Introduction: General Overview of Nuclear Security in 2018

For the international community, securing the safety of “loose nukes” and vulnerable controlled fissile materials potentially attractive to terrorists has long been considered as an important nuclear security objective. Every country should make it a political priority to constantly strengtheng the level of its nuclear security, taking into account the lessons learned from the nuclear security summit process that ended in 2016.

In 2018, no large-scale international conference on nuclear security was held at all and information about each country’s efforts toward strengthening nuclear security tended to decrease compared with the previous year. The reason for this trend is not very clear. Possible explanations may be that measures related to nuclear security have already been sufficiently implemented in each country, that the international community places less emphasis on seeing further progress, or just because political attention to nuclear security has declined. Two years have passed since the nuclear security summit process ended and since the last meeting of the International Conference on Nuclear Security. It may be necessary to wait for the next large-scale international conference on nuclear security, to be held in 2019 and organized by the IAEA, to better understand the reasons for the trend.

There have been calls for continuing focused consideration on nuclear security at multilateral fora, where high-level participants are gathered on a regular basis. It has been argued that the relationship between the three pillars of the NPT (nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear power) and nuclear security should be reviewed. For example, at the 2018 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), held in April 2018, some countries noted that nuclear security should also be positioned within the broad framework of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear power. 2 In this regard, nuclear security was mentioned by a PrepCom working paper, “Vienna Issues,” 3 prepared by the Vienna Group of Ten (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden). In addition, Australia, Canada and Spain submitted a working paper titled “Nuclear security in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”4 In particular, the latter is a document that discusses the positioning of nuclear security from the viewpoint of the NPT as follows: “First, technological advances, which have transformed the nuclear field at a fast rate. These include advances in nuclear energy production, as well as applications of radioactive materials and sources, all of which demand increasingly specialized ways of ensuring sufficient levels of nuclear security to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism using these new technologies. Second, the emergence of new asymmetric threats, as well as the proliferation of non-State actors with the potential to access nuclear material and technologies, has created an international situation in which nuclear security is one of the cornerstones of many countries’ security policies. Third, the evolution of the non-proliferation regime itself, which is increasingly complex and rich in stakeholders and instruments.” 5 It is noteworthy that this document pointed out that nuclear security is not a fourth pillar for the NPT Review Conference in 2020, but a cross-cutting issue for the existing three pillars.6

Various focal points for CPPNM Amendment Review Conference

While a new perspective on nuclear security was provided in this way, another thing in the spotlight was the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM Amendment) that came into force in 2016, and the new utilization of its framework. In particular, it is noteworthy that there was an argument that the CPPNM Amendment should be effectively utilized in the context of strengthening global nuclear security as a means of regularly calling for high-level political attention.7

These arguments were raised by some parties at the 62nd IAEA General Conference in 2018. For example, the Netherlands pointed out that the review conference in 20218 will be an important moment to evaluate the implementation and adequacy of the CPPNM Amendment. The Netherlands also urged the IAEA to undertake the preparatory process promptly and encouraged all parties to engage in these processes.9 On the other hand, discussions have reexamined the outcome of the nuclear security summit process, in connection with seeking to strengthen nuclear security on a global scale. The report, “The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010-2016,” published by the Arms Control Association (ACA) and the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) in 2018, evaluated many issues including the lessons learned through the past nuclear security summits. In particular, the report points out that the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), created by the IAEA, is an important means to complement the verification system for the CPPNM Amendment, which does not currently have its own measures to verify the status of implementation. In this regard, the report states the expectation that a “360-degree look” at physical protection, taking into consideration other instruments and resources, offering states a genuine path to continue to improve their safeguarding of nuclear material and facilities, will be given at the review conference of the Convention.10 Another example of reviewing the heritage of the nuclear security summit process was an opinion weighing the merits and demerits of keeping the summit itself as an exclusive “minilateral negotiation forum.”11 Also, in light of the many terrorist bombing attacks that have occurred faround the world, a skeptical view was expressed about the probability of nuclear terrorism.12 As a preceding study related to the latter argument, an article published in 2018 by Graham Allison, best-known for his classic book Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, became a hot topic. While proposing a new strategy for strengthening nuclear security, Allison points out that the probability of nuclear terrorism can theoretically increase in the future based on the past efforts to reduce risk and consideration on the risk factors themselves.13

However, there are a lot of actual occurrences that encourage the continuation of strengthening nuclear security, such as the case of attempted nuclear terrorism in Belgium in 201614 and the case of a drone that was deliberately crashed into a nuclear facility in France in July 2018.15 The attempted act of nuclear terrorism in Belgium naturally encouraged Belgian authorities to enhance physical protection and countermeasures against sabotage of nuclear facilities. Moreover, that incident and the staged drone attack are considered to be an opportunity to reconfirm the potential risk of drone and aircraft impacts on nuclear power plants, which is a prerequisite for the defense[1]in-depth approach. As for the latter argument, in 2018 the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) issued a statement by experts specifically mentioning aircraft impact assessments with regard to nuclear plants.16 The case of the statement by the NEI is thought to engender a certain deterrent effect to a potential aircraft attacker, by redefining the existence of such threat recognition and concrete countermeasures. Of course, the IAEA, concerned states and civil[1]society organizations have to keep raising public opinion and media attention so that nuclear security, which is a potential countermeasure against risk of nuclear terrorism, will not be disregarded. In this sense, great expectation is put on the Review Conference of the CPPNM Amendment.

In addition, it is necessary to mention that there is also a request for the IAEA to consider the new technical aspects of nuclear security. As an example, at the 62nd IAEA General Conference, Norway raised the need for intensive consideration by the IAEA about nuclear safety and nuclear security issues concerning Transportable Reactors or Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs). On this issue, Norway pointed out that the IAEA should clarify and consider the scope and applicability of existing requests and means for nuclear security and safety, and also requested that the IAEA conduct a comprehensive briefing on TNPPs in the fourth quarter of 2018.17

The role of the IAEA for nuclear security and its future expectations

Overall, the role that the IAEA plays in strengthening the level of nuclear security has expanded remarkably, and it can be said that each member country’s expectations for the IAEA are increasing. Regarding the implementation of measures for nuclear security in each country, the growing awareness of the importance of the IAEA’s efforts, including peer review through the international nuclear security review missions, has already been pointed out in the previous issues of this report.18 Even in support of actual nuclear terrorism prevention measures, the IAEA has cooperated with large-scale events such as the 2012 European Football Championship and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. In February 2018, the IAEA agreed to cooperate in the field of nuclear security with Japan ahead of the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympic Games in 2020.19 Moreover, as a matter of affecting the nuclear security efforts of each country, in 2018 the IAEA launched a new “Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources,”20 which is positioned as a supplementary guidance on the “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.”21

A number of nuclear security-related meetings involving the IAEA were held in 2018, some of which are described individually in the Section (3) of this chapter. This section provides an overview of other nuclear security-related events by the IAEA, as follows:

• Nuclear and radioactive material in transport: a “Technical Meeting on Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material in Transport” was held in Vienna in July.22
• Nuclear safety and security interface: an “International Conference on the Challenges Faced by Technical and Scientific Support Organizations (TSOs) in Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security” was held in Brussels, Belgium in October.23 Also, a “Technical Meeting on the Safety and Security Interface” was held in Vienna in October.24
• Emergency preparedness and response: a “Workshop on Emergency Preparedness and Response” was held in Luxembourg in December,25 followed by a “Regional Workshop to Review the Template of the Mediterranean regional EPR plan” was held in Vienna in December.26

In view of the above, it is worthwhile to evaluate the situation in which concerned states are continuously involved in the IAEA’s nuclear security-related events throughout the year and pursuing enhancements to their respective nuclear security systems. Through numerous regional workshops and international meetings, each country had the opportunity to share information and best practices with many stakeholders about nuclear security perception, technology, and culture. In view of the fact that nuclear security is carried out under the responsibility of each country, these opportunities represented an important achievement in promoting sustainable nuclear security initiatives.

On the other hand, as a matter of current nuclear security concerns, alarm bells continued to be sounded about cyber attacks (computer security), sabotage by drones, and insider threats that has long been regarded as a serious issue. As an example of the debate over cyber threats, The Economist referred to the fourth edition of “Nuclear Security Index,” published by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in 2018,27 and evaluated the progress of efforts towards improving the level of nuclear security in many surveyed countries. Meanwhile, The Economist pointed out that challenges remain in strengthening cyber security, and reported that three cases of cyber attacks against nuclear[1]related facilities occurred in 2016 and one case occurred in 2017.28 Even in the general context, other than nuclear security, it is pointed out that the number of cases of cyber attack revealed is the “tip of the iceberg.” There is also concern that parties which suffered cyber attacks are often reluctant to disclose information lest they expose their vulnerabilities.29 The assessment by the NTI in 2018 also valued that countries’ nuclear security countermeasures against cyber threats are progressing moderately, while pointing out that defense against expanding cyber threats is dangerously insufficient.30 In strengthening nuclear security standards in the future, cyber threat countermeasures need to be pursued with high priority.

U.S. Nuclear Security Policy

The international community has paid particular attention to nuclear security policy and implementation efforts of the U.S. Trump administration, particularly in comparison to the former Obama administration, which led the nuclear security summit process that contributed to improving the global nuclear security standards. In the U.S. “Nuclear Posture Review (NPR 2018)” announced in February 2018, the term “nuclear security” was only mentioned once, in the preface by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. On the other hand, unlike the “Nuclear Posture Review (NPR 2010)” published during the Obama administration, NPR 2018 uses the term “Countering Nuclear Terrorism” to explain deterrence and retaliation against nuclear terrorism.31 Nevertheless, similar to the former Obama administration, which promoted multilateral cooperation and technical assistance, the NPR 2018 also emphasizes that it will “continue to work with allies and partners to disrupt proliferation networks and interdict transfers of nuclear materials and related technology” and “improve coordination with international export-control and law-enforcement agencies to bolster information sharing to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material.” It adds that, in collaboration with foreign partners, the United States will “maintain the constellation of radiation detection technologies that have been deployed in 60 countries around the world to thwart the smuggling of nuclear weapons and materials by land, sea, and air.”32 Thus, the current nuclear security policy of the United States is thought to be somewhat different in nuance from the conventional the U.S. approach that had supported the improvement of the nuclear security standards in each country.

