A) Accession status to nuclear security-related conventions
Since the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001, terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants have been recognized as a real threat. Accordingly, ongoing work has focused not only on nuclear security, but also on overlapping areas, such as nuclear safety to prevent accidents at nuclear power plants, as well as and nuclear safeguards to prevent military diversion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.31 On this issue, the Co- Presidents’ Report of ICONS 2020 highlighted the following areas as those where the interface between safety and security is important: transport of nuclear materials, physical protection plans for nuclear power plants, disposal of disused radioactive sources, implementation of safeguards, development of security plans, and development and implementation of regulations.32

This section examines the accession status of the countries surveyed to international conventions related to nuclear security and safety, namely: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); the Amendment to the CPPNM (CPPNM/A); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention); the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

Some, if not all, of these nuclear safety-related conventions have provisions on physical protection measures from the perspective of safety. As these measures can also serve for nuclear security purposes, those nuclear safety-related conventions are regarded as nuclear security-related conventions in this report. Table 3-4 shows the adherence status of each surveyed country to the six conventions mentioned above.

Pertaining to nuclear security-related conventions, the Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2020 reaffirms “the importance of continuing to promote the universalization and implementation by its States Parties” of the CPPNM and its Amendment, “and looks forward to the 2021 conference.” It also reaffirms the importance of other international legal instruments, such as the ICSANT.33

In this regard, as part of its efforts to universalize these conventions, the IAEA Director General sent official letters to States not party to the CPPNM, as well as to those party to the CPPNM but not its Amendment, encouraging them to adhere to both the CPPNM and its Amendment.34Moreover, the IAEA organized a webinar in July 2020 targeted at all Parties to the CPPNM that have not yet adhered to the Amendment, as well as to IAEA Member States who are nonparty to the CPPNM and its Amendment.35

In July 2021, the Conference of the Parties to the CPPNM/A is scheduled to be held pursuant to Article 16 of the Convention. This Conference will be the first of its kind since the CPPNM/A came into effect in 2016. In preparing for this Conference, the IAEA held a meeting of legal and technical experts in June 2020 with the aim of encouraging parties to the Convention to consider the implementation and validity of the Convention.36 The IAEA also convened a technical meeting to prepare for the Conference in December. It is expected that participating State Parties will report on the detailed status of their sustainable efforts and improvement of nuclear security measures at the 2021 Conference.

Apart from the IAEA, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has played an active role in promoting universalization and implementation of international instruments on nuclear security. They cohosted a regional workshop for selected CARICOM countries with the Government of Barbados on the universalization and effective implementation of the ICSANT, the CPPNM and its Amendment in February 2020. The workshop was attended by participants from 12 countries, and it “raised awareness amongst CARICOM Member States on the importance and benefits of becoming party to, and fully implementing these legal instruments.”37 In addition, the UNODC held a national workshop on the ICSANT in the Philippines in February. Also, in March, in cooperation with the IAEA, they organized a visit to Uganda to facilitate adherence to as well as implementation of the ICSANT and the CPPNM/A.38

The latest status of international conventions related to nuclear security are as follows:

➢ CPPNM (Entry into Force: 1987)39 State Parties: 162 (as of Sep. 2020) New Adherents: Angola and Eritrea Two or three countries have joined the CPPNM every year since 2016, with the exception of 2017. The continuous increase in adherence has been maintained.
➢ CPPNM/A (EIF: 2016)40 Ratifications: 125 (as of Sep. 2020) New Adherents: Angola and Eritrea New ratifications: 15 in 2016, 7 in 2017, 3 in 2018, and 5 in 2019. The number of new ratifications in 2020 became the lowest in the last few years.
➢ ICSANT (EIF: 2007)41 Ratifications: 117 (as of Nov. 2020) New Adherent: St. Kitts and Navis New ratifications: 7 in 2016, 6 in 2017, 1 in 2018, and 2 in 2019.
➢ Nuclear Safety Convention (EIF:1996)42 New Adherent: Angola State Parties: 89 (as of Sep. 2020) New ratifications in 2019: 3
➢ Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (EIF: 1986)43 State Parties 127 (as of Sep. 2020) New Adherents: Côte d’Ivoire and Eritrea New ratifications in 2019: 1
➢ Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (EIF: 1987)44 State Parties: 122 (as of Sep. 2020) New Adherents: Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, and Namibia New ratifications in 2019: 2
➢ Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste  Management (EIF: 2001)45 State Parties: 83 (as of March 2020) New Adherent: Eritrea New ratifications in 2019: 2

As is shown above, there were gradual increases in the number of adhering countries across all conventions. It is worth mentioning that one country has joined multiple conventions and all the countries that have newly joined these conventions were African countries. These facts indicate that focused efforts to promote the universalization of these conventions has apparently come to fruition, and such efforts should be continued.

