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Hiroshima for Global Peace

(4) Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

A) Reduction of nuclear weapons


Russia and the United States continue to implement the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) which entered into force in February 2011. The status of their strategic (nuclear) delivery vehicles and warheads under the New START has been periodically updated in the U.S. Department of State homepage (see Table 1-4 below). The United States also declared the number of each type of its strategic delivery vehicles (see Table 1- 5). According to the data as of February 5, 2018—the deadline for reducing their strategic arsenals under the treaty—the number of Russian and U.S deployed strategic delivery vehicles and deployed/non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles/launchers, besides deployed strategic warheads, fell below the limit. The two countries declared they have met the limits for strategic nuclear forces.

Since the treaty’s entry into force, Russia and the United States have implemented the on-site inspections it stipulates.56 In addition, as the U.S. State Department disclosed, the two countries exchanged 18,923 notifications as of the end of 2018, but that number was not posted on its website at the end of 2019.57 Up through 2017, neither side asserted any non-compliance. However, in April 2018, Russia criticized U.S. implementation, claiming that “the United States reached the parameters set by the Treaty not only by actually reducing the arms but also by undertaking manipulations inconsistent with common practice for agreements…[I]t was done through converting a certain number of Trident- II SLBM launchers and В-52Н heavy bombers in such a way that precluded the Russian Federation from confirming that these strategic arms had been rendered incapable of employing SLBMs or nuclear armaments for heavy bombers as specified in the Treaty.”58

The New START is set to expire in February 2021 in accordance with its provision. U.S. President Donald Trump has been critical of the New START, even before his inauguration in January 2017, and maintained a negative attitude toward Russia’s proposal to extend the treaty. 

In April 2019, the U.S. administration reportedly conducted intense interagency talks to develop options for the President to pursue a new arms control arrangement which would include China as well as Russia, and also regulate not just strategic nuclear forces but also other nuclear forces and their delivery vehicles.59 There was no indication, however, that it broached any such ideas with Russia or China.

At a Senate hearing on May 15, Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson told that “the Administration [had] not made any decision on a potential extension of New START” She also listed issues that should be contemplated, as follows: Russia’s modernization of strategic forces; Russia’s history of violating arms control treaties; necessity of an arms control agreement for the United States and its allies; and China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program.60 

On the other hand, Russia has asked the United States for an extension of the New START. In addition, while Russia argued that “any discussion of weapons not currently in New START should be part of a separate discussion about other issues,” it has expressed a significant concern about the U.S. efforts for developing strategic defense systems.61 At their foreign ministerial meeting in May 2019, Washington and Moscow agreed to continue talks on extending the New START. The United States has indicated that President Trump would decide in 2020 whether or not to extend the treaty.

Meanwhile, for the first time under the auspices of New START, Russia showed its new hypersonic boost glide vehicle Avangard to the U.S. inspectors on November 24-26, prior to its deployment in December.62 Former chief-of-staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Viktor Yesin, said, “It is a standard procedure envisaged by the [New START]. Obviously, it should give the Americans an extra stimulus to extend the treaty.”63 On November 27, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told that Russia proposed to the United States extending the New START for five years, or for a shorter period if the United States would not want the five-year extension.64 Furthermore, President Vladimir Putin said in December, “Russia is ready to immediately, as soon as possible, before the end of this year, without any preconditions, extend the [New START].”65 However, in 2019, the two countries could not agree a future direction on the issue whether and to what extent the New START should be extended.

INF Treaty

Since July 2014, when the United States first officially brought up the allegations of Russian non-compliance, Russia and the United States have mutually pointed 􏰃􏰁􏰂 a􏰈d c􏰄i􏰂ici􏰑ed 􏰂he 􏰃􏰂he􏰄􏰆􏰇 a􏰉􏰉ega􏰂i􏰃􏰈􏰇 of non-compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The United States has pointed out that Russia conducted flight tests of 9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in a manner violating the INF Treaty, started to deploy them, and increased the number of their production and deployment. On the other hand, Russia dismissed the U.S. claims and asserted that it is the United States that has violated the treaty, claiming that: U.S. tests of target-missiles for missile defense have similar characteristics to intermediate-range missiles; U.S. production of armed drones falls within the definition of ground-launched cruise missiles in the Treaty; and the Mk-41 launch system for Aegis Ashore BMD system can also launch intermediate-range cruise missiles.

