A) Establishment and implementation of the national control systems

There were few remarkable developments in 2022 regarding establishing and implementing national control systems regarding export controls on nuclear-related items and technologies. The following countries surveyed in this report belong to the four international export control regimes,104 including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), have national implementation systems in place, and have implemented effective export controls regarding nuclear- (and other WMD-) related items and technologies through list and catch-all controls: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.105

These countries have also made proactive efforts to strengthen export controls. For example, Japan has held an annual Asian Export Control Seminar, inviting Asian countries and other major countries from outside the region, to promote Asian and international non-proliferation efforts, although it could not be convened in 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the 29th Asian Export Control Seminar in February 2023, approximately 150 persons in charge of export control from 30 Asian and other regional major countries/ regions, as well as eight international and other organizations, attended. At the seminar, the following issues were discussed, inter alia: outreach to industry and academia in consideration of increasing importance of advanced technology; strengthening export controls in Asia; and activities under international frameworks.106

In addition, the Vienna Group of Ten proposed as following in its working paper submitted to the NPT PrepCom: “Before supplying nuclear material, sensitive equipment or technology, States parties have the responsibility to seek assurance that the recipient State has in place Non-Proliferation Treaty-related IAEA safeguards, an adequate nuclear security regime, a minimum set of measures to combat illicit trafficking and rules and regulations for appropriate export controls in cases of retransfer.”107

Among other countries surveyed in this project, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey are NSG members. These countries have all set up export control systems, including catch-all controls. China published a white paper titled “China’s Export Controls” in the end of 2021. It stated that “China safeguards the authority of international treaties and mechanisms that uphold true multilateralism, and actively promotes the implementation of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory international export controls.” It also explained China’s basic positions—maintaining a holistic approach to national security, honoring international obligations and commitments, promoting international cooperation and coordination, and opposing the abuse of export control measures—and outlined its efforts.108

As for non-NSG members, Egypt, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have yet to establish sufficient export control legislations and systems. In the meantime, the NAM countries, including Egypt and Indonesia, underscored that many of the export control regimes were developed outside of the UN framework in selective, non-inclusive ways and without proper involvement of developing countries, as stating: “The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to the participation of all States and should not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.”109
India, Israel and Pakistan have also set up national export control systems, including catch-all controls. In 2023, the NSG was again unable to achieve a consensus on India’s membership application. China, the main opponent to this application, has argued that applicant countries must be parties to the NPT.110 It has also been reported that China will not accept India’s participation in the NSG unless Pakistan is also accepted as a member.111 Pakistan has argued that, as a state behaving responsibly regarding nuclear safety and security, it qualifies for acceptance as an NSG member.

As of the end of 2023, the status of export control implementation by North Korea, Iran and Syria remains unclear. Cooperation among these countries in ballistic missile development continues to be a concern, as mentioned below. In addition, North Korea was involved in the past in constructing a graphite-moderated reactor in Syria to produce plutonium.

 

B) Requiring the conclusion of the Additional Protocol for nuclear exports

Under the NSG Guidelines Part I, one of the conditions for supplying materials and technology designed specifically for nuclear use is to accept the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In addition, NSG member states agreed on the following principle in June 2013:

[S]uppliers should authorize transfers, pursuant to this paragraph, only when the recipient has brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional Protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol or, pending this, is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.112

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and the Vienna Group of Ten have argued that conclusion and implementation of the CSA and the Additional Protocol should be a condition for new supply arrangements with NNWS.113 Some of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements that Japan and the United States concluded recently with other countries make conclusion of the Additional Protocol a prerequisite for their cooperation with the respective partner states.

