(6) Diminishing the Roles and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategies and PoliciesHiroshima for Global Peace

Hiroshima Report 2023(6) Diminishing the Roles and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategies and Policies

A) The current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons

In the latter half of the 2010s, as great power and geopolitical competitions have become more intense, nuclear-armed states have reaffirmed the role and significance of their nuclear weapons within their national security. In 2022, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine accompanied by nuclear intimidation, as well as the further widening of the rift among NWS and intensifying strategic competition triggered by this aggression, led the nuclear-armed states and their allies to further increase their reliance on nuclear deterrence. As described below, many countries expressed their concerns at the 10th NPT RevCon, and called for reductions in the roles and possibilities of using nuclear weapons. The draft final document of the RevCon stated that, inter alia, “[p]ending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, States parties commit to making every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again”; and “[t]he nuclear weapon States should take steps to diminish, with a view to eliminating, the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.”

Russia’s nuclear intimidation

Russia, which launched its aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, repeatedly engaged in nuclear intimidation even prior to the invasion.159

In the press conference following the France-Russia summit meeting on February 7, President Putin said that if Ukraine joined NATO and decided to retake Crimea by military means, European countries would automatically be at war with Russia, one of the world’s leading NWS, and that there would be no winner.160 On February 19, Russia deployed the Iskander, a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) capable of reaching European NATO countries and carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads, 9M729, a ground-launched medium-range cruise missile (GLCM), and Kinjar, an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), around Ukraine. On February 19, under the command of President Putin and in the presence of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Russia conducted a large-scale missile launch exercise, launching not only the Yars ICBM but also the Iskander and Kinjar, the Tsircon sea-launched hypersonic missile, and the Karibur SLCM.

In his speech on February 24, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, President Putin implied to threaten a nuclear attack against Ukraine and NATO countries, including the United States, which provided assistance to Ukraine, stating: “As for military affairs, even after the dissolution of the USSR and losing a considerable part of its capabilities, today’s Russia remains one of the most powerful nuclear states. Moreover, it has a certain advantage in several cutting-edge weapons. In this context, there should be no doubt for anyone that any potential aggressor will face defeat and ominous consequences should it directly attack our country.”161 On February 27, President Putin ordered “special regime of duty” to the Russian nuclear forces,162 and the next day Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the nuclear forces, including the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Pacific Fleet, and the Northern Fleet, had moved to “combat readiness.” (However, Russia did not specify the steps taken, while a senior U.S. Defense Department official said he was unable to confirm any specific moves of note on the Russian side.163 ) Also on the same day, a referendum in Belarus approved a constitutional amendment that would allow Russia to redeploy nuclear weapons on its territory.

On March 2, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that if a third world war broke out, it would involve nuclear weapons and be destructive, according to Russian media.164 He also claimed (without providing evidence) that “Ukraine still has Soviet nuclear technologies and the means of delivery of such weapons,” and warned that Russia would face a “real danger” if Ukraine acquired nuclear weapons.165

Furthermore, on March 22, when asked under what conditions President Putin would use nuclear weapons, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov replied that Russia might use them if it faced an existential threat.166 Such statements—which were made despite Ukraine’s inability to launch an attack that would cause catastrophic damage to Russia, and despite NATO’s repeated denials about the possibility of direct military intervention in the conflict—raised suspicions about what “threat to national survival” means to Russia and whether Russia’s threshold for using nuclear weapons is set somewhat low. On March 30, Peskov attempted to allay doubts by reiterating that Russia would use nuclear weapons only in the case of a “threat to the existence” of his country, and not as a result of the military operation in Ukraine.167 However, concerns about Russia’s use of nuclear weapons remained. It was reported on March 30 that two Russian Su-24 bombers, which were considered to be armed with nuclear weapons, had violated Swedish airspace on March 2. 168

As Sweden and Finland began to consider joining NATO in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Russian deputy chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev warned that Russia would have to increase its defense capabilities in the region if both countries joined NATO, and said that “there can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic, the balance must be restored,”169 implying that Russia could deploy nuclear weapons there. Russia conducted a test launch of the Calibre SLCM from two submarines in the Sea of Japan on April 14, and of the Sarmat ICBM on April 20.

In June, Russia also conducted a maneuver exercise using more than 100 vehicles, including Yars ICBM launchers. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said, “From a military point of view, there is no need to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine to achieve the set goals. The main purpose of Russian nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack. … The media are spreading speculation about the alleged use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in the course of the special military operation, or about the readiness to use chemical weapons. All these informational attacks are absolute lies.”170

However, as Russia’s inferiority complex intensified and Ukraine’s rolling counter-attacks resulted in the recapture of areas under Russian control, President Putin, in his September 21 speech announcing the partial mobilization of military reservists, again threatened Ukraine and NATO, warning that, “When the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people. It’s not a bluff.”171 At around the same time, as a result of a “referendum” held by pro-Russian groups in Russian-controlled eastern and southern Ukraine, Russia said that those areas would be annexed to Russia, where its military doctrine, including the use of nuclear weapons, would apply. It is widely interpreted as a threat that the “threat to territorial integrity” would apply to Russian-occupied territories in the east and south of Ukraine, and that Russia would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if those areas were recaptured.

Concerns about the use of nuclear weapons by Russia have intensified, following reports that: Russia was alleged to be planning to conduct a nuclear test near the Ukrainian border; a train believed to be linked to the Russian Defense Ministry’ secret service in charge of nuclear weapons control had started moving toward Ukraine; and the Russian nuclear submarine Belgorod, carrying the “Poseidon” new nuclear torpedo, was heading for the Arctic Ocean and preparing a test launch of Poseidon.172

During Russia’s nuclear force exercise in October, ICBM Yars, SLBM Sineva, and ALCM from the Tu-95 strategic bomber were launched. However, the United States stated that there were no signs that Russia was imminently planning to use its nuclear weapons.173

In November, Russia attempted to allay the concerns of the international community regarding its potential use of nuclear weapons. In a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry “fully reaffirm[ed] our commitment” made in the Joint statement of the five NWS in January 2022, which clearly states that “nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought.” The Foreign Ministry also stated, “Russian doctrinal approaches in this sphere are defined with utmost accuracy, pursue solely defensive goals and do not admit of expansive interpretation. These approaches allow for Russia to hypothetically resort to nuclear weapons exclusively in response to an aggression involving the use of weapons of mass destruction or an aggression with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”174 On November 17, asked if it was possible that Russia would use a nuclear weapon and whether or not this had been discussed, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said even framing such questions was unacceptable, and adding, “No one from the Russian side is discussing this topic and has not discussed it.”175

On November 17, asked if it was possible that Russia would use a nuclear weapon and whether or not this had been discussed, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said even framing such questions was unacceptable, and adding, “No one from the Russian side is discussing this topic and has not discussed it.”176

U.S. State Secretary Anthony Blinken warned, “If Russia crosses this line there will be catastrophic consequences for Russia. The United States will respond decisively. Now, in private channels we have spelled out in greater detail exactly what that would mean.”177 It was reported that the United States had privately been warning Russia against using nuclear weapons in Ukraine for months.178 In October, President Biden said: “I don’t think he will [use nuclear weapons]. But I think it’s irresponsible of him to talk about it, the idea that a world leader of one of the largest nuclear powers in the world says he may use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine.”179 He also warned that Russia would be making an incredibly serious mistake if it used a tactical nuclear weapon.180

