A) Approaches toward a world without nuclear weapons

According to the preamble of the NPT, states parties “[declare] their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake ef fective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, [and urge] the cooperation of all States in the at tainment of this objective.” Article VI of the Treaty stipulates that “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in go good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

No country openly opposes the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons or the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Their commitment to nuclear disarmament has been reiterated in various fora, including the NPT review process and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA ). However, such statements do not necessarily mean that nuclear-armed states are actively pursuing the realization of a world without nuclear weapons. In the wake of the recent intensification of strategic competition, as well as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine accompanied by nuclear intimidation in 2022, the nuclear armed states have reemphasized the role of nuclear weapons in their national security, and there have been few proactive efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

 

NPT Review Conference

The 10th NPT Review Conference, which had been postponed four times due to the global pandemic of COVID-19 , was held at UN Headquarters in New York from August 1-26, 2022. By April 2020, when the conference was originally scheduled to take place, the success of the conference was already in jeopardy due to a rift between NWS and NNWS over nuclear disarmament, which was expected to result in difficulty adopting a final document. When the conference was eventually held in 2022, there were fears that it would be even more difficult because of the escalation of disputes among the NWS, particularly due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

In his speech on the first day of the RevCon, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated stated, “[ the NPT Review Conference ] takes place at a critical juncture for our collective peace and security.”7 He also made clear his sense of danger regarding the growing threats of using nuclear weapons, stating, “[W] e urgently need to reinforce and reaffirm the 77-year-old norm against the use of nuclear weapons. ” He furthermore argued that “[R] educing the risk of war is not enough. Eliminating nuclear weapons is the only guarantee they will never be used .”8

Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated at the general debate, “ As the first step of a realistic road map, which would take us from the ‘reality ’ we face in the harsh security environment to the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons, we will work on the ‘Hiroshima Action Plan’ which is rooted in the following five actions, while simultaneously making efforts to reduce nuclear risks. ” The five actions included: a shared recognition on the importance of continuing the record of non-use of nuclear weapons; enhancing transparency; maintaining the decreasing trend of the global nuclear stockpile; securing nuclear non- proliferation and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy upon that basis; and promoting the accurate understanding on the realities of nuclear weapons use through encouraging visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki by international leaders and others. 9

The participating countries, including all NWS , reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. On August 23, Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, the President of the NPT RevCon, presented a draft final document that summarized the arguments and discussions by the participating states up to that point, and after two rounds of revisions, he presented the final draft on August 25.
However, the participating countries failed to adopt a final document on substantive matters. Only Russia was opposed , stating that it did not agree with five paragraphs of the final draft.

Although Russia did not specify which five paragraphs it was referring to to, it is considered to have objected , inter to the following sentences mentioning the issues regarding the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant occupied by Russia, and the Budapest Memorandum:10

➢ “The Conference stresses the paramount importance of ensuring control by Ukraine’s competent authorities of nuclear facilities and other locations subject to IAEA safeguards located in armed conflict areas, such as the Zaporizhzya nuclear power plant and other facilities and locations within Ukraine, and of providing access to the IAEA in order to implement safeguards activities effectively and safely for the purpose of ensuring that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. ”

➢ “The Conference reaffirms the importance of full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to all existing obligations and commitments related to security assurances given to non -nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty either unilaterally or multilaterally, including the commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1994.”

In response, many participating countries expressed their disappointment that the final document could not be adopted.
Costa Rica, speaking shortly after Russia stated its opposition, explained that, “ the document was well below our expectations, falling short on concrete measures to advance us toward nuclear disarmament. However, we felt it was necessary for the NPT states parties to meet the current moment, with the nuclear risks higher than they have been in decades, and together reaffirm our determination to uphold international law in pursuit of our common goal.” 11 In a joint statement, 55 countries (including Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the European Union statedstated, “We deplore the Russian Federation’s dangerous nuclear rhetoric, actions and provocative statements about raising its nuclear alert levels, which are inconsistent with the recent P5 Leaders Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races.” They also strongly condemned Russia , stating : “We are deeply concerned that the Russian Federation, a Nuclear-Weapon State, is undermining international peace, security and stability, the international nonproliferation architecture and the integrity and objectives of the NPT by waging its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.” 12 In addition, the United States strongly rebuked Russia , stating, “The last-minute changes that Russia sought were not of a minor character.
They were intended to shield Russia’s obvious intent to wipe Ukraine off the map .” 13