On the other hand, the NAM continues to argue that supplier countries should refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on transfers of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other states parties to the NPT and their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements, stating: “The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the [NPT] are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.”114

China and Russia also oppose the imposition of additional conditions and obligations. For instance, Russia said, “Another destructive trend is the use of the NPT as a pretext for restricting States’ access to nuclear technology. Those who do so forget about Article IV of the NPT, which guarantees the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This approach is also dangerous because it creates the false impression that the Treaty is unfair, when in fact it only concerns the abuse of the NPT provisions by some NPT parties who thus try to deal with their short-term political challenges.”115

While the NPT does not prohibit NNWS from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel, provided these activities are for peaceful purposes and under IAEA safeguards, such activities remain highly sensitive due to proliferation concerns. The spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies implies that more countries could gain the capability to produce nuclear weapons. As previously noted, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines stipulate that the recipient state must implement the Additional Protocol as a condition for receiving transfers of enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology.

The U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement concluded in 2009 stipulates a so-called “gold standard”—i.e. that the recipients are obliged to forgo enrichment and reprocessing activities. However, other bilateral agreements concluded and updated by the United States (except that with Taiwan) do not stipulate similar obligations.116 In the meantime, the nuclear cooperation agreements that Japan has signed with the UAE and Jordan, respectively, prohibit the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear materials transferred, recovered or produced under the agreements.

The question of whether the nuclear cooperation agreement currently under negotiation between Saudi Arabia and the United States will adhere to the “gold standard” has garnered significant public attention. The United States has requested that Saudi Arabia renounce enrichment and reprocessing on the latter’s territory as part of the agreement. However, Saudi Arabia has yet to agree to this stipulation. Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, while Saudi Arabia has not yet concluded an amended SQP, a CSA or an Additional Protocol, it clarified in 2023 that it was working toward concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

 

C) Implementation of the UNSCRs concerning North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues

North Korea

With regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, UN Member States are obliged to implement measures set out in the UN Security Council resolutions, including embargoes on nuclear-, other WMD-, and ballistic missile-related items, material, and technologies.
The Panel of Experts, established pursuant to UNSCR 1874 (2009), has published biannual reports on its findings and recommendations about implementing the resolutions. According to the report published in March 2023, the Panel pointed out North Korea’s activities in defiance of the UNSCRs, including the following matters:117

➢ The Panel of Experts has continued to investigate the intangible transfer of technology involving North Korea.
➢ Refined petroleum products continued to be provided illicitly by “direct delivery” tankers delivering to North Korea’s tankers in its exclusive economic zone. The maritime section of the present report focuses on the significant acceleration in the country’s acquisition of vessels (mainly cargo ships) in 2022, and the methodology employed by those facilitating that acquisition. Illicit ship-to-ship imports of cargo in North Korean territorial waters remained ongoing. Prohibited ship-to-ship exports of North Korean coal continued.
➢ Cyberactivities attributed to Reconnaissance General Bureau actors continued; a higher value of cryptocurrency assets was stolen by North Korean actors in 2022 than in any previous year. The country used increasingly sophisticated cybertechniques both to gain access to digital networks involved in cyberfinance and to steal information of potential value, including to its weapons programs.
➢ The Panel investigated the apparent export of North Korea’s military communications equipment and has begun an investigation into reports of ammunition export.
➢ South Korea authorities estimated that State-sponsored North Korea cyberthreat actors had stolen virtual assets worth around $1.2 billion globally since 2017, including about $630 million in 2022 alone. A cybersecurity firm assessed that, in 2022, North Korea cybercrime had yielded cybercurrencies worth over $1 billion (at the time of theft), which is more than double the total proceeds in 2021.

In the Panel’s Midterm Report published in September 2022, the following issues, inter alia, were pointed out:118

