In February 2020, the IAEA held the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts (ICONS 2020) in Vienna, which saw over 1,900 participants from 145 countries and more than 25 international organizations, of which 53 were ministerial-level representatives.93 All countries surveyed, except North Korea, participated in the Conference. This Conference was held for the third time, following previous iterations in 2013 and 2016, with the aim of discussing measures to further strengthen global efforts on nuclear security and promoting the sharing of knowledge and experience of each country. It consisted of two parts, a Ministerial segment and a Science and Technology segment. In the latter, policy and science and technology experts discussed issues, and the Ministerial segment adopted Ministerial Declaration comprised of 22 items.94 In addition, as an outcome of the Conference, a report was prepared by the Presidents of the Conference (Romania and Panama) summarizing the results of discussions held in the science and technology segment.95 The results of the Conference will be reflected in the “IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2022- 2025.” The next ICONS is scheduled for 2024 and the Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2020 encourages all IAEA Member States to participate at the ministerial level.96 ICONS 2020 was the first international conference with high-level political participation held after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit process, and after the second ICONS of the same year. It can be regarded as the most important platform for countries to reaffirm and express their commitment to strengthening nuclear security. It is noteworthy that some countries, such as Canada97and Pakistan proactively made available reports detailing their nuclear security efforts to date. In particular, Pakistan distributed a booklet entitled “Pakistan’s Nuclear Regime” prepared in time for the ICONS 2020.98 Also, other countries have actively worked towards increasing the transparency and accountability of their nuclear security measures.

The efforts through various basket initiatives launched in the Nuclear Security Summit process, which were subsequently issued as IAEA INFCIRC documents, also deserve attention. The leading countries of the initiatives actively promoted these INFCIRC initiatives to encourage those countries who have not subscribed yet to join, for instance, using YouTube videos. It is expected that countries will actively further utilize the basis of multilateral sustainable efforts created during the Nuclear Security Summit process.

As described above, ICONS 2020 took place with a large number of participants. Afterwards however, due to COVID-19 pandemic, many activities related to the various nuclear security international efforts including those organized by the IAEA have been affected, and as a result postponed or implemented remotely.99 On the other hand, this global scale pandemic indicated the significance of and challenges to secure nuclear security measures including emergency response as well as the need to continue international cooperation under a situation wherein response measures such as restriction of domestic and international travel are taken. Under these circumstances, the IAEA conducted the Convention Exercise (ConvEx)-2b in March.100 It was aimed at testing specific parts of the international framework for emergency preparedness and response as well as at providing international assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiation emergency. Emergency situations related to nuclear and radioactive materials caused by nuclear safety and nuclear security events may have to be dealt with in the face of various crises such as natural disasters and pandemics. It is therefore significant that the exercise focused on the initial response under a scenario where the pandemic had progressed.101

A) Minimization of HEU and plutonium stockpile in civilian use
Today, minimizing HEU and plutonium inventory is one of the key indicators for acheiving the highest level of nuclear security. As a result of the 2004 GTRI as well as a series of efforts through Nuclear Security Summit process since 2010 to minimize the use of HEU and plutonium, South America, Central Europe, and Southeast Asia have become areas where there are no high-risk nuclear materials to date.

With regard to such minimization efforts, for example, Japan removed all HEU and separated plutonium from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) in 2016 via bilateral cooperation between Japan and the United States through GTRI and other programs. At the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, Japan and the United States announced that they would work together to remove all HEU fuel from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly Laboratory to the United States.102

In connection with this, the Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2020 encourages IAEA Member States, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize HEU in civilian stocks, when doing so technically and economically feasible.103

The following are remarks made by the surveyed countries at ICONS 2020 or at the IAEA General Conference in 2020 on their efforts in minimizing HEU in civilian stocks.

➢ Kazakstan104: “The Ministry of Energy worked together with the US to remove 2.9 kilograms of unirradiated HEU from the IGR research reactor, transport it hundreds of miles to a secure facility for processing, and down blend it to low enrichment uranium (LEU). This activity fulfilled an agreement worked out between the two countries at the 2019 IAEA General Conference.” In addition, the two countries signed a Joint Statement during the 2020 IAEA General Conference, committing to convert the IVG.1M research reactor at Kazakhstan’s National Nuclear Center from the use of HEU to LEU fuel in 2021.
➢ Canada105: in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy, Canada has advanced efforts to minimize HEU. It has successfully repatriated all US-origin HEU fuel from our research reactors at Chalk River Laboratories. Therefore, it no longer maintains any HEU-fueled research reactors.
➢ Norway106: “strongly advocates minimizing and eliminating the use and stockpiling of highly enriched uranium (HEU).” Norway issued a joint statement with the United States on HEU minimization. Norway has been seeking technical solution to minimize its stocks of HEU in uranium-thorium mixtures, which is barrier to it further HEU minimization efforts.
➢ South Korea107: “has developed the innovative technology to make high density low-enriched uranium powder which enables the conversion of nuclear fuel for research reactors.”
➢ Belgium108: is “fully committed to completing the conversion of both Belgium’s medical isotope production facility and its research reactor to low enriched uranium (LEU) targets and fuel as soon as technically and economically feasible.” On both aspects, significant progress has been made.
➢ India109: “in continuing its endeavor to minimize and eliminate the use of HEU, India has commissioned the 2 MW APSARA-U research reactor with LEU based fuel. India is also in an advanced stage of commissioning a Mo-99 production facility for societal benefit that will utilize LEU based targets.”
➢ The United States110: “has down-blended nearly 13 metric tons of surplus US HEU―enough material for more than 516 nuclear weapons. The U.S. has removed or confirmed the disposition of over 1,000kg of nuclear material, including material from two countries that are now HEU-free.”
➢ The United Kingdom111: “in December 2018, completed the transfer of around 700kg of HEU from Scotland to the USA for conversion to civil reactor fuel.”
➢ Indonesia112: “LEU has been used in the production of radio-isotopes and in the operation of its research reactors since 2016.This policy is part of our voluntary efforts to secure nuclear materials, in line with the letter and spirit of Ministerial Declaration on nuclear security.”
➢ South Africa113: reiterates its commitment, made in the Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2020, that South Africa “should all explore ways of minimizing the use of HEU, where technically and economically feasible.”

