Hiroshima Report 202428. South Africa ■Non-Nuclear-Weapon State
| Nuclear Disarmament | 29.5 Points | Full Points 48 | 61.5 % |
| Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2023 1.5 | |||
| South Africa has played a leading role in promoting the issue on the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons, as well as adopting the TPNW to which it is a state party. On the other hand, it was cautious in condemning Russia’ nuclear intimidations. It has ratified the CTBT. South Africa has been critical of Western countries’ nuclear disarmament efforts, such as voting against a UNGA resolution on nuclear disarmament proposed by Japan. | |||
| Nuclear Non-Proliferation | 54 Points | Full Points 61 | 88.5 % |
| Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2023 0 | |||
| South Africa is also a state party to the Africa Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has applied the integrated safeguards. It considers that the conclusion of an Additional Protocol should be voluntary. | |||
| Nuclear Security | 18 Points | Full Points 38 | 47.4 % |
| Change compared to the Hiroshima Report 2023 1 | |||
| South Africa has not ratified the A/CPPNM and was in the final stages of domestic procedures as of 2021 but did not appear to have completed them in 2023. It has ratified all other nuclear security-related conventions. South Africa has never used IPPAS missions. It still possesses a large number of HEUs. Nuclear forensics capacity-building efforts are underway. There is room for improvement in participation in multilateral efforts. There is room for improvement in enhancing measures against insider threats and for cybersecurity as well as in enhancing nuclear security culture. | |||