➢ The Panel describes a rich variety of sanctions evasion measures deployed by vessels delivering refined petroleum products to North Korea. These included more sophisticated means to avoid detection, changing trading locations in affected waters, and additional ships involved in multi-stage trans-shipments. The Panel received information that the country continues to import refined petroleum products in violation of Security Council resolutions. Vessel acquisition in violation of Security Council sanctions continued: the country acquired 14 new vessels in the period under review. Prohibited ship-to-ship exports of coal from North Korea continued.
➢ Although the country’s borders remained largely closed, trade volumes increased mainly because of the resumption of rail traffic. A large variety of foreign goods has quickly reappeared. The Panel continued to investigate reports of imports of luxury goods.
➢ After a record-breaking level of cyberthefts in 2022, estimated at $1.7 billion, North Korean hackers reportedly continued to successfully target cryptocurrency and other financial exchanges globally. Actors working for the Reconnaissance General Bureau continued to use increasingly sophisticated cybertechniques to steal funds and information. Companies in the cryptocurrency, defense, energy and health sectors were targeted in particular.
➢ North Korea continued to access the international financial system and engaged in illicit financial operations. The Panel investigated financial institutions and representatives of the country operating abroad that support such activity. Border reopening may increase cases of North Korea nationals couriering cash and high-value items. The Panel investigated reports of nationals working overseas earning income in violation of sanctions, including in the information technology, restaurant, medical and construction sectors.
➢ The Panel continued investigations into alleged exports of North Korea military communications equipment and ammunition, and initiated a number of investigations into possible cases of sales by the country of arms or other types of military support to Member States.
➢ The Panel continued to investigate allegations of the export by North Korea of armaments to the Russian Federation. In addition to a claim that in November 2022 ammunition (artillery shells, infantry rockets and missiles) was delivered by rail, the United States reported that KOMID and the Wagner Group were behind the deal. The Russian Federation replied: “The photographs provided ‘by one Member State’ are not comprehensive evidence and do not show a violation of the international restrictive measures imposed against Pyongyang. The movement of goods to/from the [DPRK] is carried out taking into account the requirements of the Security Council resolutions concerning this country. The Council’s sanctions prohibitions and restrictions are being complied with. The competent Russian authorities found no violations.” The Panel has not obtained further evidence and still cannot confirm that the train in the imagery provided was used to transport ammunition.

Regarding the implementation of sanctions against North Korea, there has been particular concern in recent years about the actions of China and Russia. They have consistently defended North Korea, especially during incidents involving missile tests and reconnaissance satellite launches, and opposed the UN Security Council’s issuance of condemnatory statements or the adoption of resolutions against North Korea. In July 2023, the UN ambassadors of the G7 countries, along with Australia, South Korea and New Zealand, addressed a letter to the Chinese UN ambassador urgently appealing for China’s support in halting maritime activities designed to circumvent sanctions imposed on North Korea. However, the Chinese UN Mission maintained that China was fulfilling its international obligations.
A more pressing concern than the China-North Korea relationship is the swiftly intensifying relationship between Russia and North Korea. Notably, Pyongyang has publicly declared its support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On September 13, 2023, a Russia-North Korea summit meeting was held at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia’s Far East. Prior to the meeting, when asked by reporters whether he would support North Korea’s development of satellites, President Putin said, “That’s why we came here. The leader of the DPRK shows great interest in rocket engineering; they are also trying to develop space.”119 It is considered that during the summit, the two leaders also discussed the provision of weapons and ammunition from North Korea to Russia. Additionally, the transfer of military technology from Russia to North Korea was also likely a topic of conversation. Although UN Security Council resolutions completely prohibit dealings in weapons and related materials with North Korea, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, said after the summit, “Sanctions against North Korea were adopted in a completely different geopolitical situation when there were problems establishing dialogue (with Pyongyang), when there were quite serious debates in the Security Council.”120
On October 26, following the Russia-North Korea summit meeting, the U.K. Ministry of Defence disclosed its analysis that over the past few weeks, more than 1,000 containers considered to be loaded with ammunition and other supplies had been transported from North Korea to Russia.121 In addition, on November 1, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service reportedly analyzed that North Korea had shipped more than a million artillery shells to Russia through ships and other transport means since early August.122 Subsequently, on November 21, North Korea carried out a launch of a reconnaissance satellite. An analysis suggested that following the Russia-North Korea summit, Russian technicians entered North Korea to provide technical assistance, particularly in relation to engine technologies.123 On December 30, U.S. Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby said Russian forces had launched at least one North Korean short-range ballistic missile into Ukraine.124