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said, “Any use of nuclear weapons is absolutely unacceptable, it will totally change the nature of the conflict, and Russia must know that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought … When we see that kind of nuclear rhetoric again and again from Russia, from President Putin, it is something that we have to take seriously – and therefore we are conveying the clear message that this will have severe consequences for Russia.”181 apan’s Prime Minister Kishida repeatedly criticized Russia’s behaviors, in his statement at the UNGA, warning that “Threatening the use of nuclear weapons, as Russia has done, let alone the actual use of nuclear weapons, is a serious threat to the peace and security of the international community, and is absolutely unacceptable.”182

On the other hand, countries that maintain good relations with Russia did not criticize Russia’s nuclear threats, at least not directly. Some of them used their influence to tone down statements by international forums. For example, the Declaration adopted at the 1MSP of the TPNW only made these references: “We are alarmed and dismayed by threats to use nuclear weapons and increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric. We stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. We condemn unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.” The draft final document of the NPT RevCon also only stated: “The Conference expresses deep concern that the threat of nuclear weapons use today is higher than at any time since the heights of the Cold War and at the deteriorated international security environment”; and “The Conference expresses concern at the threat or use of force in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or acting in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

However, some countries that have not directly condemned Russian aggression or nuclear intimidation have implied concern about its possible use of nuclear weapons. For example, in a telephone conversation with his Russian counterpart on October 26, India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh said that “[t]he prospect of the usage of nuclear or radiological weapons goes against the basic tenets of humanity,” and that nuclear weapons should not be used by any side in the Ukraine war.183

At the U.S.-China summit meeting on November 14, both the United States and China expressed their opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.184

In the meantime, Iran provided Russia with attack drones, which were used against Ukraine. (While Iran claims that it provided them before the war started, doubts have been cast on this claim based on the recovery of downed drones). It was also reported that North Korea provided ammunition and other supplies to Russia, and that Iran is considered supplying 300-km range Fateh-100 and 700-km range Zolfaghar ballistic missiles.

U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)

The U.S. Biden Administration announced at the end of March 2022 that it had completed its Nuclear Posture Review (2022 NPR). However, it did not release a report at that time, just a fact sheet consisting of the following three paragraphs:185

➢ The 2022 NPR represents a com prehensive, balanced approach to U.S. nuclear strategy, policy, posture, and forces. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible extended deterrence commitments, remain a top priority for the Department [of Defense] and the Nation.
➢ The NPR underscores our commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and reestablishing our leadership in arms control. We will continue to emphasize strategic stability, seek to avoid costly arms races, and facilitate risk reduction and arms control arrangements where possible.
➢ In concert with completion of these strategic reviews, the President has articulated his vision for U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy: As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear wea pons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.

The main body of the NPR 186 was published at the end of October 2022, combining three strategic documents in a single file, together with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Missile Defense Policy Review (MDR).

The NPR reaffirmed the importance of nuclear deterrence to U.S. security by stating:

It reaffirms a continuing commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible extended deterrence. Strategic deterrence remains a top priority mission for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Nation. For the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons will continue to provide unique deterrence effects that no other element of U.S. military power can replace. To deter aggression and preserve our security in the current security environment, we will maintain nuclear forces that are responsive to the threats we face.187

The report also clarified its policy: “Deterrence alone will not reduce nuclear dangers. The United States will pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach that places a renewed emphasis on arms control, non-proliferation, and risk reduction to strengthen stability, head off costly arms races, and signal our desire to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally.”188 In addition, the NPR also stated that the United States will “[a]dopt a strategy and declaratory policy that maintain a very high bar for nuclear employment while assuring Allies and partners, and complicating adversary decision calculus.”189

On the other hand, as mentioned in other sections of this Hiroshima Report, the declaratory policies showed not so many major changes from the previous NPRs formulated during the Obama and Trump administrations. President Biden has pledged to be proactive in nuclear arms control and disarmament since his presidential election campaign, and it was reported that adopting a policy of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons or a review of the nuclear modernization program were considered. However, the report suggested that the United States is not in a position to make major changes to its nuclear posture, especially in the wake of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, as well as due to its threat perception that “[b]y the 2030s the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries.190

China

China reiterated in its national report submitted to the NPT RevCon that there has been no change to its basic nuclear policy as follows:

China has unswervingly pursued a defensive nuclear strategy, demonstrated maximum transparency in its nuclear strategy and policy, exercised great restraint in the development of its nuclear forces, and adopted an extremely cautious approach to the use of nuclear weapons. From the day it came into possession of such weapons, China has advocated their complete prohibition and thorough destruction, and has maintained its nuclear forces at the minimum level required for its own national security. From the beginning, it has abided by a policy of non-first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and alone among the five nuclear-weapon States, has made a clear and unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China will continue to make its due contribution to achieving the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.191

China also reaffirmed its policy of maintaining minimum deterrence, stating: “China has consistently maintained its nuclear forces at the lowest level necessary for its national security, and has never competed with other countries in terms of nuclear investment, numbers or scale, participated in any form of arms race, provided a nuclear umbrella for other countries, or deployed nuclear weapons in other countries. Its nuclear weapons are exclusively strategic, and it takes an extremely cautious approach to their use.”192

In recent years, the United States has increasingly considered that China has been changing its nuclear posture in parallel with its aggressive nuclear modernization.193 China has consistently denied such a view. For instance, in June 2022, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe said, “China has developed its capabilities for over five decades. It’s fair to say there has been impressive progress. … China’s … policy is consistent. We use it for self-defense. We will not be the first to use nuclear [weapons].” 194

Meanwhile, China is likely to pursue at least counterforce options by ballistic missiles, although it is unclear whether those missiles would mount nuclear or conventional warheads. Commercial satellite images indicate that China has installed full-scale mockups for missile target, including a full-scale pier, a destroyer, and even a naval base, in the Takla Makan Desert in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and it is reported to be testing actual ballistic missile attacks against such mockups.

In addition, in recent years China has repeatedly conducted “exercises” that seem to demonstrate its nuclear and missile capabilities. Soon after U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, China fired nine ballistic missiles around Taiwan, five of which fell within Japan’s EEZ. China (sometimes jointly with Russia) also has repeatedly flown nuclear-capable bombers around Japan: for instance, in November, China announced that two Chinese H6 bombers and two Russian TU-95 bombers had jointly flown over long distances over the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and Pacific Ocean.195

North Korea

North Korea reiterated in 2022 that it would expand the role of nuclear weapons in its national security, and conducted missile tests of various types at unprecedented frequency.

On April 17, the KCNA reported that North Korea test-flighted a “New-type Tactical Guided Weapon” to bolster its nuclear forces, and this weapon system “is of great significance in drastically improving the firepower of the frontline long-range artillery units and enhancing the efficiency in the operation of tactical nukes of the DPRK and diversification of their firepower missions.”196 The fired weapon is considered to be an modified version of the KN24 SRBM.

At the military parade on April 25 that marked the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army, “tactical missile units” appeared for the first time, along with Hwasong-17 ICBMs and new type SLBMs. At the parade, Chairman Kim stated, “The fundamental mission of our nuclear forces is to deter a war, but our nukes can never be confined to the single mission of war deterrent even at a time when a situation we are not desirous of at all is created on this land. If any forces try to violate the fundamental interests of our state, our nuclear forces will have to decisively accomplish its unexpected second mission.”197 The “second mission” is likely to mean “tactical nuclear operations.”