Regarding development in adherence to nuclear security related international conventions, the following two countries shared the status of their national efforts at ICONS 2020.

➢ The Philippines46: “the Department of Foreign Affairs has re-started the process for the long-overdue Philippine ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and the ICSANT.”
➢ Pakistan47: “accession to the ICSANT remain under active consideration.”

 

Other than these two countries surveyed, no significant developments were observed in 2020 with respect to national efforts in adhering to those international instruments.

The following is a list of remarks made by the surveyed countries at ICONS 2020, as well as information compiled from open sources, regarding the application of nuclear security-related conventions to their national nuclear security regime:

 

➢ Indonesia48: “is in the process of amending its current Nuclear Energy Act that incorporates provisions for the security of nuclear and radioactive sources and materials outside regulatory control.”
➢ New Zealand49: has “continued to implement our updated domestic radiation safety legislation to ensure that at a domestic level our radiation and nuclear materials are as securely stored and managed as possible.”
➢ Egypt50: in early 2020, it will have “a decree, drafted with IAEA assistance, that will strictly regulate any movement of such material.”
➢ The UAE51: “has developed a solid legislative and regulatory framework and adopted a series of measures to ensure the full implementation of these conventions and global best practices.

In relation to the full implementation of the CPPNM, Article 14 of the Convention obligates a State Party to inform the depositary of its laws and regulations which give effect to the Convention. Considering the importance of transparency and information sharing regarding the implementation of the Convention, submission of such information has been increasingly regarded as important.

In this respect, according to the IAEA Nuclear Security Report 2020, eight States provided information on their national laws and regulations to the IAEA in accordance with Article 14 during the period from July 2019 to June 2020.52 Although the timing of the submission is unknown, Israel announced in its official statement at ICONS 2020 that it had fulfilled its obligations.53

Below is a list of remarks made by the surveyed countries at ICONS 2020 and at the IAEA General Conference on the 2021 Conference of the CPPNM/A.

➢ Australia54: affirms its “desire for, and commitment to, a productive review conference of the Amended CPPNM in 2021 where Parties actively share practices to improve their implementation and also support efforts to universalize the Convention. It is vital that implementation of the Convention is not only adequate for today’s threats but robust to manage future emerging threats.”
➢ Belgium55: hopes that “this future Conference and its preparatory work will help assess the efficiency of the Convention and its Amendment, as well as promote its universalization and effective implementation.”
➢ Norway56: the 2021 Conference “should be followed by future, periodical review conferences.” It fully supports “the IAEA in its effort for the universalization of the Amendment and effective implementation of all obligations.”
➢ Nigeria57: “will be honoured to co-chair with Switzerland.”

B) INFCIRC/225/Rev.5
Application Status of Each Surveyed Country of the Measures Recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

As of 2020, the latest version of “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” is INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, published by the IAEA in 2011. It is entirely the responsibility of the state to determine how the recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 are implemented, to address remaining issues, and to come up with suitable measures, and it is up to regulators and operators to take necessary action.

As such, it is important for each country to communicate proactively with the public concerning the status of implementation of measures recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. However, such communications have decreased since the end of the Nuclear Security Summit process in 2016. ICONS 2020 took place under such circumstances, and the following surveyed countries made references at the Conference, either directly or indirectly, on the status of implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5:

➢ Pakistan58: has enacted the “Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Installations PAK/925,” which is in line with the IAEA Information Circular 225/Revision 5.
➢ Iran59: “the relevant recommendations reflected in INFCIRC/225/rev.5 have also been envisaged in Iran’s contract with the Russian Federation for the two new nuclear power plants under
construction.”
➢ Israel60: implements “IAEA Nuclear Security Series Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, as well as practices derived from” Israel’s participation in international initiatives. Israel’s nuclear facilities “hold the highest standards of physical protection measures, above and beyond international requirements and recommendations, as well as national legislations and best practices.”
➢ Nigeria61: is applying in its “facilities and in the handling of nuclear and radioactive materials, the relevant IAEA guidance’s and recommendations based on the Nuclear Security Series.”

