Hiroshima Report 202418. Iran ■Non-Nuclear-Weapon State
| Nuclear Disarmament | 14 Points | Full Points 48 | 29.2 % |
| Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2023 -0.5 | |||
| Iran voted for most of the UNGA Resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament, including the UNGA resolution titled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations,” and other UNGA Resolutions related to the humanitarian dimensions as well as legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, it has not actively engaged in promotion of nuclear disarmament. Iran has neither ratified the CTBT nor signed the TPNW. It was against the UNGA resolutions on nuclear disarmament proposed by Japan and on an FMCT. It has been strengthening its relations with Russia continuing its invasion of Ukraine. | |||
| Nuclear Non-Proliferation | 25 Points | Full Points 61 | 41 % |
| Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2023 0 | |||
| Although indirect negotiations by the countries concerned to restore an (interim) Iran nuclear deal were held intermittently, no agreement was reached. As a countermeasure to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the enhancement of sanctions on Iran, Tehran has steadily expanded the areas from which it has withdrawn from its obligations under the JCPOA; such as the upper limits of, inter alia, its stockpile of enriched uranium, level of enrichment (including 20% and 60% HEU), and the number of centrifuges. In addition, it also suspended verification and monitoring measures under the JCPOA, including the provisional application of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA could not resolve the issues regarding the accuracy and completeness of declarations for four sites related to the alleged Iran’s past clandestine nuclear program. It has refused to accept IAEA inspectors from the U.S. and some European countries. Iran has reportedly been engaged in illegal procurement activities of nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology. | |||
| Nuclear Security | 4 Points | Full Points 38 | 10.5 % |
| Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2023 0 | |||
| Iran is not a party to several nuclear security-related conventions, and there is room for improvement. Although Iran should have completed the domestic procedures for ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste, it appears that the Convention was not ratified in 2023. Iran continued to produce HEU for civilian use and increased its holdings. Iran received an IPPAS mission in 2004. There is room for improvement in disseminating information on nuclear security efforts. | |||