On September 9, North Korea adopted the Law on Policy on Nuclear Forces,198 which stipulates that its nuclear forces “shall obey the monolithic command of the president of the State Affairs,” and “[t]he president of the State Affairs … shall have all decisive powers concerning nuclear weapons.” The Law also stipulates that “[t]he state nuclear forces command organization composed of members appointed by the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK shall assist the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK in the whole course from decision concerning nuclear weapons to execution.”

Regarding employment of nuclear weapons, the law stipulates: “In case the command and control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger owing to an attack by hostile forces, a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately to destroy the hostile forces including the starting point of provocation and the command according to the operation plan decided in advance.” Under the law, the main principle for using nuclear weapons is “the last means in order to cope with outside aggression and attack seriously threatening the security of the country and the people,” and North Korea “can use nuclear weapons in the following cases”:

➢ In case an attack by nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction was launched or drew near is judged;
➢ In case a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces on the state leadership and the command organization of the state’s nuclear forces was launched or drew near is judged;
➢ In case a fatal military attack against important strategic objects of the state was launched or drew near is judged;
➢ In case the need for operation for preventing the expansion and protraction of a war and taking the initi ative in the war in contingency is inevitably raised; and
➢ In other case an inevitable situation in which it is compelled to correspond with catastrophic crisis to the existence of the state and safety of the people by only nuclear weapons is created.

The law further stipulates that, inter alia: it “shall constantly assess outside nuclear threats and the change in the posture of international nuclear forces and correspondingly upgrade and beef up its nuclear forces in a qualitative and quantitative way in response to it”; and “The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, shall neither deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of other countries nor share them and not transfer nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned and weapon-grade nuclear substances.”

Chairman Kim strongly suggested in his speech on September 8 that North Korea’s nuclear forces are expanding their role, not only for a retaliatory strike targeting Japan and the United States, but also as an offensive capability designed to carry out warfighting and achieve escalation superiority in the Korean Peninsula, as stating: “Most importantly, it is imperative to steadily expand the space for the operation of tactical nukes and diversify their application means on a higher stage so as to enhance the combat reliability and efficiency of operational application of our nuclear forces, thus making the nuclear combat posture consolidated in every way.”199

B) Commitment to no first use, “sole purpose,” and related doctrines

In 2022, no nuclear-armed state changed or altered its policy regarding no first use (NFU) or the “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons. The draft final document of the NPT RevCon made no mention of either the NFU or the “sole purpose” of the NFU.

Among the NWS, only China has declared an NFU policy, reaffirming its commitment to this in 2022.200 China has argued that all NWS should unconditionally commit to NFU of nuclear weapons, and negotiate and conclude international legal instruments toward this end.201 While the United States argues that “[t]here is some ambiguity about conditions where Beijing’s NFU policy would no longer apply,”202 China disputes this allegation.

As for the United States, as a presidential candidate in 2020, Biden expressed support for an NFU policy or a policy that “sole purpose” of its nuclear weapons is only to deter nuclear attacks. However, in its 2022 NPR, the United States did not adopt an NFU or “sole purpose,” while stated that “[a]s long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our Allies, and partners.” At the same time, it also clearly stated its policy that the United States would explore adopting such a declaratory policy as stating the following:

We conducted a thorough review of a broad range of options for nuclear declaratory policy – including both No First Use and Sole Purpose policies – and concluded that those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light of the range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict strategic-level damage to the United States and its Allies and partners. Some Allies and partners are particularly vulnerable to attacks with non-nuclear means that could produce devastating effects. We retain the goal of moving toward a sole purpose declaration and we will work with our Allies and partners to identify concrete steps that would allow us to do so.203

In the meantime, some U.S. allies including France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Japan and South Korea reportedly called on the United States not to adopt such policies, arguing that it would send the wrong message to adversaries and undermine U.S. deterrence.204

In regard to the other nuclear-armed states, India maintains an NFU policy despite reserving the option of nuclear retaliation in response to a major biological or chemical attack. Meanwhile, Pakistan, which has developed short-range nuclear weapons to counter the “Cold Start doctrine” developed by the Indian Army, does not exclude the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons against an opponent’s conventional attack.

North Korea, in its law on “Policy on Nuclear Forces” enacted in September 2022, includes as one condition for its use of nuclear weapons a certain non-nuclear attack by a hostile force or a situation judged to be imminent, meaning that there is a possibility of first use of its nuclear weapons.205 In recent years, North Korean leaders have repeatedly and strongly hinted at the possibility of nuclear first use, and this has been stipulated in its national law.

C) Negative security assurances

No NWS significantly changed its negative security assurance (NSA) policy in 2022. China is the only NWS that has declared an unconditional NSA for NNWS, while other NWS add some conditions in their NSA policies.

The United Kingdom and the United States declared they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. The U.K.’s additional condition, as stated in its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy is that: “[W]e reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary.”206 The United States in its 2022 NPR reaffirmed its above-mentioned declaration.

In 2015, France slightly modified its NSA commitment, which stated that: “France will not use nuclear weapons against states not armed with them that are signatories of the NPT and that respect their international obligations for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”207 The condition added in 2015 was that its commitment does not “affect the right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.” 208 Russia maintains a unilateral NSA under which it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the NNWS parties to the NPT unless it or its allies are invaded or attacked by an NNWS in cooperation with an NWS.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States issued a joint statement on security assurances for NNWS at the NPT RevCon, where they also reaffirmed their respective commitments.209

Western countries condemned Russia at the NPT RevCon and in other forums, claiming that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, accompanied by nuclear intimidations, was in violation of the NSA and the Budapest Memorandum of Understanding that Russia signed with Ukraine and others in 1994. However, Russia insisted that it had not violated the Budapest Memorandum, including a commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, and argued, “We would also like to strongly reject the utterly unfounded, detached from reality and unacceptable speculations that Russia allegedly threatens to use nuclear weapons, particularly in Ukraine.210 The draft final document stated: “The Conference reaffirms the importance of full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to all existing obligations and commitments related to security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty either unilaterally or multilaterally, including the commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1994.” Russia opposed references being made to the Budapest Memorandum during the negotiation process for drafting a final document, and although not explicitly stated on the last day of the meeting, these sentences may be one of the factors why Russia was against the adoption of a final document.

As written in the previous Hiroshima Reports, while one purpose of the NSAs provided by NWS to NNWS is to alleviate the imbalance of rights and obligations between NWS and NNWS under the NPT, India, Pakistan and North Korea have also offered NSAs to NNWS. None of these countries significantly changed their NSA policies in 2021. India declared that it would not use nuclear weapons against NNWS, with the exception that “in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.” Pakistan has declared an unconditional NSA. In addition, North Korea stipulated in its law on Policy on Nuclear weapons in 2022 that it “shall neither threaten non-nuclear weapons states with its nuclear weapons nor use nuclear weapons against them unless they join aggression or attack against the DPRK in collusion with other nuclear weapons states.”

