Chapter 2　Nuclear Non-Proliferation1

(1) Acceptance and Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Obligations

A) Accession to the NPT

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has 191 states parties (including North Korea, the Holy See and Palestine). Among the current 193 United Nations (UN) Member States, those remaining outside the NPT are: India and Pakistan, both of which tested and declared they had nuclear weapons in 1998; Israel, which is widely believed to possess them despite its opaque nuclear policy2; and South Sudan, which declared its independence and joined the UN in July 2011, and does not possess any nuclear weapons.

North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, but there is no agreement among the states parties on North Korea’s official status with regard to the NPT. It has refused to return to the treaty despite UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) demanding that it do so at an early date. As noted below, it has repeatedly insisted that it will not abandon its status as a nuclear-armed state. There is no agreement among the states parties on North Korea’s official NPT status.

 

B) Compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT and the UNSCRs on non-proliferation

North Korea

Since the NPT entered into force, no case of non-compliance with Articles I and II of the Treaty has been officially reported by the UN or any other international organization.3 However, if North Korea’s withdrawal is interpreted as not being legally valid, or if it acquired nuclear weapons before announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, such acquisition of nuclear weapons would constitute non- compliance with Article II. The U.S. Department of State in its annual reports titled “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” declared that North Korea was in violation of its obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT and in non-compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement at the time it announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003.4

UNSCR 1718, adopted in October 2006, stipulates that: “[T]he DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA.” The UN Security Council also decided that North Korea “shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.”5

On several occasions in 2023, North Korea conveyed unwillingness to relinquish its nuclear arsenal. For instance, Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, stated, “Even if the DPRK-U.S. dialogue is supposed to start, it is as clear as noonday that the present U.S. administration will put nothing but only ‘CVID’ on the negotiation table. Today ‘denuclearization’ is an outdated word to be found only in a dictionary of dead words.” She also predicted that the United States would use the reduction of military exercises and the suspension of the deployment of strategic weapons as a bargaining card, and made clear the North’s intention not to accept dialogue, saying, “Such a slender trick for earning time can never work on us.”6 At the end of September, Chairman Kim Jong Un stated at the Supreme People’s Assembly, “[W]e must neither change nor concede the present position of our country as a nuclear weapons state, but, on the contrary, continue to further strengthen the nuclear force.”7 Subsequently, North Korea has amended its constitution to bolster and expand its nuclear force.

At the 2023 NPT PrepCom, 74 countries—including Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States—issued a joint statement, stating, “We urge the DPRK to take concrete steps towards abandoning all nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to immediately cease all related activities in accordance with all relevant UNSC resolutions. … We reiterate our steadfast commitment to the objective of the return by the DPRK at an early date to, and fully comply, with the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.”8

On the other hand, China and Russia repeatedly responded as if they were defending or tacitly endorsing North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities. They also opposed the Security Council’s efforts to issue a presidential statement condemning North Korea’s missile and rocket launches. Russia made the following statements at the NPT PrepCom:

For many years, it has been common to blame the DPRK for violating the NPT and the lack of progress in denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In fact, it is the United States that is taking steps incompatible with the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation by drawing the Republic of Korea, a non-nuclear-weapon State within the meaning of the NPT, into the orbit of its nuclear strategy. The President of the Republic of Korea has openly declared that the alliance with the U.S. has “upgraded to a nuclear one.” On 18 July, a U.S. nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile submarine visited the port of Busan. Such actions nullify the prospects for resolving the situation on the Korean Peninsula, undermining the goal of its denuclearization, which is backed by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The responsibility for this falls on Washington.9

On December 19, the UN Security Council convened an emergency public meeting in response to North Korea’s launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Countries, including Japan, the United States and European countries, condemned North Korea. However, China and Russia criticized U.S. military activities around the Korean Peninsula, citing them as a cause for escalating tensions. Consequently, the Security Council was unable to reach a unanimous response.

