In this “Evaluation” part, the performances of the 36 countries surveyed in this project are evaluated numerically in three areas—that is, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security—based upon study and analysis compiled in the “Report” section.

Evaluations of the four groups—nuclear-weapon states (NWS), non-parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), and one particular state (North Korea)—are made separately because of their different characteristics. Since different sets of criteria are applied to different groups of countries, full points differ according to the group each country belongs to. Then, as a measure to visualize a comparison of 36 countries’ relative performances, each country’s performance in each area is shown on a chart in percentage terms.
The Following lists the point values and scale of measurement of each evaluation criteria.

 

【Nuclear Disarmament】

 

Evaluation criteria	Maximum points	Scale of measurement
1. Status of Nuclear Forces (estimates)	-20
Status of nuclear forces (estimates)	(-20)	-5 (〜50); -6 (51〜100); -8 (101〜200); -10 (201〜400); -12 (401〜1,000); -14 (1,001〜2,000); -16 (2,001〜4,000); -17 (4,001〜6,000); -19 (6,001〜8,000); -20 (8,001〜)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
2. Commitment to Achieving a World without Nuclear Weapons	9
A) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on nuclear disarmament proposals by Japan, NAC and NAM	(6)	On each resolution: 0 (against); 1 (abstention); 2 (in favor)
B) Announcement of significant policies and important activities	(3)	Add 1 point for each policy, proposal and other initiatives having a major impact on global momentum toward a world without nuclear weapons (maximum 3 points)
C) Actions that run counter to nuclear disarmament	(-3)	Deduct 1~3 points for actions that run counter to nuclear disarmament, excluding actions evaluated under other items
3. Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons	5
A) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions	(2)	On each resolution: 0 (against); 0.5（abstention); 1 (in favor)
B) Participation in joint statements and international conferences	(1)	Add 0.5 point on each participation in joint statements and international conferences on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons
C) Victim assistance and environmental remediation	(2)	Add 1 point on each Victim assistance and environmental remediation
4. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)	10
A) Signing and ratifying the TPNW	(7)	0 (not signing); 3 (not ratifying); 7 (ratifying) As for non-signing states, add 1 point for participating in meetings as observers
B) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on TPNW	(1)	0 (against); 0.5 (abstention); 1 (in favor); 1 (in favor)
C) Voting behavior on for legally binding UNGA resolutions on prohibition of nuclear weapons	(2)	On each resolution: 0 (against); 0.5 (abstention);
5. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons	22
A) Reduction of nuclear weapons	(15)	・Add 1～10 points in accordance with the decuple rate of reduction from the previous fiscal year for a country having declared the number of nuclear weapons ・For a country having not declared it, add some points using the following formula: (the previous target – the latest target)÷the estimated number of nuclear weapons×10 ・Add 1 (engaging in nuclear weapons reduction over the past 5 years); add 1 (engaging in nuclear weapons reduction under legally-binding frameworks such as New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty); add 1 (announcing further reduction plan and implementing it in 2021) ・Give a full score (15 points) in case of the total abolition of nuclear weapons ・-1 (increase of the number of possessed nuclear weapons in the past five years without any reductions)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
B) Concrete plans for further reduction of nuclear weapons	(3)	0 (no announcement on a plan of nuclear weapons reduction); 1 (declaring a rough plan of nuclear weapons reduction); 2 (declaring a plan on the size of nuclear weapons reduction); 3 (declaring a concrete and detailed plan of reduction)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
C) Trends on strengthening/modernizing nuclear weapons capabilities	(4)	0 (modernizing/reinforcing nuclear forces in a backward move toward nuclear weapons reduction); 2～3 (modernizing/reinforcing nuclear forces which may not lead to increasing the number of nuclear weapons); 4 (not engaging in nuclear modernization/reinforcement)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
6. Diminishing the Roles and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategies and Policies	12
A) Current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons	(-8)	Deduct 6 points for reliance on nuclear weapons for their national security, and deduct 2 points for actions such as threats with nuclear weapons
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
B) Commitment to no first use, “sole purpose,” and related doctrines	(3)	0 (not adopting either policy); 2 (adopting a similar policy or expressing its will to adopt either policy in the future); 3 (already adopting either policy) Deduct 2 points for actions that violate the commitment and 1 point for words and deeds that raise doubts about the commitment
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
C) Negative security assurances	(2)	0 (not declaring); 1 (declaring with reservations); 2 (declaring without reservations) Deduct 2 points for actions that violate the commitment and 1 point for words and deeds that raise doubts about the commitment
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
D) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on legally binding security assurances for NNWS	(1)	0 (against); 0.5 (abstention); 1 (in favor)
E) Signing and ratifying the protocols of the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones	(3)	Add 0.5 point for the ratification of one protocol; a country ratifying all protocols marks 3 points