Such a change in nuances may be a proof that the development of legal instruments and HEU minimization progress through the six[1]year nuclear security summit process, and that nuclear security is entering a new phase. Alternatively, such change in nuance can also be regarded as a result of repositioning nuclear security as an integral part of the fight against terrorism, as symbolized by keywords such as deterrence and retaliation. In any case, the fact that the United States addresses such a policy direction at the time when the outcomes of the nuclear security summit are being revisited and discussion is being focused on a new multilateral forum for nuclear security that will be able to attract high-level political attention, has important meaning in understanding future trends in nuclear security.

In view of the factors mentioned above, this information sharing to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material.” It adds that, in collaboration with foreign partners, the United States will “maintain the constellation of radiation detection technologies that have been deployed in 60 countries around the world to thwart the smuggling of nuclear weapons and materials by land, sea, and air.”32 Thus, the current nuclear security policy of the United States is thought to be somewhat different in nuance from the conventional the U.S. approach that had supported the improvement of the nuclear security standards in each country. Such a change in nuances may be a proof that the development of legal instruments and HEU minimization progress through the six-year nuclear security summit process, and that nuclear security is entering a new phase. Alternatively, such change in nuance can also be regarded as a result of repositioning nuclear security as an integral part of the fight against terrorism, as symbolized by keywords such as deterrence and retaliation. In any case, the fact that the United States addresses such a policy direction at the time when the outcomes of the nuclear security summit are being revisited and discussion is being focused on a new multilateral forum for nuclear security that will be able to attract high-level political attention, has important meaning in understanding future trends in nuclear security. In view of the factors mentioned above, this Hiroshima Report 2019 124 report surveys the following items to evaluate the implementation of nuclear security-related measures of each country. In order to assess the nuclear security risks of each country, this report considers: indicators of the presence of nuclear material that may be “attractive” for malicious intent, facilities that produce such material, and related activities. It also examines the accession status to nuclear security-related international conventions, the implementation status of existing nuclear security measures and proposals to enhance them, and official statements related to nuclear security approaches, in order to evaluate the nuclear security performance and status of each county.

(1) Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities

Regarding the definition of nuclear security, the 2015 edition of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series Glossary states: “the prevention of, detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities.”33 According to the IAEA definition, a nuclear security threat is “a person or group of persons with motivation, intention and capability to commit criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities or other acts determined by the state to have an adverse impact on nuclear security.”34 The IAEA recommends that the state’s physical protection requirements for nuclear material and nuclear facilities should be based on a Design Basis Threat (DBT), specifically for unauthorized removal of Category I nuclear material, sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities that have potentially high radiological consequences.35 Furthermore, the IAEA recommended that security requirements for radioactive material “should be adopted depending on whether the radioactive material concerned is sealed source, unsealed source, disused sealed source or waste, and should cover transport.”36

The latest version of the IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) was revised and published in 2011. In this revised edition, the IAEA recommends that requirements for physical protection should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of the threat, the relative attractiveness, the nature of the nuclear material and potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear facilities.37 The IAEA also suggests that “the physical protection system should be designed to deny unauthorized access of persons or equipment to the targets, minimize opportunity of insiders, and protect the targets against possible stand-off attacks consistent with the state’s threat assessment or design basis threat.”38 In other words, the system should protect against attacks that are executed at a distance from the target nuclear facility or transport and that do not require adversary hands-on-access to the target, or require the adversary to overcome the physical protection system. The objectives of the state’s physical protection regime, which is an essential component of the state’s nuclear security regime, should be to protect against unauthorized removal, to locate and recover missing nuclear material, protect against sabotage, and mitigate or minimize effects of sabotage.39

The nuclear material itself is the primary factor for determining the physical protection measures against unauthorized removal. Therefore, categorization based on the different types of nuclear material in terms of element, isotope, quantity and irradiation is the basis for a graded approach for protection against unauthorized removal of “attractive” nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear explosive device, which itself depends on the type of nuclear material, isotopic composition, physical and chemical form, degree of dilution, radiation level, and quantity (see Table 3-1). 40

Generally, plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium 239 of 80% or more is more attractive than other plutonium isotopes from a standpoint of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices by terrorists. Weapons-grade HEU is usually enriched to 90% or higher levels of U-235. Both of these high-grade nuclear materials require high-level protection measures. In assessing the importance of preventing illegal transfers and sabotage, even if countries do not possess weapons-grade HEU or plutonium, they are at risk if they possess a uranium enrichment facility or a nuclear reactor and a plutonium reprocessing facility. The number of such sensitive facilities in a country will be the subject of assessment for a state’s effort in enhancing nuclear security. Of course, the level of these protection measures will vary depending on the geopolitical circumstance or the domestic security situation. Table 3-2 shows the latest evaluations made by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) and by other relevant research bodies, including the NTI in its “Civilian HEU Dynamic Map,” of nuclear material holdings.

Even today, HEU and plutonium equivalent to nearly 200,000 nuclear weapons exist in the whole world.41 Furthermore, more than 90% of the global HEU and weapon-grade plutonium stockpile is possessed by the United States and Russia. For terrorists who may be intent on acquiring material for nuclear weapons, these and other fissile material holdings can be considered to present the most attractive targets. While the global stockpile of HEU and separated plutonium has been occupying the attention of the international community and civil society, there is little officially disclosed information about stockpiles of HEU and weapon-grade plutonium by individual states, due to the sensitivity of these materials.

In spite of these constraints, transparency of nuclear material holdings is important, in principle. According to the NTI’s “Civilian HEU Dynamic Map,”42 the estimated holdings of HEU and plutonium of some countries other than the ones in Table 3-2 are estimated as follows:

• Countries assumed to retain approximately 1 ton of HEU (category I is 5 kg and more): Kazakhstan(10,470- 10,777kg), Canada (1,038kg)
• Countries assumed to retain 1 kg and more but less than 1 ton of HEU: Australia (2kg), Iran (6kg), the Netherlands (550- 650kg), Norway (1-9kg), South Africa (700-750 kg (unspecified)), Syria (less than 1 kg)

As a result of activities of the recent Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the number of countries that completely removed HEU has increased in recent years. Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Latvia, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, etc. are cited as countries that achieved complete removal of such HEU.43 For reference information, estimated holdings of HEU and plutonium of some countries not in the list of this survey are as follows:

• Countries assumed to retain 1 kg and more but less than 1 ton of HEU: Belarus (80-280 kg), Italy (100-119 kg)44

Any operating reactor or facility for handling spent fuel presents a potential risk of illicit transfer of fissile material or sabotage against facility. Research reactors can pose a greater risk if they utilize HEU fuel and if they are associated with spent-fuel reprocessing facilities or even unsecured storage of spent fuel.

The IAEA’s Research Reactor Database (RRDB) 45 shows that 226 out of a total of 841 research reactors are currently in operation (140 in developed countries, 86 in developing countries). Another 13 reactors (eight in developed countries, five in developing countries) are temporarily shut down, nine reactors (four in developed countries, five in developing countries) are under construction, 14 reactors (two in developed countries, 12 in developing countries) are scheduled for construction, 56 reactors (42 in developed countries, 14 in developing countries) have been permanently shut down, 443 reactors (413 in developed countries, 30 in developing countries) are decommissioned, and construction of 16 reactors (12 in developed countries, four in developing countries) have been canceled. Compared with the previous year, the number of research reactors increased by 70 in the whole world, while the number of research reactors with permanent shutdown status decreased to 55 in developed countries. In addition, the number of research reactors that were decommissioned increased by 81 in total.

According to the IAEA, 20,663 spent fuel assemblies from research reactors are enriched to levels above 20% and 9,532 of these stored fuel assemblies are enriched to levels at or above 90%.46 The figures for these spent fuel assemblies have not changed at all since last year, as follows. In terms of geographical distribution: 10,627 spent HEU fuel assemblies, which are over half of the total, are currently stored in Eastern Europe, 572 are located in Africa and Middle East, 3,492 in Asia, 4,273 in Western Europe, 85 in Latin America and 1,614 in North America. 47 Given this situation, prevention of illegal transfers and sabotage against facilities becomes critically important as a measure against nuclear security risk, regardless of whether or not the reactor is in operation.

Table 3-3 outlines the presence of nuclear power plants, research reactors, uranium enrichment facilities, and reprocessing facilities in surveyed countries, as risk indicators.