The United States denied the Russia’s claims, arguing, for instance, that the MK-41 launcher for cruise missiles is the same launcher for BMD interceptors, albeit in a different configuration.66 On January 15, 2019, the United States and Russia held a consultation meeting on the INF Treaty in Geneva, but there was no progress.67 The following week, at the CD, the United States demanded that Russia destroy the 9M729 and their launcher in a verifiable manner.68 On January 23, Russia unveiled the 9M729, explaining that the 9M729 missile, whose maximum range is 480 km, was an advanced version of the 9M728, and the new missile’s booster, cruising engine and fuel tank remain unchanged; therefore, it was not in violation of the INF Treaty.69 However, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Andrea L. Thompson rejected the Russian explanation, saying: “A static display of the system doesn’t tell me how far that missile can fly.”70 In October 2018, President Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty. Subsequent consultations failed to resolve the situation. Finally, on February 2, 2019, the United States formally notified Russia of its withdrawal from the treaty, and declared that it would suspend its obligations.71 In accordance with the provisions of the treaty, the United States withdrew from it on August 2, six months after its notification, and the INF Treaty expired.

Russia continued to deny its violation of the treaty, and criticized the U.S. decision of its withdrawal.72 On March 4, 2019, President Putin signed an executive order suspending obligations under the treaty. On July 3, President Putin signed into a law on the suspension of the INF Treaty, which came into effect on the same day. In addition, in a statement delivered after the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty, President Putin stated, “When one of the parties withdraws from the Treaty, it ceases to have effect automatically. Therefore, as of August 2, 2019 the INF Treaty no longer exists…Let me emphasize that all the responsibility for what has happened rests with the United States.”73 He also told that Russia would produce ground launched intermediate missiles, but that it would not deploy them unless the United States did so first.74

Regarding the U.S. allies’ responses, NATO expressed strong support to the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty, andcriticized that Russia’s non-compliance should be blamed. At the same time, NATO stated: “[W]e will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non- proliferation, as a key element of Euro- Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment…We continue to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia, when Russia’s actions make that possible.”75 NATO also emphasized that it would not accept the President Putin’s proposal for a moratorium on deployments of ground- launched intermediate missile since it was not a credible offer by a country which had already deployed the 9M729, in violation of the INF Treaty.76 Meanwhile, although NATO has not clarified whether it would deploy intermediate-range missiles in European soil, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg reaffirmed: “We do not intend to deploy new ground-based nuclear missiles in Europe.”77

While official U.S. statements were focused on alleged Russian non- compliance, many experts suggested that concerns about China’s growing missile arsenal unconstrained by the INF Treaty was another key factor behind the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the treaty.

As for Japan’s position, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said at a press conference in February 2019 when the United States notified its withdrawal from the INF Treaty, “As the treaty has played a historic role in arms control and reduction, it is undesirable that the treaty be ended. However, we understand the U.S. awareness of problems that led it to announce it will halt its obligations under the treaty.”78 In addition, when the INF Treaty expired in August, he reiterated Japan’s position as mentioned above, and added that it was necessary to consider a situation where countries that were not parties to the INF Treaty have developed and deployed land-based intermediate- range missiles, and also that it was also essential to thoroughly discuss a modality of arms control in East Asia, including improvement of transparency.79

Other Nuclear-Weapon/Armed States

Among nuclear-armed states other than Russia and the United States, France and the United Kingdom have reduced their nuclear weapons unilaterally. The United Kingdom, which previously announced plans to reduce its nuclear forces to no more than 120 operationally available warheads and a total stockpile of no more than 180 warheads by the mid-2020s, declared in January 2015 that it had completed the reduction of the number of deployed warheads on each of its Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) from 48 to 40 as committed to in 2010, and the total number of operationally available warheads has therefore been reduced to 120.80 France urged Russia and the United States to negotiate an extension of the New START and a follow-up arms control treaty, but has not indicated further reduction of its own nuclear arsenals.81

Among the five NWS, China has declared neither concrete information on the number of deployed or possessed nuclear weapons, nor any plan for their reduction, while reiterating that it keeps its nuclear arsenal at the minimum level required for its national security. It is widely estimated that China has not dramatically increased its nuclear arsenal numerically, perhaps keeping increases in warhead numbers to about 10 annually. On the other hand, it is likely that China will continue qualitative advancements in its nuclear arsenal.