		(not applicable to countries except NWS)
F) Relying on extended nuclear deterrence	(-5)	(not applicable to the NWS and Non-NPT Parties)
		(applied solely to the NNWS): -5 (a country relying on the nuclear umbrella and participating in nuclear sharing); -3 (a country relying on the nuclear umbrella); 0 (a country not relying on the nuclear umbrella)
G) Nuclear risk reduction	(3)	Nuclear Weapon States and Non-NPT Parties; Add 1~2 points for implementing concrete measures for nuclear risk reduction, add another 1 point for proposals and initiatives.
		Non-Nuclear Weapon States; 1 point for proposals and initiatives.
H) Actions that increases nuclear risk	(-3)	Deduct 3 points for actions that increases nuclear risk
7. De-alerting or Measures for Maximizing Decision Time to Authorize the Use of Nuclear Weapons	4
De-alerting or measures for maximizing decision time to authorize the use of nuclear weapons	(4)	0～1 (maintaining a high alert level); 2 (maintaining a certain alert level); 3 (de-alerting during peacetime); add 1 point for implementing measures for increasing the credibility of (lowered) alert status
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
8. CTBT	12
A) Signing and ratifying the CTBT	(4)	0 (not signing); 2 (not ratifying); 4 (ratifying)
B) Moratoria on nuclear test explosions pending CTBT’s entry into force	(3)	0 (not declaring); 2 (declaring); 3 (declaring and closing nuclear test sites)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
C) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on CTBT	(1)	0 (against); 0.5 (abstention); 1 (in favor)
D) Cooperation with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission	(2)	0 (no cooperation or no information); 1～2 (paying contributions, actively participating in meetings, and actively engaging in outreach activities for the treaty’s entry into force)
E) Contribution to the development of the CTBT verification systems	(2)	Add 1 point for establishing and operating the IMS; add another 1 point for participating in the discussions on enhancing the CTBT verification capabilities
F) Nuclear testing	(-3)	-3 (conducting nuclear test explosions in the past 5 years);-1 (conducting nuclear tests without explosions or tests with unclear status); 0 (not conducting any nuclear tests)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
9. FMCT	10
A) Commitment, efforts, and proposals toward immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT	(4)	Add 1 (expressing a commitment); add 1～2 (actively engaging in the promotion of early commencement); add 1～2 (making concrete proposals on the start of negotiations)
B) Voting behavior on UNGA resolutions on FMCT	(1)	0 (against); 0.5 (abstention); 1 (in favor)
C) Moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons	(3)	0 (not declaring); 1 (not declaring but not producing fissile material for nuclear weapons); 2 (declaring); 3 (declaring and taking measures for the cessation of production as declared)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
D) Contribution to the development of verification measures	(2)	0 (no contribution or no information); 1 (proposing research on verification measures); 2 (engaging in R&D for verification measures)
10. Transparency in Nuclear Forces, Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Strategy/Doctrine	6
Transparency in nuclear forces, fissile material for nuclear weapons, and nuclear strategy/doctrine	(6)	Add 1～2 (disclosing the nuclear strategy/doctrine); add 1～2 (disclosing the status of nuclear forces); add 1～2 (disclosing the status of fissile material usable for nuclear weapons)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
11. Nuclear Disarmament Verifications	7
A) Acceptance and implementation of nuclear disarmament verification	(3)	0 (not accepting or implementing); 2 (limited acceptance and implementation); 3 (accepting and implementing verification with comprehensiveness and completeness); deduct 1～2 points in case of non-compliance or problems in implementation
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
B) Engagement in research and development for verification measures of nuclear disarmament	(1)	0 (not engaging or no information); 1 (engaging in R&D)
C) The IAEA inspections to fissile material declared as no longer required for military purposes	(3)	0 (not implementing); 1(limited implementation); 3 (implementing); add 1 point if a country engages in efforts for implementing or strengthening implementation, except in the case of already implementing
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
12. Irreversibility	7
A) Implementing or planning dismantlement of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles	(3)	0 (not implementing or no information); 1 (perhaps implementing but not clear); 2～3 (implementing)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
B)Decommissioning/conversion of nuclear weapons-related facilities	(2)	0 (not implementing or no information); 1 (implementing in a limited way); 2 (implementing extensively)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
C) Measures for fissile material declared excess for military purposes, such as disposition or conversion to peaceful purposes	(2)	0 (not implementing or no information); 1 (implementing in a limited way); 2 (implementing extensively)
		(not applicable to the NNWS)
13. Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and Cooperation with Civil Society	4
Disarmament and non-proliferation education and cooperation with civil society	(4)	Add 1 (reference in the NPT Review Process and other fora, participation in joint statements; reference to gender issues, participation in joint statements; implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation education; cooperation with civil society); maximum 4 points
14. Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies	1
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies	(1)	0 (not attending)；0.5 (not attending in 2021 but has attended at least once during the past 3 years)； 1 (attending any one of the ceremonies)