The IAEA recommends that a state defines the risk based on the amount, forms, composition, mobility, and accessibility of nuclear and other radioactive material and takes prospective measures against the defined risk. In terms of unauthorized removal, nuclear or other radioactive material and related production facilities are also potential targets.48 To reduce the potential for sabotage within a plant, the IAEA recommends that a state “establishes its threshold(s) of unacceptable radiological consequences” and identifies the vital areas where risk associated materials, devices, and functions are located and designated “in order to determine appropriate levels of physical protection taking into account existing nuclear safety and radiation protection.”49

In recent years, efforts are also being made regarding nuclear security of radioactive sources. In this field, the IAEA publishes “Nuclear Security Series No.11, Security of Radioactive Sources (2009)”50 and “Nuclear Security Series No.14, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities (2011).”51 Also, at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2016, 28 countries and INTERPOL jointly released a “Gift Basket” statement on strengthening the security of high-activity sealed radioactive sources, reflecting the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.52 Regarding the individual efforts of each country related to security of radioactive sources, the “Second Technical Meeting on Radiation Detection Instruments for Nuclear Security” was held in Vienna in April.53 The meeting brought 135 representatives from 71 Member States and more than 70 representatives from equipment manufacturers and vendors together for discussions on topics such as air cargo detection operations, maintenance challenges and the role of drones and artificial intelligence.54 In addition, the “2018 annual meeting of the Working Group on Radioactive Source Security” was held at the IAEA in April.55 Also, the “International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material” was held by the IAEA in Vienna in December. The purpose of the conference was to foster the exchange of practices and experiences related to the security of radioactive material under regulatory control in use, transport and storage, and to the system and measures for detection of this material out of regulatory control.56 At the conference, over 550 participants from more than 100 countries and 15 organizations discussed how to best secure radioactive material, which is widely used in medicine, agriculture and scientific research.57

(2) Status of Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety-Related Conventions, Participation in Nuclear Security-Related Initiatives, and Application to Domestic Systems

A) Accession status to nuclear security-related conventions

This section examines the accession status of each country to the following nuclear security and safety-related conventions that are mentioned in the Nuclear Security Summit communiqué,58 namely: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); Amendment to CPPNM (CPPNM Amendment); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention); the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention); the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

• The CPPNM became effective in 1987. As of August 2018, 157 countries have signed this treaty.59 The CPPNM requires its party states to take appropriate protection measures for international transfer of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, and not permit its transfer in the case that such measures are not in place. It also calls for the criminalization of acts including unauthorized receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material, and which cause damage to any person or property, as well as theft or robbery of nuclear material.
• The CPPNM Amendment became effective in 2016. As of July 2018, 118 states have approved the Amendment.60 The Amendment makes it legally binding for states to establish, implement and maintain an appropriate physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and nuclear facilities under their jurisdiction. It provides for the criminalization of new and extended specified acts, and requires countries to put in place measures to protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities against sabotage. In this sense, the Amendment expands the existing offences identified in the CPPNM, including the theft and robbery of nuclear material, and establishes new ones, such as the smuggling of nuclear material and the actual or threatened sabotage of nuclear facilities. A number of the offences were also expanded to include substantial damage to the environment. As the only legally binding international undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material, ratification of the Amendment should be continuously promoted.
• The Nuclear Terrorism Convention entered into force in 2007. As of December 2018, the number of parties is 114.61 The convention requires party states to criminalize acts of possession and use of radioactive material62 or nuclear explosive devices with malicious intent, and against those seeking to use and damage nuclear facilities in order to cause radioactive dispersal. The convention and the CPPNM Amendment are mutually necessary to support a legal framework for nuclear security.
• The Nuclear Safety Convention entered into force in 1996. As of October 2018, the number of parties is 85.63 This treaty is aimed at ensuring and enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants. Party states of this convention are required to take legal and administrative measures, report to the review committee established under this convention, and accept peer review in order to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants under their jurisdiction.
• The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident entered into force in 1986. As of September 2018, the number of parties is 122.64 It obligates its party states to immediately report to the IAEA when a nuclear accident has occurred, including the type, time, and location of the accident and relevant information.
• The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management entered into force in 2001. As of August 2018, the number of parties is 80.65 It calls for its member states to take legal and administrative measures, report to its review committee, and undergo peer review by other parties, for the purpose of ensuring safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
• The Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency entered into force in 1987. As of September 2018, the number of parties is 117.66 This convention establishes the international framework that enables equipment provision and dispatch of experts with the goals of preventing and/ or minimizing nuclear accidents and radioactive emergencies.

Some, if not all, of these nuclear safety-related conventions can be interpreted as providing protective measures for nuclear security purposes, and thus could be listed as nuclear security-related international conventions. Table 3-4 summarizes the signature and ratification status of each country to these conventions.

B) INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

The latest version of “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” as of 2018 is INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, published by IAEA in 2011. In comparison with the INFCIRC/225/Rev.4,67 this latest revision introduced new measures on nuclear security: inter alia, creation of limited access areas, graded approaches, the enhancement of defense-in-depth, and protection against “Stand-off Attack” and airborne threat, counter measures against insider threat, development of nuclear security culture as a preventive measure against security breaches by insiders, and the provision of redundancy measures to ensure the functions of the central response station during an emergency. Implementation of the protective measures in accordance with the recommendation made by this fifth revision has been encouraged internationally, with a view to establishing a stronger nuclear security system. Furthermore, this revision stipulates a number of state responsibilities for establishing contingency plans, including interfaces with safety, as appropriate, ensuring that the operator prepares contingency plans to effectively counter the threat assessment or DBT taking actions of the response forces into consideration, evaluating effectiveness of the physical protection system through exercises, and determining the trustworthiness policy.

Since the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 was released at the same time as the start of the nuclear security summit, when participating in the Summit, countries tended to announce the introduction of physical protection measures in accordance with the fifth revision of the recommendation. This trend continued until the last nuclear security summit in 2016.68

In this regard, the application status of the recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/ Rev.5 can serve as a significant indicator to assess the nuclear security system of this report’s surveyed countries. This report refers to official statements made available in the 62nd IAEA General Conference and the 2018 NPT PrepCom, as well as other opportunities to evaluate the national nuclear security stance and performance of each state.

Application Status of Each Country of the Measures Recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

As a result of the end of the nuclear security summit, held four times over seven years, opportunities for disseminating information on the introduction and application of the recommendation measures of INFCIRC/225/ Rev.5 are gradually decreasing. The reason for the reduction of information dissemination is not entirely clear. It may be because there are few items to be newly added in each country with regard to INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, which, at the time of preparing this report, had been announced eight years earlier. Or it may be because opportunities to mention the application of the recommendation measures themselves have diminished as a result of shrinking occasions to disseminate information. As mentioned earlier, it may be necessary to take into consideration that no large-scale international conference on nuclear security was held in 2018. The cases where there were statements on the introduction of recommendation measures of INFCIRC225/ Rev.5, directly or indirectly in the surveyed countries, are as follows.

In the field of the development of legal instruments, Indonesia received the legislative support of the IAEA and revised the Act Number 10 of 1997 on Nuclear Energy for nuclear safety, nuclear security, safeguards, investigation and prosecution of authority related to nuclear terrorism countermeasures.69 Nigeria announced that nuclear security is included in the Country Program Framework (CPF) from 2018 to 2023, which is expected to be approved by Congress.70 Saudi Arabia announced the implementation of the National Atomic Energy Program, which complies with the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and transparency, in accordance with existing international treaties, protocols and best practices.71 Sweden announced that it is updating the legal framework regarding its nuclear program, including the Radiation Protection Act and Act on Nuclear Activities, taking into account the modifications of European Legislation with the aim of making it more understandable for nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation protection regulations for the licensees.72

Protection measures for sabotage actions against nuclear materials and related facilities are as follows. Belgium promoted replacement from military guards to specially trained armed police units, as a security enhancement measure for domestic nuclear sites.73 Brazil regularly carried out domestic nuclear safety and security exercises, and also participated in activities for emergency preparedness and response by the IAEA.74 The Netherlands held a “Regional workshop on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities” in cooperation with the IAEA in October, aiming to effectively deal with threats such as radiological sabotage and theft of nuclear material.75 Mexico also hosted a regional training course with the IAEA focused on protection of nuclear facilities and material against sabotage in August. Experts from 11 countries in Latin America region participated in the course, and conducted training using interactive sessions and simulated facilities.76

Regarding response to cyber threats, Germany supported IAEA efforts to embed computer security provisions into the IAEA’s recommendations level documents and to step up capacity building in this regard.77

(3) Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security

A) Minimization of HEU and plutonium stockpile in civilian use

In June 2018, Norway co-hosted the third International Symposium on HEU Minimization with the IAEA. Norway encouraged all member states to sign up to the “Joint Statement on Minimising and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications (INFCIRC/912).”78 Thus, the minimization of HEU in civilian use is gaining international attention in the context of today’s nuclear security efforts.

Since HEU, in addition to fueling some research reactors, can also be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, it is regarded as “two sides of the same coin” for weapons and civilian use. Therefore, from the viewpoint of“attractiveness” to terrorists, it is difficult to deny the possibility that fissile materials will pose a nuclear security risk to the country holding such nuclear material. Historically, HEU has long been considered to pose a proliferation risk in terms of state-to-state technology transfers. More recently, the “9.11” terrorist attacks in the United States triggered new nuclear security concerns regarding the spread of fissile material to non-state actors, including international terrorists.79 To address this particular concern, the United States in 2004 introduced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), to manage the return of Russian and U.S.-origin HEU located in civilian sites to its country of origin, and the conversion of research reactors to operate with low enriched uranium (LEU).

It can be said that GTRI raised the level of caution for the international community about the risk of “attractive” fissile material being stolen for terrorist use, and encouraged concrete counter measures. However, it was then U.S. President Barack Obama’s “Prague speech” in April 200980 that was a major factor in raising world public awareness, including international media, about the importance of nuclear security. As a measure to pursue strengthening of nuclear security, the need to minimize HEU and plutonium became better understood in concerned countries. While HEU minimization for civilian use was included early in the joint communiqué of the Nuclear Security Summit, it took more time for consensus to be reached on minimizing plutonium stocks. Most of the HEU is for military use, less for civilian use, and its inventory has been steadily reduced. On the other hand, plutonium for civilian use accounts for the majority, and the stock volume is increasing.