Iran

Nuclear activities

The E3/EU+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom/European Union plus China, Russia and the United States) and Iran agreed on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015, which stipulates that Iran accepts restrictions on its nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, and that other parties would ease or lift sanctions against Iran. However, the United States under then-President Donald Trump in May 2018 decided to withdraw from the JCPOA, and to reimpose sanctions against Iran. In response, from May 2019, Iran gradually suspended implementation of its obligations set out in the JCPOA, including limitations on the storage and enrichment level of enriched uranium as well as of the number of centrifuges for enriching uranium. (See Section 2 of this chapter regarding suspension of implementation of monitoring and verification measures, including IAEA safeguards.)10

Centrifuges—The JCPOA limited Iran to enriching uranium using only 5,020 first generation (IR-1) centrifuges and only at the Natanz main fuel enrichment plant (FEP). Since September 2019 it has steadily breached these limits.
The IAEA periodical report in November 2023 reported on the centrifuge installation as follows:11

➢ FEP: In addition to the 30 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges provided for under the JCPOA, Iran has informed the Agency that it has installed another 36 cascades (IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6).

➢ Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP): Iran installed one cascade each of IR-4 and IR-6, and one interconnected cascade comprising IR-4 and IR-6.

➢ FFEP: Iran installed six cascades of IR-1, and two cascade of IR-6 centrifuges.

Enriched uranium—The JCPOA limited Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium to no more than 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), with a maximum enrichment level of 3.67%. The IAEA estimated Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile as of October 28, 2023 to be 4,486.8 kg, of which the total enriched uranium stockpile in the form of UF6 was 4,130.7 kg (1,217.2 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235; 2,218.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235; 567.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 128.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235).12 Iran has steadily increased its enriched uranium up to 20% and up to 60%. The level of 20% and above is considered to be highly enriched uranium (HEU), which could theoretically be used in a nuclear weapon. As a practical matter, however, 60% HEU is considered to be weapons usable while more than 90% is considered weapons grade.

The IAEA reported in February 2023 that “[d]uring the monthly interim verification (IIV) on 22 January 2023, the Agency took environmental samples from the product sampling point at FFEP, the analytical results of which showed the presence of [HEU] particles containing up to 83.7% U-235.”13 In this regard, Iran explained that it occurred during the “transition period at the time of commissioning the process of [60% U-235] product (November 2022) or while replacing the feed cylinder.”14 In May 2023, the IAEA reported:

In a letter dated 30 March 2023, the Agency indicated that on the basis of its evaluation, the Agency assessed that the information provided was not inconsistent with Iran’s explanation for the origin of these particles and that the Agency had no further questions on the matter at that stage. The Agency also found no indication of the accumulation and collection of nuclear material enriched above 60% U-235 at FFEP and it will be able to confirm that no diversion of nuclear material took place at the facility only on the basis of the outcome of the next physical inventory verification (PIV).15

At the end of December, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reported that Iran, which had been reducing its production of 60% enriched uranium to 3 kg per month since June 2023, reversed this reduction and increased production to 9 kg per month since November 2023.16 This was likely related to the unravelling of a deal to allow Iran access to $6 billion in frozen oil revenues, discussed below.

Other activities—According to an IAEA report in November, Iran neither pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) nor carried out activities related to reprocessing at the facilities which it has declared to the IAEA. Meanwhile, Iran has not informed the IAEA about the inventory of heavy water in Iran or the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP), nor allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP—which are ruled in the verification procedures agreed to by Iran and the IAEA based on the JCPOA although not required under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.17

In July 2023, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Mohammad Eslami said, “We are currently operating eight [uranium] mines, and six more mines are planned to come on stream by the end of the [Iranian calendar] year [that is, March 20, 2024].”18

Breakout time—The uranium enrichment limits in the JCPOA were formulated to ensure that Iran’s breakout time (the time required to produce weapons-grade fissile material for one nuclear weapon) would be no less than 12 months. Iran’s increase in its stockpile of enriched uranium, including HEU, has dramatically reduced the breakout period to less than one week, according to some analysts.19 Based on the IAEA November 2023 report, other U.S. experts contend (with no official confirmation) that Iran could also quickly produce additional weapons, assessing that:

Iran can use a fraction of its 60 percent enriched uranium to rush to its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in as little as seven days. Its enriched uranium stocks are sufficient to make enough weapon-grade uranium for six nuclear weapons in one month, eight nuclear weapons in two months, ten in three months, eleven in four months, and twelve in five months.20

 

Efforts to restore the nuclear deal

Indirect negotiations aimed at restoring a nuclear deal with Iran have failed to reach an agreement. Although progress was reported from time to time, each time new difficulties emerged.
In February 2023, indirect discussions were reportedly held between the United States and Iran regarding a possible prisoner exchange to secure the release of U.S. citizens imprisoned in Iran.21 In April, it was also reported that the United States consulted with European countries and Israel on a proposal for an interim agreement with Iran that would include some sanctions relief in exchange for Tehran freezing parts of its nuclear program.22 While there was no official confirmation of such discussions, off the record officials from various nations sketched the outlines of an impending halt to the escalation with Iran.23
An agreement on the U.S.-Iranian prisoner exchange was reportedly reached in August. Following this, in September, Iran released five detained U.S. nationals and the U.S. government dismissed charges against five Iranians accused of violating U.S. sanctions and lifted a freeze on $6 billion in Iranian oil revenues in South Korea. It was agreed that the funds would be managed by Qatar and their use limited to humanitarian assistance purposes and subject to close monitoring by the United States.

There was no official mention of Iran accepting limits on its enrichment program but since June, Iran had reduced its production of 60% enriched uranium. As noted above, this reduction was reversed in December, after the U.S. government re-imposed the freeze on Iranian access to $6 billion assets now under Qatari control following an October 7 murderous attack on Israeli citizens by the Iran-related Hamas organization.
In addition to the countries directly involved in the JCPOA, other countries also made attempts to facilitate the restoration of a nuclear agreement with Iran. In September 2023, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian revealed in an interview that Japan had presented a proposal for mediation and that “it could satisfy Iran’s interest. It deserves attention and can be positively considered.”24 In the same month, Qatar reportedly proposed a tentative proposal, suggesting that the United States would allow Iran to export up to 2 million barrels per day of Iranian crude oil in exchange for Iran reducing its uranium enrichment level to 20%.25 Despite these initiatives, by the end of 2023, such efforts did not succeed in restoring the nuclear agreement.

In the meantime, Iran continued to criticize the United States, and stated at the NPT PrepCom:

The U.S. is responsible for the dire situation of the JCPOA. While Iran was fully implementing its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the agreement without any justification relevant to the JCPOA, then unlawfully re-imposed all U.S. sanctions against Iran, in material breach of UNSC Resolution 2231 and tried to force others to join it in violating the JCPOA. The Islamic Republic of Iran acted responsibly and with strategic patience and maximum resistance preserved the agreement. But the European JCPOA participants failed to abide by their commitment to compensate for the losses Iran incurred as a result of re-imposed U.S. sanctions. Therefore, Iran in exercise of its rights under Paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA is applying remedial action and is no longer bound to JCPOA nuclear-related measures.
Between April 2021 and March 2022, Iran negotiated in good-will with other participants on the resumption of the full implementation of the JCPOA and the return of the U.S. to full compliance. However, achieving this objective has been delayed due to the fact that the United States has not yet decided to return to compliance with the JCPOA. When the U.S. makes the right decision to resume the full implementation of its sanction-lifting commitments under the JCPOA, then Iran, in turn, will cease its remedial actions and resume the full implementation of its nuclear-related measures in accordance with the 2015 agreement.26

Iranian President Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi also stated at the UN General Assembly in September, “America’s withdrawal from the JCPOA was a violation of the Muslim principle of faithfulness to the covenant. … America needs to prove by building trust that it has good intentions and has a real will to fulfil its commitments and finalise the path.”27