Regarding the inventory of HEU, Norway and Australia voluntarily submitted reports to the IAEA in August 2019 and January 2020 respectively. Both countries used a reporting format attached to the 2017 Joint Statement on Minimising and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications (INFCIRC/912).114 It is encouraged to use the standard format because doing so enables information desired to be shared to be made public, and if submitted regularly, allows the international community to evaluate the HEU minimization efforts of the country concerned. In addition to Australia and Norway, 21 countries including Canada and the Netherlands are participating in the initiative described in INFCIRC/912.115

B) Prevention of illicit trafficking

Nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, research and development of new technologies to strengthen capacity of law enforcement and customs, as well as participation in the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) have all been regarded as important measures for preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. In particular, the ITDB which is a database on incidents related to unauthorized possession, illicit trafficking, illegal dispersal of radioactive material, and discovery of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control has been regarded not only as an essential component of the information platform supporting the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan, but also appreciated as providing useful statistics which enable us to realize the real threat of nuclear terrorism.116 According to the ITDB Fact Sheet 2020, as of December 2019, the number of ITDB participants reached 139 with the participation of Comoros.117 The latest IAEA Annual Report 2019 says that 189 incidents were reported to the ITDB in 2019. In 2018, 253 incidents were reported,118 meaning that the number of reported cases decreased by 64 from 253 in the previous year. According to the IAEA Nuclear Security Report 2020,119 3,768 incidents had been reported by the end of June 2020 since the ITDB’s initial launch in 1995. The number of incidents reported from July 2019 to June 2020 was 208, and the number of incidents taking place during the same period was 94.120

The following is a breakdown of the 208 incidents newly reported:

➢ Five were related to trafficking, including 2 scams. All of the material involved in these incidents was seized by the relevant competent authorities within the reporting State. No incidents involved HEU, plutonium or Category 1 sources.
➢ Sixty-seven incidents in which the intent to conduct trafficking or malicious use could not be determined. These included 55 thefts, 3 incidents of unauthorized possession, and 9 incidents of missing materials. In 53 incidents, the materials, all of which involved lower risk sources below Category 3, were not recovered.
➢ For 136 reported incidents, the material was out of regulatory control but not related to trafficking, malicious use or scams. Most of these incidents involved unauthorized disposal, unauthorized shipments and unexpected discoveries of material such as previously lost radioactive sources.

In order to protect confidentiality of the ITDB participants, detailed information on incidents and illicit trafficking is not made available to the public.

The followings are remarks made by the surveyed countries during ICONS 2020 on their efforts to prevent illicit trafficking, the establishment of legal instruments for export control, installation of detection equipment at border crossings, and reinforcing nuclear forensic capabilities:

➢ India121: has developed “State of the Art” Radiation Monitoring Systems for search, detection and quick qualitative and quantitative assessment of large area radioactive contamination in case of nuclear and radiological emergencies. In addition India held the IAEA Technical Meeting on determining minimum detectable quantities and alarm thresholds in March 2020 with 43 participants from 15 IAEA Member States.
➢ Indonesia122: in cooperation with the IAEA, it “continues to develop and strengthen its nuclear security infrastructure, among others through capacity building programs and installation of Radiation Portal Monitors and Radiological Data Monitoring Systems at Indonesia’s entry points and borders.”
➢ Brazil123: “has made significant progress in enforcing border and export controls along its more than [17,000] kilometers of land borders with ten different countries, and along more than [8,000] kilometers of coastal line, in order to prevent trafficking of nuclear materials. Its Integrated Border Protection Program enhances prevention of a wide range of well-known cross border crimes, through coordinated actions with law enforcement agencies, and authorities from neighboring countries. The Program includes conveyance of nuclear material entering the national jurisdiction waters, under the coordination of our maritime law enforcement agency.”
➢ Iran124: “is updating the regulations regarding the security of radioactive sources and the relevant guidance on control and combating illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials.
➢ Canada125: “Canada Border Services Agency has upgraded Canada’s RADNet to help prevent illicit trafficking via commercial marine containers entering Canada; standalone, automated radiation detection portals detect potential radiation in shipping containers at Canada’s major marine ports.”
➢ The United Kingdom126: “our detection architecture prevents the trafficking of radioactive material. This is key to U.K. nuclear security, so the U.K. is trialing and using the latest detection technologies at its borders and in-land.”
➢ The United States127: “has equipped 672 border crossing points worldwide with radiation detection systems, and it has developed 177 mobile or man-potable systems to detect and identify smuggling.”
➢ Mexico128: The Regional workshop for Central American countries on detection architecture awareness was considered for the third quarter of 2020.

Looking at efforts made by other international organizations than the IAEA, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) provides a forum for collecting data on prevention of nuclear terrorism, supporting investigation, and building confidence and coordination among national law enforcement agencies. In April 2019, at the Technical Meeting on Nuclear Forensics organized by the IAEA, INTERPOL gave a briefing on the role of nuclear forensics in response to the threat posed by the nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.129

Table 3-6 shows the implementation status regarding the minimization of HEU for peaceful purposes, participation in the ITDB and measures for the prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other radiological materials, based on official statements made at past Nuclear Security Summits, IAEA Nuclear Security Conferences, and any other opportunities.