Throughout the Nuclear Security Summit process, minimization of HEU in civilian use had been treated as one of the top priority issues. The 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué stipulates keeping state stockpiles of separated plutonium to the minimum level consistent with national requirements.81 According to the fact sheet published by the United States at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in March 2016, HEU and plutonium have been removed or down-blended at 50 facilities in 30 countries.82 In addition, as a result of Indonesia completing the withdrawal of domestic HEU in 2017,83 Southeast Asia, following South America and Central Europe, has become a region where there is no nuclear material attractive for terrorists. In the list of major achievements of the GTRI efforts announced by the U.S. Department of Energy in 2018, conversion of the HEU research reactor in Nigeria and an isotope production facility in the Netherlands; establishment of the first non-HEU Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) production in the United States in nearly 30 years; removal of over 325 kg of HEU from multiple countries; and down blending of a cumulative of 160 MT of surplus HEU are enumerated.84 In connection with these efforts, the IAEA has helped remove 27 disused highly radioactive sources from five South American countries in a significant step forward for nuclear safety and security in the region. It was the largest such project ever facilitated by the IAEA until 2018. The material, mainly used for medical purposes such as treating cancer and sterilizing instruments, was transported to Germany and the United States for recycling. Canada, where some of the sources were manufactured, funded the project upon requests for IAEA support from Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.85

Although this is an issue beyond the category of civilian use of HEU and plutonium, there has been a debate in recent years about whether nuclear materials used for military purposes should be subject to similar standards of accountability.86 Even in 2018, at the 62nd IAEA General Conference, Switzerland issued a statement to encourage comprehensive nuclear security for all nuclear material in both civilian use and non-civilian use.87

In the above regard, at the 62nd IAEA General Conference and on other occasions, the following updates on commitments to minimize HEU and plutonium use were made:

• China completed its support for conversion of Ghana’s Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) to a LEU fuel system in 2017. This success is called “Ghana model” in China.88
• Nigeria announced that research reactor fuel is being converted to LEU-type fuel with support from the IAEA, the U.S., China, the U.K. and Norway.89
• Netherlands completed the conversion from HEU to LEU fuel for the production of medical isotopes in 2018.90
• In 2018, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission revised the “The Basic Principles on Japan’s Utilization of Plutonium” for the first time in 15 years, upholding the principle of not possessing plutonium that does not have a specific purpose under the Atomic Energy Basic Act, and launched measures to reduce the size of its plutonium stockpile.91 It also mentioned the following about plutonium used for research and development. “Examine all options such as use and disposal of plutonium that is associated with research and development purposes, if there is no concrete plan for its immediate use, while ensuring flexibility depending on the situations.”92 In this regard, Japan has stated that it will steadily carry out plutonium thermal power generation, increase transparency in the use and management of its plutonium, and accept stringent IAEA safeguards.93

B) Prevention of illicit trafficking

Nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, research and development of new technologies to strengthen enforcement capacity of law enforcement machinery and customs department, participation for the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) have been regarded as important measures for preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. In particular, the IAEA ITDB is the database on incidents related to unauthorized possession, illicit trafficking, illegal dispersal of radioactive material, and discovery of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The ITDB has been regarded not only as an essential component of the information platform supporting the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan, but also in terms of statistics, which bring to light the real existence of a nuclear security threat.94 As of December 31, 2017, 136 states participate in the ITDB program.95 According to the latest IAEA Annual Report 2017, states confirmed 166 incidents during 2017.96 Considering that the number of reports to ITDB was 189 in 2016,97 the number of cases decreased by 23 in 2017.

On the other hand, the IAEA Nuclear Security Report98 specifies the following details. During the reporting period, states reported, or otherwise confirmed to the ITDB program, a total of 127 incidents. In this regard, 235 occurred between July 1, 2017 and June 30, 2018, and the remaining cases had occurred prior to July 1, 2017 but were not reported by that date. Of the 235 newly reported incidents, three were related to trafficking and four were a scam. All of the material involved in these incidents was seized by the relevant competent authorities within the reporting State. No incident involved highly enriched uranium, plutonium or Category I sources. On the other hand, there were 33 reported incidents in which the intent to conduct trafficking or malicious use could not be determined. These included 17 thefts, four unauthorised possessions and 12 incidents of missing materials. In 25 incidents the materials were not recovered, including one incident relating to Category III radioactive sources. In addition to this, there were also 125 reported incidents in which the material was out of regulatory control, but not related to trafficking, malicious use or scams. Most of these incidents involved unauthorized disposal, unauthorized shipments and unexpected discoveries of material such as previously lost radioactive sources.

As of December 31, 2017, the ITDB contained a total of 3,235 confirmed incidents reported by participating states since 1993. Of these 3,235 confirmed incidents there are 278 incidents that involved a confirmed or likely act of trafficking or malicious use (Group I), 913 incidents for which there is insufficient information to determine if it is related to trafficking or malicious use (Group II), and 2,044 incidents that are not related to trafficking or malicious use (Group III).99

In order to protect sensitive information, detailed information on incidents and illicit trafficking is not published.100 Therefore, as it is not possible to assess the involvement of the surveyed countries, this report considers only their respective participation status.

Preventive measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material include the development of legal instruments for export control and enforced detection capability, such as the installation of sensing devices for radiological material at national borders and reinforcing nuclear forensic capabilities. The following describe some of efforts taken from 2017 to 2018 as preventive measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material:

• Austria held the “Second Technical Meeting on Radiation Detection Instruments for Nuclear Security: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities” by the IAEA in April.101 In June, Austria also held a workshop on the evaluation of the technologies used for border surveillance, at the IAEA laboratory in Seibersdorf. The workshop focused on the evaluation tests of the spectroscopic handheld detectors to monitor radioactive material, and also supported the efforts of the Border Monitoring Working Group – a cooperation and coordination mechanism between the European Union, the United States and the IAEA – to detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control.102
• Nigeria announced that it is developing a National Nuclear Security Detection Architecture roadmap with the support of the IAEA, based on overall assessment of national security needs and capabilities, as well as economic and technical resources.103
• Kazakhstan announced that it is strengthening the system to combat the illegal trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials under full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540.104
• The United States announced that it will sustain and build upon the roughly 57,000 radiation detectors operating at the U.S. seaports, border crossings and within the American interior, to thwart the smuggling of nuclear weapons and materials.105
• Indonesia’s Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency, Badan Pengawas Tenaga Nuklir (BAPETEN) requested the IAEA’s assistance on nuclear security prior to the 18th Asian Games in Jakarta and Palembang, Indonesia, held from August to September 2018. In this case, Indonesia received training and advice to support the incorporation of nuclear security into the Games’ overall security plan, and also provided handheld radiation detection equipment by the IAEA.106

In terms of international and regional organization efforts, INTERPOL provides a forum for collecting data on prevention of nuclear terrorism, supporting investigation, and confidence building and coordination among national law enforcement agencies. In 2018, INTERPOL conducted a “RADNUC” Cross[1]Border Radiological and Nuclear Investigations and Coordination Workshop in Tbilisi, Georgia in January, attended by some 40 experts from seven countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine). The workshop brought together law enforcement representatives from police, customs, border control, intelligence units and civil defense, with the aim to identify, assess and address the gaps in a country’s ability to coordinate investigations into the smuggling of radiological and nuclear material.107

Table 3-6 shows the implementation status regarding the minimization of HEU for peaceful purposes, participation status for the ITDB and measures for the prevention of illegal transfer of nuclear material and other radiological materials, based on official statements made at the past Nuclear Security Summits, IAEA Nuclear Security Conferences, and any other opportunities.

C) Acceptance of international nuclear security review missions

The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) provides recommendations to improve the physical protection system of nuclear material, associated facilities, and transport systems of the state, upon the request of a member state. In IPPAS missions, an IPPAS team, consisting of physical protection experts organized by the IAEA, visits government organizations and nuclear facilities in a state, reviews the physical protection system of the facility in detail, and conducts hearing investigations, in order to assess whether or not the reviewed physical protection system is in line with the recommendations of the IAEA INFCIRC/225, and to provide advice where necessary for its improvement. As was pointed in an earlier issue of this report,108 acceptance of the IAEA missions is a valuable opportunity for member states to have an authoritative third-party peer review of their national nuclear security systems. Of course, there are various nuclear security-related treaties and guidelines. However, since the details of concrete implementation will ultimately be left to the governments of each country, measures to strengthen nuclear security tend to be self-righteous in some cases. For this reason, the peer review process, which points out the items and methods to be improved mutually by external organizations, contributes to implementing nuclear security related measures. The external evaluation and recommendations obtained from the IPPAS mission are useful for reviewing the policy of future nuclear security enhancement in the host country. According to the nuclear security-related events list released by the IAEA in 2018, there were four events related to international evaluation missions.109 Since the number of events in the previous year was 14, the number in 2018 decreased by ten.

In 2018, the IAEA announced the completion of the second IPPAS mission in Switzerland in May.110 Also, an IPPAS follow-up mission was held in France in March and in Japan in November.111 Outside the surveyed countries, the IPPAS mission in Ecuador was completed in March.112 According to the IAEA, IPPAS missions are scheduled to be held in Lebanon in February, Belgium in June, Madagascar in August and Uruguay in November, respectively in 2019.113

Apart from the IPPAS missions, the IAEA also provides the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), for the sake of developing nuclear security systems and capabilities. In accordance with the IAEA, the INSServ provides recommendations to improve a broad spectrum of nuclear security activities of the state, by reviewing its nuclear security system and requirements.114 Also, INSSP provides a platform for nuclear security work to be implemented over a period of time, thus ensuring sustainability. INSSP review missions enable the IAEA, the state concerned, and any donors financing the work, to plan and coordinate activities from both a technical and a financial point of view—optimizing the use of resources and avoiding duplications.115

Regarding advisory services by IAEA other than IPPAS, the Philippines accepted the review of INSSP in April 2018 and it was stated that this advice was reflected in the Philippines’ Nuclear Security Support Center in July.116 South Africa also announced that the updates of the INSSP plans are advancing under the support of the IAEA.117