At the 2019 NPT PrepCom, China reiterated its long-standing position: “Countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should continue to make drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner while faithfully implementing their existing nuclear arms reduction treaties.”82 In addition, China has often states: “If other countries’ arsenals are at China’s level, we are ready to join this process.”83

The United States urged, though not with specific or concrete proposals, China to join with Russia in discussions on new nuclear arms control frameworks in the context of its withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the extension of the New START.84 German Chancellor Angela Merkel also called on China to participate in international disarmament negotiations after the expiration of the INF Treaty.85 Furthermore, Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro Kono urged the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, including China, to discuss a new framework for disarmament.86

However, China has been strongly opposed to participating in negotiations on nuclear arms control in the current situation. At a press conference, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang clearly said, “The multilateralization of the INF Treaty involves a series of complex issues covering political, military and legal fields, which draws concerns from many countries. China opposes the multilateralization of this treaty.”87 In May 2019, he also stated, “[China’s] nuclear force is always kept at the minimum level required by national security, with an order-of-magnitude difference from that of the US and Russia, which puts things in a completely different light. We oppose any country’s attempt to make an issue out of China on arms control and will not participate in any negotiation for a trilateral nuclear disarmament agreement.”88 RegardingGermany’s above mentioned request, he rebuffed, “China develops its capabilities strictly according to its defensive needs and doesn’t pose a threat to anybody else. So we are opposed to the multilateralization of the INF [Treaty].”89 China also opposed Japanese Foreign Minister Kono’s suggestion to create a new multilateral structure to replace the INF Treaty by the five NWS, arguing: “If the agreement becomes multilateral, this will influence a whole range of complex political, military and legal issues…The Chinese side does not give its consent.”90

As for India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, there is no information, statement or analysis which suggests any reduction of their nuclear weapons or capabilities. To the contrary, as noted below, they are expanding their nuclear programs.

B) A concrete plan for further reduction of nuclear weapons

In 2019, there was no new proposal by nuclear-armed states to take new, concrete measures for further reductions of their nuclear arsenals. As mentioned above, there was little progress made with U.S.-Russian further reductions of their strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. China, France and the United Kingdom have not changed their positions that further significant reduction of Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals is needed, so as to commence a multilateral process of nuclear weapons reductions. In South Asia, Pakistan only stated that it would abandon its nuclear weapons if India did the same. As mentioned below, North Korea pledged to “take steps toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” but has not presented a concrete plan on dismantling its nuclear arsenals or even clarifying what it means by “denuclearization”.

C) Trends on strengthening/ modernizing nuclear weapons capabilities

While nuclear-armed states have reiterated their commitments to promoting nuclear disarmament, they continue to modernize and/or strengthen their nuclear weapons capabilities.


Although China has not disclosed the status of its development and deployment of nuclear weapons, it has actively carried out their modernization. At a military parade held in October 2019, China introduced the new DF-41 mobile MIRVed ICBM (capable of carrying 10 nuclear warheads per a missile) with a range of 15,000 km, as an “important pillar of its strategic nuclear weapons.” During the military parade, the following missiles were also unveiled: the DF-5B and DF-31AG ICBMs; the DF-26 IRBMs, with anti-ship capability; the H-6K and H-6N strategic bombers; the JL-2 SLBMs; the DF-100 cruise missile; and the DF-17, which carries the hypersonic glider DF-ZF (for which nine flight tests have been conducted since 2014).91

In its Annual Report on the Chinese Military in 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that China is estimated to possess approximately 90 ICBMs and launchers, and 80-160 IRBMs including DF-26 we well as their 80 launchers.92

The U.S. Defense Department also assessed: “China has constructed six JIN- class SSBN, with four operational and two outfitting at Huludao Shipyard. China’s JIN SSBNs, which are equipped to carry up to 12 [JL-2]…China’s next- generation Type 096 SSBN reportedly will be armed with the follow-on JL-3 SLBM, and it will likely begin construction in the early2020s.”93 In December 2019, China reportedly conducted a flight test of the JL-3. According to a report published by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in February 2019, China possesses more than 2,000 missiles, 95% of which are ground-based medium- and intermediate-range missiles (of which about 400-600 have a range of 1,000 km or more) prohibited under the INF Treaty.94

China has been deepening its relations with Russia, and in October 2019 President Putin stated that Russia was helping China build a new missile attack warning system.95