C) Acceptance of international nuclear security review missions
The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) provides States with peer advice, upon their request, regarding the implementation of international instruments and IAEA guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material, associated facilities and activities. IPPAS missions are conducted by teams of international nuclear security experts. Missions comprises a national level review of the legal and regulatory framework. Depending on a State’s request, a mission may also include a review of security systems and measures at facilities, and during the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material.

In 2018 and in 2019, five IPPAS missions were conducted, respectively, while none were conducted in 2020, apparently due to COVID-19.130 On the other hand, some countries have received IPPAS missions in the past and then requested follow-up missions to continue working on strengthening the protection of nuclear materials.131 The IAEA recommends that a follow-up mission be conducted three to four years after the receiving the initial mission.

Regarding the request for future IPPAS missions, the following countries in the survey made references to this during ICONS 2020:

➢ Poland132: “will be looking into inviting a follow-up IPPAS mission in 2021 to take stock of the achievements INSSP mission in 2019.”

➢ Pakistan133: “hosting of an International Physical Protection Advisory Service Mission remains under active consideration.”
➢ Turkey134: upgrading Turkey’s legislative framework to the highest international standards and enhancing its implementation capacity is a continuous process. Turkey expects to host an IAEA IPPAS mission in the near future.
➢ Belgium135: “will host at the end of 2020 the Third International Seminar on Sharing Experience and Best Practices from Conduct of IPPAS missions.”

Furthermore, in August 2020, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company, ROSATOM, held an online workshop on IAEA nuclear security-related missions, including IPPAS and the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Program (INSSP), which was attended by more than 40 industry experts from the country. Russia has not hosted any IPPAS missions so far, but the workshop seems to be intended to deepen the understanding of stakeholders in the country to prepare for receiving missions in the near future.136

A recent trend concerning IPPAS missions is to make the IPPAS report partially available to the public while protecting sensitive information. It is encouraged from the viewpoint of transparency and accountability of national nuclear security efforts. In response to this trend, Japan released part of their IPPAS and follow-up mission reports in December 2019. They followed the examples of the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, and other countries which had done similarly.137

Apart from IPPAS missions, the IAEA also provides the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and other missions to develop an INSSP in order to assist States in establishing nuclear security systems and capabilities. The INSServ provides advice to improve a broad spectrum of nuclear security activities of the state, by reviewing national nuclear security regime. As for the INSSP, it provides a platform for nuclear security work to be implemented over a period of time, thus ensuring sustainability of national nuclear security efforts. The INSSP review missions enable the IAEA, the state concerned, and donors, to plan and coordinate activities from both a technical and a financial point of view, optimizing the use of resources and avoiding duplications.

According to IAEA Nuclear Security Report 2020, as of June 2020, there are 84 approved INSSPs in total, 21 awaiting Member State acceptance and 2 awaiting finalization with the respective Member States.138

In this regard, the IAEA actively worked to promote the completion of self-assessment surveys prior to and in preparation for INSSP meetings. They organized a regional workshop in February 2020 to assist Member States with the self-assessment of their nuclear security regimes for Latin America and the Caribbean.139

D) Technology development ―nuclear forensics
Nuclear forensics is an important technology for nuclear security that can identify and prosecute perpetrators of illicit trafficking and malicious acts involving nuclear and radiological materials. Efforts and support for further advancement of this technology, as well as the establishment of national systems and international networking systems have been made to date. The Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2016 identified nuclear forensics as one of the key areas in which the IAEA needs to provide further support to its Member States.140

In this regard, the IAEA newly set up a Crime Scene Management and Nuclear Forensics Unit within the Department of Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security, which began work in January 2020.141

While the Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2020 did not mention nuclear forensics, in the technical session of the Conference, a panel discussion on Nuclear Forensics Collaborative Efforts was held and more than 25 presentations were made.142 Among the surveyed countries, Japan, the United States, and Canada all contributed to the panel discussion.

As for multilateral cooperation on nuclear forensics, the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) serves as a platform to support the technological development and sharing of nuclear forensic methods.

The year 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of the ITWG, and the 25th annual meeting was scheduled to be held in that year. However, due to COVID-19, it was postponed to June 2021. Nevertheless, several activities were conducted virtually, such as the Fourth Galaxy Serpent Exercise (GSv4) for the development of a national nuclear forensics library, which was expected to be completed by September 2020. 143

Furthermore, the “ITWG 7th Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX- 7) Data Review Meeting is slated to be held in September 2021.144 Although only six analytical labs participated in the inaugural CMX-1, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Canada, Czech, China, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Lithuania, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission (Joint Research Center: JRC), are participating in most recent CMX (namely CMX-6) and the scale of participation has increased markedly over time.145

Another important framework for multilateral cooperation on nuclear forensics is the Nuclear Forensics Working Group (NFWG) chaired by Canada and established within the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), described below. Aiming at strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities through multilateral cooperation, the NFWG has conducted many workshops and desktop exercises. The following is a list of nuclear forensics efforts or remarks made by the surveyed countries in this study regarding such efforts.

➢ Israel146: its national nuclear forensics laboratory employs state of the art technology and takes part in the global efforts to promote the science and applications of nuclear forensics. This laboratory collaborates with the parties to the GICNT.
➢ Brazil147: is particularly interested in further developing its nuclear forensics for detection and tracing of radioactive materials.
➢ Canada148: is in the process of transitioning multiple scientific research and development as well as technical and operational capability development programs into a formalized federal inter-departmental/ agency framework for an enhanced and expanded national nuclear forensics capability.