Withdrawal from the NPT

While Article X-1 of the NPT provides some guidelines on how a state party can legitimately withdraw from the treaty, there remains a lack of clarity over certain aspects of this process. In light of North Korea’s declaration to withdraw from the NPT, Japan, South Korea and several other Western countries have proposed stricter requirements for withdrawal from the treaty. At the 10th NPT Review Conference (RevCon) in 2022, the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) argued for the need to, “[r]eaffirm that the procedures in article X must be fully and strictly followed by any State party that makes the decision to withdraw from the Treaty. The Treaty provides for the requirements to exercise the right of withdrawal, which means that any notice of withdrawal without completing these requirements is not valid.” It proposed principles and requirements for withdrawal.28 At the NPT PrepCom in 2023, the Vienna Group of Ten also made a proposal similar to the NPDI.29

On the other hand, the Chinese and Russian positions on this issue seem more cautious than the above-mentioned countries. Furthermore, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries along with Brazil have been critical of the tightening of withdrawal requirements, arguing that withdrawal from the treaty is a right of the states parties. At the NPT PrepCom, Iran stated, “The wording Article X of the NPT on the right to withdrawal is very explicit. Article X is crystal clear and void of any ambiguity. It recognizes the existence of an unconditional right for its States parties to withdraw from the Treaty in exercising their national sovereignty. [Iran] would never agree to any proposal that would challenge, constrain or condition the sovereign right of States parties to withdraw from the Treaty.” Iran also blamed the United States regarding North Korea’s declaration of withdrawal from the NPT, saying, “So far, the right of withdrawal has been exercised only once and, as a result of the United States’ policy of intimidation, pressure and hostility against the North Korea. Pressure and threats by a nuclear-weapon State drove a non-nuclear-weapon State out of the Treaty.”30

Alleged interest in acquiring nuclear weapons

In the wake of rapid advancements in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, accompanied by increasingly aggressive nuclear posturing, South Korea has at times shown indications of interest in acquiring nuclear weapons in order to counter the escalating threats from its northern neighbor. On January 11, 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, at a policy briefing with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense, said that South Korea could deploy tactical nuclear weapons or possess its own nuclear weapons should the North Korean nuclear situation worsen. He further added that South Korea’s advanced science and technology could facilitate the rapid development of nuclear weapons.31 However, soon after his remarks, the office of president clarified that South Korea had no plan to acquire nuclear weapons.32

Meanwhile, South Korea has implied interest in a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States, which would involve deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and using them by South Korea’s delivery systems. However, the United States has denied any plans or intentions for such an arrangement. The Washington Declaration, issued during the U.S.-South Korea summit in April 2023, emphasized the need to strengthen extended (nuclear) deterrence, but noted, at the same time, that “President Yoon reaffirmed the ROK’s longstanding commitment to its obligations under the [NPT] as the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime as well as to the U.S.-ROK Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.”33

Since the mid-2010s, there have been repeated statements from Saudi Arabia suggesting an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Again in September 2023, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman said in an interview, “If [Iranian] get one, we have to get one … for security reasons, and for balancing power in the Middle East, but we don’t want to see that.”34 In the meantime, in 2023, it was reported that Saudi Arabia, in the context of constructing nuclear power plants, was considering proposals from China, which does not impose restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing activities. Moreover, Saudi Arabia was reportedly exploring the possibility of acquiring uranium enrichment technology from China.35

Negotiations between the United States and Saudi Arabia over a nuclear cooperation agreement that would allow access to U.S. nuclear energy technology have been stalled for several years over U.S. insistence on conditions that would prohibit acquisition of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In 2023, it was reported that the two sides were considering a broader agreement under which Saudi Arabia would recognize Israel and the United States would supply security assurances and a uranium-enrichment facility under U.S. control. Perturbations over the October 7 Hamas attack and Israel’s response reportedly interrupted these discussions.36

Regarding Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on June 11, “Accusations about Tehran seeking nuclear weapons is a lie and they know it. We do not want nuclear arms because of our religious beliefs. Otherwise they (the West) would not have been able to stop it.”37 President Ebrahim Raisi also stated at the UNGA, “Nuclear weapons have no place in the defence doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Official reports of relevant international authorities and even Western intelligence communities have repeatedly emphasised the truth of this claim.”38

C) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) have entered into force in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty), the South Pacific (Rarotonga Treaty), Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty), Africa (Pelindaba Treaty) and Central Asia (Central Asian NWFZ Treaty). In addition, Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone at the UNGA in 1992, and the UNGA has been adopting a resolution entitled “Mongolia’s International Security and Nuclear-Weapon Free-Status” every two years since 1998, in support of Mongolia’s declaration.39

In August 2022, the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Commission adopted a “Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the Treaty on the South -East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (2023–2027).” Its adoption and implementation was noted in the UNGA resolution on the SEANWFZ in 2023.40

At the 2023 NPT PrepCom, Arab states and Iran called for Israel to join the NPT as a NNWS and accept IAEA comprehensive safeguards. They also criticized Israel and the United States for not participating in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Region Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereafter the “Middle East Conference”), and urged them to attend the fourth Middle East Conference held in November 2023. Egypt stated, “We reiterate that this UN Conference, which aims at elaborating a legally-binding treaty on the establishment of the Zone, takes the 1995 Resolution as its terms of reference and is fully based on consensus and arrangements freely arrived at. The unilateral refusal to engage with this Conference on the part of Israel should therefore not be utilized as a means to put into question the inclusivity of this process. Any argument that is predicated on this logic is in our view untenable.”41 Iran argued that “[s]ome States party to the NPT, including France, Germany, Norway, the U.S. and UK which assisted Israel to build its nuclear weapons have a special responsibility in this regard,” and specifically “call[ed] on Germany to end its assistance to Israel’s nuclear proliferation activities,” including the provision of submarines capable of carrying nuclear weapons.42

Russia criticized the United States, stating: “We regret to note that the United States, by its non-participation in the Conference, continues to refrain from its responsibilities as one of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. We see no real reason for Washington, which, moreover, is constantly trying to claim in words to be a leader in nonproliferation, to further sabotage the meetings aimed at establishing the Middle East WMD-free zone.”43

The United States responded to such criticism by stating:

The United States remains committed to the goal of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, based on arrangements freely arrived at by all regional states. We are convinced that the only path to progress is through direct, inclusive dialogue aimed at building confidence and addressing the legitimate security concerns of all parties. We are prepared to engage on initiatives to advance implementation of the 1995 Resolution that have consensus regional support. The United States took note of developments during the first three sessions of the UN Conference on the establishment of such a zone, but we continue to question whether that UN Conference can serve as an effective forum for dialogue among all the regional states. We note that no other regional zone required a UN umbrella or architecture for negotiation, and we reject claims that the United States’ decision not to participate as an observer in this Conference in any way constitutes hindering the implementation of the 1995 Resolution or backtracking on past U.S. commitments. I note that it was not the United States that ended regional consultations to prepare for the Middle East Zone conference called for in the 2010 Action Plan, consultations in which the Israel participated in at a senior level.44

Israel stated the following at the UNGA First Committee:

The 1999 Disarmament Commission Report on Guidelines and Principles for the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones clearly states that Nuclear Weapon Free Zones should be established on the basis of arrangements “freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned” and “pursued by ALL the states of that region.”
Ill motivated initiatives, such as the UN Conference on the Middle East go against the guidelines and established principles of any Nuclear Weapons Free Zones and are unhelpful.45

The fourth Middle East Conference was held on November 13-17, 2023, in which 23 regional countries and four observers (China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom) participated. According to its conference report, the general discussion covered diverse issues, including the importance of implementing the Middle East Resolution issued by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, general principles and core obligations, the inalienable right of States parties to receive and use nuclear, chemical and biological technology and materials solely for peaceful purposes, commitment to achieving a WMD free world, Peaceful uses and technical cooperation. The participating countries also urged Israel to promptly join the NPT and implement IAEA comprehensive safeguards, and emphasized the necessity for Israel to participate in the Middle East Conference. Thematic debates covered peaceful uses and technical cooperation, nuclear verification, and topics identified at the previous conference that require further discussion. In addition, the conference also received reports on the intersessional working committee, which addressed glossary of terminologies, and general principles and obligations for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD.46