In a speech on nuclear policies in February 2015, President François Hollande declassified that the French nuclear deterrent consists of 54 middle- range ALCMs and three sets of 16 SLBMs.96

All French Le Triomphant-class SSBNs carry the M51 SLBM (with an estimated range of 8,000 km), which was deployed starting in 2010 to replace the M45 SLBM by late 2016. In December 2017, M51.2—an upgraded version of the M51.1—loading new nuclear warheads commenced to operate, which all French SSBNs will carry by 2020. France also plans to complete a development of the M51.3 by 2015, and incorporate a new third stage for extended range and 97 further improvement in accuracy. In addition, France has begun design development of a stealthier, extended- range replacement for the ASMPA, which will be called the ASN4G (air-sol nucléaire 4ème génération) and enter into service around 2035.98


Russia continued to develop new types of strategic nuclear forces to replace its aging systems, mainly aiming to bolster nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the United States. In January 2018, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that 90 percent of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces would be armed with modern weaponry by 2021,99 and in December he reported that the modernity level of the strategic nuclear forces had reached 82%.100

Regarding ICBMs, the deployment of mobile/fixed RS-24 (Yars) ICBMs is progressing. In addition, Russia repeatedly conducted flight tests of the MIRVed RS-28 (Sarmat), which can carry 10-16 nuclear warheads. It is estimated that the RS-28 will complete its testing phase by the end of 2020, and begin replacing the SS-18 (RS-20V) ICBMs by 2021.101 As for its-sea based nuclear forces, the conversion to Borey-class SSBNs has begun, with three ships in service and five under construction.102 In October 2019, “[f]or the first time with the newest strategic missile submarine ‘Knyaz Vladimir’ of project Borey-A, test-fired a sea based Bulava ballistic missile”103