➢ Australia149: continues its work on nuclear forensics, providing regional training courses both in cooperation with the IAEA and bilaterally. Australia encourages states to take the opportunity of this Ministerial Conference to subscribe to the Joint statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security issued as Information Circular 917, and join the 31 countries that have already done so.
➢ China150: IAEA and China’s State Nuclear Security Technology Centre signed Practical Arrangements in February 2020.
➢ The Netherlands151: IAEA and the Netherlands Forensic Institute signed Practical Arrangements in February 2020.

E) Capacity building and support activities
Before the start of the Nuclear Security Summit process, many countries set up Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) as a means to strengthen the sustainability of their national nuclear security capacity, including education and training functions, or established centers of excellence (COE) for experts in the region. In this way, capacity building efforts on nuclear security have been carried out continuously since then in many countries and regions.

As part of their efforts in this area, the IAEA published a technical document called “Establishing and Operating a National Nuclear Security Support Centre” as TECDOC-1734 in 2020.152 The IAEA also initiated work to establish a specialized training facility in Seibersdorf “for the demonstration of equipment and technologies related to nuclear security and the organization of training activities on the implementation of nuclear security systems and measures at major public events.”153 According to the IAEA, the facility will complement the activities of national NSSCs and its infrastructure investments are planned to be implemented effectively and sustainably managed.

The following is a list of remarks made by the countries surveyed regarding the status of their efforts on the COE at the ICONS 2020 and the IAEA General Conference:

➢ Japan154: has been continuously leading international human resource development and capacity building in Asia, through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency. The ISCN, is the first support center for enhancing nuclear security in Asia. Until now, it has received more than 4,600 experts, mainly from Asian countries, and has provided them with training courses. Japan is determined to continue its contribution in this field.
➢ India155: ‘State of Art’ facilities and laboratories for physical protection systems like access control, advanced surveillance systems etc. Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) became operational in April 2017.Since then, GCNEP has conducted over 25 International programs including training courses, workshops, technical meetings, etc., drawing around 400 participants from more than 40 member states.
➢ Saudi Arabia156: has donated $10 million to the IAEA towards the establishment of a specialized nuclear security center in Seibersdorf.

In addition, according to the Russian Nuclear Security Update, the Technical Academy of ROSATOM and the IAEA carried out the first theoretical session of the International School on Nuclear Security in the form of a video conference. Twenty-five participants from 9 countries participated in the School. It was the first time that a session of the IAEA nuclear security school was conducted in Russian.157

Apart from the above, the following surveyed countries made references to their efforts in capacity building at ICONS 2020:

➢ Israel158: “as part of our willingness to extend assistance, we have joined the IAEA Response and Assistance Network and our team engage in IAEA Incident and Emergency Center exercises. Israel stands ready to assist its neighbours and other states in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.”
➢ South Korea159: “in order to enhance regional capacity building, we began designing new projects with the Agency focusing on the ASEAN, including a training course on nuclear forensics.”
➢ India160: GCNEP is extending technical assistance in capacity building to Bangladesh for their upcoming Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant in addition to training on physical protection systems to Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission personnel.
➢ Nigeria161: Nuclear security centers are being strategically positioned to adequately support both national and regional initiatives.

International Network for training and support

Efforts to set up COEs and implement training as described above not only help capacity building related to global nuclear security, but also contribute to promoting understanding of nuclear security among regional experts, operators and related organizations. Moreover, strengthening cooperation with each country’s COE has advantages such as mutual exchange of instructors among COEs. At the same time, to promote efficient cooperation and closer information sharing, it is important to avoid duplication in the activities of the COEs that have been established over the past several years. These tasks include building a broad network centered around the IAEA, and strengthening education and training through international support. To maintain and further facilitate exchange of experts, information and training material, the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network) was established in 2012 under the leadership of the IAEA. As of 2020, 72 institutions from 64 countries participates in the Network. The break-down of 72 by region is as follows: 24 institutions from the Asia/Pacific region, 22 from Europe, 18 from Africa, 6 from Latin America, and 2 from North America.162 Participating countries in this study include Chile, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea and Pakistan.

On international network for training and support, the following surveyed countries made remarks at ICONS 2020:

➢ Japan163: the ISCN has received more than 4,600 experts, mainly from Asian countries, and has provided them with training courses. Japan is determined to continue its contributions in this field.
➢ South Korea164: Since 2014, the International Nuclear Security Academy hosted 45 international training courses, 19 out of them jointly with the IAEA. According to the IAEA statistics, it is considered one of the leading NSSCs in the world.

In this connection, China distributed a brochure which detailed its capacity building efforts during ICONS 2020. In September 2019, the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) was designated to be an IAEA Collaborating Center for Nuclear Security Technologies and it was decided that the Sate Nuclear Security Technology Center will participate in the IAEA Collaborating Center scheme.165 Under a new cooperation agreement, the CAEA and the IAEA will work together to improve the functionality of radiation detection equipment and physical protection systems including, for example, thorough tests that simulate harsh environmental conditions.166

The members of the Asia Regional Network of NSSCs—China, Japan and South Korea—will host an inaugural technical exchange visit for NSSCs in the Asia Pacific region, focused on human resource development, in autumn 2021.