At the closing meeting, NNWS also reiterated their criticism of the stagnation and retrogression of efforts toward nuclear disarmament. Mexico, on behalf of the TPNW states parties, stated, “ Both the TPNW’s First Meeting of States Parties and this conference have taken place at a critical time, when the risk of the use of nuclear weapons is high, and the possibility of the catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons is looming ominously over us. We are dismayed that this very fact has been used at the NPT review conference deliberations as reason against the urgently needed progress on nuclear disarmament, and to uphold an approach to security based on the fallacy of nuclear deterrence.”14 Several NNWS, including New Zealand, pointed out that the draft final document contained unsatisfactory content on nuclear disarmament.
Furthermore, Austria argued, “We are lacking a positive agenda and the sufficient political will and shared vision of what the successful implementation of the NPT means. The last four weeks have shown us again how the NPT primarily cements the status quo or even backtracks. No matter the existing obligations and commitments, the Treaty does little in real life to move us forward on nuclear disarmament.” 15

Although it could not be adopted, the draft final document of the NPT RevCon stated, “ States parties recommit to achieving a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty. ” On the other hand, reflecting the above-mentioned strict arguments regarding nuclear disarmament by NNWS , the draft final document “expresses deep concern at the absence of tangible progress in further reductions in global stockpiles and in the implementation of disarmament commitments by the nuclear-weapon States since the 2015 Review Conference.”16

 

Nuclear -armed states

Despite deepening tensions and confrontations, the five NWS have continued to take a certa in degree of cooperative actions on nuclear disarmament issues in the context of the NPT, such as holding regular meetings and issuing joint statements at the NPT RevCons and their Preparatory Committee.

On January 3, 2022, immediately after the decision was made to postpone the NPT RevCon for the fourth time, the five NWS issued a “Joint statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Race s,” in which they stated that “[five NWS] consider the avoidanc e of war between  Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities.” They also said, “We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have  far-reaching consequences, we als o affirm that nuclear weapons —for as long as they continue to exist —should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war.”
Furthermore, the five NWS stated, inter alia: “We remain committed to our [NPT] obligations, including our Article VI obligation”; “We each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons”; and“We underline our desire to work with all states to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all.” 17 On December 7, 2021, they also submit ted a working paperpaper, titled “ Strategic Risk Reduction,” to the NPT RevCon .18 

However, since Russia’s invasion in Ukraine commenced in February 2022, the rift within the NWS has widened. On one side, France, the United Kingdom and the United States have hars harshly condemned Russia, imposed sanctions on Moscow and provided military assistance to Ukraine. On the other side, Russia and China have strengthened their strategic partnership, resulting in increasincreased tensions with the United States and other Western countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including on the Taiwan issue. This trend has had a significant impact in the context of the NPT. Since the end of February 2022 , no meeting of the five NWS has been held, and no joint statement was issued at the NPT RevCon in August, either.

At the RevCon, France, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a working paper, titled “Principles and responsible practices for Nuclear Weapon States,” 19 and issued their ministerial statement, in which they stated, “ We reaffirm the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and as the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We recall our enduring efforts to reduce nuclear risks in furtherance of our nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT.”20 These three NWS also issued a joint statement on security assurances to NNWS. 21

Each  nuclear-weapon state also individually expressed its commitment and approach to nuclear disarmament at the NPT RevCon and other forums.

China stated, “ An active participant in international nuclear arms control efforts, China has steadfastly advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and holds that all [NWS] should earnestly fulfil their obligations under article VI of the [NPT] and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons.” 22 At the same time, however, China also indicated that it is not willing to participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations at this time , stating the following:

Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual and balanced reduction. States with the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and overarching responsibilities with regard to nuclear disarmament, and should continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals significantly and substantially in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner in order to create conditions for the ultimate realization of general and complete nuclear disarmament. When conditions are ripe, all nuclear-weapon States should join the multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation process. 23

China also argued that “[t] he principles of ‘maintaining global strategic  stability’ and ‘undiminished security for all’ should be followed in the practices of nuclear disarmament.”24

France explained that “ in pursuit of peace, [it] is fully committed to disarmament in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty.” It also stated, “France considers that the goal of nuclear disarmament cannot be separated from the goal of collective security.
Nuclear disarmament can move forward only if the strategic context is taken into account, and should be viewed as part of a gradual process that will guarantee undiminished security for all and, beyond that, global stability and security. ”25

