In 2023, there were no significant changes in nuclear-armed states’ official policies on alert and/or operational status of their respective nuclear forces. Russian and U.S. strategic ballistic missiles have been on high alert status. In its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States indicated that while its ICBMs are not on “hair trigger” alert, it would not adopt the reduction of its alert level, as it could undermine crisis stability.206 As for the United Kingdom and France, their respective nuclear forces are kept on alert under their continuous SSBN patrols, albeit at lower readiness levels than those of the two nuclear superpowers.

China has not been expected to be on high alert in peacetime like the United States and Russia, but it is unclear what exactly China means by “moderate readiness.”207 The United States has recently pointed out a possibility of changes in these policies to a launch on warning (LOW) posture, in view of China’s introduction of MIRVed ICBMs and new SSBNs/SLBMs, and its construction of an early warning system with Russia’s cooperation.208 In response to these U.S. assertions, China has repeatedly stated that its nuclear posture, including its alert status, has not changed.

Little definitive information has been made available regarding the alert status of other nuclear-armed states’ nuclear forces. It is widely considered that India’s nuclear forces are not on a high alert status. In February 2014, Pakistan stated that it “would not delegate advance authority over nuclear arms to unit commanders, even in the event of a crisis with India, […and] all weapons are under the central control of the National Command Authority, which is headed by the prime minister.”209 Regarding North Korea, it was reported that an Enlarged Meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Military Commission in May 2020 set out “new policies for further increasing the nuclear war deterrence of the country and putting the strategic armed forces on a high alert operation.”210 However, it is unclear what concrete measures have been or will be implemented to that end.

Proponents of de-alerting have often argued that such measures are useful in preventing accidental use of nuclear weapons. The UNGA resolution titled “Reducing nuclear danger,”211 which “calls for…immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons,” was adopted by 112 countries. However, 49 countries (including Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States) voted against it, and 13 countries (including China, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan and Russia) abstained.

 

 

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206 The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, 2022, p. 13.
207 NPT/CONF.2020/41, November 16, 2021.
208 U.S. DOD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, October 2023, p. 112.
209 Elaine M. Grossman, “Pakistani Leaders to Retain Nuclear-arms Authority in Crises: Senior Official,” Global Security Newswire, February 27, 2014, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistani-leaders-retain-nu clear-arms-authority-crises-senior-official/.
210 “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Enlarged Meeting of WPK Central Military Commission,” KCNA, May 24, 2020, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2020/202005/news24/20200524-01ee.html.

211 A/RES/78/44, December 4, 2023.