Also, according to MirageNews, the Atomic Energy Licensing Board of Malaysia and the IAEA established a pool of radiation detection equipment available for loan to support nuclear security training and detection capabilities at major public events in Asia and the Pacific. This is the first nuclear security equipment repository facilitated by the IAEA. Japan has provided financial support for the purchase of equipment.167

International Network for Education

While NSSC focuses on training, the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) focuses on nuclear security education to further advance technology development and information sharing in this area. According to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Report 2020, the Network now has 194 institutions from 65 Member States.168 In 2020, one new country and 10 new institutions joined INSEN. The number of participating countries and educational institutions has continued to increase in recent years. Countries in this survey which participate in INSEN include: Austria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.169

At the INSEN annual meeting held in July 2020, similar to last year’s meeting, a panel discussion on the role of women in nuclear security was held under the theme of gender initiatives. On the gender dimension of nuclear security, the Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2020 encouraged IAEA Member States to establish an inclusive workforce within their national security structures, including equal access to education and training.170 At ICONS 2020, the IAEA also hosted a side event on gender entitled “Women in Nuclear.”171

F) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund

The IAEA’s fifth Nuclear Security Plan, covering the period 2018-2021,172 was approved in September 2017 and has been currently being implemented. For the sake of successful implementation of this plan, in 2002 the IAEA established the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) as a voluntary funding mechanism to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. Since then, the IAEA has been calling on Member States to make voluntary contributions to the Fund. The Ministerial Declaration of ICONS 2020 recognizes the NSF as an important instrument for the Agency’s activities in the field of nuclear security. It also states that the countries gathered at the ICONS 2020 will continue to provide, on a voluntary basis, funds to the NSF, as well as technical and human resources, as appropriate, for the IAEA to implement its work in nuclear security and to provide, upon request, the support needed by Member States.173

Although the IAEA’s regular budget allocations for nuclear security have gradually increased in recent years, the increase has been limited due to the persistent negative opinions, especially among developing countries.174 For this reason, at ICONS 2020, Belgium, Germany, Norway and other countries highlighted the need to increase their regular budget allocations.175

According to the IAEA Nuclear Security Report 2020, in the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, the IAEA accepted pledges and received contributions to the NSF from the following Member States: Belgium, Canada, China, Estonia, France, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as other contributors.176 In addition, according to the IAEA Annual Report 2019, the most recent available at the time of writing, NSF revenue for FY2019 was €33.3 million.177 While this was an increase of €11.1 million over the previous year, the FY2018 revenue was a decrease of €21.9 million from FY2017. The increase in the NSF contribution seems to be due to the ICONS 2020 conference, which was held with ministerial-level participation on the last day of the conference, it was announced that new contributions totaling more than US $20 million to the NSF had been announced or confirmed.178

The following is a description of the specific contributions to the NSF made by the surveyed countries, as revealed in their statements at ICONS 2020:

➢ The United Kingdom179: plans to　contribute a further￡1.6 million to the NSF, and urges to other Member　States to contribute as well.
➢ New Zealand180: is a “regular contributor to the IAEA NSF, and we　are pleased to announce today an additional contribution of NZ$150　thousand towards the fund.”

In addition, at ICONS 2020, the following countries in this study mentioned the to date contributions they made to the NSF.

➢ Canada181: with this additional funding, Canada is proud to be the third-largest contributing state to the IAEA’s NSF, having now contributed over $58 million. Canada announced $2.5 million for the Agency’s work on helping Nuclear Security Support and Training Centers boost the IAEA’s ability to ensure training and equipment is provided across different regions.
➢ Belgium182：Since 2010, has yearly contributed to the Nuclear Security Fund, for a total of more than US $2 million.
➢ Switzerland183: since ICONS in 2016, contributed 31.5 euros to NSF.
➢ Germany184: “has done its part with more than 5 million euros – and encourage further Members to contribute to the Fund.”
➢ Russia185: Since 2010, Russia annually contributes $ 1 million USD to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund (NSF). As part of activities funded by Russian voluntary contributions to the NSF, more than forty international, regional and national projects are being implemented annually.
➢ France186: contributes annually to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. Starting this year, it will finance a new capacity building project in the Sahel worth one million euros.
➢ South Korea187: has contributed around 7 million US dollars to the IAEA NSF since 2012.
➢ Australia188: in 2019, provided a further $250 thousand AUD to the IAEA NSF. It encourages all states to ensure there remains a sustainable source of funds for the IAEA to fulfill this important role.
➢ The United States189: “we must continue providing the IAEA with the necessary resources it needs to accomplish the various activities within its nuclear security mandate. Since 2016 IAEA Conference on Nuclear Security, the US has voluntarily provided over $51million to the IAEA and its NSF as well as additional in-kind support.”

➢ The Netherlands190: “is a longstanding contributor to the Nuclear Security Fund and will continue to be so.”
➢ Sweden191: “has contributed generously to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund as well as to the work of the IAEA through in-kind contributions.”

G) Participation in international efforts

International efforts to improve the level of nuclear security form a multilayered structure today. Major efforts by the international community on nuclear security are comprised of two approaches, one made by international organizations and the other by multilateral forums such as the Nuclear Security Summit process which ended in 2016. The approach by international organizations includes: UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)192 on non-proliferation, which calls for UN Member States to take legal measures to prohibit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to establish a strict export control system, based on the Chapter VII of the UN Charter; INTERPOL’s support to national law enforcement agencies on the issue of nuclear security; a series of IAEA International Conferences on Nuclear Security, and other relevant meetings and workshops.