More attention has been paid to Russia’s development of brand-new nuclear delivery vehicles.104 For instance, the Avangard hypersonic boost glide vehicle (with a range of at least 5,500 km) flies over Mach 20 and is highly mobile, making interception by ballistic missile defense difficult. After a test launch in December 2018, Russia announced at the end of 2019 that it had started to deploy the Avangard.105 In addition, Russia has developed a Status-6, or Poseidon Unmanned Nuclear Submersible (UUV), a long-range nuclear torpedo with a range of more than 10,000 km driven by nuclear power.106 By detonating a highpowered nuclear warhead near the adversary’s coast, it can create a tsunami of radioactive seawater and debris, and cause serious radioactive contamination of ports, cities and economic infrastructure near the coast, rendering them uninhabitable for generations.107 In January 2019, it was reported that 32 units would be deployed in the near future.108 On the other hand, the development of the SSC-X -9 (Skyfall) nuclear-propelled cruise missile, which President Putin mentioned in his March 2018 speech, is seen as experiencing difficulty.109 In August 2019, an explosion at a Russian military test site (near Severodbinsk, Arkhangelsk) caused an increase in radiation levels in the surrounding area. Rosatom, a Russian state-run nuclear power company, stated, “The tragedy happened while working with the engineering and technical support of the isotope power source in a liquid propulsion system.”110 However, it was suspected that the nuclear propulsion engine for nuclear-powered cruise missiles had accidentally exploded.
Regarding land-based intermediate-range missiles, it was reported that Russia had already deployed approximately four 9M729 battalions (approximately 100 missiles).111 Moscow has not confirmed whether it deployed those missiles. On the other hand, Russia clearly stated that it would never accept the U.S. and NATO demand to destroy its 9M729 because they are not in violation of the INF Treaty.112 Russia also said that if the INF treaty expired, it would need to develop new ground-launched intermediate-range missiles within two years, such as a ground-launched version of the Kalibr cruise missiles or land-based long-range hypersonic cruise missiles.113
The United Kingdom
In October 2017, the United Kingdom started to construct a new Dreadnoughtclass of four SSBNs as replacements of the existing Vanguard-class SSBNs, at a projected cost of £31 billion (with an additional £10 billion contingency). The first new SSBN is expected to enter into service in the early 2030s, but construction has been delayed due to technical problems. It has also been pointed out that the increase in construction costs may make the UK military spend more on equipment procurement in the future.114 In parallel, the United Kingdom is participating in the U.S. current service-life extension program for the Trident II D5 missile. It is reported that a U.K. decision on a replacement warhead has been deferred until 2019-2020.115
The United States
Since the timing of renewal for the U.S. strategic delivery vehicles, which began deployment during the Cold War, is drawing closer, the United States has contemplated development of succeeding ICBMs, SSBNs and strategic bombers (and Long Range Stand-Off Weapons (LRSO) for use thereon).116 In the NPR publicized in February 2018, the Trump administration reaffirmed the importance of the U.S. nuclear triad and its modernization plan designed by the previous administration as follows:117
➢ Constructing 12 Colombia-class SSBNs, the first of which will start to operate in 2031;
➢ Building 400 Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD, the new ICBMs) for replacing 450 Minuteman III; and
➢ Developing and deploying B-21 next generation strategic bombers as well as LRSO.
Regarding non-strategic nuclear forces, the NPR 2018 states that: the United States will maintain, and enhance as necessary, the capability to forward deploy nuclear bombers and DCA around the world; and, in the near-term, the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a modern nucleararmed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).118 In January 2019, the first W79-2 low-yield nuclear warhead (its explosive power is 5 kt) was produced at the production plant in Pantex, Texas.119 And the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) completed the First Production Unit (FPU) of the W76-2 warhead in February.120
As for intermediate-range missiles, the United States conducted a flight test of the GLCM (a ground-launched version Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile) on August 19, 2019, immediately after its withdrawal from the INF Treaty.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the launcher used in the GLCM test was a MK-41; “however, the system tested is not the same as the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System.”121 The United States also tested a prototype version of a conventional, groundlaunched IRBM in December, which terminated in the open ocean after flying for more than 500 km. The Defense Department reportedly considered that a deployment of its IRBMs were not likely for five years or more.122 In the
meantime, the U.S. Congress agreed that under the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), spending any fiscal 2020 funds for buying or fielding intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles would be prohibited.123
India seems to be energetically pursuing the possession of a strategic nuclear triad, that is: ICBMs and SLBMs to complement its nuclear bomber force. In January, May and December 2018, India conducted flight-tests of Agni-5 mobile ICBMs.124 It has also developed an Agni-6 ICBM with a range of 8,000-10,000 km. In the maritime, India’s second strategic nuclear submarine Aridhant was launched in November 2017. India also mentioned in November 2018 that its first domestically built nuclear-powered submarine had completed a “deterrence patrol.”125 It reportedly plans to build a bigger and more potent version of the indigenous nuclear submarine in the immediate future,126 and the new SLBMs of K-15 (700 km) and K-4 (3,000 km).
Israel is believed to have developed the Jericho 3 IRBM (range 4,800 to 6,500 km), but it is not known whether or not it will be deployed. The deployment of SLCMs capable of carrying nuclear warheads was also reported, and in October 2017 Israel announced an agreement to purchase 3 additional Dolphin-class submarines capable of carrying nuclear warheads from Germany (Five vessels currently in operation).127
Pakistan128 has prioritized the development and deployment of nuclearcapable short- and medium-range missiles for ensuring deterrence vis-à-vis India. For instance, Pakistan conducted several test flights of the Nasr SRBMs in January 2019,129 and a test of the Shaheen-II MRBM.130
The U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats testified at a February 2018 hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that: “Pakistan continues to produce nuclear weapons and develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic missiles. These new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks for escalation dynamics and security in the region.”131
North Korea
While North Korea aggressively developed and tested nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in 2017, it initiated a peace offensive in 2018, and did not conduct any nuclear explosive or missile flight tests throughout the year. In his New Year’s address in January 2019, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong-un stated that that North Korea would continue its suspension of nuclear and missile tests, and that it would not produce, test, use or proliferate nuclear weapons. In fact, North Korea did not conduct a nuclear test or test-fire long-range ballistic missiles in 2019. However, North Korea launched more than 20 short-range ballistic missiles and multiple rocket launchers in 2019. It is also considered that apart from visible testing, North Korea has continued to develop its nuclear and missile programs. The following developments were reported.
➢ Analysts at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said North Korea may have produced 12 nuclear weapons since the first Trump-Kim summit in 2018.132
➢ Commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center indicates that while the site remained operational and was still well maintained, the main facilities did not appear to be operating. The one possible exception is the Uranium Enrichment Plant (UEP)— although if it is operating, in what capacity remains unclear.133 In addition, it is assumed that North Korea maintains enrichment facilities outside Yongbyon.134
➢ IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano reported at the Board of Governors in March, “At the Light Water Reactor, the Agency saw indications of ongoing construction work. We also continued to observe indications of the ongoing use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility.”135
➢ At the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (Tongchang-ri), construction to rebuild the launch pad and engine test stand was completed, and would have returned to normal operational status.136
➢ The shipyard in Sinpo is reportedly continuing to build new submarines,137 and North Korea conducted a test launch of Pukguksong-3 SLBM in September.138
➢ The KCNA reported that North Korea succeeded a “test of great significance” at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on December 7, which would “have an important effect on changing the strategic position of the DPRK once again in the near future.”139 A private think tank assessed that it was a static (ground) test of a large liquidpropellant rocket engine.140 On December 14, North Korea also announced its intention to conduct “another crucial test” at the same site, and stated, “The research successes being registered by us in defence science one after another recently will be applied to further bolstering up the reliable strategic nuclear deterrent of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”141