D) Technology development ―nuclear forensics

Since its importance was pointed out in the Ministerial Declaration of 2016,118 nuclear forensics has become the key nuclear security technology. Through provision of nuclear forensic relevant guidance and training, organizations such as the IAEA have supported the development of technology and systems for seamless management of crime using nuclear and radioactive materials from the site where the target material was seized to the analytical laboratory.119 In fact, since the first Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, it has been recommended at each summit to build nuclear forensics capability and multilateral cooperation for that purpose.120 Above all, at the fourth Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2016, 30 concerned states issued a Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security, reflecting the growing awareness of the international community about the importance of nuclear forensics.121 In accordance with the “IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.2-G (Rev.1) Nuclear Forensics Support (2006)”122 definition, nuclear forensics is the technological method for the investigation of nuclear and other radiological material that has been removed without authorization from regulatory control and seized by a law enforcement authority of state. Following the increased threat perception of nuclear terrorism, technological development of nuclear forensics has been required so as to complement existing efforts to strengthen nuclear security. In particular, analysis on intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material and any associated material, to provide evidence for nuclear attribution, is the subject matter of nuclear forensics. Therefore, nuclear forensic analysis includes the characterization of the material and correlation with its production history.123

As for a case of multilateral cooperation on nuclear forensics, the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) was established in 1996 under the auspices of the G8 Non-Proliferation Expert Group (NPEG), for the purpose of addressing the issue of illegal transfers following the end of the Cold War. The ITWG serves as the platform to support the technological development and sharing of nuclear forensic methods. Over the past few years, it has pursued a number of activities. These include conducting comparative nuclear material exercises (CMX) that socialize nuclear forensic techniques and identify best practices. Also, ITWG conducted exercises that clarify the uses and utility of national nuclear forensic libraries in helping identify the origin of nuclear or other radioactive material found outside regulatory control.124 The ITWG has been focusing on the promotion of nuclear forensic best practice through the development of guidelines for forensic analysis of nuclear, radioactive, and radiologically contaminated materials, and published “Guidelines for Evidence Collection in a Radiological or Nuclear Contaminated Crime Scene (2011)”125 and “Proposed Framework for National Nuclear Forensics Libraries and International Directories (2011).”126 Indeed, many ITWG-related meetings were held in 2018 as well.127 In June, the ITWG Annual Meeting (ITWG-23) was held in Switzerland and the GICNT Implementation and Assessment Group Meeting was held in Finland. In addition, the second KINAC-SIPRI Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Security Seminar: State Implementation of the National Nuclear Forensic Libraries was held in Sweden in cooperation of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). In September, the Australia-New Zealand Forensics Science without Borders Conference, IAEA Regional Training Course on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics (Spanish Speaking), and ITWG sixth Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX-6) were held respectively. In October and November, the IAEA International Training Course on Practical Introduction to Nuclear Forensics was held in Hungary, as well as the IAEA Regional Training Course on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics (French Speaking), held in Senegal.

Another international cooperation initiative, the Nuclear Forensic Working Group (NFWG), chaired by Canada128 and established under the framework of the GICNT, actively organized a number of workshops and tabletop exercises.129 In February 2018, the nuclear forensics exercise “Destiny Elephant” was held in the United Kingdom “Destiny Elephant” built on the outcomes of the 2014 Exercise “Mystic Deer” by applying the GICNT best practices guidance document “Forensics Fundamentals for Policymakers” to current nuclear forensics challenges.130

As a remarkable new initiative, in March 2018, the IAEA launched a new coordinated research project in which nuclear forensic scientists from different States with various capabilities will work together to improve the implementation of nuclear forensics in the context of national laws, and to support investigative needs.131 To support Member States in strengthening their nuclear forensic science capacity, the IAEA, in collaboration with the Hungarian National Nuclear Forensic Laboratory, held a practical training course in October 2018 in Hungary.132 Nuclear forensics related information has been generally limited, and details have not been released to the public. Therefore, the list of countries and organizations participating in recent exercises related to nuclear forensics (ITWG-CMX) is shown in the following table (Table 3-7).133 Although this list is merely information on participation, it is considered to be a reference for the nuclear forensics ability of each country.

E) Capacity building and support activities

Around the time when the Nuclear Security Summit process started, in many states and regions, capacity in nuclear security also began to be built up and international cooperation efforts for nuclear security were actively promoted. As an example of such efforts leading up to the present capacity building, in 2018, Canada announced that it has finalized an additional $9.65 million contribution to the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), in order to enhance nuclear security through the sustainable management of disused sealed radioactive sources in countries in Latin America, Africa and the Pacific.134 Sweden has reported technical cooperation in the field of nuclear safety and nuclear security for many years with Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.135 Norway has undertaken a partnership to assist Romania in strengthening its regulatory infrastructure for nuclear safety and security based on cooperation with the IAEA since 2009. In September 2018, it was announced that the partnership between the two countries will be extended for another four years. The partnership agreed to advance the improvement of Romania’s capabilities to prevent accidents and malicious acts involving nuclear or other radiological material. It also aims to strengthen the country’s preparedness for nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies.136

Various approaches to the above-mentioned capacity building included developing teaching and training in nuclear security, for example, by setting up training courses in that field, and establishing Centers of Excellence (COE) for experts from these states and regions to improve their capacity in nuclear security. In the above regard, at the 62nd IAEA General Conference and on other occasions, the following updates on the development and utilization of the COEs were made:

• China has managed nearly 100 training courses at the COE that was launched in 2016 and implemented capacity building support. Approximately 2,000 experts participated in these training courses from home and abroad.137
• India announced that it has implemented international programmes on a variety of subjects at the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP), established in 2010, including the areas of nuclear safety, security and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear facilities, emergency response to radioactive disperse devices, etc.138
• Pakistan operates the Pakistan Center of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS), the National Institute for Nuclear Safety and Security (NISAS) and the Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS) under close cooperation with the IAEA. Pakistan announced that these institutions are conducting training for national and international participants in the fields of nuclear safety, security, material accounting, cyber security and human reliability programmes.139
• Indonesia announced that it will continue development and strengthening of its nuclear security infrastructure through the establishment of a Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness (I-CoNSEP), the Center for Security Culture and Assessment, graduate programmes in nuclear security, and the Regional School on Nuclear Security for Asia and the Pacific.140
• Japan has undertaken initiatives to contribute to the progress of nuclear security on a global scale through human resource development plan under the close cooperation of the IAEA and the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA).141 Since its inauguration, JAEA[1]ISCN has held 144 training courses and workshops by March 2018 and has conducted training for 3,800 people from 75 countries and three international organizations. In addition, JAEA[1]ISCN promoted collaboration such as information sharing, mutual visits of training facilities and co-organizing regional training courses with respective COEs in China, South Korea and other Asian countries.

Other countries’ efforts on capacity building in 2018 are as follows. The International Center for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) held an International School on Nuclear Security in conjunction with the IAEA at the ICTP laboratory in Trieste.142 The IAEA and the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council jointly organized the IAEA’s International Schools on Nuclear Security for professionals from Spanish[1]speaking countries in Valdemoro, Spain in May. The course, which targeted early career professionals, consisted of both lectures and practical exercises covering a range of nuclear security topics, including transport security for nuclear and other radioactive material, and threat and risk assessment.143 In June, the IAEA and the Ministry of Health in Barbados jointly organized the regional workshop for Central America and the Caribbean countries. During the workshop, more than 20 nuclear security professionals from 12 countries and regional organizations reviewed the basic elements of a national nuclear security regime and learned how the IAEA assists in strengthening nuclear and radiological security.144

Such efforts to set up COEs and implement training as described above not only help capacity building related to global nuclear security, but also contribute to promoting understanding of nuclear security among regional experts, operators and related organizations. Moreover, strengthening cooperation with each country’s COE has advantages such as mutual exchange of instructors among COEs. At the same time, to promote efficient cooperation and closer information sharing, it is important to avoid duplication in the activities of the COEs that have been established during the past several years. These tasks include building a broad network around the IAEA and strengthening education and training through international support.

To maintain and further facilitate exchange of experts, information and training material, the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network) was established in 2012 under the leadership of the IAEA. In March 2018, the NSSC Network annual meeting was held in Tokai, Japan. In discussions at the meeting, the 77 participants from 52 States and two observer organizations encouraged an expansion of the Network’s activities to include a programme of technical exchange visits during which national staff from existing and prospective Centres could learn from each other.145 In addition, as an approach of the same kind, there is the activity of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) by IAEA, to further advance technology development and information sharing related to nuclear security education. According to the IAEA’s latest Nuclear Security Report, the Network now has 170 institutions from 62 Member States.146

F) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund

The IAEA’s fifth Nuclear Security Plan covering the period 2018-2021,147 was approved in September 2017 and has been executed. For the sake of successful implementation of this plan, since 2002, when the IAEA established the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) as a voluntary funding mechanism to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism, the Agency has been calling on member states to make voluntary contributions to the Fund. According to the 2017 IAEA Annual Report (the latest at the time of writing this report), 16 countries and the European Commission pledged financial contributions to the NSF. Actual NSF revenue for FY 2017 was €44.1 million.148 It is a decrease of €3.3 million compared with the previous year.