【Nuclear Non-Proliferation】

 

Evaluation criteria	Maximum points	Scale of measurement
1. Acceptance and Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Obligations	20
A) Accession to the NPT	(10)	0 (not signing or declaring withdrawal); 3 (not ratifying); 10 (in force); 0 point for declaring withdrawal after accession
B) Compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT and the UNSCRs on non-proliferation	(7)	0 (not complying with Articles I and II of the NPT); 3～4 (having not yet violated Articles I and II of the NPT but displaying behaviors that raise concerns about proliferation, or not complying with the UNSCRs adopted for relevant nuclear issues); 5 (taking concrete measures for solving the non-compliance issue); 7 (complying)
		As for the non-NPT states (maximum 3 points); 2 (not complying with the UNSCRs adopted for relevant nuclear issues); 3 (other cases)
C) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones	(3)	1 (signing the NWFZ treaty); 3 (ratifying the treaty)
D) Actions that run counter to nuclear non-proliferation	(-4)	Deduct 1~4 points for actions that run counter to nuclear non-proliferation, although they do not violate NPT
2. IAEA Safeguards Applied to the NPT NNWS	18
A) Signing and ratifying a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement	(4)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 4 (in force)
B) Signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol	(5)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 3 (provisional application); 5 (in force)
C) Implementation of the integrated safeguards	(4)	0 (not implementing); 2 (broader conclusion) 4 (implementing)
D) Compliance with IAEA Safeguards Agreement	(5)	0 (not resolving the non-compliance issue); 2 (taking concrete measures for solving the non-compliance issue); 5 (complying)
3. IAEA Safeguards Applied to NWS and Non-Parties to the NPT	7
A) Application of the IAEA safeguards (Voluntary Offer Agreement or INFCIRC/66) to their peaceful nuclear in facilities	(3)	0 (not applying); 2 (applying INFCIRC/66); 3 (applying Voluntary Offer Agreement)
B) Signing, ratifying, and implementing an Additional Protocol	(4)	0 (not signing); 1 (not ratifying); 3 (in force); add 1 point if widely applied to peaceful nuclear activities
4. Cooperation with the IAEA	4
A)Cooperation with the IAEA	(4)	Add 1 (contributing to the development of verification technologies); add 1～2 (contributing to the universalization of the Additional Protocol); add 1 (other efforts)
B) Behaviors impeding IAEA activities	(-2)	Deduct 1~2 points for impeding IAEA activities
5. Implementing Appropriate Export Controls on Nuclear-Related Items and Technologies	15
A) Establishment and implementation of the national control systems	(5)	0 (not establishing); 1 (establishing but insufficient); 2 (establishing a system to a certain degree); 3 (establishing an advanced system, including the Catch-all); add 1～2 (if continuing to implement appropriate export controls); deduct 1～2 (not adequately implementing)
B) Requiring the conclusion of an Additional Protocol for nuclear export	(2)	0 (not requiring or no information); 1 (requiring for some cases); 2 (requiring)
C) Implementation of the UNSCRs concerning North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues	(3)	0 (not implementing or no information); 2 (implementing); 3(actively implementing); deduct 1～3 (depending on the degree of violation)
D) Participation in the PSI	(2)	0 (not participating); 1 (participating); 2 (actively participating)
E) Civil nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT	(3)	0 (exploring active cooperation); 1~2 (contemplating cooperation, subject to implementing additional nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures); 3 (showing a cautious attitude or being against it)
6. Transparency in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy	4
A) Reporting on the peaceful nuclear activities	(2)	0 (not reporting or no information); 1 (reporting but insufficiently); 2 (reporting)
B) Reporting on plutonium management	(2)	0 (not reporting or no information); 1 (reporting); 2 (reporting on not only plutonium but also uranium)；add 1 (ensuring a high level of transparency in plutonium although not being obliged to report)

