Hiroshima Report 2024Preface and Acknowledgements
The Hiroshima Report 2024: Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in 2023 (hereinafter referred to as “Hiroshima Report 2024”) is a result of the “Hiroshima Report Publication Project,”1 commissioned by the Hiroshima Organization for Global Peace (HOPe) to the Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology (CDAST), the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). As with the previous reports issued since 2013, the Hiroshima Report 2024 is published in both Japanese and English.
The prospect of the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains a distant one at best. Even more concerning, the circumstances surrounding nuclear weapons are becoming ever more complicated. In response, the international community has undertaken various efforts, including the adoption of the “G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament” at the G7 Hiroshima Summit, which was the first G7 Leaders’ document with a particular focus on nuclear disarmament. Despite these efforts, the worsening nuclear predicament could not be alleviated.
The five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the NPT—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—and other nuclear-armed states—India, Israel and Pakistan—as well as North Korea continue to perceive their nuclear weapons as indispensable components of their national security. They also have taken measures with a view to sustaining nuclear deterrence for a longer period, such as modernization of nuclear forces and development of new delivery vehicles. In particular, growing concerns have emerged over China’s rapid reinforcement of its nuclear arsenal, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Russia, amidst its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, continued its nuclear saber-rattling in 2023. In addition, Russia announced to suspend the implementation of the U.S.-Russian New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and revoked its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Furthermore, there has been little progress in the further reductions of nuclear weapons by the NWS, including in negotiations between the United States and Russia, as well as between the United States and China.
Meanwhile, the status and prospects regarding nuclear non-proliferation remain gloomy as well. North Korea has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons. Instead, it has continued to aggressively develop and test various types of missiles, and has been in pursuit of the advancement of its nuclear weapons capability. Pyongyang has also repeatedly suggested the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons. Regarding the Iran nuclear issue, indirect negotiations between the United States and Iran to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) were held intermittently, but failed to reach an agreement, and by year’s end the talks were moribund. During this period, Iran increased its stockpile of enriched uranium as well as the level of enrichment far beyond the limits set by the JCPOA, reaching a point where it could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in less than a week.
The situation regarding nuclear security continues to require attention. As Russia’s military occupation of Ukrainian nuclear power plant continued and fighting intensified in the vicinity, the nuclear safety and nuclear security of the facilities was repeatedly confronted with situations that could seriously be undermined. The new challenge of responding to the threat posed by a state became even more obvious. With regard to traditional nuclear security, the threat of cyberattacks and drone sabotage against nuclear facilities has become more diverse and complex due to the development of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), and thus require continued close monitoring. Strengthening of measures against insider threats and efforts to foster a nuclear security culture are also required. While progress has been made by countries in the Global South in joining nuclear security-related conventions, efforts by multilateral initiatives have been limited, with the exception of efforts by the G7.
The Hiroshima Report seeks to assist the movement toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, first and foremost, by clarifying the current status of issues and efforts surrounding nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security. In doing so, it aims to encourage increased debate on these issues among policymakers, experts both within and outside governments, and civil society. Furthermore, by issuing the “Report” and the “Evaluation” from Hiroshima, which once suffered the wartime use of a nuclear weapon, it endeavors to help bring attention to and further promote actions across various fields toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons.
The Research Committee was established to conduct this project, namely producing the “Report” and the “Evaluation.” This Committee met once within the Japanese fiscal year 2023 to discuss its content. The members of the Research Committee are as follows:
Chairperson and Project Coordinator
Hirofumi Tosaki (Director, CDAST, JIIA)
Research Members
Nobumasa Akiyama (Professor, Hitotsubashi University)
Kazuko Hikawa (Professor, Osaka Jogakuin University)
Junko Horibe (Associate Professor, Nagoya University of Foreign Studies)
Akira Kawasaki (Executive Committee Member, Peace Boat)
Masahiro Kikuchi (Former Board Member, Nuclear Material Control Center)
Mitsuru Kurosawa (Professor Emeritus, Osaka University)
Kazumi Mizumoto (Professor Emeritus, Hiroshima City University)
Michiru Nishida (Professor, Nagasaki University)
Hiroshi Tamai (Executive Secretary, Mentor Subcommittee, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Japan Chapter)
The Research Committee appreciates the comments and advice to the “Report” given by the following experts:
Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe (Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and former Commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission)
Mr. Mark Fitzpatrick (Former Executive Director of the Americas Office and head of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program, International Institute for Strategic Studies)
Dr. Tanya Ogilvie-White (Senior Research Adviser, Asia Pacific Leadership Network)
Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki (Vice Director and Professor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University)
In this edition, experts posted columns on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security issues.2 It also appreciates the efforts of Shintaro Kawame, Shodai Maruyama, Raemi Omori, Ritsuko Takahashi, Kazuma Takahata and Akio Tamura, who provided assistance to edit the Hiroshima Report.
The views or opinions expressed in the “Report,” “Evaluation” and “Columns” are those of the members of the Research Committee or respective authors, and do not necessarily represent the view of the HOPe, the Hiroshima Prefecture, the JIIA, or the organizations to which they belong. Not all of the members necessarily agree on all of the points discussed.
1 This project has been conducted as part of the “Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan launched by Hiroshima Prefecture in 2011.
2 The views or opinions expressed in the columns are those of the respective authors, and do not represent the view of the HOPe, the Hiroshima Prefecture, the JIIA, or the organizations to which they belong.