Russia and the United States have implemented verification measures, including on-site inspections, under the New START. Since its entry into force, they had conducted on-site inspections as stipulated in the treaty. However, as mentioned above, on-site inspections have been suspended since April 1, 2020. (See Section 5 (A) of this chapter.)

Within the UN framework, the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues, established pursuant to a 2019 UNGA resolution,250 published its final report in June 2023. The report summarized the group’s discussions as follows:

The Group made several conclusions on nuclear disarmament verification. The Group, inter alia, developed a working definition of nuclear disarmament verification to guide its work; identified the primary purpose and objective of nuclear disarmament verification; highlighted the importance of trust and confidence-building measures, and the value of taking stock of existing experiences; recognized the amount of work done on the concept of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts; recognized the utility of continuing work on nuclear disarmament verification; and underlined that equal opportunities for women and men should be provided, and discussed that awareness raising of nuclear disarmament verification, through peace and disarmament education, could be considered part of capacity building.

The Group of Governmental Experts recommended, inter alia, that Member States of the United Nations, as well as relevant bodies of the international disarmament machinery, in accordance with their respective mandates, consider this report and continue discussions on nuclear disarmament verification.
The Group also recommended that Member States of the United Nations continue the work on nuclear disarmament verification issues, as well as consider capacity building efforts, including on regional approaches to capacity building, as appropriate, and that Member States of the United Nations take appropriate measures to ensure equal opportunities for women and men to enable their full and meaningful engagement in nuclear disarmament efforts, including nuclear disarmament verification.251

One notable activity on verification is the “International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV),” launched by the United States in December 2014. With 28 participating countries (plus the EU and the Vatican),252 the IPNDV continues to study verification measures and technologies related to dismantling nuclear weapons, as well as fissile material derived from dismantled nuclear warheads. At the IPNDV Plenary Meeting in December 2022, partner countries revised the working group structure to better facilitate cross coordination and information exchange among participants, and decided to establish the following four working groups:253

➢ Limitations Working Group, which is exploring verification options for a scenario where a notional country (Ipindovia) is bound by agreement to limit its arsenal of nuclear weapons to a maximum of 500;

➢ Reductions Working Group, which is exploring verification options for a scenario where Ipindovia reduces its arsenal of nuclear weapons from 500 to zero;

➢ Concepts Working Group, which is exploring cross-cutting conceptual issues associated with the limitation and reduction scenarios; and

➢ Technology Track, which explores technologies relevant to the other three working groups.

The above working group meetings were held in Albuquerque in April 2023,254 and in Budapest in September 2023255 to discuss and review the assigned issues.

In another effort on nuclear disarmament verification, the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway and Sweden launched the “Quad” initiative in 2015, and have continued its work since then. In their working paper submitted to the 10th NPT RevCon, these countries noted that two separate workstreams of verification strategies and verification technologies are being organized for study and analysis, based on the lessons learned from the multilateral exercise conducted in 2017; and “the two workstreams [would] mainly focus on their respective programmes of work in the period up to 2022 … [and] the partnership will then build on their results and integrate them into a common, substantive deliverable, possibly including an exercise, within the time frame of the 2026 NPT review cycle.”256 In addition, France and Germany conducted the Nuclear Disarmament Verification Exercise (NuDiVe) in September 2019 and April 2022 within the framework of IPNDV.257

In March 2023, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), with support from the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, in cooperation with the Swiss Army and others, conducted the “Menzingen Verification Experiment,” which was designed to test practical procedures for verifying the absence of nuclear weapons at a storage site.258

On the other hand, Russia voiced criticism regarding the ongoing efforts in the realm of nuclear disarmament verification, stating:

The issue of nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) has been gaining popularity in recent years. However, we strongly believe that the potential benefits of its in-depth discussion at the present stage have been greatly overestimated. Discussions in the specialized UN Group of Governmental Experts confirmed the lack of unity in relation to approaches to NDV and its scope. Most importantly, there is no agreement on the advisability of the “early” development of verification procedures in isolation from comprehensive negotiation work that will be required in the future to conclude nuclear disarmament agreements. All of this range of views is presented in the final report of the Group, which also contains a number of important consensus statements on the fundamental principles on which the NDV should be based. It is unlikely that in the foreseeable future the NPT community will have much to add on this topic for the purposes of the Treaty review process.259

At the NPT PrepCom, the NAM countries requested IAEA’s involvement in developing verification measures, including those applied to fissile material removed from nuclear weapons programs. They also called for the establishment by the NPT RevCon of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the NWS.260

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250 A/RES/74/50, December 19, 2019.
251 A/78/120, June 23, 2023.
252 In addition to three NWS (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), participating countries include Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UAE. China and Russia attended in Phase I (2015-2017) as observers, but did not join in Phase II (2018-2019).

253 “IPNDV April 2023 Working Meeting, Albuquerque, New Mexico,” IPNDV, https://www.ipndv.org/ events/ipndv-april-2023-working-meeting-albuquerque-new-mexico/.
254 Ibid.
255 “IPNDV September 2023 Working Meeting, Budapest, Hungary,” IPNDV, https://www.ipndv.org/ events/ipndv-september-2023-working-meeting-budapest-hungary/.
256 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.2, November 4, 2021.
257 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.18/Rev.1, July 7, 2022.
258 Pavel Podvig, “Menzingen Verification Experiment: Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field,” UNIDIR, July 31, 2023, https://unidir.org/publication/menzingen-verification-experiment-verifying-the-absence-of-nuclear-weapons-in-the-field/.

259 “Statement of Russia,” Cluster 1, First PrepCom for the 11th NPT RevCon, August 3, 2023.
260 NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.15, June 14, 2023.