Two of the surveyed countries made statements at the 62nd IAEA General Conference regarding their commitments to the NSF. The United Kingdom said it made a contribution of £4.1 million to the NSF.149 Germany revealed that its contributions to the NSF since 2011 have exceeded €5 million.150

G) Participation in international efforts

The international efforts to improve the level of nuclear security that this report draws attention to are not limited to the IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security, the NSS process that ended in 2016, UN Security Council Resolution 1540151 and various contributions made by the INTERPOL. In the present circumstances, various other multilateral frameworks relevant to nuclear security are operating around the world. The establishment of a “Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (G8GP) was agreed at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in 2002. It committed the G8 to raising up to $20 billion over the next ten years to fund nonproliferation projects, principally in Russia but also in other nations. The so-called “10 plus 10 over 10” initiative called for the United States to contribute $10 billion, and the other original G7 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) a combined $10 billion to help the projects.152

In addition to the G8 member states (G7+ Russia), other donor participants (Australia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, etc.) have participated in the G8GP and carried out various projects, in particular denuclearization cooperation in Russia. This work also includes destruction of chemical weapons, secure dismantling and transport of decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines, improved detection of nuclear and radiological materials, re-employment of former WMD scientists and technicians to civilian programs, and the removal and safe transportation of nuclear material in Kazakhstan. In relation to nuclear security, the Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) was established under the G8GP and has been working with nuclear security summits and the IAEA’s international conferences on nuclear security. However, in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the leaders of the G7 collectively decided to expel Russia from the G8 as a punitive measure.153 As a result, the former G8 initiative has officially changed the name to “G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (G7GP).154

Under the G7GP, Nuclear & Radiological Security Working Group (NRSWG) partners expressed support for the Information Sharing Initiative on Nuclear and Radiological Security projects in Ukraine, as outlined in the Cooperative Framework agreed in October 2018. In addition, for the purpose of enhancing global nuclear and radiological security, the NRSWG has set several items for its thematic areas as follows: physical protection measures at facilities housing nuclear and other radioactive material, radiological source security (whole-of[1]life management), prevention of illicit trafficking as well as detection and response to material outside regulatory control, nuclear security culture including training and nuclear security training and support centres, international legal frameworks related to nuclear security, nuclear forensics, information and computer security, transportation security, disposition and conversion of nuclear materials.155 Regarding nuclear security, the G7 Statement on Non[1]Proliferation and Disarmament of the G7 foreign ministers’ communique in 2018156 states in para 27: “We are committed to facilitating efforts by states to use nuclear materials or embark on nuclear power programs for civilian purposes in accordance with the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non[1]proliferation, and we encourage these states to develop a nuclear governance culture that takes into account interfaces between nuclear safety, security and safeguards, as well as cyber threats.” Para 28 states: “We remain vigilant in ensuring that terrorists and other malicious actors do not obtain materials for committing acts of nuclear or radiological terrorism. In that context, we support the efforts of the Nuclear Security Contact Group to help ensure that we continue to implement our shared commitments to enhancing nuclear security worldwide. We also commend the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). By convening a broad array of technical experts and policy makers from its 88 partner states and five official observer organizations, GICNT continues to provide a critical forum to address the shared global threat of nuclear terrorism.” (The Nuclear Security Contact Group mentioned here refers to a group of concerned countries that has substantially inherited the Sherpa meeting, which played an important role in agenda setting and others at the nuclear security summit.157) In addition, the declaration states in para 29: “We encourage universalization and implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as amended in 2005, and call on states that have not yet done so to become parties to these key nuclear security instruments. We encourage the states that have not done so to become contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and work toward their effective and sustainable implementation.” Besides, the declaration concretely states that “Iran is the only state with an operational nuclear power plant that is not party to any of these conventions, and we call on it to adhere to them.”

On the other hand, GICNT, which was agreed by the U.S.-Russia initiative at the St. Petersburg Summit in 2006, is another important international effort in the field of nuclear security. GICNT is a framework of voluntary international cooperation by concerned states. As mentioned in the previous section on nuclear forensics technology development, the presence of multilateral activities by GICNT for strengthening nuclear security has greatly increased in recent years. The GICNT now includes participation from 88 partner countries (including Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) and six international organizations, including UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), newly joined in 2018 as official observers.158 All partner nations have voluntarily committed to implementing the GICNT Statement of Principles (SOP), a set of broad nuclear security goals encompassing a range of deterrence, prevention, detection, and response objectives.159 The eight principles contained within the SOP aim to improve accounting, control, and protection of nuclear/ radiological material, enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities, detect and suppress illicit trafficking of nuclear/radiological material, assure denial of safe haven and resources from terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear/ radiological material, and so on. Since 2010, the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG, chaired by Finland) was established as a working arm of the GICNT partnership. IAG has several priority functional areas with working groups, such as the Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDWG, chaired by the United Kingdom), the Nuclear Forensic Working Group (NFWG, chaired by Canada) and Response and the Mitigation Working Group (RMWG, chaired by Argentina).160

Individual efforts concerning GICNT are as follows. In April, Hungary hosted the “Fierce Falcon” workshop to discuss how to respond to an attempted or actual theft of radiological material.161 In May, Mexico hosted the “Black Jaguar” field exercise to strengthen prosecution measures for nuclear or radiological terrorist attacks. Issues of emergency response mitigation, radiological crime scene management, nuclear forensics, and communications protocols were addressed at the exercise.162 In June, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a GICNT IAG meeting in Helsinki. The meeting was co-chaired by the United States and Russia, and a total of over 140 experts participated in the discussion on the progress of the three GICNT technical working groups.163 In August, Malaysia organized the IAEA regional workshop in cooperation with the GICNT. The workshop used a table top exercise to help participants from three countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) strengthen their capacity to detect and respond to nuclear security events in coastal and maritime areas.164

In this report, it is expected that the acceptance of international nuclear security review missions such as IPPAS by the IAEA, national efforts regarding nuclear forensics, and commitments to nuclear security capacity-building and support will contribute to enhancing surveyed countries’ nuclear security-related capabilities and performances, and make more effective their respective nuclear security systems. Furthermore, the contributions to the IAEA NSF, and participation in the G8GP (G7GP) and the GICNT, are indicators of the desire of states to enhance their commitment to nuclear security and can be used to undertake an overall evaluation of each country’s nuclear security system. Table 3-8 below shows the participation status and efforts regarding these nuclear security initiatives.

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[1] This chapter is written by Sukeyuki Ichimasa.

[2] Statement by South Africa on the Draft Chair’s Summary at the NPT Second Prepcom, May 4, 2018, http:// statements.unmeetings.org/media2/18559906/south-african-npt-statement-on-the-chairs-summary.pdf.

[3] NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.5.

[4] NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.14.

[5] Ibid., p. 2.

[6] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[7] One example is as follows. Jonathan Herbach and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, “More Work to Do: A Pathway for Future Progress on Strengthening Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, October 2015, https:// www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_10/Features/More-Work-to-Do-A-Pathway-for-Future-Progress-on-Strengthening-Nuclear-Security.

[8]     Based on Article 16 of the CPPNM Amendment, a review conference will be held five years after the effective date of the Convention (May 8, 2016).

[9] Statement by Ms. Anke ter Hoeve-van Heek, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the IAEA, September 19, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62- netherlands-final-statement.pdf.

[10] Kees Nederlof, “The Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM): What has been Achieved and What Remains to be Done,” in Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly, “An Arms Control Association and Fissile Materials Working Group Report The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010-2016,” Arms Control Association website, July 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/files/Reports/NSS_Report2018_digital. pdf, pp. 10-14.

[11]     Leah Matchett, “The controversial legacy of the Nuclear Security Summit,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists website, October 4, 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/10/the-controversial-legacy-of-the-nuclear[1]security-summit/.

[12] “Commentary Georgetown Security Studies Review: Is the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Distracting Attention from More Realistic Threats?,” RAND Cooperation website, July 27, 2018, https://www.rand.org/ blog/2018/07/is-the-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism-distracting-attention.html.

[13] Graham Allison, “Nuclear Terrorism: Did We Beat the Odds or Change Them?” PRISM, Volume 7, No. 3, May 15, 2018, https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1507316/nuclear-terrorism-did-we-beat-the-odds-or-change-them/

[14]     Patrick Malone and Jeffrey Smith, “A Terrorist Group’s Plot to Create a Radioactive “Dirty Bomb”: ISIS was Looking for Nuclear Materials, and Belgium was a Smart place to Hunt,” The Center of Public Integrity website, February 2016, https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/a-terrorist-groups-plot-to-create-a[1]radioactive-dirty-bomb/.

[15] “Greenpeace Activists ‘Crash’ Drone into French Nuclear Plant,” AFP, July 3, 2018, https://www.yahoo. com/news/greenpeace-activists-crash-drone-french-nuclear-plant-134507827.html; Michael Shellenberger, “If Nuclear Plants Are So Vulnerable To Terrorist Attack, Why Don’t Terrorists Attack Them?” Forbes, July 6, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/07/06/if-nuclear-plants-are-so-vulnerable[1]to-terrorist-attack-why-dont-terrorists-attack-them/#5842d0645877.

[16] Richard Mogagero, “4 Reasons Why U.S. Nuclear Power Plants Are Safe from Drones,” NEI website, August 6, 2018, https://www.nei.org/news/2018/4-reasons-us-nuclear-plants-safe-from-drones.

[17] Norway’s National Statement at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www. iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-norway-statement.pdf.

[18] Hiroshima Report 2015, p. 93.

[19] “IAEA to Cooperate with Japan on Nuclear Security at 2020 Olympic Games in Tokyo,” IAEA website, February 15, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-to-cooperate-with-japan-on-nuclear-security-at-2020-olympic-games-in-tokyo.

[20] Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources (IAEA/CODEOC/MGT-DRS/2018), IAEA, 2018, https://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/13380/Guidance-on-the-Management-of-Disused-Radioactive-Sources.

[21] Matt Fisher, “IAEA Guidance on Managing Disused Radioactive Sources Now Available,” IAEA website, July 5, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-guidance-on-managing-disused-radioactive-sources-now-available.

[22] “Technical Meeting on Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material in Transport,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/events/technical-meeting-on-security-of-nuclear-and-other-radioactive-material-in-transport.

[23]     “International Conference on Challenges Faced by Technical and Scientific Support Organizations (TSOs) in Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security: Ensuring Effective and Sustainable Expertise,” IAEA website, https:// www.iaea.org/events/challenges-faced-by-technical-and-scientific-support-organizations-conference-2018; Nathalie Mikhailova, “Technical and Scientific Support Key for Strong Nuclear Safety and Security: IAEA Conference Opens,” IAEA website, October 16, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/technical-and-scientific-support-key-for-strong-nuclear-safety-and-security-iaea-conference-opens.

[24] “Technical Meeting on the Safety and Security Interface – Approaches and National Experiences,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/events/EVT1802553.

[25] “Workshop on Emergency Preparedness and Response – Requirements and Practical Implementation,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/events/workshop-on-emergency-preparedness-and-response[1]requirements-and-practical-implementation.