Regarding Russia, President Vladimir Putin said in his message to the NPT RevCon, “ As a State party to the NPT and one of its depositary states, Russia consistently adheres to the letter and spirit of the Treaty.” Russia also stated at the general debate, “We would like to emphasize that Russia has consistently made a significant practical contribution to freeing the world from the threat posed by WMDs. We remain committed to the noble goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In fully implementing our international obligations, including those under Article VI of the NPT, we bear our fair share of responsibility for preserving peace and strengthening global security.” 26 At the same time, it argued in its working paper, titled “ Nuclear disarmament: an area of shared responsibility ,” “Practical steps towards disarmament – and not only with regard to nuclear weapons – are impossible without an enabling international environment.” 27

The United Kingdom stated at the RevCon, “ The UK is committed to pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We reaffirm our unequivocal undertaking, alongside the other Nuclear Weapons States, to accomplish the total elimination of our nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.” 28 In its working paper, “Getting to a world without nuclear weapons, ” the United Kingdom listed “some of the factors that need to be considered in order to make that step to a world without nuclear weapons a reality” from short and longer terms perspectives. 29

U.S. President Joseph Biden stated in his statement issued at the first day of the RevCon, “ the United States renews its commitment to the world to be a responsible steward of its nuclear arsenal, and to continue working toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”30 Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, “ The United States is committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and re-establishing our leadership on arms control, and we’ve undertaken a deliberate policy review toward that goal. ”31 And, at the Main Committee I of the RevCon, the United States “reaffirm[ed its] steadfast commitment to Article VI of the NPT and to creating a secure world without nuclear weapons.” 32

The United States, which argues that the international security environment needs to be improved in order to promote nuclear disarmament, launched the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) in 2019. Forty-three countries—including NWS, NNWS, non -NPT states, NAM countries, U.S. allies, and Treaty on the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW ) signatories— participated in CEND meetings. While little has been reported on  CEND’s progress in 2022 , the three subgroups addressing the following issues, with the support of non-govern mental expert facilitators, have reportedly made steady progress in addressing the tasks.

➢ Reducing perceived incentives for states to retain, acquire, or increase their holdings of nuclear weapons and increasing incentives to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons (co-chaired by the Netherlands and Morocco);
➢ Mechanisms to bolster nonproliferation efforts and build confidence in and further advance nuclear disarmament (co-chaired by South Korea and the United States); and
➢ Interim measures to reduce the risks as sociated with nuclear weapons (co-chaired by Finland and Germany).

In accordance with the timeline discussed at the November 2020 plenary meeting, the respective subgroups planned to finalize recommendations late in 2022 and release their findings early in 2023 .33
Nuclear-armed states outside the NPT have stated their commitment to nuclear disarmament and their own approaches at the UN General Assembly, its First Committee, and other fora.
India said that it “ remains firmly committed to the goal of universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. India has called for  complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a “step by step process,” and continued to propose negotiations on a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention at the CD. 34 Pakistan also made a similar statement, arguing that “[it] remains firmly committed to the goal of a nuclear weapons free world, achieved in a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory manner,” and proposed “the immediate commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention.”35

On the other hand, Israel and North Korea did not mention in their speeches to the UNGA First Committee any policies regarding a world without nuclear weapons or the abolition of nuclear weapons. North Korea insisted, “ In order to realize the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, the United States, the first user of nuclear weapons and the biggest nuclear weapon state in the world, should take the lead in nuclear disarmament and refrain from provision of nuclear umbrella, sharing of nuclear weapons and transfer of nuclear echnology.” 36 Chairman Kim Jong Un also stated on September 9, “ As long as there exist nuclear weapons and remains imperialism on the earth, and as long as the United States and its vassal forces refuse to stop their anti anti-DPRK manoeuvrings, our journey of building up the nuclear forces will not come to an end. ”37 

 

NNWS

Regarding approaches to nuclear disarmament, while the five NWS have argued for a step-by -step approach, some NNWS allied with the United States have proposed a “progressive approach” based on building -block principles, and the Non -Aligned Movement (NAM) countries have called for launching negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