Iran

The UN Iran Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts was wound up after the conclusion of the JCPOA, at Iran’s insistence, and the UN Security Council is now responsible for overseeing the remaining limitations.
In accordance with the JCPOA, approval of the Procurement Working Group, established under the agreement, is required for Iranian procurement of nuclear-related items and material. The number of cases has been reported to the Security Council every six months. According to the reports published in June and December 2023, in the six months leading up to that month, respectively, no proposal was under review by the Procurement Working Group.125
Although it is not clear whether Iran is engaged in illegal nuclear-related procurement activities, some European intelligence agencies have reported that Iran has been engaged in such activities. In 2023, the German, Dutch, and Swedish intelligence agencies stated in their respective reports that Iran was engaged in procurement activities in those countries for technology and equipment that could be used to develop nuclear weapons.126

The JCPOA set October 18, 2023, eight years after the entry into force of the agreement (or “the IAEA reaches the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities,” whichever is earlier) as the “Transition Date.” On the specified date, the EU was expected to implement additional sanctions relief measures, including lifting the embargo on nuclear materials and ballistic missiles. Concurrently, the United States would consider terminating or modifying laws pertaining to suspended sanctions. Meanwhile, Iran would endeavor, in accordance with the constitutional roles of its President and Parliament, to ratify the Additional Protocol.
On October 18, the Secretariat of the UN Security Council, by sending a note to the UN member states, officially ended the provisions of clauses 3, 4 and 6 of Annex B of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231, including restrictions on the export and import of missile items to Iran, as well as sanctions related to confiscation of property and providing financial services to Iranian individuals and institutions under the sanctions of the Security Council has informed the countries.127 Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, respectively, issued statements announcing the end of UN prohibitions aimed at constraining Iran’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) activities under UNSCR 2231.128
On the other hand, France, Germany and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement on September 14, 2023, announcing, “In direct response to Iran’s consistent and severe non-compliance with its JCPOA commitments since 2019, the governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom intend to maintain nuclear proliferation-related measures on Iran, as well as arms and missile embargoes, after JCPOA Transition Day on 18 October 2023.” At the same time, they also stated, “Our commitment to finding a diplomatic solution remains. This decision does not amount to imposing additional sanctions nor to triggering the snapback mechanism. We stand ready to reverse our decision, should Iran fully implement its JCPOA commitments.”129
On the day before the Transition Day, the EU also stated, “The Council adopted legal acts to maintain the designations, that had initially been imposed by the United Nations for individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missiles activities or affiliated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).” At the same time, its statement also said, “The Council also agreed to maintain sectoral and individual measures, existing under the EU’s sanctions regime, notably those related to Iran nuclear proliferation, as well as arms and missile embargoes.”130
On October 18, the United States announced sanctions against 11 individuals, eight entities, and one vessel based in Iran, Hong Kong, China and Venezuela, which are enabling Iran’s destabilizing ballistic missile and UAV programs. In a separate move, the U.S. Department of State imposed sanctions on two Iranian officials for engaging in activities that have materially contributed to Iran’s missile program, and also imposed sanctions on two Iran-based entities and four Russia-based entities.131 The United States also released an “Iran Ballistic Missile Procurement Advisory” directed at the industry. This advisory detailed the alleged deceptive practices employed by Iran to acquire components for its ballistic missile program from various international sources.132
Meanwhile, no JCPOA member activated the snapback mechanism provided for in the agreement.
On the day before the Transition Day, Russian Foreign Ministry stated, “Supplies to and from Iran of products falling under the Missile Technology Control Regime no longer require prior approval by the UN Security Council.”133 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson also said that “China supports lifting relevant restrictions and unilateral sanctions on Iran as slated in the Security Council Resolution and the JCPOA.”134

Nuclear-related cooperation between concerned states

There have been repeated allegations over the years that North Korea and Iran have engaged in nuclear and missile development cooperation. The report by the Panel of Experts on North Korea in March 2021 mentioned that North Korea and Iran had resumed cooperation on long-range missile development projects.135 However, subsequent reports published by the Panel in 2022 and 2023 did not contain any references regarding cooperation between North Korea and Iran in this area. Meanwhile, no concrete evidence has been revealed to support allegations of nuclear-related cooperation between North Korea and Iran.

