Under the NPT, nuclear-weapon states (NWS) are not required to conclude a CSA with the IAEA. However, to alleviate concerns about the discriminatory nature of the NPT, the NWS have voluntarily agreed to apply safeguards to some of their nuclear facilities and fissile material that are not involved in military activities. All NWS have also concluded tailored Additional Protocols with the IAEA.

The IAEA Annual Report 2022 (Annex), published in 2023, lists facilities in NWS under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material during 2022.85 The IAEA does not publish the number of inspections conducted in NWS. The safeguarded facilities include the following.

➢ China: A power reactor, and an enrichment plant
➢ France: A fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, and an enrichment plant
➢ Russia: A separate storage facility
➢ The United Kingdom: An enrichment plant and two separate storage facilities
➢ The United States: A separate storage facility

In its Safeguards Statement, “the [IAEA] Secretariat concluded for [five NWS] that nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements. There were no such withdrawals from the selected facilities in France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom.”86

Each NWS has already concluded an IAEA Additional Protocol. Among them, the Additional Protocol concluded by the United States includes provisions for complementary access similar to those in Additional Protocols concluded by NNWS. The United States was the first NWS that has hosted a complementary access visit by the IAEA. The respective Additional Protocols concluded by France and the United Kingdom also include provisions for complementary access, though these are somewhat limited. Compared to the three NWS mentioned above, application of IAEA safeguards to nuclear facilities by China and Russia have been more limited. Their Additional Protocols do not stipulate any provision for complementary access visits.

France stated in its national report submitted to the NPT RevCon, “all French facilities holding civil nuclear materials are subject to Euratom inspection.” It also reported that certain nuclear fuel cycle facilities in France (including uranium enrichment plant, reprocessing plant and MOX fuel fabrication plant) are subject to IAEA safeguards verification, in addition to those by the EURATOM.87 The United Kingdom also reported in its national report submitted to the NPT RevCon that all enrichment and reprocessing in the United Kingdom has been conducted under international safeguards, and that its safeguards agreement with the IAEA “allows for the application of safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in facilities within the United Kingdom, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only.”88 The United States, like the United Kingdom, also designates all of its civilian nuclear facilities as eligible facilities.

India has concluded an India-specific safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/754), under which India has designated all civilian nuclear facilities subject to the safeguards, and the declared nuclear materials and facilities have been inspected by the IAEA. Israel and Pakistan have concluded facility-specific safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66. These non-NPT states have accepted IAEA inspections of the facilities that they declare are subject to these agreements. According to the IAEA Annual Report 2022, the facilities placed under IAEA safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material in non-NPT states as of December 31, 2022 are as listed below.89 (The IAEA does not publish the number of inspections conducted in those countries.)

➢ India: Eleven power reactors, three fuel fabrication plants, two separate storage facilities
➢ Israel: One research reactor
➢ Pakistan: Seven power reactors (an increase from six in the previous year) and two research reactors

Regarding these countries’ activities in 2022, the IAEA “concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.”90

In terms of protocols additional to non-NPT states’ safeguards agreements (which differ significantly from the model Additional Protocol), the India-IAEA Additional Protocol entered into force in July 2014. This Additional Protocol is similar to ones that the IAEA concluded with China and Russia, with provisions on providing information and protecting classified information, but not on complementary access. No negotiation has begun to date on similar protocols with Israel or Pakistan.
Some NNWS call on the NWS for further application of the IAEA safeguards to their nuclear facilities in order to alleviate a discriminative nature that NNWS are obliged to accept full-scope safeguards whereas NWS are not. At the NPT PrepCom in 2023, the NAM countries, in particular, continue to demand that the NWS undertake to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards.91

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85 IAEA Annual Report 2022, GC(67)/2/Annex, Table A43(a).
86 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2022.”

87 NPT/CONF.2020/42/Rev.1, August 1, 2022.
88 NPT/CONF.2020/33, November 5, 2021. EURATOM safeguards are no longer in place in the United Kingdom due to the U.K.’s withdrawal from the EU.
89 IAEA Annual Report 2022, GC(67)/2/Annex, Table A43(a).

90 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2022.”
91 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.13, June 14, 2023.