Except under protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties, NWS have not provided legally binding NSAs. The NAM countries argued at the NPT RevCon that: “[T]he Group stresses that the urgent negotiations on the provision of effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, universal and legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances should also be pursued as a matter of priority and without further delay.”211

China stated that it “advocates the early negotiation and conclusion by the international community of an international legal instrument on unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, and supports the early commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in this regard.”212 However, the other four NWS have been consistently reluctant to pursue their codification.213 The draft final document of the NPT RevCon stated: “Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon States commit: to honor and respect all existing security assurances undertaken by them; not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty consistent with their respective national statements”; and “States Parties call on the Conference on Disarmament to immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument and recalls the urgency and importance ascribed by non-nuclear weapon States to the commencement of such negotiations.”

At the 2022 UNGA, a resolution titled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” was adopted. The resolution calls for NWS to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach that could lead to a legally-binding instrument. The voting behavior of countries surveyed in this project on this resolution is as follows:

➢ 120 in favor (Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Ind onesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and others); 0 against; 60 abstentions (Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, North Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, South Africa , Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and others)

D) Signing and ratifying the protocols of the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones

The protocols to the NWFZ treaties include the provision of legally-binding NSAs. At the time of writing, only the Protocol of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) has been ratified by all NWS, as shown in Table 1-5. No new progress regarding additional ratifications by NWS was made in 2022. Regarding the Protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ Treaty (Bangkok Convention), which has not been signed by any of the five NWS, it has been reiterated that consultations between the parties to the treaty and the five NWS are continuing. However, it is unclear how far the consultations have progressed.

Some NWS have added interpretations—which are substantially reservations—to the protocols to the NWFZ treaties when signing or ratifying them. The NAM and NAC, as well as states parties to the NWFZ treaties, have called for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. While it seems unlikely that any NWS except China will accept such a request, the draft final document of the NPT RevCon stated, “The Conference encourages nuclear-weapon States to review any reservations or interpretative statements made in connection with ratification of the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and to engage in dialogue in this regard with members of the zones.”

E) Relying on extended nuclear deterrence

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine impacted on the issues surrounding extended nuclear deterrence.

For instance, Sweden and Finland, which had been neutral, decided to apply to join NATO, citing the growing threat from Russia. In a letter to the NATO Secretary-General, Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde wrote that “Sweden accepts NATO’s approach to security and defense, including the essential role of nuclear weapons, intends to participate fully in NATO’s military structure and collective defence planning processes and is willing to commit forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions.” In November 2022, Sweden’s new Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also stated that Sweden would be ready to accept the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory if it became a NATO member, and Finland’s Prime Minister Sanna Marin also said that “no preconditions should be placed” on the deployment of nuclear weapons on Finnish soil.216 It should be noted that, in accordance with a pledge under the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, the United States has not stationed nuclear weapons in new (post-Cold War) NATO member states. As of the end of 2022, two NATO members, Hungary and Turkey, had not approved accession by Finland and Sweden.

In the NATO Strategic Concept adopted in June 2022, the importance of nuclear deterrence was emphasized more than in the previous Strategic Concept in 2010, and in relation to extended nuclear deterrence, it stated the following:217

➢ “The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particula rly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.
These Allies’ separate centres of decision -making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries.
NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies on the United States’ nuclear weapons forward forward-deployed in Euro Europe and the contributions of Allies concerned. National contributions of dual capable aircraft to NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort. ”

➢ “NATO will take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission. The Alliance is committed to ensuring greater integration and coherence of capabilities and activities across all domains and the spectrum of conflict, while reaffirming the unique and distinct role of nuclear deterrence. NATO will continue to maintain credible deterrence, strengthen its strategic communications, enhance the effectiveness of its exercises and reduce strategic risks. ”

In addition, the communiqué adopted at the NATO summit in June stated, “Given the deteriorating security environment in Europe, a credible and united nuclear Alliance is essential. Nuclear weapons are unique. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. NATO reiterates that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. If the fundamental security of any of its members were to be threatened, however, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.218

Currently, the United States deploys approximately 100 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs in five NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey), and thus maintains nuclear sharing arrangements with them. NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group also supports the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht announced her intention in March 2022 to procure F35 fighter jets to address the issue of updating the DCAs to carry nuclear weapons deployed by the United States under the nuclear sharing arrangement. In addition, the U.S. budget for fiscal year 2023 added a U.S. air base in the United Kingdom to the list of “special weapons” (that is, nuclear weapons) storage sites undergoing upgrades. U.S. nuclear bombs were removed from Lakenheath, England, in 2008, and it is unclear whether they are being stored again at the U.K. base or are being upgraded for future deployment.219

In April, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, head of Poland’s governing political party, explained that Poland was “open” to deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in the country, but that this was not currently under consideration.220

NATO conducted another round of nuclear sharing exercises in 2022. In March, U.S. Air Force B-52 strategic bombers trained with German and Romanian armed forces in Romanian airspace and elsewhere; in October, the annual NATO nuclear weapons exercise “Steadfast Noon” was held with up to 60 fighters and surveillance aircrafts from 14 of the NATO’s 30 member states. NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg said, “I think it would send a very wrong signal if we suddenly now cancelled a routine, long time planned exercise because of the war in Ukraine. … [W]e need to understand that NATO’s firm, predictable behavior, our military strength, is the best way to prevent escalation.”221 The exercises included simulated nuclear bombings by the DCAs of the participating countries, related reconnaissance and aerial refueling, and confirmation of procedures for ground personnel to delivery and attach nuclear bombs to aircraft.
While no U.S. nuclear weapon is deployed outside American territory, except in the NATO countries mentioned above, the United States has established consultative mechanisms on extended deterrence with Japan (the Extended Deterrence Dialogue) and South Korea (the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee). In Japan, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said in February that nuclear sharing, in which U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed on its allies’ territory and jointly operated with them, should be discussed domestically in Japan. Prime Minister Kishida said at the House of Councillors Budget Committee on March 10 that extended deterrence is essential, it is important to consult and cooperate closely with the United States, and that Japan and the United States will continue to hold firm discussions to maintain and strengthen confidence in extended deterrence. However, he also stated that his administration would not discuss nuclear sharing as part of joint operations, although there could be a general national discussion based on the international situation and other factors.222

The Japan-U.S. joint statement issued at the bilateral summit meeting on May 23 stated, “President Biden reiterated the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, backed by the full range of capabilities, including nuclear. … The two leaders affirmed the critical importance of ensuring that U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient.”223 And in its National Security Strategy published in December 2022, Japan reaffirmed that “Japan will further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S. that is backed by its full range of capabilities, including nuclear.”224

In regard to the U.S.-South Korea relation, in their presidential joint statement in May 2022, “President Biden affirmed] the U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence using its full range of capabilities.” The countries also agreed to reconvene the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, which had not been held since January 2018.225 The Committee was convened in September. Meanwhile, South Korean President Yun Seok-yeol, who took office in May, had pledged during his presidential campaign to seek the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea and nuclear sharing. However, after his inauguration, he made it clear that he would not pursue these arrangements. Nonetheless, interest in nuclear sharing is often expressed in South Korean political circles.
Moving on to Australia, AUKUS, a security framework with the United Kingdom and the United States, was established in 2021. As one of its initiatives, three countries agreed that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered (non nuclear-armed) submarines with support from the other members. (See also section 2 of Chapter 2.) In October 2022, it was reported that the United States is preparing to deploy up to six nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to Australia’s Tyndall Air Force Base.226