【Nuclear Security】

Evaluation criteria	Maximum points	Scale of measurement
1. The Amount of Weapon-Usable Nuclear Material and Possession of Relevant Facilities	-15
A) The amount of weapon-usable nuclear material	(-13)	・HEU: -5 (100t or more）; -4 (50ｔ or more); -3 (10ｔ or more); -2 (1t or more); -1 (possessing less than 1t) ・Military Separated Pu: -5 (50t or more); -4 (20ｔ or more); -3 (5ｔ or more); -2 (1t or more); -1 (possessing less than 1t) ・Non-military Separated Pu: -3 (70t or more); -2 (30t or more); -1 (possessing less than 30t)
B) Possession of facilities that could cause serious radiological effects	(-2)	・Power Reactor(s): -1 ・Reprocessing Facility(ies): -1 Not the number of facilities, but their presence or absence. Does not include facilities under construction.
2. Status of Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety-Related Conventions and Their Application to Domestic Systems	20
A) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention	(3)	0 (not signed the CPPNM); 1 (not ratified the CPPNM); 2 (Convention in force, but not ratified the A/CPPNM); 3 (both the CPPNM and the A/CPPNM in force)
B) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	(2)	0 (not signed); 1 (not ratified); 2 (in force)
C) Convention on Nuclear Safety	(2)	0 (not signed); 1 (not ratified); 2 (in force)
D) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident	(2)	0 (not signed); 1 (not ratified); 2 (in force)
E) Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management	(2)	0 (not signed); 1 (not ratified); 2 (in force)
F) Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency	(2)	0 (not signed); 1 (not ratified); 2 (in force)
G) Enactment of laws and establishment of regulations for the national implementation	(3)	0 (not established domestic laws and regulations nor the national implementation system) 1: Establishment of CPPNM Implementation Authority 1: National Legal Framework for A/CPPNM 1: Submission of information in accordance with Article 14.1
H) INFCIRC/225/Rev.5	(4)	0 (not applied or no information) ・Average score of Security & Control Measures and Protect Facilities in the NTI Nuclear Security Index 2020 are used. 4 (80 points or above); 3 (60 points or above); 2(50 points and above); 1(35 points or above); 0 (Less than 35 points)
3. Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security	17
A) Minimization of HEU in civilian use	(4)	0 (no effort or no information); 1 (limited efforts: efforts made in the past); 3 (active efforts); add 1 (commitment to further enhancement) Breakdown of 3 (active efforts): 2: Reduction in 2022 or complete removal in the past; 1: Ongoing efforts (including technology development efforts)
B) Acceptance of international nuclear security review missions	(4)	0 (none or no information) 2: Accepted in 2022 (1: Announcement of future mission) 1: Acceptance of review mission within the last 5 years or accepted more than two missions in the past 1: Making part of mission report available to the public
C) Technology development―nuclear forensics	(2)	0 (no effort or no information); 1 (some efforts: Participation in ITWG, CMX, INFCIRC/917, etc.); 2 (active efforts: Implementation or announcement of major activities in 2022)
D) Capacity building and support activities	(2)	0 (not implemented or no information); 1 (implementing: Establishment of COE or relevant organizations, participation in training courses, workshops, etc., regional and international support activities); 2 (actively implementing: new major activities in 2022)
E) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund	(2)	0 (no contribution or information); 1 (made contributions: contributions made in 2022); 2 (made active contributions: continuous contributions (*points added if contributions have been made continuously over the years even if contributions cannot be confirmed in 2022))
F) Participation in international efforts	(3)	0 (no participation); 1 (participated in two or more frameworks); 2 (participated in four or more frameworks); add 1 point if contributing actively
4. Responding to Nuclear Security Threats Posed by States	-2
A) Commitment to international norms prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities for peaceful uses, and strengthening of efforts	(1)	0 (none, no information); 1 (statement of commitment, proposal, etc.)
B) Attack against Nuclear Facilities	(-3)	0 (none); -3 (attacked nuclear facilities)

As for the evaluation section, a set of objective evaluation criteria is established by which the respective country’s performance is assessed.
The Research Committee of this project recognizes the difficulties, limitations and risk of “scoring” countries’ performances. However, the Committee also considers that an indicative approach is useful to draw attention to nuclear issues, so as to prompt debates over priorities and urgency.

