateral initiatives on nuclear security, western countries and NAM countries have different views. Western countries attach great importance to international cooperation in these nuclear security areas. For example, the working document submitted by the G10 to the 10th NPT RevCon referred to “the need to strengthen efforts to improve existing cooperative mechanisms.”270 On the other hand, NAM countries set out their basic position that “measures and initiatives aimed at enhancing nuclear safety and security should not be used as a pretext or reason to violate, deny, constrain, or limit the inalienable rights and interests of developing countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”271
The 10th NPT RevCon draft final document included the following language:272

The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue, in coordination with its Member States, to play a constructive and coordinating role in other nuclear security-related initiatives, within their respective mandates and memberships, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and to work jointly, as appropriate, with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions. (para. 51)

 

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168 Regarding separated plutonium, it was mentioned for the first time in the series of Nuclear Security Summits the need to maintain them at the minimum level in the communique of the 2014 Hague Summit. The Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2020 called upon “all Member States possessing HEU and separated plutonium in any application, … to make sure they are appropriately secured and accounted for, by and in the relevant State,” and encouraged “Member States, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize HEU in civilian stocks, when technically and economically feasible.”
169 Laura Varella and Audrey Kelly, “Report on Main Committee III,” NPT News in Review, Vol. 17, No .4 (August 10, 2022), p. 20.
170 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.14, p. 4; Ibid.
171 NPT/CONF.2020/CRP.1/Rev.2, August 25, 2022, p. 14.

172 “U.S. Removes Over 30 Kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium from Japan,” NNSA, May 23, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/us-removes-over-30-kilograms-highly-enriched-uranium-japan.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 “President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Announce the Nonproliferation Triumph, Which Was the Result of Years of Cooperation,” NNSA, May 23, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/us-removes-over-30-kilograms-highly-enriched-uranium-japan.
176 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the United States and Japan: Strengthening the Free and Open International Order,” May 23, 2022, p. 7, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/files/100347254.pdf.
177 “Statement by Japan,” at the IAEA General Conference, September 2022; “Second Multi-Year HEU Repatriation Campaign Fulfills Countries’ Previous Commitment and Demonstrates Their Dedication to Nuclear Nonproliferation,” NNSA, August 9, 2022.
178 “Statement by Japan,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022.

179 “Top NNSA Leaders Visit Kazakhstan, Discuss Continued Security, Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation,” NNSA, October 14, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/top-nnsa-leaders-visit-kazakhstan-discuss-continued-security-nuclear-nonproliferation.
180 “Statement by Kazakhstan,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022.
181 “Statement by Norway,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022; Laura Varella and Audrey Kelly, “Report on Main Committee III,” NPT News in Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 (August 10, 2022), p. 20.
182 Laura Varella and Audrey Kelly, “Report on Main Committee III,” NPT News in Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 (August 10, 2022), p. 20.
183 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.14, p. 4.
184 “Joint Statement on Minimising and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications,” INFCIRC/912, February 16, 2020; “Australia’s 2019 INFCIRC/912 HEU Report,” IPFM Blog, January 23, 2020, http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2020/01/australias_2019_infcirc91.html.
185 INFCIRC/912, April 20, 2017. Regarding reporting on HEU inventory quantities, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom voluntarily added to their reporting in their reporting of civilian separated plutonium inventory quantities under the International Plutonium Management Guidelines (INFCIRC/549).

186 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.14, p. 4.
187 INFCIRC/912/Add.4, March 5, 2020 (Australia); INFCIRC/912/Add.3, August 19, 2019 (Norway).
188 “The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué,” March 25, 2014, https://www.consilium.europa. eu/media/23823/141885.pdf.
189 “Stray Plutonium: Why 22 Tons of Japan’s Plutonium is in the UK,” Mainichi Shimbun, October 6, 2022, p. 11.
190 “Plutonium Transfer to France for Fugen Fuel, JAEA Announces,” Nikkei Shimbun, June 24, 2022, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA24C4V0U2A620C2000000/.

191 “Statement by the U.S. at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”

192 IAEA, “ITDB: Incident and Trafficking Database.”
193 IAEA, ITDB 2022 Fact Sheet, https://www.iaea.org/sites/ default/files/22/01/ itdb-factsheet.pdf.
194 IAEA, Annual Report 2021, GC (66)/4, 2022, p. 106.
195 Nuclear Security Review 2022, August 2022, p. 23.
196 Ibid.
197 IAEA, ITDB 2022 Fact Sheet.
198 Nuclear Security Report 2022, p. 14.