 

D) Participation in the PSI

A total of 106 countries—including 21 member states of the Operational Expert Group (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia,136 Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others) as well as Israel, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland and others—have expressed their support for the principles and objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Many of them have also participated and cooperated in PSI-related activities.

The interdiction activities actually carried out within the framework of the PSI are often based on information provided by intelligence agencies; therefore, most of them are classified. In the meantime, participating states have endorsed the PSI statement of interdiction principles and endeavored to reinforce their capabilities for interdicting WMD through exercises and outreach activities.
From May 30 to June 2, 2023, the PSI ministerial meeting and the Asia-Pacific regional interdiction exercise, named “Eastern Endeavor 23” were held in South Korea. Seventy countries, including Australia, Japan and the United States, participated in the ministerial meeting. (China, a non-member country that was invited, did not participate.) The interdiction exercise was conducted off Jeju Island by six countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and the United States). Academic conferences and tabletop exercises by experts from each country, as well as a PSI Operation Experts Meeting, were also convened.

In August, a Southeast Asia PSI Workshop was held in Bangkok, which was co-hosted by the United States and Thailand. In addition to the host countries, participants included Cambodia, Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Australia. The purpose of this workshop was to “examine modern [WMD] proliferation pathways, improve understanding of WMD interdiction obligations, explore legal frameworks and the best practices of partners, and enhance the connections of the ‘Countering WMD’ community in Southeast Asia.” The workshop included an expert brief on global and regional proliferation threats from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), panel discussions, and a scenario-based tabletop discussion focused on intra-governmental information sharing and decision-making about potential WMD-related proliferation activities in the region.137
In October, the United States led a joint statement on Iran-related issues, along with approximately 50 countries that endorse the Statement of Interdiction Principles, which stated the following:

Specifically, with regard to Iran and consistent with the PSI principles, we affirm our commitment to take all necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology, to protect peace and stability in the region and beyond including: (1) undertake effective measures to interdict the transfer to and from Iran of missile-related materials, including those related to UAVs; (2) adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning Iran’s proliferation activities; (3) review and work to strengthen our relevant national legal authorities to address Iranian missile- and UAV-related issues; and (4) take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts related to Iran’s missile and UAV programs.138

In January 2018, several PSI-participating countries released a joint statement reiterating their commitment to impede and stop North Korea’s illicit activities, including smuggling, by taking measures such as: inspecting proliferation-related shipments on vessels with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items prohibited under UNSCRs; and prohibiting their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from North Korean-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from North Korea.139
Regarding illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean-flagged vessels prohibited by UNSCRs, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has carried out monitoring and surveillance activities in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea since December 2017. Japan’s Foreign Ministry published a post regarding North Korea’s illicit activities on its official website.140 Monitoring and surveillance activities regarding this matter were conducted by Japan and the United States, together with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in 2023 as in previous years.

 

E) Civil nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT

In September 2008, the NSG agreed to grant India a waiver allowing nuclear trade with the member states under the condition that India made commitments, including conclusion of the IAEA Additional Protocol and continuation of the nuclear test moratorium. Since then, some countries have sought to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India, and several countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Russia and the United States, have concluded bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreements with India.