[26] “Regional Workshop to Review the Template of the Mediterranean Regional EPR Plan,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/events/regional-workshop-to-review-the-template-of-the-mediterranean-regional-epr-plan.

[27] “NTI Nuclear Security Index Theft—Sabotage: Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action (Fouth Edition),” NTI website, September 2018, https://ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ NTI_2018-Index_FINAL.pdf.

[28] “Nuclear Security is Improving Almost Everywhere: Cyber-Security is a Growing Concern,” The Economist, September 6, 2018, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/09/06/nuclear-security-is-improving[1]almost-everywhere.

[29]     Caroline Baylon, Roger Brunt and David Livingstone, “Chatham House Report Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks,” Chatham House website, September 2015, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20151005CyberSecurityNuclearBaylonBruntLivingstone. pdf.

[30] Ernest J. Moniz, “Forward,” in “NTI Nuclear Security Index Theft—Sabotage: Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action (Fouth Edition),” NTI website, September 2018, https://ntiindex.org/ wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NTI_2018-Index_FINAL.pdf, p. 4.

[31] U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. XV-XVI.

[32] Ibid., p. 67.

[33] Nuclear Security Series Glossary Version 1.3 (November 2015). Updated, International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/nuclear-security-series-glossary-v1-3.pdf, p. 18.

[34] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.20, “Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime,” 2013, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1590_web.pdf.

[35] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.13, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5),” 2011, p. 13.

[36] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.14, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities,” 2011, p. 14.

[37] INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, paragraph 3.37.

[38] Ibid., paragraph 5.14.

[39] Ibid., paragraph 2.1.

[40] Ibid., paragraph 4.5.

[41] Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser, “Global Fissile Material Report 2015: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpile and Production,” NPT Review Conference, May 8, 2015, http://fissilematerials.org/library/ipfm15. pdf. While HEU stocks are decreasing, plutonium stocks are increasing, mainly due to increased inventory of civilian plutonium.

[42] NTI, “Civilian HEU Dynamic Map,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, November 2018, https://www.nti. org/gmap/other_maps/heu/index.html.

[43] Ibid; Chuck Messick, et.al., “Global Threat Reduction Initiative: U.S.-Origin Nuclear Fuel Removals,” U.S. Department of Energy website, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/em/GlobalThreatReductionInitiative. pdf.

[44] Ibid.

[45] IAEA, Research Reactor Data Base, IAEA website, https://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch. aspx?rf=1.

[46]     IAEA, Worldwide HEU and LEU assemblies by Enrichment, IAEA website, https://nucleus.iaea.org/ RRDB/Reports/Container.aspx?Id=C2.

[47]     IAEA, Regionwise distribution of HEU and LEU, IAEA website, https://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/Reports/ Container.aspx?Id=C1.

[48] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities,” 2011, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1487_web.pdf.

[49] Ibid., p. 14.

[50] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 11, “Security of Radioactive Sources,” 2009, http://www-pub.iaea.org/ MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1387_web.pdf.

[51] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14.

[52] “Joint Statement Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS),” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, March 11, 2016, https://static1.squarespace. com/static/568be36505f8e2af8023adf7/t/57050be927d4bd14a1daad3f/1459948521768/ Joint+Statement+on+the+Security+of+High+Activity+Radioactive+Sources.pdf.

[53] Second Technical Meeting on Radiation Detection Instruments for Nuclear Security: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities, IAEA website, April 16-20, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/events/second-technical-meeting-on-radiation-detection-instruments-for-nuclear-security-trends-challenges-and-opportunities.

[54] Catherine Friedly, “IAEA Meeting on Radiation Detection Instruments Highlights Role of Science, Technology and Engineering in Nuclear Security,” IAEA website, April 24, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/ newscenter/news/iaea-meeting-on-radiation-detection-instruments-highlights-role-of-science-technology-and-engineering-in-nuclear-security.

[55] Catherine Friedly, “IAEA Working Group on Radioactive Source Security Fosters Experience Sharing to Enhance Nuclear Security,” IAEA website, May 11, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-working-group-on-radioactive-source-security-fosters-experience-sharing-to-enhance-nuclear-securi

[56] “International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material: The Way Forward for Prevention and Detection,” IAEA website, December 3-7, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/events/security-of-radioactive-material[1]conference-2018.

[57] Inna Pletukhina, “Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication Key to Securing Radioactive Material: IAEA Conference,” IAEA website, December 14, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/cooperation[1]coordination-and-communication-key-to-securing-radioactive-material-iaea-conference.

[58] “Nuclear Security Summit 2016 Communiqués,” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 1, 2016.

[59] Multilateral agreements in nuclear energy II. Non-proliferation and nuclear security: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), OECD NEA website, August 6, 2018, https://www.oecd-nea. org/law/multilateral-agreements/convention-protection-material.html.

[60] Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, July 25, 2018, https:// www-legacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.pdf.

[61] “Status of Treaties: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,” United Nations Treaty Collections website, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ no=XVIII-15&chapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en.

[62] International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, United Nations, 2005, https:// treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/english-18-15.pdf, Article 1.

[63] “Convention on Nuclear Safety,” IAEA website, July 3, 2018, http://www-legacy.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Conventions/nuclearsafety_status.pdf.

[64]     “Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,” IAEA website, September 17, 2018, https:// www-legacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cenna_status.pdf.

[65] Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, IAEA website, August 16, 2018, https://www-legacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ Conventions/jointconv_status.pdf.

[66] Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, IAEA website, September 17, 2018, https://www-legacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cacnare_status.pdf.

[67] “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/publications/ documents/infcircs/physical-protection-nuclear-material.

[68] “Highlights of National Progress Reports,” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016, http://www.nss2016.org/news/2016/4/5/highlights-from-national-progress-reports-nuclear-security-summit.

[69] Statement by Dr. Darmansjah Djumala, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary/Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-indonesia-statement.pdf.

[70] Nigeria’s Country Statement Delivered by his Excellency Mr. Ibrahim Usman Jibril, Honourable Minister of State for Environment at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/ sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-nigeria-statement.pdf.

[71] Statement of the Head of Delegation of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia H.E. Khalid A. Al-Falih, Minister of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources at the IAEA 62nd General Conference, September 2018, https://www. iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-saudi-arabia-statement_en.pdf.

[72] Sweden Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mikaela Kumlin Granit at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-sweden-statement.pdf.

[73]     S.E. Pieter De Crem, Secrétaire d’Etat au Commerce extérieur, Declaration Nationale De La Belgique 62ème Session De La Conférence Générale De L’aiea, Septembre 18, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ files/18/09/gc62-belgium-statement.pdf.

[74] Statement by H.E. Ambassador Marcel Biato, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the IAEA and PrepCom-CTBTO at the 62nd IAEA General Conference, September 17-21, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/ default/files/18/09/gc62-brazil-statement.pdf.

[75] Statement by Ms. Anke ter Hoeve-van Heek, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the IAEA, September 19, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62- netherlands-final-statement.pdf.

[76]     Nanako Kogiku, “IAEA Training for Latin American Countries Focuses on Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Material Against Sabotage,” IAEA website, September 13, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/ iaea-training-for-latin-american-countries-focuses-on-protection-of-nuclear-facilities-and-material-against-sabotage.

[77]     Statement by Thorsten Herdan, Director General Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 18, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/ gc62-germany-statement.pdf.

[78] Statement by the Norwegian Delegation at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-norway-statement.pdf.

[79]     “Past and Current Civilian HEU Reduction Efforts,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, December 20, 2017, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/past-and-current-civilian-heu-reduction-efforts/.

[80]     Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 5, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered.

[81] “Hague Communiqué,” 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, March 25, 2014.

[82]     The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: The Nuclear Security Summits: Securing the World from Nuclear Terrorism,” March 29, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/29/fact-sheet-nuclear-security-summits-securing-world-nuclear-terrorism.

[83] NTI, “Civilian HEU Dynamic Map,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, December 2017, http://www.nti. org/gmap/other_maps/heu/index.html.

[84] U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration, “Prevent, Counter, and Respond-A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats FY2019-FY2023 Report to Congress,” October 2018, https:// www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/10/f57/FY2019%20NPCR.pdf

[85] “IAEA Helps Remove Highly Radioactive Material from Five South American Countries,” IAEA website, April 30, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-helps-remove-highly-radioactive-material-from-five-south-american-countries.

[86] Hiroshima Report 2017, pp.109-110; Hiroshima Report 2018, pp. 111-112.

[87]     Statement by Mr Benoît Revaz, State Secretary and Director of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy at the 62nd Session of the IAEA General Conference, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ files/18/09/gc62-switzerland-statement_en.pdf.

[88] Statement by the Chinese Delegation, 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https:// www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-china-statement.pdf.

[89] Nigeria’s Country Statement Delivered by his Excellency Mr. Ibrahim Usman Jibril, Honourable Minister of State for Environment at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/ sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-nigeria-statement.pdf.

[90] Statement by Ms. Anke ter Hoeve-van Heek, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the IAEA, September 19, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62- netherlands-final-statement.pdf.

[91] Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “The Basic Principles on Japan’s Utilization of Plutonium,” July 31, 2018, http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/3-3set.pdf.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Statement by Minister of State Masaji Matsuyama at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 17, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-japan-statement.pdf.

[94]     IAEA, “ITDB: Incident and Trafficking Database,” https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ files/16/12/16-3042_ns_to_itdb_web-20160105.pdf.

[95]     IAEA, “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Out of Regulatory Control,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/12/itdb[1]factsheet-2018.pdf.

[96]    IAEA Annual Report 2017, GC(62)/3, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/ reports/2017/gc62-3.pdf, p. 85.

[97] IAEA Annual Report 2015, GC(60)/9, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC60/GC60Documents/ English/gc60-9_en.pdf, pp. 90-91.

[98] IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2018, GOV/2018/36-GC(62)/10, August 6, 2018, https://www-legacy. iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC62/GC62Documents/English/gc62-10_en.pdf, pp. 2-3.