In terms of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, especially the U.S.’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in five NATO countries, Russia and some NNWS criticize this situation as a clear violation of non-proliferation obligations under Article I of the NPT, being transfer by NWS, and under Article II by the recipient NNWS. In addition, at the NPT RevCon in 2022, China repeatedly criticized the nuclear sharing, stating:

The so-called nuclear sharing arrangements run counter to the provisions of the NPT and increase the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear conflicts. The United States should withdraw all its nuclear weapons from Europe and refrain from deploying nuclear weapons in any other region. The relevant non-nuclear-weapon States should earnestly fulfill their NPT obligations and their own commitments, stop instigating nuclear sharing or other forms of nuclear deterrence arrangements. Any attempt to replicate the NATO’s nuclear sharing model in the Asia-Pacific region would undermine regional strategic stability and would be firmly opposed by the countries in the region and, when necessary, face severe countermeasures.227

Germany responded to China’s criticism by exercising its right of reply and said, “NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements … continue to be, fully consistent and compliant with the NPT.”228 China also repeatedly referred to “attempts of nuclear sharing in the Asia-Pacific,” with naming Japan, at the NPT RevCon, but Japan countered that it was not considering nuclear sharing.229

NNWS which are not allied with NWS also criticized the reliance on extended nuclear deterrence. For instance, the NAC stated at the NPT RevCon, “the NWS and states under extended nuclear security guarantees have increased the salience of nuclear weapons in their security and nuclear doctrines, policies and postures. These are troubling trends, at odds with achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.”230 It also called for the following activities: “The Conference should call on States that are part of military alliances that include nuclear-weapon States to report, as a significant transparency and confidence-building measure, on steps taken, or future steps planned, to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security doctrines.”231 During the process of drafting the final document of the NPT RevCon, the sentence, “responsibility of nuclear allies for reducing the role of nuclear weapons” was included in the initial text, but Germany and other allies opposed it, and it was eventually deleted.

In the meantime, Russia criticized NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement, and reiterated its policy that “Russia does not deploy nuclear weapons outside the national territory and does not transfer control over its nuclear weapons.”232 On the other hand, Belarus, which is allied with Russia and where Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed during the Cold War, repeated its readiness to accept the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on its territory if necessary. On February 17, Belarus’ President Lukashenko said, “Should it be necessary, should our adversaries and competitors make such stupid, mindless steps, we will deploy not only nuclear weapons, but super-nuclear as well, those currently being developed, in order to protect our territory.”233 On February 27, a referendum was held in Belarus to vote on a proposed constitutional amendment was passed, so deleting the article in the current constitution stating that the country’s territory would be a nuclear-free zone and that Belarus would aim to become a neutral country. As of the end of 2022, Russia was not reportedly deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus. Meanwhile, Russia announced the provision of dual capable 9M720 (Iskander) SRBMs, and Belarus asked Russia to upgrade its Su-25 fighter jets to enable them to carry nuclear weapons.234

F) Risk Reduction

As nuclear disarmament continues to stall and regress, amidst concerns that the possibility of using nuclear weapons is increasing, there has been growing interest in recent years in nuclear risk reduction as one of the few concrete measures that could be agreed on regarding nuclear disarmament, as well as addressing such concerns. While NWS have argued that nuclear risk reduction primarily refers to measures to prevent the unintended use of nuclear weapons, NNWS have proposed measures including preventing the intentional use of nuclear weapons, as well as reduction of nuclear arsenals and improvement in transparency, in the context of nuclear risk reduction. The Hiroshima Report, while covering both sides’ arguments and proposals, analyzes and evaluates nuclear risk reduction mainly in terms of prevention of the unintended use of nuclear weapons.

Efforts by NWS

In the “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races” issued on January 3, 2022, in which five NWS “affirm[ed] that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” and stated, “We each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate the validity of our previous statements on de-targeting, reaffirming that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State.”235

Prior to that joint statement, five NWS submitted a working paper, titled “Strategic Risk Reduction,”236 to the NPT RevCon. In this document, they stated:

In the context of the strategic sphere and nuclear domain, risk reduction is fundamentally about reducing the risk of nuclear use and armed conflict involving States that possess nuclear weapons. It encompasses efforts to prevent or resolve conflicts and crises that might result from misinterpretations of a potential adversary’s policies, actions and intentions or through the failure to foresee the consequences of one’s own steps. It includes refraining from intentionally unsafe, hazardous or dangerous actions and making use of suitable instruments to rapidly resolve unintended incidents should they arise. It is also concerned with ensuring that States are aware of the risk of nuclear weapons use that could emanate from any armed conflict involving States that possess nuclear weapons, and that actions are taken to prevent these from occurring. Accordingly, the nuclear-weapon States share the desire to limit the risks that nuclear weapons could be used based on or as a result of incorrect assumptions, by reducing the potential for misperception, miscommunication and miscalculation.

They listed three main elements of the strategic risk reduction as follows: building confidence and predictability through dialogue; increasing clarity, communication and understanding; and effective crisis prevention and crisis management tools. In addition, they introduced multiple formal and informal risk reduction measures created and utilized among the NWS, including: Formal risk reduction agreements and arrangements; Regular bilateral talks on strategic stability issues; Continuation of the P5 Process: P5 glossary; NWS’ discussion on doctrines and policies; Political statements promoting restraint and reassurance; De-targeting of nuclear weapons; and Establishment and maintenance of bilateral crisis communication channels.

However, the five NWS lost momentum in terms of the NPT RevCon when Russia launched an armed attack on Ukraine in February 2022 and intimidated to use nuclear weapons. Before the RevCon in August, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted their joint statement, titled “Principles and responsible practices for Nuclear Weapon States.”237 In this document, three NWS reaffirmed their acknowledgement that “nuclear war cannot be won, and never be fought” and their commitment to nuclear disarmament; and criticized Russia’s nuclear intimidations. Three NWS also stated, “While we recognise that work on strategic risk reduction does not replace disarmament obligations, we see this as a complementary and necessary step to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and enhance mutual trust and security.” As the elements of the risk reduction which the RevCon should support, they proposed, inter alia, preserving the record of non-use of nuclear weapons in place since 1945; fostering dialogue among States possessing nuclear weapons, and between States possessing nuclear weapons and NNWS; ensuring transparency of nuclear policy, doctrine, and budgeting; not targeting their nuclear weapons at any other states; instituting policies and procedures to ensure a deliberate process allowing leaders sufficient time to gather information and consider courses of action in a crisis; ensuring that nuclear weapons remain safe, secure and under persistent positive control to prevent accidents; maintaining human control concerning nuclear weapons employment; creating and enhancing secure communication channels among the capitals of the nuclear-weapon states; and promoting research and multilateral dialogue on future nuclear arms control and disarmament verification requirements and measures.