It has been ten years since the publication of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. The IAEA initiated a virtual process to continue discussions related to the need for its revision.62 In this regard, Canada mentioned in its national progress report made available at ICONS 2020 that it is playing a leading role in the review of the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.63

In the area of the establishment and strengthening of national legislation in relation to INFCIRC/225/rev.5, the following references were made:

➢ Israel64: its “legislature dictates the oversight and accountability of all government agencies to various regulatory authorities in all aspects of nuclear security including physical security and cyber security.”
➢ Poland65: is continuing “the revision of the 2008 Regulation on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities to reflect the latest good practices in physical protection.”
➢ Brazil66: “a high-level interagency advisory body, the Committee for Nuclear Program Development, has made a decision to set up an independent regulatory authority which will be charged with implementing the regulations and recommendations to improve the county’s culture related to safety, security and safeguards of nuclear technology and materials.”

In the area of identification and assessment of threats, the following references were made.

➢ Canada67: is “currently undertaking a thorough analysis and evaluation process to update its Design Basis Threat (DBT) for high-security nuclear facilities.”
➢ Poland68: will “host a national workshop on the DBT in March 2020. The workshop will assist the creation of a Task Force for the development of a new DBT.”
➢ Pakistan69: “performance based regulatory approach has been implemented at all nuclear installations that is based on the current evaluation of threat or DBT.”

With regard to physical protection measures against sabotage, Pakistan stated in its booklet entitled “Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Regime” that it requires control measures for protection against sabotage of equipment/component in vital areas.70 Mexico announced at the ICONS 2020 that it planned to hold a national training course on the protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities against sabotage in 202071.

Furthermore, measures against insider threats have been increasingly recognized as one of the most important nuclear security measures.72 In connection with this, the IAEA published in January 2020 a revised “Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats,” originally published in 2008, as Nuclear Security Series No.8-G (Rev.1). This newly revised publication provides “updated guidance to States, their competent authorities and operators, and shippers and carriers on selecting, implementing and evaluating measures for addressing insider threats.”73 On the subject of taking measures against insider threats, the following remarks or references were made by the surveyed countries in their official statements or handouts at ICONS 2020 and a side event.

➢ Pakistan74: establishes, maintains, and implements “insider mitigation measures to monitor the initial and continual trustworthiness and reliability of individuals. Physical protection system shall be designed to deny unauthorized access of persons or equipment to the targets, to minimize the opportunity of insiders.”
➢ Mexico75: “The national training course on preventive and protective measures against insider threat to nuclear materials is planned for 2020 in Mexico.”
➢ Belgium76: will “host the first pilot outside of the United States of the IAEA’s Advanced Training Course on Insider Threat Mitigation in 2021.”
➢ The United States77:announced a new working group to address insider threats. The International Working Group will advance the IAEA Information Circular 908-the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats, which was sponsored by the United States in 2016.
➢ France78:announced its accession to the joint declaration on mitigating insider threats, referenced in INFCIRC/980.

Pertaining to cyber threats, there were reportedly 23 cases of cyber-attacks at nuclear facilities around the world in the last quarter century.79 In addition, given the evolution and rapid development of new technology, issues related to information security and computer security are becoming more important than ever. In connection with this, the Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2020 recognizes “the threats to computer security and from cyber-attacks at nuclear related facilities, as well as their associated activities including the use, storage and transport of nuclear and radioactive materials,” and calls on IAEA Member States to “strengthen protection of sensitive information and computer-based systems, and encourage the IAEA to continue to foster international cooperation and to assist Member States, upon request, in this regard.”80

In response to the increased importance of computer security, ICONS 2020 held eight technical sessions focused on this topic, discussing it from various perspectives such as risk management, threat assessment, future trends, and activities. More concretely, discussions were held, for instance, on how the dynamic nature of cyber-attacks can challenge the orthodox approach to creating and using a threat assessment or a Design Basis Threat, and on the need to simulate robust nuclear processes capable of simulating and analyzing such threats and exploitation scenarios in order to develop strategies to protect against them.81

IAEA efforts in this area in 2020 include approval of the publication of draft implementation guidelines entitled “Computer Security for Nuclear Security (tentative title)” and “Computer Security Technology for Nuclear Facilities (tentative title).” Also, at a side event during ICONS 2020, the IAEA held a technical demonstration called “Cyber Village” on the prevention and detection of nuclear security incidents and response to nuclear security incidents.82 This event was aimed at raising awareness of the need for computer security.