55 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP8, March 20, 2019.

56 The U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Inspection Activities,” new-start-treaty-inspection-activities/.

57 The U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty,”

58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, “Russia’s Assessment of the US Department of State’s Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” April 24, 2018, asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3192916. See also Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Challenges US Compliance with Nuclear Arms Treaty,” Associated Press, September 9, 2018, d9eeccab26d64019ab3ea1954eb89280.

59 Kylie Atwood and Nicole Gaouette, “Trump Admin Aiming for Major Nuclear Deal with Russia and China,” CNN, April 26, 2019, china/index.html.

60 Andrea Thompson, “Statement for the Record,”Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 15, 2019.

61 Patrick Tucker, “New New START a Nonstarter: Russian Ambassador,” Defense One, March 12, 2019,

62 “Russia Says It Showed Hypersonic Nuclear Missile System to U.S. Inspectors,” Reuters, November 26, 2019, missile-system-to-u-s-inspectors-idUSKBN1Y01Z0.

63 “Demonstration of Russia’s Avangard System May Stir US into Extending New START — expert,” Tass, November 27, 2019,

64 Faizan Hashmi, “Russia Proposes to US Extending New START For 5 Years or Less—Deputy Foreign Minister,” Urdupoint, November 27, 2019, extending-new-start-for-772649.html.

65 Tom O’Conner, “Russia is ‘Ready to Immediately’ Extend Nuclear Arms Limit Treaty, Says U.S. is not Answering,” Net week, December 5, 2019. nuclear-treaty-1475778.

66 The U.S. Department of State,“INF Myth Busters: Pushing Back on RussianPropagandaRegarding the INF Treaty,” Fact Sheet, July 30, 2019, russian-propaganda-regarding-the-inf-treaty.

67 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Kremlin Calls Idea that Trump Worked for Moscow ‘Absurd,’” ABC News, January 17, 2019, weapon-60411901.

68 David Brennan, “U.S. Tells Russia to Destroy ‘Illegal Missile’ That Poses ‘Potent and Direct Threat,’” Newsweek, January 21, 2019, trump-robert-wood-disarmament-ssc-1299250.

69 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Presents info on Missile US Says Violates Pact,”StarTribute,January23, 2019,

70 Neil Mac Farquhar, “Russia Shows Off New Cruise Missile and Says It Abides by Landmark Treaty,” New York Times, January 23, 2019, cruise-missile.html.

71 Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks,” Press Briefing Room, Washington,D.C., February 1, 2019, https://

72 “Russia Will Counter Destructive Steps on Arms Control—Foreign Ministry,” Tass, February 2, 2019,

73 “Statement by the President of Russia on the Unilateral Withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” August 5, 2019, http://en.

74 Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber and Vladimir Soldatkin, “Putin Says Russia Will Make New Missiles, Warns of Arms Race,” Reuters, September 5, 2019, putin-says-russia-will-produce-new-missiles-after-demise-of-nuclear-pact-idUSKCN1VQ18O.

75 NATO, “Statement on Russia’s Failure to Comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,” Issued by the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, February 1, 2019,

76 “Russia’s Proposed Moratorium on Missile Deployment ‘Not a Credible Offer,’ Says NATO,” Tass, September 26, 2019,

77 “NATO Rules out New Missiles in Europe, Says It Does Not Want Arms Race,” Wio News, February 15, 2019, arms-race-196965.

78 “Japan Reluctantly Endorses ‘Undesirable’ U.S. Exit from INF Nuclear Arms Pact with Russia,” Kyodo, February 4, 2019, reluctantly-endorses-undesirable-u-s-exit-inf-nuclear-arms-pact-russia/#.XWnoV5P7RnY .