The different numerical values within each category (i.e., nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security) reflect each activity’s importance within that area, as determined through deliberation by the Research Committee of this project. However, the differences in the scoring arrangements within each of the three categories do not necessarily reflect a category’s relative significance in comparison with others, as it has been driven by the differing number of items surveyed. Thus, the value assigned to nuclear disarmament (maximum of 101 points) does not mean that it is more than twice as important as nuclear nonproliferation (maximum of 61 points) or nuclear security (maximum of 41 points).

Regarding “the number of nuclear weapons” (in the Nuclear Disarmament section) and “the amount of fissile material usable for nuclear weapons” (in the Nuclear Security section), the assumption is that the more nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile material a country possesses, the greater the task of reducing them and ensuring their security. However, the Research Committee recognizes that “numbers” or “amounts” are not the sole decisive factors. It is definitely true that other factors—such as implications of missile defense, chemical and biological weapons, or conventional force imbalance and a psychological attachment to a minimum overt or covert nuclear weapon capability—would affect the issues and the process of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security. However, they were not included in our criteria for evaluation because it was difficult to make objective scales of the significance of these factors. In addition, in view of the suggestions and comments made to the Hiroshima Report 2013, the Research Committee modified the criteria of the following items: current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons in national security strategies and policies; reliance on extended nuclear deterrence; and nuclear testing.

In the end, there is no way to mathematically compare the different factors contained in the different areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security. Therefore, the evaluation points should be taken as indicative of performances in general but by no means as an exact representation or precise assessment of different countries’ performances. Since the Hiroshima Report 2014, such items as “relying on extended nuclear deterrence” and “nuclear testing” have been negatively graded if applicable.

Along with the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), its signature and ratification status was newly added to the evaluation item in the Hiroshima Report 2018. In addition, since the Hiroshima Report 2019, the Research Committee has added an evaluation item addressing whether the respective countries attended the Hiroshima or the Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies, while attendance at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony alone had been evaluated until the Hiroshima Report 2018. (the maximum score in this item remains the same). Since the Hiroshima Report 2020, increase of the number of possessed nuclear weapons in the past five years without any reductions, and activities that are not covered by the existing evaluation items but contrary to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are negatively graded, if applicable. Furthermore, since the Hiroshima Report 2021, the Research Committee modified grading range as follows: grading range of negative evaluation on actions against nuclear non-proliferation has been expanded; grading range on the IAEA “Recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5),” has been expanded and measures against insider threat and cyber threat have been positively evaluated; grading range on enactment of laws and establishment of regulations for national implementation has been expanded. In addition, not only efforts made in 2021 but also previous efforts have been evaluated.

For the NWS, radar charts were produced to illustrate where each country stands with respect to different aspects of nuclear disarmament. For this purpose, the 12 issues used for nuclear disarmament evaluation were grouped into six aspects: (1) the number of nuclear weapons, (2) reduction of nuclear weapons, (3) commitment to achieving a “world without nuclear weapons,” (4) operational policy, (5) the status of signature and ratification of, or attitudes of negotiation to relevant multilateral treaties, and (6) transparency.

 

Modification of evaluation items and criteria in the Hiroshima Report 2023

Nuclear disarmament

➢Commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons: “Actions that run counter to nuclear disarmament,” which had been one of the evaluation criteria in “Important policy announcements and implementation of activities,” was made an independent medium-term item, with no change in grade, but with the newly specified “excluding actions evaluated under other items” as the evaluation criteria.

➢Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons

• What had been evaluated as a middle item in “Commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons” was changed to an independent major item due to the increase in evaluation items based on the treatment under the TPNW and other factors.
• What had been evaluated as a middle item in “Commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons” was changed to an independent major item due to the increase in evaluation items based on the treatment under the TPNW and other factors.