[99]     IAEA, IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control 2017 Fact Sheet, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/12/itdb[1]factsheet-2017.pdf, p. 2.

[100] Ibid., p. 1.

[101] “Second Technical Meeting on Radiation Detection Instruments for Nuclear Security: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/events/second-technical-meeting-on-radiation-detection-instruments-for-nuclear-security-trends-challenges-and-opportunities.

[102] Catherine Friedly, “Workshop Aids Nuclear Security Experts in Testing and Evaluating Technology Used for Border Monitoring,” IAEA website, July 24, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/workshop-aids-nuclear-security-experts-in-testing-and-evaluating-technology-used-for-border-monitoring.

[103] Nigeria’s Country Statement Delivered by his Excellency Mr. Ibrahim Usman Jibril, Honourable Minister of State for Environment at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/ sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-nigeria-statement.pdf.

[104] Statement by the Minister of Energy of Kazakhstan Kanat Bozumbaev at the 62nd Session of the IAEA General Conference, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-kazakhstan[1]statement.pdf.

[105] NPR 2018, p. 67.

[106] Catherine Friedly, “IAEA Helped Indonesia Implement Nuclear Security at the 2018 Asian Games,” IAEA website, October 25, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-helped-indonesia-implement[1]nuclear-security-at-the-2018-asian-games.

[107]     “News and Events: RADNUC Investigation and Coordination Workshop in Tbilisi,” INTERPOL website, https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/CBRNE/News-and-Events.

[108] Hiroshima Report 2017, p.116.

[109] “Meetings, Conferences and Symposia: Meetings on Nuclear Safety and Security,” IAEA website, http:// www-ns.iaea.org/meetings/default.asp?tme=ns&yr=2017&s=10&l=79&submit.x=7&submit.y=7.

[110] Peer Review and Advisory Services Calendar, IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/services/review[1]missions/calendar?type=3170&year%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&location=All&status=All; Statement by Mr Benoît Revaz, State Secretary and Director of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy at the 62nd Session of the IAEA General Conference, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-switzerland[1]statement_en.pdf.

[111] “Peer Review and Advisory Services Calendar,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/services/review[1]missions/calendar?type=3170&year%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&location=All&status=All; “IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Japan,” IAEA website, December 7, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/ newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-japan.

[112] “Peer Review and Advisory Services Calendar,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/services/review[1]missions/calendar?type=3170&year%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&location=All&status=All.

[113] Ibid.

[114] International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ), IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/ services/review-missions/international-nuclear-security-advisory-service-insserv.

[115] Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), IAEA website, http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/ inssp.asp?s=4.

[116] Statement of the Philippines by H.E. Ambassador Maria Cleofe R. Natividad at the 62nd Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62- philippines-statement.pdf.

[117] Statement by the Republic of South Africa Delivered by Deputy Minister of Energy, Ambassador Thembisile Majola, MP on the Occasion of the 62nd Session of the IAEA General Conference, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-south_africa-statement.pdf.

[118] GC(61)/24: Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021, September 14, 2017, https://www-legacy.iaea.org/About/ Policy/GC/GC61/GC61Documents/English/gc61-24_en.pdf, p. 4.

[119] Ibid., p. 14.

[120]     The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Work Plan of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit,” April 13, 2010.

[121] “Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security,” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016, http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-forensics-in-nuclear-security.

[122] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.2-G (Rev.1), “Nuclear Forensics Support,” 2006, http://www-pub.iaea. org/books/IAEABooks/10797/Nuclear-Forensics-in-Support-of-Investigations.

[123] Ibid., p. 3.

[124] “EU-US Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) Joint Statement,” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 1, 2016, http://www.nss2016.org/document-center[1]docs/2016/4/1/eu-us-nuclear-forensics-international-technical-working-group-itwg-joint-statement.

[125]     ITWG “Guideline,” ITWG website, http://www.nf-itwg.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ITWG_Guideline_for_RN_Evidence_Collection_FINAL.pdf.

[126]     “Nuclear Forensics Libraries,” ITWG website, http://www.nf-itwg.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/National_Nuclear_Forensic_Libraries_TOR_FINAL.pdf.

[127] GC(61)/24: Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021, September 14, 2017, http://www.nf-itwg.org/newsletters/ ITWG_Update_no_7.pdf.

[128] “Fact Sheet,” GICNT website, June 2018, http://www.gicnt.org/documents/GICNT_Fact_Sheet_ June2018.pdf.

[129] “Key Multilateral Events and Exercises,” GICNT website, http://www.gicnt.org/documents/GICNT_ Past_Multilateral_Events_July2018.pdf.

[130] Ibid., p. 16.

[131] David Kenneth Smith and Timofey Tsvetkov, “NEW CRP: Applying Nuclear Forensic Science to Respond to a Nuclear Security Event (J02013),” IAEA website, May 7, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/ new-crp-applying-nuclear-forensic-science-to-respond-to-a-nuclear-security-event-j02013.

[132] Inna Pletukhina, “Crime Scene to Court Room: Implementing Nuclear Forensic Science,” IAEA website, October 29, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/crime-scene-to-court-room-implementing-nuclear-forensic-science.

[133] Jon M. Schwantes, et al., “State of practice and emerging application of analytical techniques of nuclear forensic analysis: highlights from the 4th Collaborative Materials Exercise of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG)” J Radioanal Nucl Chem, DOI 10.1007/s10967-016-5037-5 (published online, September 16, 2016).

[134] Canadian Statement by Ambassador Heidi Hulan, Permanent Representative of Canada to the International Organizations in Vienna at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https:// www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-canada-statement-en.pdf.

[135] Sweden Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mikaela Kumlin Granit at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-sweden-statement.pdf.

[136] Miguel Santini, ”Norway and Romania Extend IAEA-supported Partnership to Strengthen Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security,” IAEA website, October 2, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/ norway-and-romania-extend-iaea-supported-partnership-to-strengthen-nuclear-and-radiological-safety-and-security

[137] Statement by the Chinese Delegation, 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https:// www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-china-statement.pdf.

[138] Statement by Dr. Sekhar Basu Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and Secreatary, Department of Atomic Energy at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 19, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/ default/files/18/09/gc62-india-statement.pdf.

[139]     Statement by the Leader of the Pakistan Delegation, 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-pakistan-statement.pdf.

[140] Statement by Dr. Darmansjah Djumala, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary/Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-indonesia-statement.pdf.

[141] Statement by Minister of State Masaji Matsuyama at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 17, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-japan-statement.pdf.

[142] “Joint ICTP-IAEA International School on Nuclear Security,” IAEA website, https://www.iaea.org/ events/joint-ictp-iaea-international-school-on-nuclear-security.

[143] Matt Fisher, “Nuclear Security Skills Strengthened at IAEA Course in Spain,” IAEA website, June 19, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/nuclear-security-skills-strengthened-at-iaea-course-in-spain.

[144] Brunelle Battistella, “IAEA Regional Workshop Helps Raise Awareness of Nuclear Security in Central America and the Caribbean,” IAEA website, July 18, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-regional-workshop-helps-raise-awareness-of-nuclear-security-in-central-america-and-the-caribbean.

[145]     Susanna Lööf, “IAEA Network Fosters International Cooperation That Strengthens Nuclear Security, Members Agree at Annual Meeting,” IAEA website, April 10, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/ iaea-network-fosters-international-cooperation-that-strengthens-nuclear-security-members-agree-at-annual-meeting.

[146] GOV/2018/36-GC(62)/10: Nuclear Security Repot 2018, https://www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/ GC/GC62/GC62Documents/English/gc62-10_en.pdf, p. 17.

[147] Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021, GC(61)/24, September 14, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/ GC/GC61/GC61Documents/English/gc61-24_en.pdf.

[148]     IAEA, “IAEA Annual Report 2017,” https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2017/ gc62-3.pdf, p. 85.

[149] UK National Statement at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 2018, https://www.iaea. org/sites/default/files/18/09/gc62-uk-_statement.pdf.

[150]     Statement by Thorsten Herdan, Director General Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy at the 62nd General Conference of the IAEA, September 18, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/ gc62-germany-statement.pdf.

[151] Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016, http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-1540-committee

[152] NTI, “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (“10 Plus 10 Over 10 Program”),” June 20, 2017, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/global-partnership-against-spread-weapons-and-materials-mass-destruction-10-plus-10-over-10-program/.

[153] Ibid.

[154] “G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” G7 2017 Italia website, http://www.g7italy.it/it/node/190.

[155] “Nuclear & Radiological Security,” GPWMD website, https://www.gpwmd.com/nrswg.

[156] “2018 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” G7 website, https://g7.gc.ca/en/g7- presidency/themes/building-peaceful-secure-world/g7-ministerial-meeting/g7-foreign-ministers-joint-communique/2018-g7-statement-non-proliferation-disarmament/.

[157] “Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture,” Nuclear Security Contact Group website, April 5, 2016, http://www.nscontactgroup.org/.

[158]     “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Partner Nations List,” June 2018, http://www.gicnt.org/ documents/GICNT_Partner_Nation_List_June2018.pdf.

[159] “Overview,” GICNT Website, http://www.gicnt.org/index.html.

[160] “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet,” GICNT website, June 2018, http://www. gicnt.org/documents/GICNT_Fact_Sheet_June2018.pdf.

[161] Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), NTI website, September 30, 2018, https://www. nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/global-initiative-combat-nuclear-terrorism-gicnt/.

[162] Ibid.

[163] Michio Seya, “2-2 GICNT-IAG Kaigou Sanka Houkoku,” ISCN News Letter, No.0257, August 2018, https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/nnp_news/attached/0257.pdf, pp. 16-23.

[164] Catherine Friedly, “IAEA Holds Table Top Exercise to Strengthen Detection and Response Capabilities in Maritime Nuclear Security Events,” IAEA website, October 3, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/ news/iaea-holds-table-top-exercise-to-strengthen-detection-and-response-capabilities-in-maritime-nuclear-security-events.