199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 NPT/CONF/2020/CRP.1/Rev.2, p. 7.
202 An international team of Member States and IAEA experts dispatched by the IAEA reviews the nuclear security situation as implemented by mission recipient countries. The review examines everything from the regulatory framework to transportation, information, and computer security arrangements, and compares them to the international guidelines or good practices described in the 2005 A/CPPNM and the IAEA Nuclear Security Series Document.
203 IAEA, “25 Years of Strengthening Nuclear Security with Physical Protection Peer Advice,” IAEA News, December 23, 2022, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/25-years-of-strengthening-nuclear-security-with-physical-protection-peer-advice; Nuclear Security Review 2022, p. 13.
204 IAEA, “Peer Review and Advisory Services Calendar,”; “IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Finland,” IAEA Press Release, June 17, 2022, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/ iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-finland.
205 Nuclear Security Review 2022, p. 3.
206 “IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Finland.”
207 Ibid.

208 “Statement by the U.S. at the A/CPPNM Review Conference,”; Office for Nuclear Regulation, “Corporate Report Office for Nuclear Regulation Corporate Plan 2022 to 2023,” June 21, 2022, https:// www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-corporate-plan-2022-to-2023/offi ce-for-nuclear-regulation-corporate-plan-2022-to-2023.
209 “Statement by the U.S. at the A/CPPNM Review Conference.”
210 NRA, “Acceptance of the International Nuclear Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),” December 21, 2022, https://www.nra.go.jp/data/ 000414656.pdf.
211 “Netherlands Draft Follow-up Mission Report,” February 2012, https://www.autoriteitnvs.nl/ binaries/anvs/documenten/rapporten/2014/12/24/ippas/international-physical-protection-advisery-service-ippas-v2.pdf.
212 “Sweden Draft Follow-up Mission Report,” October 2016, https://www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten. se/contentassets/27a6dd9e94e54dc189cecfa7c7f2f910/draft-follow-up-mission-report-sweden.pdf.
213 “Australia IPPAS Follow-up Mission Report,” November 2017, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/defau lt/files/2017-ippas-follow-up-mission-report.pdf.
214 “Canada IPPAS Mission Report,” October 2015, “http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/pdfs/IPPAS/ Canadas-IPPAS-Mission-Report-2015-eng.pdf.
215 Nuclear Regulation Authority, “Release of the IAEA IPPAS Mission Report and its Follow-up Mission Report,” December 24, 2019. After the follow-up mission, the IAEA stated, “Since the previous mission, there has been a marked improvement in Japan’s nuclear security posture. The regime is robust, well established, and in accordance with the basic principles of the Revised Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.” “IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Japan,” December 7, 2018, IAEA Press Release, https://www.iaea.org/ newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-japan.
216 Nuclear Security Review 2022, p. 2.

217 “Report Submitted by the Netherlands,” NPT/CONF.2020/5, November 24, 2021.
218 INSServ is a service in which an IAEA team of international experts reviews the overall requirements of the requesting country’s nuclear security posture and provides advice on areas that need improvement.
219 The INSSP is an assistance plan designed to help countries requesting assistance systematically and comprehensively improve their nuclear security posture, while at the same time helping the IAEA, relevant countries, and donors to avoid duplication of assistance, optimize resources from technical and financial perspectives, and ensure the sustainability of nuclear security The plan is designed to avoid duplication of support, optimize resources from a technical and financial perspective, and ensure the sustainability of nuclear security-related activities in the country.
220 Nuclear Security Report 2022, p. 12.
221 ACPPNM/RC/2022/4, April 2022, p. 5.
222 NPT/CONF.2020/CRP/Rev.2, August 22, 2022, p. 7.
223 Nuclear Security Review 2022, p. 25.
224 JAEC, White Paper on Nuclear Energy 2021, 2022; for more information on JAEA’s efforts, see ISCN/JAEA, “Results of the Third Medium- to Long-Term Plan Period and Looking Ahead,” March 2, 2022, https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/activity/2022-03-02/ 2022-03-02-03.pdf.

225 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-U.S. Nuclear Security Working Group (NSWG),” November 9, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/dns/n_s_ne/page4_002303.html.
226 For more information on this meeting, see “Recent IAEA Activities on Strengthening Nuclear Forensics Capabilities,” ISCN Newsletter, No. 0307, July 2022, pp. 20-24.
227 ITWG, Nuclear Forensics Update, No. 23, June 2022, p. 4.
228 Ibid, p. 5.
229 ITWG, Nuclear Forensics Update, No. 24, September 2022, p. 2.
230 Ibid.
231 The countries surveyed in CMX-6 were Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

232 “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT: Report Submitted by the United States of America,” December 21, 2021, NPT/CONF.2020/47, p. 25.
233 Nuclear Security Review 2022, p. 16.
234 Ibid.
235 “Statement by Pakistan,” at the IAEA General Conference, September 2022; “Pakistan’s National Centre of Excellence Contributes to Sustaining Nuclear Security,” January 18, 2022, https://www.iaea. org/newscenter/news/pakistans-national-centre-of-excellence-contributes-to-sustaining-nuclear-security.
236 “Statement by Japan,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 26, 2022.