References to computer security in the official statements of the surveyed countries at ICONS 2020 are as follows.

➢ Brazil83: cybersecurity of the nuclear system is also a priority for the government. Under its new National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Brazilian government “provides long-needed guidelines for governance, prevention and mitigation of cyber threats, including normative aspects and strategic partnerships.”
➢ Canada84: the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has included “cyber security requirements from the CSA N290.7-14 standard in relevant license condition handbooks and licensees are implementing the new standard with target completion dates in 2019 2020. The CNSC has inspected cyber security programs at Canadian nuclear power plants and will inspect the updated programs once they have finished implementing the new standard. The CNSC will inspect its national nuclear lab facilities against cyber security requirements.”
➢ The United Kingdom85: recognizes that, “to keep pace with evolving technologies, cyber security requires greater global attention.” In 2017, the U.K. “published a Cyber Security Strategy for the civil nuclear sector. This set out measures to enable its nuclear sector to defend against and recover from cyber threats.”
➢ Japan86: regards it “an important challenge to further enhance nuclear security measures including those for cybersecurity at nuclear facilities by taking duly into consideration technological developments.”
➢ Pakistan87: protects “the computers, communication systems and networks associated with functions important-to-safety and physical protection from cyber-attacks.”
➢ Germany88: strongly supports “the efforts of the IAEA to embed computer security provisions into the recommendation-level documents and to step up capacity building in this regard.”

➢ Australia89: hosted the IAEA regional training course on computer security incident response for nuclear facilities for East Asia and the Pacific in Sydney in March 2020.

Regarding nuclear security culture, the following surveyed countries made remarks at ICONS 2020 or made efforts in this area:

➢ Brazil90: engaged in fostering nuclear security culture. It values all contributions received from all nuclear countries, on sharing technical skills and best practices to respond against nuclear security threats.
➢ Egypt91: held a national workshop on nuclear safety culture and nuclear security culture, including interfaces between the two in Cairo in February 2020.
➢ Saudi Arabia92: held a national workshop on nuclear safety culture and nuclear security culture, including interfaces between the two in Riyadh in January 2020.

 

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31 International Nuclear Safety Group, “INSAG-24: The Interface Between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants,” IAEA, 2010.
32 “Co-Presidents’ Report,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 23.

33 “Ministerial Declaration,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
34 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC (64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 22.
35 “Webinar on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and Its Amendment,” https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/07/the-convention-on-the physical-protection-of-nuclear-material-cppnm-and-its-amendment.pdf. As there are countries which do not have any nuclear material and thus not feel necessity to join the CPPNM, universalization efforts have been made focusing on raising awareness on the merits of joining the Convention.
36 IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2019, GC(64)/3, pp. 12-13; IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020,GOV/2020/31-GC (64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 4.

37 “UNODC Supports CARICOM Countries to Act against Risks of Nuclear Terrorism,” UNODC, 2020, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/latest-news/2020_unodc-supports-caricom-countries-toact-against-risks-of-nuclear-terrorism.html.
38 “UNODC Promotes the International Legal Framework Against Nuclear Terrorism in the Philippines,” UNODC, 2020, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/latest-news/2020_unodc-promotes-theinternational-legal-framework-against-nuclear-terrorism-in-the-philippines.html; “UNODC Promotes the International Legal Framework Against Nuclear Terrorism in Uganda,” UNODC, 2020, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/latest-news/2020_unodc-uganda-nuclear-terrorism.html.
39 The CPPNM is the only legally binding undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material. It establishes measures related to the prevention, detection and punishment of offenses relating to nuclear material.
40 The CPPNM/A makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. Regarding the universalization of the CPPNM/A, it is important for States not parties to the CPPNM yet to become a party to the CPPNM and ratify the CPPNM/A at the same time, just as Angola and Eritrea did in 2020. Also, diplomatic efforts focusing on the CPPNM parties but not yet ratified its Amendment to encourage their ratification and provide support towards that end is important.
41 The ICSANT obligates State Parties to criminalize offences related to nuclear terrorism and to make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material.