At the NPT RevCon in 2022, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa ) stated, “Nuclear disarmament is a legal obligation and a moral and ethical imperative. With that in mind, the NAC has put forward proposals on concrete, transparent, mutually reinforcing measures to promote the fulfilment of NPT Article VI obligations. We need to be creative, while taking existing commitments as starting points for further progress. ”38

The NAM countries reiterated their traditional proposal: “ The Group stresses the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion, a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, containing also a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.”39 In addition, “[t] he Group also reaffirm [ that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they will never be produced again is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. ”40 Both the NAC and NAM also noted the significance of the TPNW in the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Nonproliferation and DisarmamentInitiative (NPDI), formed under the initiative of Australia and Japan stated, “to achieve the unequivocal undertaking by all Nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, we call for greater progress in implementing disarmament obligations,” including: further reductions in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; reaffirmation of the undertakings not to increase nuclear weapons arsenals; adoption of tangible risk reduction measures; and increased transparency through engagement in concrete activities.41  

In January 2022, Japan and the United States issued a “ Joint Statement on the Treaty on the NPT ,” in which they “reaffirm [ed] their commitment to the NPT, which is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non -proliferation regime … [and] recognize [d] the NPT as indispensable for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieving their total elimination.”42 In a Japan-U.S. joint statement in May, “ Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden reaffirmed their intent to work together toward a world without nuclear weapons. In particular, they affirmed their commitment to strengthen the [NPT] as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Prime Minister Kishida noted the importance of advancing realistic measures on nuclear disarmament, while addressing security challenges, and President Biden agreed.” 43 At the joint press conference, Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida said regarding hi his decision to convene the 2023 G7 summit meeting in Hiroshima, “ As the Prime Minister of Japan, the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, I believe there is no other venue as fitting as Hiroshima to demonstrate our commitment to peace. I hope that we can vow to the world that mankind will never cause the catastrophe brought about by nuclear weapons, that President Biden and other leaders of the G7 will together confirm in front of the Peace Memorial on solidarity to defend peace, global order, and values. ”44

 

B) Voting behavior on UNGA resolu resolu-tions on nuclear disarmament proposals by Japan, NAC and NAM

In 2022 , the UNGA again adopted the following resolutionsresolutions/decision titled: “Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons ”45 proposed by Japan and others; decision titled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” 46 proposed by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC); and “Nuclear disarmament” 47 proposed by NAM members. The voting behavior of the countries surveyed in this project on these three documents is presented below.

➢ “Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons”—147 in favor ( Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others); 6 against (China, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia South Africa and Syria); 27 abstentions ( Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan , Pakistan and others)
➢ “Towards a nuclear nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nu clear disarmament
commitments”—153 in favor (Austria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden,Switzerland, Syria and others); 3 against (India, Israel and Russia); 23 abstentions (Australia, China, France, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others)

➢ “Nuclear disarmament ”—120 in favor (Brazil, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and others); 42 against (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others); 20 absten tions ( Austria, India, Japan, North Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa and others)

The resolution proposed by Japan called for implementing the following measures which were based on the “Hiroshima Action Plan” proposed by Prime Minister Kishida at the NPT RevCon, inter alia:

➢ Urging all States, especially the NWS, to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric concerning the use of nuclear weapons;
➢ Calling upon all States, in particular the NWS, to pursue enhanced transparency measures by providing information related to concrete data on their nucle ar arsenals and capabilities, including the status of production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons;
➢ Emphasizing that maintaining the overall decreasing trend of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons is vital, and calling upon NWS to undertak undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons;
➢ Urging States that have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify the CTBT;

➢ Calling upon the CD to immediately commence and bring to an early conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT, and upon the NWS to maintain or declare voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices;
➢ Calling upon all States, especially the NWS, to commit to further identifying, exploring and implementing effective risk reduction measures , and to intensify dialogue among NWS, and between NWS and NNWS on nuclear risk reduction;
➢ Reaffirming the commitment to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, of North Korea in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, and the obligation of all Member States to fully implement all relevant Security Council resolutions; and urging North Korea to return at an early date to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards; and
➢ Calling upon all States to facilitate efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, which is a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the NPT.

In addition, for the first time in a resolution proposed by Japan, the preamble, which was factual, acknowledged that “the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 6 was adopted on 7 July 2017, … was opened for signature by the Secretary-General on 20 September 2017, entered into force on 22 January 2021 and held its first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons from 21 to 23 June 2022.”

