(2) Status of Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety-Related Conventions, Participation in Nuclear Security-Related Initiatives, and Application to Domestic Systems

A) Accession status to nuclear security-related conventions
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants have been feared as a real threat. Under these circumstances, efforts are being made focusing not only on nuclear security, but also on overlapping areas, including nuclear safety to prevent accidents at nuclear power plants and safeguards to prevent military diversion of peaceful use of nuclear weapons.56 In particular, the interface between safety and security is a well-known concept in the context of nuclear counter-terrorism. Against this background, the status of accession, participation in nuclear security-related initiatives and application of domestic systems are attracting attention. This section examines the accession status of each country to the nuclear security and safety-related conventions mentioned in the Nuclear Security Summit communiqué,57 namely: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); the Amendment to CPPNM (CPPNM/A); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention); the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention); the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
➢ The CPPNM became effective in 1987. As of December 2019, 160 countries have signed this treaty. The CPPNM requires its party states to take appropriate protection measures for international transfer of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, and not permit its transfer in the case that such measures are not in place. It also calls for the criminalization of acts including unauthorized receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material, and which cause damage to any person or property, as well as theft or robbery of nuclear material.
➢ The CPPNM/A became effective in 2016. As of December 2019, 123 states have approved the Amendment. The CPPNM/A makes it legally binding for states to establish, implement and maintain an appropriate physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and nuclear facilities under their jurisdiction. It provides for the criminalization of new and extended specified acts, and requires countries to put in place measures to protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities against sabotage. In this sense, the CPPNM/A expands the existing offences identified in the CPPNM, including the theft and robbery of nuclear material, and establishes new ones, such as the smuggling of nuclear material and the actual or threatened sabotage of nuclear facilities. A number of the offences were also expanded to include substantial damage to the environment. As the only legally binding international undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material, ratification of the CPPNM/A should be continuously promoted.
➢ The Nuclear Terrorism Convention came into force in 2007. As of December 2019, the number of parties is 116. The convention requires party states to criminalize acts of possession and use of radioactive material or nuclear explosive devices with malicious intent, and against those seeking to use and damage nuclear facilities in order to cause radioactive dispersal. The convention and the CPPNM/A are mutually necessary to support a legal framework for nuclear security.
➢ The Nuclear Safety Convention became effective in 1996. As of September 2019, the number of parties is 88. This treaty is aimed at ensuring and enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants. Party states of this convention are required to take legal and administrative measures, report to the review committee established under this convention, and accept peer review in order to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants under their jurisdiction.
➢ The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident entered into force in 1986. As of September 2019, the number of parties is 124. It obligates its party states to immediately report to the IAEA when a nuclear accident has occurred, including the type, time, and location of the accident and relevant information.
➢ The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management became effective in 2001. As of August 2019, the number of parties is 82. It calls for its member states to take legal and administrative measures, report to its review committee, and undergo peer review by other parties, for the purpose of ensuring safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
➢ The Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency entered into force in 1987. As of September 2019, the number of parties is 119. This convention establishes an international framework that enables equipment provision and dispatch of experts with the goals of preventing and/or minimizing nuclear accidents and radioactive emergencies.

Except for Syria ratifying the CPPNM and CPPNM/A and the Iranian parliament endorsing ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, there has been no significant movement in 2019 with respect to these nuclear security treaties. On the other hand, the number of ratifying countries increased gradually over all treaties. In general, while the ratification process of the Convention often takes time, the fact that the signature and ratification in the field of nuclear security and safety is progressing steadily can be evaluated. Some, if not all, of these nuclear safetyrelated conventions can be interpreted as providing protective measures for nuclear security purposes, and thus could be listed as nuclear security-related international conventions. Table 3-4 summarizes the signature and ratification status of each country to these conventions.

B) INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

As of 2019, the latest version of “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” is INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, published by the IAEA in 2011. It is entirely the responsibility of the state to determine how the introduced measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 are actually implemented, to address remaining issues, and to come up with individual countermeasures, and it is up to regulators and business operators to take action. Therefore, the IAEA has
published a guide to the implementation of the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, and the latest version of the “Implementing Guide Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” was published in 2018.58

In this regard, the application status of the recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 can serve as a significant indicator to assess the nuclear security system of this report’s surveyed countries. This report refers to official statements made available in the 63rd IAEA General Conference and 2019 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference, as well as other opportunities to evaluate the national nuclear security stance and performance of each state.

Application Status of Each Country of the Measures Recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

After the end of the nuclear security summit, which attracted media attention, with the participation of the leaders of each country, the amount of information transmitted from the countries concerned referring to the introduction and implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 recommendations has decreased. Even in 2019, there was no significant change in this trend, except for some countries that are focusing on the introduction of nuclear power. It is not clear whether the reason for the decrease in the amount of information transmitted regarding the introduction of the recommended measures is that there are few new issues to appeal to about INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 nine years after its formulation, or because opportunities to refer to the application status as a result of the reduction of the platform for disseminating information such as the Nuclear Security Summit have decreased. The cases where there were statements on the introduction of recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, directly or indirectly in the surveyed countries, are as follows.

In the field of the development of legal instruments, Indonesia has announced that it is receiving legislative support from the IAEA in the process of reviewing the ongoing Indonesia Nuclear Energy Act, which will contribute to further fulfillment of international obligations and involvement. It also announced that a revised bill to incorporate nuclear safety, nuclear security, safeguards and emergency preparedness in 2020 is scheduled to enter the final stages of parliamentary deliberations.59 Poland is continuing to improve its framework for both nuclear safety and nuclear security, and in August 2019, its regulatory team reported the completion of a simulation to conduct a safety assessment and assessment of sample applications for construction licenses in order to prioritize regulatory readiness. Poland has announced that it will analyze many observations collected during the simulation and use it to develop action plans to further improve the nuclear safety regulatory framework.60 Turkey has announced the completion of the reorganization of the Nuclear Energy Agency, following the establishment of a nuclear authority. Turkey’s legal framework has been reviewed as part of the transitional process, new regulations have been issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority.61

Table 3-5: Application Status and Efforts for Recommended Measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

Protection measures for sabotage actions against nuclear materials and related facilities are as follows. Egypt has announced that it has adopted a culture of nuclear security in the process of modernizing physical protection systems in the country’s first and second research reactors.62
As a physical protection against sabotage, Belgium announced that it is gradually replacing the security staff of its nuclear facilities with specially trained armed police to further strengthen nuclear security.63 Saudi Arabia has announced that it has contributed tens of millions of dollars under the supervision of the IAEA and set up a special center for nuclear security as part of its efforts to combat all terrorism, including nuclear terrorism.64

Regarding response to insider threats, Belgium’s Federal Nuclear Regulatory Agency and Ministry of Interior, in cooperation with the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) of the U.S.

Department of Energy, held an international symposium on mitigating internal threats in March. The symposium was attended by 200 people from 50 countries, and views were exchanged on best practices, which is believed to have helped raise awareness of internal threat issues.65
In response to cyberterrorism, Belgium announced that it is working to strengthen its legislative and regulatory framework and has adopted a legal framework for cybersecurity regulations specific to the nuclear sector in April.66 Germany announced that it is fully involved in strengthening nuclear security in the context of computer security at its nuclear facilities and is promoting international cooperation in this area. In fact, Germany hosted the IAEA’s cybersecurity technology meeting in Berlin in September 2019.67 South Korea, in cooperation with the IAEA and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation And Control (KINAC), held a workshop on defending nuclear facilities from cyberattacks in November, and announced that 32 people from 20 countries participated in a training course utilizing mock scenarios.68