In 2022 NPR, the United States described its policies and measures for nuclear risk reduction. For example, it mentioned the importance of dialogue in peacetime with potential adversaries, and stated: “The United States has substantial experience in strategic dialogue and crisis management with Russia, but has made little progress with the PRC despite consistent U.S. efforts. The world expects nuclear powers to act responsibly, including on risk reduction and crisis communications, and the United States will continue to pursue these efforts with China.”238In addition, the United States referred to its efforts to reduce the risk of unintended nuclear escalation due to accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, as follows:

The United States has extensive protections in place to mitigate this risk. As an example, U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are not on “hair trigger” alert. These forces are on day-to-day alert, a posture that contributes to strategic stability. Forces on day-to-day alert are subject to multiple layers of control, and the United States maintains rigorous procedural and technical safeguards to prevent misinformed, accidental, or unauthorized launch. Survivable and redundant sensors provide high confidence that potential attacks will be detected and characterized, enabling policies and procedures that ensure a deliberative process allowing the President sufficient time to gather information and consider courses of action. In the most plausible scenarios that concern policy leaders today, there would be time for full deliberation. For these reasons, while the United States maintains the capability to launch nuclear forces under conditions of an ongoing nuclear attack, it does not rely on a launch-under-attack policy to ensure a credible response. Rather, U.S. nuclear forces are postured to withstand an initial attack. In all cases, the United States will maintain a human “in the loop” for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate and terminate nuclear weapon employment.239

In a working paper submitted to the NPT RevCon, the United States outlined its nuclear risk reduction efforts since the Cold War era, including the Hotline Agreement, establishment of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, ballistic missile launch notification, mutual de-targeting, nuclear war prevention agreements, notification of large-scale strategic exercises, agreements on incidents in the air and at sea, agreements on dangerous military incident, and measures to reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war.240

In addition to the initiatives described in the NPR, the U.S. national report submitted to the NPT RevCon also included the measures for “nuclear surety [which] is the assurance that a nuclear weapon will operate safely, securely, and reliably if deliberately activated and that no accidents, incidents, or unauthorized detonations will occur.”241

China detailed safety and credibility of its nuclear forces in its national report submitted to the NPT, as follows:

China has always attached great importance to the effective control of its nuclear weapons as well as to their safe management and use. From the day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China has actively taken a series of practical and effective measures to ensure that its numerically limited nuclear forces are maintained in a state of absolute safety and reliability, and has implemented a rigorous regime of laws, regulations and reliable technical means for the safety management at every stage of nuclear weapons storage, transportation and training processes. To prevent unauthorized and accidental launches of nuclear missiles, China has adopted many special technical safety measures in the area of equipment technology, in addition to clear provisions in its regulatory system and its hierarchy of operational readiness priorities. China values building a culture of nuclear safety in its nuclear-related departments, institutions and forces, and constantly strengthens the nuclear safety awareness and sense of responsibility of nuclear-related personnel. No safety or security problems involving nuclear weapons have ever occurred in China.242

Meanwhile, Alexandra Bell, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, said, “As a first step, we’d really like to have a conversation with them about each other’s doctrines, about crisis communication, crisis management” while China has shown no interest in discussing steps to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons.243

Russia stated in its national report submitted to the NPT RevCon, “Nuclear risk reduction as an inter-state confidence-building measure is viewed by the Russian Federation in the general context of making progress towards nuclear disarmament while strengthening international security and stability, taking into account current strategic realities. With a view to preventing both nuclear conflict as well as any other military conflict, the Russian Federation acts in such a manner as to avert situations that could lead to dangerous aggravation of relations at the international and regional levels and to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war, and is also taking the necessary steps to reduce the nuclear threat.” It also listed the following concrete measures taken by Russia, such as the establishment of a hotline, advance notification of missile launches, a bilateral agreement on the prevention of nuclear conflicts, and a bilateral agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activities.244

Proposals by NNWS

At the NPT RevCon in 2022, NNWS made various proposals on nuclear risk reduction.

The Stockholm Initiative (comprising of 20 countries including Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland),245 which has been active in making proposals on this issue in recent years, has proposed comprehensive measures and efforts in its working paper, such as: declaratory commitments as a political signal; renewed commitment by the NWS and expanded risk dialogue; supporting measures by all states parties; research, analysis, education and awareness; and establishing a process. With regard to nuclear risk reduction measures in the narrow sense, the following were listed, inter alia:

➢ Reducing the risk of miscalculation or misperception and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through the establishment and enhancement of hotlines building on robust and trusted crisis communication technology, joint data centers, military-to -military dialogue and other cooperative measures;
➢ Steps to reduce the likelihood of new technologies, notably in the digital realm (cyber, artificial intelligence, machine learning) and in the area of delivery systems, leading to new nuclear risks and exacerbating existing ones, including consideration of how certain technologies may lessen risks and contribute to improving the security environment; and
➢ The impacts on nuclear risk of developments in defensive and offensive systems (such as new types of delivery vehicles or dual-capable long -range delivery systems), as well as counterspace capabilities.

The Stockholm Initiative also proposed that strategic and nuclear risk reduction should be a standing item in the forthcoming NPT review cycle and establish risk reduction as a Cluster 1 Specific Issue.246

Austria’s proposals in its working paper submitted to the NPT included: Transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons; Measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations; and Other measures to reduce nuclear risks.247 The NPDI identified the following as particularly important in developing practical nuclear risk reduction measures: sustained efforts to enhance transparency on nuclear arsenals; pursuit of early conflict prevention and resolution in relation to nuclear threats; intensified dialogue, both among NWS and between NWS and NNWS, on risk perceptions, nuclear doctrines, and forces postures; declaratory restraint and efforts to reduce perceived ambiguity and entanglement between nuclear and conventional weapons; NSAs; de-alerting and reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; notification and data exchange agreements; minimizing vulnerabilities related to potentially disruptive new technologies and cyber capacities; enhanced military-to-military contacts and the establishment of crisis-proof communication lines and risk-reduction centers; prevention of unintended or accidental use; and further investigation of operational uncertainties, pathways to nuclear use, sharing of best practices and de-escalation pathways.248

The NAC and NAM countries also acknowledged the need for nuclear risk reduction to a certain extent. However, they simultaneously stressed that risk reduction efforts do not justify the possession of nuclear weapons, and are not an alternative to nuclear disarmament but an interim measure until nuclear weapons are eliminated.

Draft Final Document

The draft final document of the NPT RevCon stated that “[p]ending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, States parties commit to making every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again,” and mentioned, as part of such efforts, measures and actions for nuclear risk reduction to be undertaken by the NPT states parties, especially NWS.

For instance, in the draft final document, participating countries required that “[t]he nuclear-weapon States commit to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric concerning the use of nuclear weapons. … [and] to further identifying, exploring and implementing all risk reduction measures necessary to mitigate risks of miscalculation, misperception, miscommunication or accident.” For that purpose, NWS were called for taking following measures:

➢ To intensify regular dialogue among and between the NWS, and with the NNWS, on nuclear doctrines and arsenals, on addressing the root causes of international tensions and ways to enhance relations with a view to enhance mutual trust and predictability, as well as on the potential implications of emerging technologies.

➢ To develop and make every effort to implement effective crisis prevention and management arrangements, mechanisms and tools, including enhanced leader-to-leader and military-to-military contact, crisis-proof communication lines, the issuance of declarations of restraint, as well as notification and data exchange agreements.

➢ To maintain the practice of not targeting each other or any other state with nuclear weapons and keep them at the lowest possible alert levels and continue to maintain and develop policies and procedures to increase the time available for decision-making and to allow for de-escalation of crises.

The draft also stated: “The States parties underscore that nuclear risks will persist as long as nuclear weapons exist, and reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to eliminate all risks associated with these weapons. States parties reaffirm that nuclear risk reduction is neither a substitute nor a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament and efforts in this area should contribute to forward movement in and complement the implementation of Article VI obligations and related nuclear disarmament commitments.”