At past UNGAs from 1980 through 2017, a resolution titled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” was adopted without a vote. However, the resolution in 2023, as in the previous years, was taken to a vote: 1795 countries were in favor, Israel was against it, and the United State and other two countries abstained.47
Concerning Northeast Asia and South Asia, while initiatives for establishing NWFZs have been proposed by non-governmental groups in the respective regions, there are few signs that states parties in these regions are taking any serious initiative toward this goal. One exception is Mongolia, which in its report submitted to the NPT RevCon expressed a willingness to “[p]lay an active role in promoting the idea of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in north-east Asia.”48

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1 This chapter is authored by Hirofumi Tosaki.
2 In an interview, Israeli far-right cabinet minister Amichai Eliyahu, Minister of Heritage, said that “that is one way,” regarding the possibility of a nuclear attack on the Gaza Strip. In response, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a statement saying, “Eliyahu’s words are detached from reality.” “Netanyahu Rushes for Damage Control, Suspends Minister for Gaza Nuclear Bombing Remark,” Wion, November 5, 2023, https://www.wionews.com/world/netanyahu-rushes-for-damage-control-bans-minister-over-nucle ar-bombing-remark-on-gaza-655362.
3 No international body is explicitly mandated with a responsibility for assessing compliance with these articles, apart from the IAEA’s safeguards verification mandate.
4 The U.S. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” April 2023, p. 13.

5 S/RES/1718, October 14, 2006. The UNSCR 1874 in June 2009 also demanded that North Korea “immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006).” Since this resolution also states to “[take] measures under its Article 41,” any measures involving the use of armed forces cannot be taken on the basis of this resolution.
6 “Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK,” KCNA, July 17, 2023, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202307/news17/20230717-12ee.html.
7 “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at 9th Session of 14th SPA,” KCNA, September 28, 2023, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202309/news28/20230928-01ee.html.

8 “Joint Statement addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge,” First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 9, 2023.
9 “Statement of Russia,” Cluster 2, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 7, 2023.
10 Iran justifies that its suspension of obligations was in accordance with Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif also stated, “Iran has significantly increased its nuclear capabilities since May 2019—but it has done so in full conformity with paragraph 36 of the nuclear agreement, which allows Iran to “cease performing its commitments” under the deal should another signatory stop performing its own. If the new U.S. administration hopes to alter the current trajectory, it needs to promptly change course.” Mohammad Javad Zarif, “Iran Wants the Nuclear Deal It Made: Don’t Ask Tehran to Meet New Demands,” Foreign Affairs, January 22, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/iran/2021-01-22/iran-wants-nuclear-deal-it-made.

11 GOV/2023/57, November 15, 2023.
12 Ibid. Iran has shut down its online enrichment monitors and other equipment, and the IAEA has provided estimates because it is unable to determine its real-time enriched uranium holdings.
13 GOV/2023/8, February 28, 2023.
14 Patrick Wintour, “Pressure on West to Act Grows After Report on Iranian Uranium Enrichment,” The Guardian, February 28, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/28/pressure-on-west-to-act-grows-after-report-on-iranian-uranium-enrichment.

15 GOV/2023/24, May 31, 2023.
16 Francois Murphy, “Iran Undoes Slowdown in Enrichment of Uranium to Near Weapons-grade: IAEA,” Reuters December 26, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-undoes-slowdown-enrich ment-uranium-near-weapons-grade-iaea-2023-12-26/.
17 GOV/2023/57.
18 “AEOI Chief: Iran to Run 6 More Uranium Mines,” Fars News Agency, July 24, 2023, https://www. farsnews.ir/en/news/14020502000632/AEOI-Chief-Iran-Rn-6-Mre-Uranim-Mines.
19 Kelsey Davenport, “Iran in 2022: Cusp of Nuclear Threshold,” The Iran Primer, US Institute of Peace, December 21, 2022, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2022/dec/21/iran-2022-cusp-nuclear-threshold.