79 “Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary,” August 2, 2019, tyoukanpress/201908/2_a.html. (in Japanese)

80 “UK Downsizes Its Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 45, No. 2 (March 2015), http://www.

81  “Statement by France,” Cluster 2, 2019 NPT PrepCom, May 2, 2019.

82  NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP40, April 26, 2019.

83  “China Has No Plans to Join Russia-US Disarmament Talks,” Tasnim News Agency, November 8, 2019, disarmament-talks.

84 See, for instance, “Statement by the United States,” General Debate, UNGA, October 10, 2019.

85 Robin Emmott, “China Rebuffs Germany’s Call for U.S. Missile Deal with Russia,” Reuters, February 17, 2019,

86 “China Does Not Support Creation of New Multilateral Deal Replacing INF Treaty,”Sputnik News, July 30, 2019, of-new-multilateral-deal-replacing-inf-treaty/.

87 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Remarks on the US Suspending INF Treaty Obligations and Beginning Withdrawal Process,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, February 2, 2019,

88 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference,”May 6, 2019,

89 Emmott, “China Rebuffs Germany’s Call for U.S. Missile Deal with Russia”; “Merkel Urges Chinato Join Disarmament Efforts,” Fox News, February 16, 2019, urges-china-to-join-disarmament-efforts.

90 “China Does Not Support Creation of New Multilateral Deal Replacing INF Treaty.”

91 See, for instance, Hans M. Kristensen, “Military Might Takes Center Stage at Chinese 70-Year Anniversary Parade,” Federation of American Scientists, October 1, 2019, 2019/10/china-military-parade/.

92 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2019, p. 117.

93 Ibid., p. 66.

94 Jacob Stokes, “China’s Missile Program and U.S. Withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,” Staff Research Report, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 4, 2018, p. 3,

95 Daria Litvinova, “Russia is Helping China Build a New Missile Attack Warning System, Putin Says,” CBS news, October 4, 2019. attack-warning-system-vladimir-putin-says-today-2019-10-04/.

96 François Hollande, “Nuclear Deterrence—Visit to the Strategic Air Forces,” February 19, 2015, 23. html#Chapitre1.

97 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “French Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol. 75, No. 1 (2019), p. 52.

98 Ibid., p. 53.

99 “Defense Chief Sets Sights on Beefing Up Russia’s Nuclear Triad with Advanced Weaponry,” Tass, January 10, 2018,

100 Russian Ministry of Defense, “Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Attends Extended Session of the Russian Defence Ministry Board Session,” December 18, 2018, en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12208613@egNews.

101 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2019,”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 2 (2019), p. 77; David Brennan, “Russia’s ‘Invulnerable’ Satan 2 Nuclear Missile will be Ready to Fire by the End of 2020, Space Agency Official Says,” Newsweek, July 8, 2019, https://www.newsweek. com/russia-satan-2-nuclear-missile-rs-28-sarmat-ready-fire-2020-1447994.

102 Kristensen and Korda, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2019,” p. 78.

103 Thomas Nilsen, “Bulava Ballistic Missile Launch from Brand New Strategic Subin WhiteSea,”Barents Observer, October 30, 2019, missile-launch-brand-new-strategic-sub-white-sea.

104 See, for instance, Jill Hruby, “Russia’s New Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems: An Open-Source Technical Review,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2019.

105 Kristensen and Korda, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2019,” p. 77; Brennan, “Russia’s ‘Invulnerable’ Satan 2 Nuclear Missile.”

106 “Is Russia Working on a Massive Dirty Bomb,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, November 10, 2015,

107 Kyle Mizokami, “How Can We Stop Russia’s Apocalypse Nuke Torpedo?” National Interest, August 17, 2018,

108 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia to Deploy Over 30 Nuclear-Capable ‘Poseidon’ Underwater Drones,” Diplomat, January 14, 2019, underwater-drones/.

109 “Russia’s Nuclear Cruise Missile is Struggling to Take Off, Imagery Suggests,” NPR , September 25, 2018,

110 Thomas Nilsen, “Rosatom Says Five Employees Killed in Blast While Testing Isotope and Liquid Propellant Engine,” Barents Observer, August 10, 2019,

111 Michael R. Gordon, “On Brink of Arms Treaty Exit, U.S. Finds More Offending Russian Missiles,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2019,; “Russia Has Deployed More Medium-Range Cruise Missiles Than Previously Thought,” Radio Free Europe, February 10, 2019,

112 “Russia Says it Won’t Destroy Missiles U.S. Claims Break INF Treaty,” Moscow Times, March 19, 2019, treaty-a64864.