237 Nuclear Security Report 2022, p. 9.
238 For basic information on the NSSC network, see: IAEA, “Understanding Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSCs) in FIVE QUESTIONS,” https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/08/nssc-five-questions.pdf.
239 “Annual Meeting of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), Chair’s Report,” July 2022, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/chairs_report_annual_meeting_2022.pdf.
240 “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT: Report Submitted by the United States of America,” December 21, 2021, NPT/CONF.2020/47, p. 25.
241 “Annual Meeting of the INSEN, Chair’s Report.”
242 “Annual Meeting of the INSEN, Chair’s Report,” July 2019; “Working Group Meeting of the INSEN, Chairman’s Report,” February 2015.
243 Nuclear Security Report 2022, p. 11.
244 The plan identifies the IAEA’s priorities for implementation as strengthening activities in the areas of physical protection, prevention, detection and response, insider threat mitigation, nuclear security culture, and the protection of sensitive information and computer-based systems, and states that the Agency will provide assistance upon request from Member States, Nuclear Security Plan 2022-2025: Report by the Director General, GC(65)/24, September 15, 2021, p. 4

245 Nuclear Security Review 2022, p. 8.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid, p. 8.
248 Ibid.
249 “EU Contributions to Nuclear Safety and Security,” July 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/ default/files/documents/EEAS-JRC_NUCLEARSECURITY%26Safety_28Juy.pdf.
250 “Statement by Germany,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022.
251 “Statement by Canada,” at the 66th IAEA General Conference, September 2022.
252 Ibid.
253 “National Report of the UK pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT,” NPT/CONF.2020/33, November 5, 2021, p. 15.

254 “Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004),” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016.
255 UN Security Council, “Resolution 1540 (2004),” S/RES/1540 (2004), April 28, 2004.
256 The purpose of the NSCG is to facilitate sustained engagement and implementation of nuclear security by states and to build a strengthened, sustainable, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.
257 “Statement of Principles Nuclear Security Contact Group.”
258 “Members,” Nuclear Security Contact Group, http://www.nscontactgroup.org/members.php.

259 “What Are INFCIRCs?” Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.ntiindex.org/story/what-are-nuclear-security-infcircs/.
260 The International Working Group (IWG) was established in 2020 as an effort to advance “Insider Threat Mitigation (INFCIRC/908),” which is intended to provide a forum for sharing best practices and resources. The United States and Belgium co-chair the IWG while leading the Steering Committee, which includes Canada, Chile, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, and Nigeria.
261 For example, “Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group on Nuclear Safety and Security at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,” August 11, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/1003 86837.pdf; “G7 Statement on Ukraine,” October 11, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100386840.pdf; “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement,” November 4, 2022, https://www.g7germany.de/resource/blob/ 974430/2059136/cfc18fbb7c0b7f55b1ce0961cec6ffcf/2022-07-01-report-of-the-g7-nuclear-safety- and-security-group-nssg–data.pdf?download=1.
262 “G7 Statement on Ukraine,” October 11, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100386840.pdf; “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement,” November 4, 2022, https://www.g7germany.de/resource/blob/974430/ 2059136/cfc18fbb7c0b7f55b1ce0961cec6ffcf/2022-07-01-report-of-the-g7-nuclear-safety-and-security-group-nssg–data.pdf?download=1.
263 NSSG is responsible for providing technically informed policy advice to G7 leaders on nuclear safety and security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The group was established at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit.
264 “Report of the G7 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) during the German Presidency in 2022,” June 2022, https://www.g7germany.de/resource/blob/974430/2059136/cfc18fbb7c0b7f55b1ce0961cec 6ffcf/2022-07-01-report-of-the-g7-nuclear-safety-and-security-group-nssg–data.pdf?download=1.
265 Ibid.
266 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT),” June 2, 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/gi.html.

267 “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Partner Nations List.”
268 See the GICNT website at https://www.gicnt.org/.
269 Ibid.
270 “Working Paper Submitted by G10,” NPT/CONF.2020/WP.3/Rev.1, June 20, 2022, p. 9.
271 “Working Paper Submitted by NAM,” NPT/CONF.2020/WP.25, November 24, 2022, p. 5.
272 NPT/CONF/2020/CRP.1/Rev.2, p. 8.