Actual nuclear cooperation with India under these agreements has been sparse,141 with the exception of India importing uranium from Australia, Canada, France, Kazakhstan and Russia, and the conclusion of its agreements to import uranium from Argentina, Mongolia, Namibia and Uzbekistan.142 In addition, despite the United States’ ongoing support for India’s membership in the NSG,143 India has yet to be admitted to it.
Meanwhile, China has been criticized for its April 2010 agreement to export two nuclear power reactors to Pakistan, an act which may violate the NSG guidelines. China has claimed an exemption for this transaction under the “grandfather clause” of the NSG guidelines (i.e. it was not applicable at the time China became an NSG participant after the start of negotiations on the supply of the reactors). China will also supply enriched uranium to Pakistan for operating these reactors.144 Because all other Chinese reactors that were claimed to be excluded from NSG guidelines under the grandfather clause were built at Chashma, there remains a question as to whether or not the exemption can also apply to the Karachi plant. In June 2023, Pakistan and China signed a $4.8 billion deal to build the seventh Chinese nuclear power plant in Pakistan.145

The NAM has criticized civil nuclear cooperation with non-NPT states, and argued as following:

The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.146

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104 Aside from the NSG, Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).
105 In July 2019, Japan pointed out the inadequacy of South Korea’s domestic export control system, and reviewed its operation of export controls with respect to South Korea. However, Japan announced that South Korea was re-designated as a Group A (formerly “White Countries”) in April 2023.

106 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The 29th Asian Export Control Seminar,” March 1, 2023, https://www. mofa.go.jp/dns/n_s_ne/page4e_001370.html.
107 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.17, June 15, 2023.
108 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Export Controls,” December 29, 2021, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202112/29/content_WS61cc01b8 c6d09c94e48a2df0.html.

109 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.11, June 14, 2023.
110 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, January 31, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t16345 07.shtml.
111 “China and Pakistan Join Hands to Block India’s Entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group,” Times of India, May 12, 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-and-Pakistan-join-hands-to-block-Indias-entry-into-Nuclear-Suppliers-Group/articleshow/52243719.cms.
112 INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, July 26, 2011.
113 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.17, June 15, 2023; “Statement of New Zealand,” Cluster 2, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 4, 2023.

114 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.13, June 14, 2023.
115 “Statement by Russia,” First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 1, 2023.
116 The U.S.-Mexico Nuclear Cooperation Agreement concluded in May 2018, and it is stated in the preamble that Mexico will not conduct sensitive nuclear activities, which is referred to as a “silver standard.”

117 S/2023/171, March 7, 2023.

118 S/2022/656, September 12, 2023.

119 “Putin Meets Kim, Says Russia Will Help North Korea Build Satellites,” Reuters, September 13, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-says-russia-help-north-korea-build-satellites-2023-09-13/.
120 “Russia’s Lavrov Says Situation Has Changed Since North Korea Was Hit by U.N. Sanctions,” Reuters, September 13, 2023, https://jp.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN30J0T4/.

121 Twitter of the U.K. Ministry of Defence, October 28, 2023, https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/ 1717442824927363583. Regarding arms and ammunition transfers from North Korea to Russia, see also James Byrne, Joseph Byrne and Gary Somerville, “The Orient Express: North Korea’s Clandestine Supply Route to Russia,” RUSI, October 16, 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/ commentary/report-orient-express-north-koreas-clandestine-supply-route-russia.
122 Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, “Russian Help to Boost North Korea Bid to Launch Spy Satellite, South Korea Says,” Reuters, November 1, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-chances-succeeding-spy-satellite-launch-high-skorea-2023-11-01/.
123 “Notification of a North Korea’s Satellite Launch—Direct Assistance from Russian Engineers to Improve Capability? South Korean Defense Minister: ‘Engine Problem Almost Resolved,’” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 21, 2023, https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/20231121-OYT1T50147/. (in Japanese)
124 Jeff Mason and Josh Smith, “White House says Russia used missiles from North Korea to strike Ukraine,” Reuters, January 5, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-north-korea-recently-provided-russia-with-ballistic-missiles-2024-01-04/.
125 S/2023/448, June 30, 2023; S/2023/963, December 6, 2023.
126 “Iran’s Illicit Procurement Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany During 2022,” Memeri, June 21, 2023, https://www.memri.org/reports/irans-illicit-procure ment-related-weapons-mass-destruction- netherlands-sweden-and-germany.