42 This Convention aims at ensuring and enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants. State Parties are required to take legal and administrative measures, report to the review committee established under this convention, and accept peer review in order to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants under their jurisdiction.
43 This Convention obligates State Parties to immediately report to the IAEA when a nuclear accident has occurred, including the type, time, and location of the accident and relevant information.
44 This Convention establishes an international framework that enables equipment provision and dispatch of experts with the goals of preventing and/or minimizing nuclear accidents and radioactive emergencies.
45 The Joint Convention calls for its State Parties to take legal and administrative measures, report to its review committee, and undergo peer review by other parties, for the purpose of ensuring safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
46 “Statement of the Philippines,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
47 “Statement of Pakistan,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.

48 “Statement of Indonesia,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
49 “Statement of New Zealand,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
50 Inna Pletukhina, “A Moving Target Nuclear Security during Transport,” IAEA Bulletin, February 2020,p. 19.
51 “Statement of the United Arab Emirates,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
52 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC (64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 23.
53 “Statement of Israel,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.

54 “Statement of Australia,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
55 “Statement of Belgium,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
56 “Statement of Norway,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
57 “Statement of Nigeria,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 1.

58 “Statement of Pakistan,” ICONS 2020, February 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Regime, February 2020, p. 5.
59 “Statement of Iran,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
60 “Statement of Israel,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 3.
61 “Statement of Nigeria,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
62 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 3
63 Government of Canada, “National Progress Report,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
64 “Statement of Israel,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 3.
65 “Statement of Poland,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
66 “Statement of Brazil,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.

67 “Government of Canada: National Progress Report,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
68 “Statement of Poland,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
69 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Regime, February 2020, p.8.
70 Ibid., p. 5.
71 “Statement of Mexico,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
72 Regarding incidents related to insider threat, for example, in 2014 at the Doel nuclear power plant in Belgium, a nuclear reactor was shut down as a result of the improper discharge of turbine lubricants by dissatisfied insiders. “The Enduring Need to Protect Nuclear Material from Insider Threats,” CRDF Global, April 26, 2017, https://www.crdfglobal.org/insights/enduring-need-protect-nuclear-material-insiderthreats.
73 IAEA, “Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats,” IAEA Nuclear Security Series, No.8-G(Rev.1), January 2020.

74 PNRA, “Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Installations-(PAK/925),” July 12, 2019, p. 8.
75 “Statement of Mexico,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
76 “NNSA Administrator, Belgium Ambassador announce new international working group to address insider threats,” National Nuclear Security Administration, February 11, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/ nnsa/articles/nnsa-administrator-belgium-ambassador-announce-new-international-working-groupaddress; “Statement of Belgium,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
77 “Statement of the United States of America,” ICONS 2020, February 2020. The United States made a seven-minute-long YouTube video to promote INFCIRC/908 during ICONS 2020. In the video, the nuclear security efforts of the countries which subscribe to INFCIRC/908 are introduced (https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=PC110FjKVw0).
78 “Statement of France,” ICONS 2020, February 2020; IAEA, INFCIRC/908/Add.3, February 18, 2020. Slovenia has newly subscribed INFCIRC/908 in September 2020. As of November 2020, 31 countries and INTERPOL subscribe INFCIRC/908. INFCIRC/908/Add.4, October 6, 2020; “FACT SHEET: IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) 908: Mitigating Insider Threats,” February 19, 2020.
79 Alexandra Van Dine, Michael Assante and Page Stoutland, “Outpacing Cyber Threats: Priorities for Cybersecurity at Nuclear Facilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, p.15.

80 “Ministerial Declaration,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 1.
81 “Co-Presidents’ Report,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, pp. 17-18.
82 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 10.
83 “Statement of Brazil,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
84 “Government of Canada: National Progress Report,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 3.

85 “Statement of United Kingdom,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 17.
86 “Statement of Japan,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
87 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Regime, February 2020, p.5.
88 “Statement of Germany,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 4.
89 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 10.
90 “Statement of Brazil,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
91 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 12.
92 Ibid