With regard to the Nuclear Security Summit Process, several mechanisms have been established to continue international efforts to improve the level of nuclear security after the end of the process in 2016, and the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG)—established through the Joint Statement on Sustained Action to Enhance Global Nuclear Security—is at the center of the process. The purpose of the NSCG is to promote sustained engagement and implementation of nuclear security by States, and to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture to ensure that it is both sustainable and comprehensive. The NSCG is expected to hold annual meetings in conjunction with the IAEA General Conference, as well as related meetings. India, for example, announced its plans to organize a technical meeting of the NSCG in 2020.193

The number of participating countries in the NSCG was 40 at the time of its establishment, but Canada has since taken the lead in issuing an IAEA information document, INFCIRC/899, which clearly states the NSCG’s Statement of Principles and invites countries that have not yet joined to join.194 As of November 2020, 48 countries, including Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as four regional and international organizations, the European Union (EU), IAEA, INTERPOL and the UN, are participating as observers.195 The number of participating countries is gradually increasing for example, Pakistan newly joined in 2019.196

Regarding the NSCG, the following references were made by the surveyed countries at ICONS 2020:

➢ Canada197: remain a strong supporter of the NSCG, given its effort to build and sustain and comprehensive international nuclear security architecture. Canada welcomes the participation of all countries that subscribe to the Group’s Statement of Principles, outlined in INFCIRC/899.
➢ Nigeria198: would like to further underscore its commitment to the continuing work of the NSCG.

In addition to the NSCG, a number of basket initiatives have been launched as part of the Nuclear Security Summit process, such as “Transportation Security (INFCIRC/909)” led by Japan, “Internal Threat Mitigation (INFCIRC/908)” led by the United States, “Nuclear Forensics (INFCIRC/917)” led by Australia, and “Security of Highly Radioactive　Sources (INFCIRC/910)” led by France.199

At ICONS 2020, some countries, such as Israel, made reference in their statement to the basket initiatives in which they participated, and stated that they would continue to remain dedicated to the commitments made during the summit process,200 while other countries that took the lead in specific initiatives played a role in leading ongoing efforts by holding side events on various themes.201

In addition to the efforts of the various multilateral fora mentioned above, other multilateral cooperation frameworks for nuclear security include the G7 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG), the G7 Global Partnership against Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (G7GP, formerly known as the G8 Global Partnership), and the GICNT.

The NSSG holds three meetings annually and produces a report. Their 2019 report noted that emerging technologies such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) could pose challenges to nuclear safety, security and safeguards, and that a cybersecurity framework for civilian nuclear facilities needs to be addressed from both the political and regulatory aspects.202 As for FY 2020, it is not clear whether NSSG meetings were held as usual, and whether a report was produced. Regarding the nuclear security measures for SMRs, Japan expressed in its national statement at ICONS 2020 that “as a country deeply involved in the research and development of advanced nuclear technologies such as SMRs, Japan regards it an important challenge to further enhance nuclear security measures including those for cybersecurity at nuclear facilities by taking duly into consideration technological developments.”203

On the other hand, the G7GP plenary meeting was held virtually in June, and the Chair, the United States, expressed a need to continue the Partnership’s work complementing the efforts of the IAEA in nuclear and radiological security, to preserve momentum on priorities set in ICONS 2020, and to support the implementation and universalization of CPPNM/A in the run up to its 2021 Review Conference.204 In this regard, Canada mentioned that it coordinated diplomatic outreach with G7 partners to a number of countries to continue universalization efforts and supported regional workshops in Latin America and Africa to help boost universalization and implementation efforts.205

Elsewhere, the GICNT, which was agreed to by the U.S.-Russia initiative at the St. Petersburg Summit in 2006, is another important international effort in the field of nuclear security. The GICNT is a framework of voluntary international cooperation by concerned states. As mentioned in the previous section on nuclear forensics technology development, GICNT activities with the aim of strengthening nuclear security has greatly recognized in recent years. The GICNT now includes participation from 89 partner countries (including Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and six international organizations, including the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) as official observers.206

The GICNT has three main Working Groups: Response and Mitigation, Nuclear Forensics, and Nuclear Detection. In 2019, joint exercises and workshops were held under GICNT to support the detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials, improve nuclear forensics capabilities, and respond to disasters related to nuclear security incidents. As for in 2020, however, no activities could be found in publicly available information. On the other hand, several countries surveyed in this study mentioned GICNT at ICONS 2020.

➢ Canada207: remains “committed to multilateral initiatives such as GICNT under which Canada continues to chair the Nuclear Forensics Working Group.”
➢ France208: “regularly hosts training courses or visits by foreign delegations. In particular, in April 2020, France will organize a seminar on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, in Paris.”
➢ New Zealand209: “has supported workshops led by the World Institute for Nuclear Security and Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism, both with a focus on supporting the Asia Pacific region.”

The next GICNT plenary meeting is scheduled to be held in 2021 to discuss the future direction of the Initiative, based on activities beyond 2019.210

In addition to the multilateral efforts described above, countries are working toward the enhancement of nuclear security on a bilateral basis. For example, Japan announced the establishment of the Japan-U.S. Nuclear Security Working Group (NSWG) in November 2010, and has been promoting cooperation in the areas of human resource development, nuclear forensics, transportation security, and HEU minimization.211

Bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea is another example. These two states held the Fourth Nuclear Security Working Group Meeting and High-Level Bilateral Commission virtually in September 2020. At the meeting, they reviewed the current status of bilateral cooperation in nuclear security and discussed ways to work together in the future.212 The two countries have shown leadership in strengthening the global nuclear security regime and have led the international community in minimizing HEU, improving cyber security of nuclear facilities, and strengthening IAEA nuclear security activities.213

Furthermore, in October, the U.S. National Security Administration (NNSA) and the Atomic Energy of Canada signed “a memorandum of understanding-Cooperation and Information Exchange on Nuclear Security, Safeguards and Non- Proliferation Matters” to enable more effective bilateral collaboration in the areas of nuclear safety and nuclear security. “The agreement includes the sharing of knowledge and information, including cross-training, workshops and exercises, as well as collaboration in research and development.”214

Hosting international nuclear security review missions such as IPPAS, nuclear forensics, capacity-building, and supporting efforts will contribute to enhancing the surveyed countries’ nuclear-security-related capabilities and performance. Thus, these can be treated as indicators of their national nuclear security regimes. Furthermore, contributions to the IAEA NSF, and participation in activities of G7GP as well as GICNT can also be regarded as indicators of States’ commitments to enhance nuclear security. Based on these premises, in Table 3-7, the status of each surveyed country’s participation in and efforts toward the above items (nuclear security initiatives) are shown.