Russia-Ukraine War

As Russia increased its military pressure on Ukraine toward the end of 2021, the United States made a number of proposals to Russia in January/February 2022. One of these was risk reduction measures, which included exchanging briefings on NATO and Russian exercises, increasing transparency in military exercises, reducing threats in outer space and cyberspace, and preventing accidents at sea and in the air.249 Russia responded positively to some of the risk reduction measures, such as arms control and avoidance of accidental collisions, but said that the United States and NATO were not responding to Russian claims on the Ukraine issue and demanded that they take additional measures.250

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, several steps were taken to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons. For example, a deconfliction hotline was established between the U.S. and Russian militaries on March 1.251 In addition, in March and April, the United States postponed two scheduled Minuteman III ICBM launch tests to avoid Russia’s misunderstanding.252 In August, the United States announced that it had postponed an ICBM launch test to avoid heightened tensions with China, which had begun military exercises near Taiwan.253 Meanwhile, when Russia conducted an ICBM launch test in April, it clarified that it had given advance notification in accordance with the New START.254

Even as the war in Ukraine and the ensuing confrontation between the West and Russia continue, the United States and Russia each have acknowledged that channels of dialogue have been maintained at various levels and in various forms, including the prevention of unintended nuclear escalation as an important objective.

159 In its national statement submitted to the NPT RevCon, Russia stated, “The approaches to the role of nuclear weapons set out in the Military Doctrine are specified in the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, dated 2 June 2020 (hereinafter – the Basic Principles of State Policy). The document states that our country “takes all necessary efforts to reduce nuclear threat and prevent aggravation of interstate relations, that could trigger military conflicts, including nuclear ones.” It also clearly defines that Russian policy on nuclear deterrence is strictly defensive by nature, and it is aimed at protecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.” NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1, March 19, 2021.
160 David M. Herszenhorn and Giorgio Leali, “Defiant Putin Mauls Macron in Moscow,” Politico, February 7, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-welcomes-emmanuel-macron-france-into-his-lair-kremlin-ukraine/.

161 Address by the President of the Russian Federation, February 24, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/67843
162 Yuras Karmanau, et al., “Putin Puts Nuclear Forces on High Alert, Escalating Tensions,” AP News, February 28, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-business-europe-moscow-2e4e1cf7 84f22b6afbe5a2f936725550.
163 The U.S. Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds an Off-Camera Press Briefing,” February 28, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2948793/senior-defense-official-holds-an-off-camera-press-briefing/.
164 “Russia’s Lavrov: A Third World War would be Nuclear, Destructive,” Aljazeera, Mar 2, 2022, https:// www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russias-lavrov-says-a-ww-iii-would-be-nuclear-and-destructive.
165 Ibid.
166 “Putin Spokesman Refuses to Rule out Use of Nuclear Weapons if Russia Faced an ‘Existential Threat,’”

CNN, March 22, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/22/europe/amanpour-peskov-interview-ukraine-intl/index.html. (in Japanese)
167 “Kremlin Spokesman: Russia would Use Nuclear Weapons Only in Case of ‘Threat to Existence of State,’” Reuters, March 29, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-spokesman-russia-would-use-nuclear-weapons-only-case-threat-existence-2022-03-28/.
168 “Swedish Defence Minister Calls Russian Violation of Airspace ‘Unacceptable,’” Reuters, March 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swedish-armed-forces-says-russian-fighter-jets-violated-swedish-airspace-2022-03-02/.
169 Ebunoluwa Olafusi, “Russia Threatens to Deploy Nuclear Weapons if Sweden, Finland Join NATO,” The Cable, April 14, 2022, https://www.thecable.ng/russia-warns-of-nuclear-weapon-deployment-if-sweden-finland-join-nato.
170 “Russia Says ‘No Need’ to Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine,” Reuters, August 16, 2022, https://www. reuters.com/world/europe/defence-minister-shoigu-says-russia-has-no-need-use-nuclear-weapons-ukraine-2022-08-16/.

171 Pavel Polityuk, “Russia Holds Annexation Votes; Ukraine Says Residents Coerced,” Reuters, September 25, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-marches-farther-into-liberated-lands-separa tist-calls-urgent-referendum-2022-09-19/.
172 “Si muove il sottomarino Belgorod. Nato in allarme: Test per il supersiluro Poseidon,” La Repubblica, October 2, 2022, https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2022/10/01/news/belgorod_sottomarino_mar_ baltico_russia-368180406/.
173 Katie Bo Lillis and Natasha Bertrand, “US Believes It’s Unlikely Putin will Use a Nuclear Weapon but Threat Has ‘Elevated’,” CNN, September 28, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/28/politics/us-putin-nuclear-weapon-not-probable/index.html.

174 “Statement of the Russian Federation on Preventing Nuclear War,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, November 2, 2022, https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1836575/?lang=en.
175 “Russia is not Considering Using Nuclear Weapons – Kremlin Says,” Reuters, November 17, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-is-not-considering-using-nuclear-weapons-kremlin-says-2022-11-17/.
176 “Secretary-General’s remarks to the Press on the war in Ukraine,” United Nations, March 14, 2022, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2022-03-14/secretary-generals-remarks-the-press-the-war-ukraine-delivered.
177 “Meet the Press – September 25, 2022,” NBC, September 26, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-september-25-2022-n1299064.
178 Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “U.S. has Sent Private Warnings to Russia against Using a Nuclear Weapon,” Washington Post, September 22, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/22/russia-nuclear-threat-us-options/.
179“Biden: Putin a ‘Rational Actor Who’s Miscalculated Significantly,” CNN, October 11, 2022 https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/cton/date/2022-10-11/segment/01.
180 Brett Samuels, “Biden: Russia would be Making ‘Serious Mistake’ to Use Tactical Nuclear Weapon,” WSAV, October 25, 2022, https://www.wsav.com/news/biden-russia-would-be-making-serious-mis take-to-use-tactical-nuclear-weapon/.

181 “NATO Warns Russia of ‘Severe Consequences’ in Case of a Nuclear Strike,” Reuters, September 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-warns-russia-severe-consequences-case-nuclear-stri ke-2022-09-27/.
182 “Address by Prime Minister Kishida at the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 20, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page3e_001242.html.
183 “India’s Defence Minister Warns against Nuclear Weapons in Call with Russian Counterpart,” Reuters, October 26, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/indias-defence-minister-warns-against-nuclear-wea pons-call-with-russian-2022-10-26/.
184 Nana Shibata and Ken Moriyasu, “Xi told Biden that China Rejects Nuclear War in Ukraine,” Nikkei Asia, November 15, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/ Xi-told-Biden-that-China-rejects-nuclear-war-in-Ukraine.

185 The U.S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review , March 28, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/29/2002965339/-1/-1/1/FACT-SHEET-2022-NU CLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-AND-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF.
186 The U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, October 2022 (hereinafter, 2022 NPR).