➢TPNW

• Signature and ratification of the TPNW: Participating as observers was added to the evaluation criteria following the holding of the First Meeting of the States Parties.
• Voting on three UNGA resolutions: split the evaluation item into one related to TPNW and one related to the other two (overall, no change in evaluation criteria)

➢Diminishing the roles and significance of nuclear weapons in national security strategies and policies

• Current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons: In light of the outbreak of acts of aggression under nuclear threat, in addition to the conventional reliance on nuclear weapons (points were reduced uniformly for nuclear powers), points were reduced for acts such as nuclear threats in the evaluation criteria. No change was made to the total score (point reduction) for the relevant evaluation item.
• With regard to “no first use” and “negative security assurances,” in order to clarify that actions, etc. that differ from the declared policy have occurred, points are deducted for actions that violate the commitment or words and deeds that raise doubts about the commitment, respectively.
• In response to the fact that assurance of safety to non-nuclear weapons States has become an important issue, “Voting for a legally binding UNGA resolution on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons States” was newly added as an evaluation item.
• In response to the fact that nuclear risk reduction has become an important issue, “nuclear risk reduction” was newly established as an evaluation item.

➢CTBT: “Voting behaviors for a UN General Assembly resolution on the CTBT” was newly established to further clarify the situation surrounding the CTBT and the responses of countries under investigation.

➢FMCT: “Voting behaviors for the UN General Assembly Resolution on an FMCT” was newly established to clarify the situation surrounding the FMCT and the responses of the countries surveyed.

➢Disarmament and non-proliferation education, and cooperation with civil society: Based on the discussions at the 10th NPT Review Conference, the evaluation criteria were changed to “reference in the NPT Review Process and other fora, participation in joint statements; reference to gender issues, participation in joint statements; implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation education; cooperation with civil society” (total (No change to the total grade).

 

Nuclear non-proliferation

➢Compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations: “Actions contrary to nuclear non-proliferation,” which had been one of the evaluation criteria for the middle item “Compliance with NPT Articles I and II and related Security Council resolutions,” was set as an independent middle item (no change in grade).

➢Cooperation with the IAEA: In light of the occurrence of actions that impede IAEA safeguards, a point reduction was added to the evaluation item for “actions that impede the activities of the IAEA.”

 

Nuclear security

➢The amount of weapon-usable nuclear material

• The base holding was revised so that the point reduction categories would be based on the current holdings of each country.
• Plutonium classification was changed from “weapons-grade plutonium” to “military separated plutonium” and from “reactor-grade plutonium” to “non-military separated plutonium.” Because it was difficult to collect data under the old classification name, the name was changed to one that is more commonly used and more stable today.
• The item “Possession of facilities that could cause serious radiological effects” was added. This item was added in response to recent concerns about the risk of sabotage of nuclear facilities as well as the risk of theft of nuclear materials. In addition to commercial reactors and reprocessing facilities, there are other facilities that could have radiological consequences in the event of sabotage, but two were selected as the main representative facilities that could have serious consequences.

➢Enactment of laws and establishment of regulations for the national implementation

• For the “IAEA Recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” in order to clarify the grading criteria and from the viewpoint of objective evaluation, the evaluation method was changed to use the score of the Nuclear Security Index of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), which is the most recognized worldwide.
• Regarding “Establishment of laws and system,” because evaluation is made focusing on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” which is the key convention among nuclear security-related conventions, it was moved to “2-G)” immediately after “F) Convention on Assistance to Nuclear Accidents,” which is the last item in the series of conventions, rather than after the IAEA recommendation document.
• Clarified the scoring criteria for “establishment of laws and institutions for domestic implementation.”

➢Efforts to maintain and improve the highest level of nuclear security

• Removed “separated plutonium inventory” from “minimization of HEU and separated plutonium inventory for civilian use” (because separated plutonium inventory for civilian use is evaluated as “separated plutonium for non-military use” under “Item 1”). In addition, the evaluation criteria for this evaluation item were clarified.
• “Prevention of illicit trafficking” was omitted due to difficulty in obtaining data for each country that would allow an objective assessment.
• Clarified the evaluation criteria for “acceptance of international evaluation missions.”
• Clarified the evaluation criteria for “Technology Development – Nuclear Forensics.”
• Clarified the evaluation criteria for “Human Resource Development/ Capacity Building and Support Activities.”
• Clarified the evaluation criteria for “IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund.”
• Clarified the evaluation criteria regarding “Participation in International Initiatives,” and the international initiatives covered were revised and updated.

➢“Response to Nuclear Security Threats Posed by States” was newly added (in response to Russia’s attack against Ukraine’s nuclear facilities).