 

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7 António Guterres, “Statement,” NPT Review Conference, August 1, 2022, https://www.un.org/sg/en/ content/sg/speeches/2022-08-01/secretary-generals-remarks-the-tenth-review-conference-of-the-parties-the-treaty-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons.

8 Ibid.
9 Fumio Kishida, “Statement,” NPT Review Conference, August 1, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ files/100376850.pdf.
10 On the other hand, Russia said that it was not be the only country that opposed the draft final document, and obstinately insisted that the responsibility for the failure to reach the consensus could not be attributed to Russia alone. Russia, in the last opportunity to make remarks before closing the RevCon, also criticized that some parts of draft text regarding Ukraine-related issues were “politicized” and this RevCon was the “one-side meeting.” “Statement by Mr. Andrei Belousov, Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation at Closing Meeting of the 10th NPT Review Conference,” Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, August 26, 2022, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/260822d.

11 “Statement by Costa Rica,” Plenary Meeting, 10th NPT RevCon, October 26, 2022.
12 “Joint Statement, delivered by France,” Plenary Meeting, 10th NPT RevCon, October 26, 2022.
13 “Statement by the United States,” Closing Meeting, 10th NPT RevCon, October 26, 2022.

14 “Closing Statement, delivered by Mexico,” Plenary Meeting, 10th NPT RevCon, October 26, 2022.
15 “Statement by Austria,” Plenary Meeting, 10th NPT RevCon, October 26, 2022.
16 NPT/CONF.2020/CRP.1/Rev.2, August 25, 2022.

17 “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races”, January 3, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/.
18 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.33, December 7, 2022.
19 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.70, July 29, 2022.
20 “NPT – Ministerial statement of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America,” August 1, 2022, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-pro liferation/news/2022/article/npt-ministerial-statement-of-france-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-of.
21 “P3 Joint Statement on Security Assurances,” August 4, 2022, https://www.state.gov/p3-joint-state ment-on-security-assurances/.

22 NPT/CONF.2020/41, November 16, 2021.
23 Ibid.
24 “Statement by China,” General Debate, 10th NPT RevCon, August 2, 2022.
25 NPT/CONF.2020/42/Rev.1, August 1, 2022.
26 “Statement by Russia,” General Debate, NPT RevCon, August 2, 2022.
27 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.56, May 27, 2022.

28 “Statement by the United Kingdom,” Main Committee I, NPT RevCon, August 5, 2022.
29 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.35, December 10, 2021.
30 “President Biden Statement Ahead of the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” August 1, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ statements-releases/2022/08/01/president-biden-statement-ahead-of-the-10th-review-conference-of-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/.
31 “Statement by the United States,” General Debate, NPT RevCon, August 1, 2022.
32 “Statement by the United States,” Main Committee I, NPT RevCon, August 4, 2022.

33 Robert Wood, “Prevention of Nuclear War, Including All Related Matters: Nuclear Risk Reduction,” Remarks to the CD Plenary Thematic Debate on Agenda Item 2, May 18, 2021, https://geneva.usmission. gov/2021/05/18/ambassador-woods-remarks-to-the-cd-plenary-thematic-debate-on-agenda-item-2/.
34 “Statement by India,” General Debate, UNGA, October 10, 2022.
35 “Statement by Pakistan,” General Debate, UNGA, October 4, 2022.
36 “Statement by North Korea,” General Debate, UNGA, October 11, 2022.
37 “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at Seventh Session of the 14th SPA of DPRK,” KCNA, September 10, 2022, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202209/news10/20220910-23ee.html.

38 “Statement by Mexico on behalf of the NAC,” General Debate, 10th NPT RevCon, August 1, 2022.
39 “Statement by Azerbaijan on behalf of the NAM,” General Debate, 10th NPT RevCon, August 1, 2022.
40 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.20, November 22, 2021.
41 “Statement by NPDI,” General Debate, NPT RevCon, August 2, 2022.
42 “Japan-U.S. Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” January 21, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press3e_000308.html.

43 “Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders’ Statement: Strengthening the Free and Open International Order,” May 23, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100347252.pdf.
44 “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference,” Tokyo, May 23, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/23/ remarks-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan-in-joint-press-conference/.
45 A/RES/77/76, December 7, 2022.
46 A/DEC/77/516, December 7, 2022.
47 A/RES/77/65, December 7, 2022.