113 “Russia to Develop New Missile Systems in 2 Years after Treaty Pullout,” AFP, February 5, 2019,

114 Paris Gourtsoyannis, “Cost of Trident ‘Could Sink Mod Budget,’” The Scotsman, January 3, 2019,

115 Claire Mills and Noel Dempsey, “Replacing the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent: Progress of the Dreadnought Class,” U.K. Parliament, House of Commons Briefing Paper, June 19, 2017.

116 See, for instance, Amy F. Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” CRS Report, March 6, 2018, pp. 9-41; “U.S. Nuclear Modernization Program,” Fact Sheet and Brief, Arms Control Association, August 2018, Modernization.

117 The U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, February 2018, pp. 48-51.

118 Ibid., pp. 54-55.

119 Julian Borger, “US Nuclear Weapons: First Low-Yield Warheads Roll off the Production Line,” Guardian, January 28, 2019, yield-warheads-roll-off-the-production-line.

120 NNSA, “NNSA Completes First Production Unit of Modified Warhead,” February 25, 2019,

121 Aaron Mehta, “Watch the Pentagon Test Its First Land-Based Cruise Missile in a Post-INF Treaty World,” Defense News, August 19, 2019,

122 Robert Burns, “US Plans Tests This Year of Long-Banned Types of Missiles,” Associated Press, March 13, 2019,

123 Theresa Hitchens, “Congress Stalls INF-Busting Missiles & Nuke Treaty Withdrawal,” Breaking Defense, December 11, 2019,

124 Dinakar Peri, “India Successfully Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Agni-5,” The Hindu, June 4, 2018,; “India Successfully Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Agni-5 Missile,” The Time of India, December 10, 2018,

125 “India Says Nuclear Submarine Makes First Patrol, Modi Warns Against ‘Misadventure,’” Reuters,November 5, 2018,

126 Franz-Stefan Gady, “India Launches Second Ballistic Missile Sub,” Diplomat, December 13, 2017,; Dinakar Peri and Josy Joseph, “A Bigger Nuclear Submarine is Coming,” The Hindu, October 15, 2017,

127 “Israel Signs MoU to Purchase Dolphin-class Submarines from Germany,” Naval Technology, October 25, 2017,

128 See Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Julia Diamond, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 5 (2018), pp. 348-358.

129 “Pakistan Launches NASR Missile Again to Counter Indian Cold Start Doctrine,” EurAsian Times, February 1, 2019,

130 Asad Hashim, “Pakistan Military Says It Test-Fired Ballistic Missile Shaheen-II,” Aljazeera, March 29, 2019,

131 Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” February 13, 2018.

132 Sharon Shi and Clément Bürge, “While Trump and Kim Talk, North Korea Appears to Expand Its Nuclear Arsenal,” Wall Street Journal, July 27 2019,

133 Frank V. Pabian and Jack Liu, “North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Facilities: Well Maintained But Showing Limited Operations,” 38 North, January 9, 2019,

134 “North Korea Maintains Maximum 10 Enrichment Facilities,” Asahi Shimbun, January 22, 2019, (in Japanese)

135 Yukiya Amano, “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” March 4, 2019,

136 Jack Liu, Irv Buck and Jenny Town, “North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launch Facility: Normal Operations May Have Resumed,” 38 North, March 7, 2019,

137 “North Korea’s Sinpo South Shipyard: Submarine Shipbuilding Continuing at Slow Pace,” North 38, April 12, 2019.; Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha, “Sinpo South Shipyard: Construction of a New Ballistic Missile Submarine?” Beyond Parallel, August 28, 2019.

138 Helen Regan, Will Ripley, Ryan Browne and Jake Kwon, “North Korea Says it Test Fired a New Type of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile,” CNN, October 3, 2019,

139 “Statement of Spokesman for Academy of National Defence Science Issued,” KNCA, December 8, 2019,

140 Vann H. van Diepen, “Resumed North Korean ICBM Testing: Possible Technical Objectives,” 38 North, December 9, 2019,

141 “Spokesman for Academy of Defence Science of DPRK Issues Statement,” KCNA, December 14,2019,

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