 

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93 “Co-Presidents’ Report,” ICONS 2020, February 14, 2020, p. 2.
94 “Ministerial Declaration,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
95 The Science and Technology segment was composed of high-level panel sessions and technical sessions.
96 “Ministerial Declaration,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
97 “Government of Canada: National Progress Report,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
98 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Regime, February 2020.

99 IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2019, GC(64)/3, p. 1.
100 Thirty-five IAEA Member States, World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and two Regional Specialized Meteorological Center (RSMC) participated.
101 Nicholas Tarsitano, “Preparing to Assist in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency Under all Circumstances,” IAEA, March 30, 2020.
102 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Fourth Washington Nuclear Security Summit, Japan-US Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation (Summary).” (in Japanese)

103 “Ministerial Declaration,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 1.
104 National Nuclear Security Administration, “Kazakhstan and U.S. Cooperate to Eliminate Highly Enriched Uranium in Kazakhstan,” September 22, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/ kazakhstan-and-us-cooperate-eliminate-highly-enriched-uranium-kazakhstan.
105 “Statement of Canada,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
106 “Statement of Norway,” ICONS 2020, February 2020; “U.S. and Norwegian Experts Cooperating to Make Norway Free of Highly Enriched Uranium,” National Nuclear Security Administration, September 21, 2020.
107 “Statement of Republic of Korea,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 4.
108 “Statement of Belgium,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.

109 “Statement of India,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
110 “Statement of United States of America,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 3.
111 “Statement of United Kingdom,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 13.
112 “Statement of Indonesia,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
113 “Statement of South Africa,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
114 “Joint Statement on Minimising and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications,” INFCIRC/912, February 16, 2020; “Australia’s 2019 INFCIRC/912 HEU Report,” IPFM Blog, January 23, 2020, http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2020/01/australias_2019_infcirc91.html.
115 INFCIRC/917, April 20, 2017. Some countries have voluntarily added reporting of HEU stocks to the reporting of civilian separated plutonium stocks, which is based on the International Plutonium Control Guidelines (INFCIRC/549).
116 IAEA, “ITDB: Incident and Trafficking Database.”
117 IAEA, “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control 2020 Fact Sheet,” p. 1.
118 IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2019, GC(64)/3, p.82.
119 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, pp. 8-9. According to the ITDB Factsheet 2020, a total of 3,686 cases were reported to the ITDB between 1993 and 2019. These cases are categorized into three groups and the breakdown of 3, 686 cases according to this grouping are as follows: Group I (incidents that are, or are likely to be, connected with trafficking or malicious use); 290 cases; Group II (incidents of undermined intent); 1,023 cases; Group III (incidents that are not, or are unlikely to be, connected with trafficking or malicious use) 2,373 cases. “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control 2020 Fact Sheet,” p. 2.
120 These 208 incidents include those which occurred prior to July 2019.

121 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 20; “Statement of India,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
122 “Statement of Indonesia,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
123 “Statement of Brazil,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
124 “Statement of Iran,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 6.

125 “Government of Canada: National Progress Report,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 4.
126 “Statement of United Kingdom,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 15.
127 “Statement of United States of America,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 3.
128 “Statement of Mexico,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
129 Jerry Davydov, David Kenneth Smith and Nicola Vorhofer, “The IAEA Technical Meeting on Nuclear Forensics: Sharing Global Success in Nuclear Forensics Development and Implementation,” ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update, No.11, June 2019, p. 2.

130 IAEA, “Peer Review and Advisory Services Calendar.”
131 For instance, Poland received their first IPPAS mission in 1997, their second one in 2016, and plans to receive a follow-up mission in 2021. “Statement of Poland,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
132 “Statement of Poland,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
133 “Statement of Pakistan,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
134 “Statement of Turkey,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 3.
135 “Statement of Belgium,” ICONS 2020, February 2020. Belgium received an IPPAS follow-up mission in 2019. IPPAS mission evaluation includes “recommendations,” “suggestions,” as well as “best practices,” which come from other countries that have hosted IPPAS missions. For the countries receiving IPPAS missions, receiving best practices provides motivation to further enhance physical protection measures. Also, sharing those best practices while protecting sensitive information will be useful for other countries seeking to improve their physical protection measures. Thus, doing so is highly encouraged. “Twenty Years of International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) (History and Benefits: 2nd International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security,” IAEA, May 2016

136 “ROSATOM Concluded Online Workshop on IAEA Nuclear Security Missions,” Russian Nuclear Security Update, September/October 2020 Issue, http://russiannuclearsecurity.com/september-october 2020issue.
137 Nuclear Regulation Authority of Japan, “Publication of IAEA’s IPPAS Mission Report and its Follow-up Mission Report,” December 24, 2019.
138 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 7.
139 Ibid, p. 8.

140 “Ministerial Declaration,” ICONS 2016, December 2016, pp. 1-2.
141 Henrik Horne and David Kenneth Smith, “IAEA Perspectives on the ICONS 2020,” ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update, No. 16, September 2020, p. 5.
142 Michael Curry and Klaus Mayer, “ITWG’s Contribution to the International Conference on Nuclear Security, 2020,” ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update, No. 15, June 2020, p. 1-5.
143 “Chairpersons’ Address,” ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update, No. 16, September 2020, p. 1.
144 Ibid.
145 Jon M. Schwantes, “Trends in Nuclear Forensic Analyses: 20 Years of Collaborative Materials Exercises,” ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update, No.10, March 2019, p. 6.