20 David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso and Andrea Stricker, “Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report — November 2023,” Institute for Science and International Security, November 20, 2023, p. 17.
21 Dan De Luce and Abigail Williams, “The U.S. and Iran Are Holding Indirect Talks on a Possible Prisoner Exchange, With the Help of the U.K. and Qatar, Sources Say,” NBC News, February 15, 2023, https:// www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-iran-indirect-talks-prisoner-exchange-uk-qatar-rcna70645.
22 Barak David, “Scoop: U.S. Discussing Freeze-for-Freeze Approach to Iran Nuclear Program,” Axios, April 3, 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/04/03/iran-biden-proposal-freeze-nuclear-activity-deal.
23 Mark Fitzpatrick, “Iran-US Diplomacy Trudges on As Hopes of New Nuclear Understandings Grow,” Al-Monitor, June 25, 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/06/iran-us-diplomacy-trudges-hopes-new-nuclear-understandings-grow.

24 “Japan to Mediate Proposal to Rebuild Iran Nuclear Agreement in August, Foreign Minister ‘Positive Consideration,’” Kyodo News, September 25, 2023, https://www.47news.jp/9905862.html. (in Japanese)
25 “Tentative Plan to Rebuild Iran Nuclear Agreement, Reduce Enrichment to Export Crude Oil,” Kyodo News, September 24, 2023, https://www.47news.jp/9901875.html. (in Japanese)
26 “Statement of Iran,” Cluster 2, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 7, 2023.
27 “Statement by Iranian President Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi,” UN General Assembly, September 19, 2023.

28 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.58, June 3, 2022.
29 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.17, June 15, 2023.
30 “Statement of Iran,” Cluster 3 Specific Issues, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 9, 2023.
31 Chae Sang-Hun, “In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option,” New York Times, January 12, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons. html.

32 Jon Herskovitz, “South Korea’s Flirtation With Nuclear Arms Piles Pressure on US,” Bloomberg, January 18, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-17/south-korea-s-flirtation-with-nuclear-arms-piles-pressure-on-us.
33 “Washington Declaration,” April 26, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/.
34 Sarah Fortinsky, “Saudi Crown Prince on Iran Acquiring Nuclear Weapons: ‘If They Get One, We Have To Get One,’” The Hill, September 20, 2023, https://thehill.com/policy/international/4215594-saudi-crown-prince-on-iran-acquiring-nuclear-weapons-if-they-get-one-we-have-to-get-one/.
35 Summer Said, Sha Hua and Dion Nissenbaum, “Saudi Arabia Eyes Chinese Bid for Nuclear Plant,” Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-eyes-chinese-bid-for-nuclear-plant-e4a56f.
36 Sharon Squassoni, “Nuclear Mirage: U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia,” Arms Control Today, December 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-12/features/nuclear-mirage-us-nuclear-coopera tion-saudi-arabia.

37 Parisa Hafezi, “Iran’s Khamenei Says ‘Nothing Wrong’ with a Nuclear Deal with West,” Reuters, June 12, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-nothing-wrong-with-nuclear-de al-with-west-2023-06-11/.
38 “Statement by President Raisi.”
39 A/RES/53/77D, December 4, 1998.
40 A/RES/78/39, December 4, 2023.
41 “Statement of Brazil,” Cluster 2 Specific Issue, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 7, 2023.

42 “Statement of Iran,” Cluster 2 Specific Issues, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 7, 2023.
43 “Statement of the United States,” Cluster 2 Specific Issues, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 7, 2023.
44 “Statement of Russia,” Cluster 2 Specific Issues, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 7, 2023.

45 “Statement of Israel,” Nuclear Weapons Cluster, First Committee, UN General Assembly, October 16, 2023.
46 A/CONF.236/2023/2, November 17, 2023.
47 A/RES/78/17, December 4, 2023.
48 NPT/CONF.2020/18, March 20, 2020.