187 Ibid., p. 1.
188 Ibid., p. 1.
189 Ibid., p. 3.
190 Ibid., p. 4.

191 NPT/CONF.2020/41, November 16, 2021.
192 Ibid.
193 See, The U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, November 2022.
194 “China’s Defense Minister Says Country’s Nuclear Arsenal ‘For Self Defense’,” CNBC, June 11, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/12/chinas-defense-minister-on-countrys-nuclear-weapons-arsenal-.html.
195 Joint Staff Office, “Activities of Chinese and Russian Military Aircraft,” November 30, 2022. (in Japanese)

196 “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Observes Test-fire of New-type Tactical Guided Weapon,” KCNA, April 17, 2022, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202204/news17/20220417-01ee.html.
197 “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at Military Parade Held in Celebration of 90th Founding Anniversary of KPRA,” April 26, 2022, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202204/news26/ 20220426-02ee.html.
198 “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated,” KCNA, September 9, 2022, http://www. kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202209/news09/20220909-02ee.html.

199 “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at Seventh Session of the 14th SPA of DPRK,” KCNA, September 10, 2022, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202209/news10/20220910-23ee.html.
200 NPT/CONF.2020/41, November 16, 2021.

201 “China Calls on Big 5 to Make Firm Commitment on No-First-Use of Nukes,” Shine, January 4, 2022, https://www.shine.cn/news/nation/2201040430/.
202 The U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 90.
203 2022 NPR, p. 9.
204 See, for instance, Demetri Sevastopulo and Henry Foy, “Allies Lobby Biden to Prevent Shift to ‘No First Use’ of Nuclear Arms,” Financial Times, October 29, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/8b96a60a-759b-4972-ae89-c8ffbb36878e.

205 “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated.”
206 United Kingdom, Global Britain in a Competitive Age.
207 NPT/CONF.2015/10.
208 Ibid.
209 The U.S. Department of State, “P3 Joint Statement on Security Assurances,” August 4, 2022, https:// www.state.gov/p3-joint-statement-on-security-assurances/.

210 “Statement by Russia in Exercise of the Right of Reply,” 10th NPT RevCon, August 2, 2022.
211 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.23, November 22, 2021.

212 NPT/CONF.2020/41, November 16, 2021.
213 France stated that it “considers [the] commitment [on security assurances in its statement in April 1995] legally binding, and has so stated.” See, for instance, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/14, April 25, 2014.
214 A/RES/77/39, December 7, 2022.

215 Jens Petersson, “As Sweden Gets Ready for NATO, will Its Approach to Nuclear Weapons Change?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 27, 2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/07/as-sweden-gets-ready-for-nato-will-its-approach-to-nuclear-weapons-change/.

216 “New Swedish Prime Minister is Willing to Accept Deployment of Nuclear Weapons If Sweden Joins NATO,” AFP News, November 2, 2022, https://www.afpbb.com/articles/-/3431982. (in Japanese)
217 NATO, Strategic Concept, June 29, 2022, p. 8.
218 NATO, “Brussels Summit Communiqué,” June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ news_185000.htm.

219 Hans Kristensen, “Lakenheath Air Base Added to Nuclear Weapons Storage Site Upgrades,” Federation of American Scientists, April 11, 2022, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2022/04/lakenheath-air-base-added-to-nuclear-weapons-storage-site-upgrades/.
220 Wojciech L, “Polish Deputy Prime Minister Suggests Basing of US Nuclear Weapons and up to 150,000 Troops in Poland,” Overt Defense, April 4, 2022, https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/04/04/polish-deputy-prime-minister-suggests-basing-of-us-nuclear-weapons-and-150000-troops-in-poland/.
221 Jens Stoltenberg, “Pre-Ministerial Press Conference,” at the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers, October 11, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_208037.htm.

222 “Kishida Says Japan won’t Seek Nuclear Sharing with U.S.,” Nikkei Asia, February 28, 2022, https:// asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Kishida-says-Japan-won-t-seek-nuclear-sharing-with-U.S.
223 “Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders’ Statement: Strengthening the Free and Open International Order,” May 23, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100347252.pdf.
224 “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022.
225 “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/.

226 Angus Grigg, Lesley Robinson and Meghna Bali, “US Air Force to Deploy Nuclear-Capable B-52 Bombers to Australia as Tensions with China Grow,” ABC, November 1, 2022, https://www.abc. net.au/news/2022-10-31/china-tensions-taiwan-us-military-deploy-bombers-to-australia/101585380.
227 “Statement by China,” 10th NPT RevCon, August 2, 2022.
228 “Statement by Germany (right of reply),” NPT RevCon, August 4, 2022.
229 “China Criticizes Arguments on Nuclear Sharing in Japan; Discussion Begins at the Main Committees of the NPT RevCon,” Jiji Press, August 9, 2022, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2022080900255&g=int. (in Japanese)
230 “Statement by NAC,” General Debate, NPT RevCon, August 1, 2022.

231 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.5, November 11, 2021.
232 NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1, March 19, 2021.
233 “Belarus to Deploy Nuclear Weapons Only in Case of Threats from West, Lukashenko Says,” Tass, February 17, 2022, https://tass.com/world/1405141.
234 Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Russia to Provide Nuclear-Capable Missiles and Fighter Jets to Belarus,” Defense News, June 28, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/06/27/russia-to-provide-nuclear-capable-missiles-and-fighter-jets-to-belarus/.

235 “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races,” January 3, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/.
236 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.33, December 9, 2021

237 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.70, July 29, 2022.
238 2022 NPR, p. 13.

239 2022 NPR, p. 13. U.S. also mentioned its own efforts in the national report submitted to the NPT RevCon. NPT/CONF.2020/47, December 27, 2021.
240 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.55, May 19, 2022.
241 NPT/CONF.2020/47, December 27, 2021.

242 NPT/CONF.2020/41, November 16, 2021.
243 “U.S. Says China Resisting Nuclear Talks after Xi Vow to Boost Deterrent,” Reuters, November 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-says-china-resisting-nuclear-talks-after-xi-vow-boost-deterrent-2022-11-01/.
244 NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1, March 19, 2021.
245 Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

246 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.9, May 14, 2021.
247 NPT/CONF.2020/WP/60/Rev.1, August 12, 2022.
248 NPT/CONF.2020/WP.10, September 10, 2021.

249 Hibai Arbide and Azamiguel Gonzalez, “US Offered Disarmament Measures to Russia in Exchange for Deescalation of Military Threat in Ukraine,” El Pais, February 2, 2022, https://english.elpais.com/ usa/2022-02-02/us-offers-disarmament-measures-to-russia-in-exchange-for-a-deescalation-of-military-threat-in-ukraine.html.
250 “Россия будет вынуждена реагировать в том числе путем реализации мер военно-технического характера,” Kommersant, February 17, 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5218858.
251 Tara Copp, “US, Russia Agree to Deconfliction Hotline As Putin’s Attack on Ukraine Escalates,” Defense One, March 3, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/us-russia-agree-deconfliction-hotline-putins-attack-ukraine-escalates/362750/.
252 Jake Thomas, “U.S. to Ease Nuclear Tensions with Russia, Cancel ‘Minuteman’ Missile Tests,” Newsweek, April 1, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/us-ease-nuclear-tensions-russia-cancel-minuteman-missile-tests-1694406.
253 “U.S. Delays Minuteman III Missile Test over Taiwan Tensions,” Reuters, August 5, 2022, https://www. reuters.com/world/us-delays-minuteman-iii-missile-test-amid-tensions-over-taiwan-wsj-2022-08-04/.
254 “Russia Test-Fires New Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” The Asahi Shimbun, April 21, 2022, https:// www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14603920.

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Hiroshima Report 2023(6) Diminishing the Roles and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategies and Policies

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