146 “Statement of Israel,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 5.
147 “Statement of Brazil,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
148 “Statement of Canada,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 3.
149 “Statement of Australia,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
150 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 21
151 Ibid

152 IAEA, “Establishing and Operating a National Nuclear Security Support Centre, Revision of IAEATECDOC- 1734.” 2020.
153 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 6.
154 “Statement of Japan,” 64th IAEA General Conference, September 21, 2020, p. 6.
155 “Statement of India,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
156 “Statement of Saudi Arabia,” 64th IAEA General Conference, September 21, 2020; “Saudi Arabia Donates $ 10mn to IAEA for Combating Nuclear Terrorism,” Saudi Gazette, 22 September 2020, https://www.saudigazette.com.sa/article/598318/SAUDI-ARABIA/Saudi Arabia-donates-$10mn-to- IAEA-for-combating-nuclear-terrorism.

157 “IAEA and ROSATOM Technical Academy Held the First Nuclear Security School in Russian,” Russian Nuclear Security Update, September/October 2020 Issue, http://russiannuclearsecurity.com/ september-october2020issue.
158 “Statement of Israel,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 5.
159 “Statement of Republic of Korea,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
160 “Statement of India,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
161 “Statement of Nigeria,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.

162 “Chair’s Welcome,” IAEA NSSC Network Newsletter, Issue 5, March 2020, https://us6.campaign-archive.com/?u=958dfcbed8f359a6db0bb9c87&id=1c47327614. 
163 “Statement of Japan,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
164 “Statement of Republic of Korea,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 4.
165 Miklos Gasper, “China’s Nuclear Security Technology Centre Supports International Training Efforts,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol.61-1, February 2020, pp. 10-11.
166 Ibid

167 “Malaysian Nuclear Security Support Center to Make IAEA Radiation Detection Equipment Available Regionally,” Mirage News, October 7, 2020, https://www.miragenews.com/malaysian-nuclear-securitysupport-center-to-make-iaea-radiation-detection-equipment-available-regionally/.
168 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 24.
169 “Annual Meeting of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), Chair’s Report,” July 2019; “Working Group Meeting of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), Chairman’s Report,” February 2015.
170 “Ministerial Declaration,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
171 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 3.
172 IAEA, “Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021,” GC(61)/24, September 14, 2017.

173 “Ministerial Declaration,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
174 “Support for the International Atomic Energy Agency,” NTI Nuclear Security Index, https://www. ntiindex.org/story/support-for-the-international-atomic-energy-agency/.
175 “Statement of Belgium,” International Conference on Nuclear Security, February 2020; “Statement of Germany,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, pp. 3-4; “Statement of Norway,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
176 IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2020, GOV/2020/31-GC(64)/6, August 12, 2020, p. 29.
177 IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2019, GC (64)/3, p. 82.
178 Inna Pletukhina, “Countries to Provide US$20 million to IAEA Nuclear Security Fund,” February 17, 2020, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/countries-to-provide-us-20-million-to-iaea-nuclear-security-fund.
179 “Statement of the United Kingdom,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
180 “Statement of New Zealand,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.

181 “Statement of Canada,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, pp. 1-2.
182 “Statement of Belgium,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
183 “Statement of Switzerland,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
184 “Statement of Germany,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, pp. 3-4.
185 “Statement of Russia,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
186 “Statement of France,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
187 “Statement of Republic of Korea,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
188 “Statement of Australia,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
189 “Statement of the United States,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.

190 “Statement of the Netherlands,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
191 “Statement of Sweden,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
192 “Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004),” 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016.
193 “Statement of India,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.

194 “Statement of Principles Nuclear Security Contact Group.”
195 “Members,” Nuclear Security Contact Group, http://www.nscontactgroup.org/members.php.
196 “Statement of Pakistan,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
197 “Statement of Canada,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 2.
198 “Statement of Nigeria,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
199 See NSCG website, http://www.nscontactgroup.org/. “INFCIRC 909: A Global Tool for Transport Security”; “INFCIRC 908: A Global Tool for Insider Threat Mitigation”; “INFCIRC 910: A Global Tool for Radioactive Source Security.”
200 “Statement of Israel,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
201 Side events were organized by Japan on Transport Security, by the United States and Belgium on Insider Threat, and by France, Germany and the United States on the Security of High Activity Radioactive Sources.

202 “2019 Report Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG),” French G7 Presidency Biarritz, 2019.
203 “Statement of Japan,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
204 “The Global Partnership: Still Standing Strong Against WMD Proliferation,” June 30, 2020,
https://www.state.gov/The-Global-Partnership-Still-Standing-Strong- Against-WMD-Proliferation.
205 “Government of Canada: National Progress Report,” ICONS 2020, February 2020, p. 4.
206 “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Partner Nations List.”

207 “Statement of Canada,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
208 “Statement of France,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
209 “Statement of New Zealand,” ICONS 2020, February 2020.
210 “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT),” Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 28, 2020.
211 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-U.S. Nuclear Security Working Group (NSWG),” August 31, 2018. (in Japanese)
212 This working group is one of the four working groups established under the High Level Bilateral Commissions, which was launched pursuant to the revised ROK-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement in 2015.

213 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, “4th Meeting of ROK-U.S. Nuclear Security Working Group Takes Place,” Press Releases, September 23, 2020, http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/ view.do?seq=321231.
214 “U.S., Canada Sign MOU on Safeguards and Nonproliferation,” American Nuclear Society, October 19, 2020, https://www.ans.org/news/article-2296/us-canada-sign-mou-on-safeguards-and-nonproliferation/.