A) Efforts toward commencing negotiations on an FMCT

In the “Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the participating countries agreed on the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the CD. However, substantive negotiations have not yet commenced. The 2023 session of the CD again ended without adopting a program of work that included the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on an FMCT negotiation, due to Pakistan’s strong objection, as was the case in previous years. As in previous years, Pakistan continued to oppose the negotiations of a treaty that would solely prohibit the new production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, stating:

Time to pursue this fundamentally flawed approach has long passed. A treaty which only results in a cut-off in the future production of fissile material would be a non-starter given that it would perpetuate asymmetries and will have no added value for nuclear disarmament. The inefficacy and duplicity of this approach is also laid bare, when states with so-called moratoria modernize and increase their nuclear arsenals. Or when states exercise double standards by engaging in nuclear cooperation with a country in South Asia that has amassed fissile material stockpiles outside safeguards.

Therefore, a realistic approach is required which recognizes the importance of developing consensus on a Fissile Materials Treaty that addresses asymmetries in existing stockpiles and results in equal and undiminished security for all states.234

The NAM countries also stated at the NPT PrepCom, “The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.”235

While the commencement of FMCT negotiations remained unrealized, Japan co-hosted a Commemorative High-Level Event on a FMCT with Australia and the Philippines in September during the UN General Assembly. Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida stated, “Shouldn’t we limit the quantitative improvement of nuclear weapons by banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons now to maintain the declining trend of global nuclear arsenals?”236

At the 2023 UNGA, a resolution, titled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,”237 which called for immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations at the CD and declaration of moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, was adopted with 160 countries in favor, 5 against (China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and other) and 20 abstentions (including Egypt, Israel, North Korea Russia and Syria).

 

B) Moratoria on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons

As in the previous year, China, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea have not declared a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Among those countries, at least India, Pakistan and North Korea are seen as highly likely to continue producing fissile material for nuclear weapons.

It is considered that China does not currently produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. However, there are also concerns that the advanced fast-breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities that China is developing for civilian purposes can be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes.238 In May 2023, Russia confirmed that it was supplying highly enriched uranium for two Chinese fast breeder reactors (CFR-600).239

North Korea was considered to have produced fissile material for nuclear weapons and conducted related activities in 2023, as in previous years. In its defense white paper published in February 2023, South Korea reported that North Korea had continued the reprocessing of spent fuel. The report also estimated that North Korea possesses around 70 kg of weapons-grade plutonium as a result of these activities.240 In April, the U.S. experts provided analysis that North Korea’s 5 MW graphite-moderated reactor was in operation, and that the construction of an experimental light water reactor (LWR) in Yongbyon was nearing completion.241 At the end of the same month, it was also analyzed that the 5 MW reactor had likely been shut down, and that spent fuel containing approximately 5-8 kg of weapons-grade plutonium, may have been removed from the reactor.242 Furthermore, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated in December that the discharge of warm water from the LWR was observed, which was “indicative the reactor has reached criticality.”243

None of the nuclear-armed states have declared the amount of fissile material for nuclear weapons which they possess (except for the United States, which declassifies the amount of its past production of HEU and plutonium). Estimates by research institutes are summarized in Chapter 3 of this Report.

 

 

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234 “Statement of Pakistan,” Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons, First Committee, UNGA, October 16, 2023.
235 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.8, June 14, 2023.

236 “Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. KISHIDA Fumio, Prime Minister of Japan at the Commemorative High-Level Event on an FMCT,” Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, September 19, 2023, https://www. mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100555656.pdf.
237 A/RES/78/28, December 4, 2023.
238 See, for instance, The U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, p. 97.
239 Echo Xie, “Russia Confirms Enriched Uranium Supplies to China,” South China Morning Post, May 5, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3219424/russia-confirms-enriched-uranium-supplies-china.
240 Hyonhee Shin, “South Korea Defence Paper Calls North ‘Enemy,’ Estimates Plutonium Stockpile at 70 kg,” Reuters, February 16, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-defence-paper-calls-north-enemy-estimates-plutonium-stockpile-70-kg-2023-02-16/.
241 Peter Makowsky and Jack Liu, “Growing Activity at North Korea’s Experimental Light Water Reactor,” 38 North, April 1, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/04/yongbyon-nuclear-research-center-growing-activity-at-the- experimental-light-water-reactor/.

242 Olli Heinonen, Peter Makowsky, Jack Liu and 38 North, “Possible Refueling at Yongbyon’s 5 MWe Reactor,” 38 North, April 29, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/04/possible-refueling-at-yongbyons-5-mwe-reactor/.
243 “IAEA Director General Statement on Recent Developments in the DPRK’s Nuclear Programme,” IAEA, December 21, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-general-statement-on-recent-developments-in-the-dprks-nuclear-programme.